The third volume of Bruce Gamble’s Rabaul trilogy concludes the story of the massive Allied campaign (Operation Cartwheel) to isolate, neutralize and finally bypass the formidable Japanese island stronghold, which the Imperial Command envisioned as the key to their entire war effort in the southwest Pacific, but which became increasingly irrelevant as it was gradually surrounded, continuously bombed, and perceived by the Allies as a backwater area, along with the Solomons and New Guinea, as their conquests moved on to Truk, the Marianas, the Philippines and beyond.
Those with an interest in aircraft and hardware will find detailed descriptions of all the planes and ordnance used by both sides, and how they were employed in the titanic air battles waged over New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland, Bougainville, and Bismarck and Solomon Seas, from early 1942 well into 1944. Particularly devastating to the Japanese were the B-25 Mitchell medium bombers outfitted as “strafers” with extra 50-caliber machine guns; these planes went in at low altitude and wrought havoc on parked bombers and fighters, antiaircraft emplacements, and ancillary structures—as well as the personnel inside them. All in all, the siege of Rabaul is but one of many examples of how the irresistible industrial and demographic might of the United States, lying behind its Army and Navy, was gradually brought to bear against Japan—as presciently predicted by Admiral Yamamoto when he declared after Pearl Harbor that Japan had merely “awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with a terrible resolve”. Rabaul thus became an archetype of the ultimate futility of the entire Japanese war effort.
The mountains and jungles of New Guinea, New Ireland and New Britain, as well as the surrounding seas, are littered with the wreckage of hundreds of aircraft and scores of ships, which to this day continue to be discovered, and give mute testimony to the severity of the conflict and the determination of the Americans to avenge Pearl Harbor and (for the Australians) the destruction of Lark Force in January 1942; as well as Japan’s determination to hang on to what they considered the linchpin of their entire strategy to dominate the southwest Pacific. A sizable proportion of the losses incurred by both sides was also due to accidents and the unpredictability of the weather. It was very easy for planes with only rudimentary navigational tools to become disoriented, be blown off course, run out of fuel, and crash at sea; or to fly into the side of a mountain (especially the formidable peaks of the Owen Stanley Range) obscured by clouds or fog. But while the United States could provide a constant stream of new aircraft and well-trained pilots to replace losses, the Japanese could not and were hampered by the increasing scarcity of experienced pilots (most had been lost in the Coral Sea, at Midway, in the battles that raged around the Solomons in 1942 and early 1943, and in the defense of Rabaul itself) and the increasing obsolescence and inferiority of their aircraft compared to new models gradually added to the U.S. arsenal (the F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair in particular). Their losses became increasingly disproportionate to those of the Americans as the conflict ground on. Eventually the Japanese were forced to withdraw most of their air and naval assets from Rabaul in order to minimize losses (moved to Truk or other rear areas) and the fortress and its garrison were left to wither on the vine. More than 100,000 troops were forced to live in tunnels in mountainsides or other underground shelters, adopting a troglodyte existence in order to escape the continuous Allied fragmentation and incendiary bombing, the purpose of which was to destroy everything above ground and keep the various airfields around Rabaul (so laboriously constructed, and repaired innumerable times over the years, by Allied POW’s and thousands of Indian and Chinese slave laborers) out of commission in case the Japanese should ever decide to reinforce Rabaul. They were also obligated to grow most of their own food since it became almost impossible for any supply ships or aircraft to get through.
This of course left very little for the slave laborers, who were essentially starved and worked to death. Most had been sent to Rabaul from captured territories in China, Burma or Malaya and were lucky if they survived more than a few months of such treatment. Those who did not were buried in mass, unmarked graves.
Most disturbing in Gamble’s book are the sections describing the execution of Allied POW’s, which mirrored what had happed during the infamous “Rape of Nanking” in China in 1937 and when the Japanese retaliated against the Chinese who had helped the Doolittle raiders in 1942. The perverted interpretation of traditional bushido and samurai philosophy which was promulgated by the increasingly militaristic Japanese regime during the 1930’s declared that not only was it dishonorable for a soldier to surrender or be captured, but that the Japanese “race” was superior to all others and white people, especially, were no more than subhuman. Therefore a hapless POW, inferior by nature and disgracefully captured, was doubly damned and worthy of only the most severe punishment. Training of Japanese soldiers involved a lot of beatings and brutality, the purpose of which was to reinforce the above maxims. At Rabaul, the ultimate “test of courage” was to execute a POW—either by decapitation with a katana or by a bayonet thrust while the prisoner was tied to a pole. The Japanese were not signatories to any of the Geneva conventions and the soldiers ordered to carry out the executions (and they dared not disobey) were also informed that the prisoners were merely getting what they deserved.
Scores, if not hundreds, of Americans, Australians and New Zealanders were executed between 1942 and 1945, often 30 to 40 at a time all on the same day. Many others died of starvation, disease or overwork. Those lucky enough to survive their imprisonment were officers or higher-profile prisoners who were deemed likely to possess specialized or strategic knowledge and who were sent to Japan for further interrogation. The book does not make clear exactly how many prisoners were killed, or how many Japanese eventually faced retribution for these war crimes. Some high-profile perpetrators were hanged (such as Tojo, Homma and Yamashita); other lesser officers and enlisted men served out prison sentences and were then released. Many probably escaped any consequences because as time passed, even as more mass graves were uncovered at Rabaul, it became impossible to prove who had done what. And, as the author points out, America needed an ally in the western Pacific against the looming threat of the Soviet Union and preferred to concentrate on the rebuilding of Japan rather than hunting down every single soldier who had executed a POW. While this pragmatic reasoning made a sort of political sense, it was no doubt of little comfort to the families of those who suspected that their loved one, listed as missing in action, had been ruthlessly murdered and thrown into a mass grave.
Rabaul is thus the Japanese war effort in microcosm—initial success against an unprepared but defiant enemy; unexpected and shocking defeats and reversals as the enemy gradually gains strength; retreat as that enemy overwhelmingly strikes back; ultimate surrender and futility. The author’s research is extensive and well-documented and the story is told in a compelling way. Most highly recommended!
***** review by Chuck Graham *****