The first edition (1981) took a critical look at the accepted wisdom of historians who interpreted battlefield events primarily by reference to firepower. It showed that Wellington's infantry had won by their mobility rather than their musketry, that the bayonet did not become obsolete in the nineteenth century as is often claimed, and that the tank never supplanted the infantryman in the twentieth. A decade later, the author has been able to fill out many parts of his analysis and has extended it into the near future. The Napoleonic section includes an analysis of firepower and fortification, notably at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815. Additional discussions of the tactics of the American Civil War have been included. The evolution of small-unit tactics in the First World War is next considered, then the problem of making an armored breakthrough in the Second World War. Following is a discussion of the limitations of both the helicopter and firepower in Vietnam. The author points to some of the lessons learned by the U.S. military and the doctrine which resulted from that experience. Concluding is a glimpse at the strangely empty battlefield landscape that might be expected in any future high technology conflict.
Paddy Griffith was a senior lecturer in war studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst for 16 years. He is the author of numerous articles and books on the history of warfare, including Battle Tactics of the Western Front, 1916-18 and The Art of War of Revolutionary France, 1789-1802.
I struggled with this book - if I could give 1/2 stars this would have got 2 1/2 stars. It got good at the end.
I liked the British perspective. Griffith takes the reader on a short tour looking at the development of firepower and maneuver. It's the last chapter that provides the most insight. Trained and motivated combat soldiers is the most important determinant of success. It also details the 'empty' battlefield and the difficulty of close combat tactical movement under fire.
Updated in 1990, the author makes some poor and some spot on predictions. Lethality and detection increases which continues to empty the field. Depth of the fight increases as a result. The increased dispersion of forces reduces casualties in spite of increased PKI. Mobility increases except when in contact where it decreases. Technical increases across the board.
My favorite? "A system which uses 18 different technologies is surely at least 6 times more likely to fail than one which uses just 3." Can't help but think of our mission command systems...
This is certainly a worthy book, both from a narrative standpoint and the informative content. However, I found it particularly hard to read given my background, which is not in military or war gaming. Although it is not a long read, I had to go back from time to time to remind myself of the question that was the subject of discussion. I found the overall discussion, about the infantry and armored cavalry tactics, very interesting. This book leaves nothing to second-guessing and cites the necessary references wherever possible. Since I read the version of 92, I would hope they improved the graphics that are severely lacking compared to the content.
Griffin quality, a bit aged since uppdate in the late eighties but a worthwile read and a good source for further reading. a bit of myth killing too. a must for military history and current understanding of conflict studies.