Ike's Bluff

by Evan Thomas

Evan Thomas's startling account of how the underrated Dwight Eisenhower saved the world from nuclear holocaust.

Upon assuming the presidency in 1953, Dwight Eisenhower set about to make good on his campaign promise to end the Korean War. Yet while Eisenhower was quickly viewed by many as a doddering lightweight, behind the bland smile and simple speech was a master tactician. To end the hostilities, Eisenhower would take a colossal risk by bluffing that he might use nuclear weapons against the Communist Chinese, while at the same time restraining his generals and advisors who favored the strikes. Ike's gamble was of such magnitude that there could be but two thousands of lives saved, or millions of lives lost.

A tense, vivid and revisionist account of a president who was then, and still is today, underestimated, Ike's Bluff is history at its most provocative and thrilling.

Genres: History, Biography, Nonfiction, Politics, Presidents, American History, War

495 pages, Paperback

First published September 25, 2012

About the author

Evan Thomas is the author of nine books: The Wise Men (with Walter Isaacson), The Man to See, The Very Best Men, Robert Kennedy, John Paul Jones, Sea of Thunder, The War Lovers, Ike’s Bluff, and Being Nixon. Thomas was a writer, correspondent, and editor for thirty-three years at Time and Newsweek, including ten years (1986–96) as Washington bureau chief at Newsweek, where, at the time of his retirement in 2010, he was editor at large. He wrote more than one hundred cover stories and in 1999 won a National Magazine Award. He wrote Newsweek’s fifty-thousand-word election specials in 1996, 2000, 2004 (winner of a National Magazine Award), and 2008. He has appeared on many TV and radio talk shows, including Meet the Press and The Colbert Report, and has been a guest on PBS’s Charlie Rose more than forty times. The author of dozens of book reviews for The New York Times and The Washington Post, Thomas has taught writing and journalism at Harvard and Princeton, where, from 2007 to 2014, he was Ferris Professor of Journalism.

Reviews

[robin friedman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Eisenhower's Lonely Presidency

Dwight David Eisenhower(1890 -- 1969) served from 1953 -- 1961 as the 34th president after a heroic military career in which he was Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces during WW II. Proceeded by Harry Truman and followed by John Kennedy, Eisenhower's presidency tended to be poorly regarded in its immediate aftermath. But Eisenhower's presidency continues to attract attention and debate. Beginning in the late 1960's, scholars began revisiting Eisenhower's leadership style and accomplishments to find that he was a president of both force and subtlety. Early in 2012, Jean Edward Smith published a lengthy and highly laudatory biography of Eisenhower that has received substantial critical attention. "Eisenhower in War and Peace" Smith covers Eisenhower's entire life rather than focusing on his presidency. Evan Thomas' new book "Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World" (2012) is much more narrowly focused. Thomas covers only Eisenhower's presidency, and considers almost exclusively his foreign policy rather than his domestic programs. A Washington insider, Thomas has written extensively on 20th Century American history.

The title "Eisenhower's Bluff" refers to the central characteristic of the president's enigmatic foreign policy. In public, Eisenhower appeared a smiling, confident, avuncular war hero who frequently spoke in fractured syntax and who displayed a fondness for playing golf. Eisenhower as also a skilled a fiercely competitive poker and bridge player. In these games, and as a general, he learned how to hold his cards and his feelings. The "bluff" refers to Eisenhower's attitude towards the use of nuclear weapons. As Thomas points out, with his presidency and with the United States possession of a nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower became the first person to literally hold the fate of the world in his hands.

Eisenhower's foreign policy was based on a doctrine called "Massive Retaliation" under which war would be averted and avoided by the United States threat to resort to nuclear weapons, even in seemingly local conflicts. Eisenhower seemed to be convinced that nuclear weapons had made conventional warfare obsolete. In seeming contradiction to this policy, Eisenhower was fully aware of the terrible character of the nuclear bomb and was convinced that such weapons should never be used. Eisenhower's foreign policy, for Thomas, turned upon the threat to use nuclear weapons, not their use. Thomas summarizes his study of Eisenhower early in the book.

"The 1950s were boringly peaceful (or are remembered that way) only because Eisenhower made them so. Eisenhower governed by indirection, not just because he preferred to, but also because he had to. His ability to save the world from nuclear Armageddon entirely depended on his ability to convince America's enemies-- and his own followers-- that he was willing to use nuclear weapons. This was a bluff of epic proportions."

Thomas offers a number of telling anecdotes to explain Eisenhower's bluff. The first involves a meeting with Dean Acheson, Truman's Secretary of State, who advised Eisenhower to determine for himself when, if at all, he would commit to the use of nuclear weapons and to "tell no one" what he decided. Then, in 1958,the poet Robert Frost visited the White House to present Eisenhower with a book of poems. Frost inscribed the book: "[t]he strong are saying nothing until they see." Eisenhower wrote in response "I like his maxim perhaps best of all."

Thomas book is in two parts, each of which considers one of Eisenhower's two terms as president. Thomas describes the many foreign policy crises in the Eisenhower years beginning with Korea, and continuing through Vietnam, Formosa, the Suez Canal, Berlin, and much more. In these and other crises, many advisors close to the president were willing to opt for the use of nuclear weapons, a prospect Eisenhower seemingly found unthinkable. Eisenhower governed, Thomas argues, through indirection and through deliberately sending mixed and confusing signals to achieve his goals. Eisenhower was willing to threaten in public the use of nuclear power while working in a different direction behind the scenes. The process was messy but it kept the United States out of war during Eisenhower's presidency. Thomas argues that Eisenhower's method of governance was dependent upon the esteem in which Eisenhower was held and upon his stature as a war hero and could not have been used effectively by any other American leader.

The book describes Eisenhower's complex relationship with John Foster Dulles, his Secretary of State, and with his brother Allan Dulles, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Eisenhower could reign in his sometimes blustering Secretary of State but he fared less well with the CIA and the many covert operations in which it engaged during the 1950s and thereafter.

The book describes well the tensions of the Cold War and the exaggerated views held by many, not including Eisenhower, about the Soviet threat at the time. The launching of Sputnik and the fears of an in fact nonexistent "missile gap" brought a great deal of fear to those growing up in the United States at the time. Thomas suggests that Eisenhower would have had difficulty defusing these fears at the time because doing so would have required the release of highly secret information and of the means of its collection.

Following Eisenhower's presidency, his successors adopted a doctrine called "Flexible Response" which Eisenhower had rejected. This doctrine allows for the prosecution of limited war without the nuclear threat. As Thomas points out, the use of flexible response has achieved questionable results in places such as Vietnam and perhaps Iraq and Afghanistan.

Scholars remain divided on the nature of Eisenhower's commitment to "Massive Retaliation" and whether the threats to use nuclear weaponry in fact constituted a "bluff". Thomas offers a detailed examination of Eisenhower's governance which on the whole offers a highly favorable assessment of Eisenhower and his accomplishments, while recognizing that the policy would not have worked in the hands of his successors. Thomas concludes:" Eisenhower understood with profound insight, the moral ambiguities, the wrenching dilemmas, the dreary expediencies, and the quiet moral courage required of a life of duty, honor, country..... That he could be, as he made his lonely and sometimes inscrutable way, so resolutely cheerful, so determinedly optimistic, was a kind of miracle born of faith."

This book will be of interest to readers with a passion for 20th Century American history, particularly to aging baby boomers.

Robin Friedman

[Mara · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found this book to be completely fascinating as it touched on themes at the nexus of US history, game theory, behavioral economics, psychology, decision making, the role of science in policy and, well, a lot of other stuff in which I maintain an avid interest.

Ike's Bluff is not a general biography of Eisenhower. It's really an examination of its titular thesis about Eisenhower's foreign policy/military decisions in his role as one of the first Commanders in Chief of the nuclear age. This thesis (and really, this isn't a spoiler) is pretty much as follows:

His [Einsenhower's] ability to save the world from nuclear Armageddon entirely depended on his ability to convince America’s enemies—and his own followers—that he was willing to use nuclear weapons. This was a bluff of epic proportions.

Outside of this reading, I don't really know enough about Eisenhower and his era to comment as to whether the author was overly biased in his portrait- though I'd hazard a guess that Evan Thomas is a pretty big fan of Ike's. I'd also be willing to bet that not every one of Eisenhower's public faux pas was a strategic attempt to be underestimated by those around him, and even Thomas is willing to admit that Ike probably gave too much free reign to the CIA. However, Eisenhower did seem to possess a keen understanding of the nature of war (violence begets more violence), and of human and institutional irrationality.

I definitely came away from this liking Eisenhower. Heck, his list list of dislikes is pretty much dead on as far as I'm concerned:

he disliked visits by Republican ladies wearing corsages; also “abstract” paintings, “women who cry,” “people who are afraid of him,” “people who gush,” and being physically touched by almost anyone.

Eisenhower seemed uniquely freed from what seems to be a presidential obsession with public opinion, likely due to his experience and indoctrination in military leadership.

Eisenhower knew that he could, in the short term, calm the public’s fears by taking the easy way out. Patience and privacy were virtues of leadership, vices of politics. There was no choice for Ike: he was the lonely keeper of the nation’s secrets.

Public terror was a price—politically as well as psychologically—well below Armageddon.

I'm looking forward to perusing many of the works in Thomas' bibliography, so I suppose the jury is still out on the greatness of this book vis-à-vis historical accuracy. But, in the meantime, I can certainly recommend it as a great thought piece on leadership in early Cold War America.

[John Frazier · Rating 4 out of 5]

As is the case with many of my Baby Boomer peers, I've long viewed Eisenhower's two terms in the White House as a sort of historical void. Certainly things happened while he was the leader of the free world, there's just not much known about it.

After reading "Ike's Bluff" by Evan Thomas, I can point to two reasons for that. One, there may not have been a president who actually spent less time in the White House. This guy played enough golf to make George W. look like a hard worker. Hell, he had a third house (apart from his second home in Gettysburg, PA) on the Augusta National Golf Course in Georgia, built by and given to him by some of his rich cronies. I don't care if he did play with great purpose and little waste of time, he was on the links much too frequently to avoid the perception of detachment and inattention.

(As an aside, I've always contended that people's true nature is best exhibited on a golf course. That Ike apparently took numerous liberties with the rules and his scores is not at all reassuring.)

The other distraction he had to contend with was the Cold War in all of its stages and manifestations, none of which received the scrutiny then that our 24-hour news channels and insatiable thirst to know would've demanded and given today.

It was really the nascence of nuclear stockpiling, a time when certainly the United States (and eventually Russia) could've wiped everybody off the face of the earth several times over. "How many times do we need to kill these people?" Ike asked often as he tried to institute some sort of control over an arms race that was already well beyond it.

We'd learn more accurately years later that the Russians were well behind the U.S. for much of the race. Still, and erring on the side of caution, it was believed that their armament contained enough nuclear warheads attached to enough long-range bombers or missiles to effectively wipe out much of our country. (There was much less emphasis on missile defense systems then, much more on offensive capacity.)

Combine that with Ike's "all or nothing" philosophy on war and you can better understand why he played his cards so close to his vest. (He was, we learn, also an excellent card strategist and player.) To Ike, if you were going to engage in war, you did so to win it all. And to win it all, all you had to do was employ weaponry that could well make the winners regret having survived.

It was a delicate dance as he tried to encourage detente while (implicitly or explicitly) sending U2 spy planes over Russia (unbeknownst to most American congressional leaders). Throw in Khrushchev's threat to kick the westerners out of Berlin and you have all the machinations of a real-life spy saga, one that we couldn't truly appreciate until years later.

Thomas also gives Eisenhower's personality much more breadth and character than I'd been led to perceive. Apparently he could be quite mercurial, sometimes charming and a bit of a booze-hound. His heretofore relatively unknown health issues (well chronicled here) during his administrations also lend a certain sense of urgency to the tasks at hand, and I now have a better appreciation for those and the contraints under which he was operating.

Ike's history as the Supreme Allied Commander of WWII is well chronicled and established. And while he will never enjoy the reputation of either Roosevelt, Lincoln or the president who succeeded him, "Ike's Bluff" goes a long way toward expanding the presidential legacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower. A four-star story on the five-star general.

[Jill · Rating 4 out of 5]

A number of new studies of Dwight Eisenhower have reassessed him in a much more positive light than he was previously considered. (Historical revisionism of the Eisenhower Administration is not a new phenomenon, but it has picked up speed of late.) Evan Thomas joins the latest list of scholars who aim to elevate Eisenhower’s reputation, and he does so by focusing on his handling of the nuclear threat during his time in office. As Thomas demonstrates in this entertaining history:

The peace and prosperity that marked his two terms in office ‘didn’t just happen, by God’ (quoting Eisenhower)… The 1950’s were boringly peaceful (or are remembered that way) only because Eisenhower made them so.”

The principal thesis of Evan Thomas's study of Eisenhower’s presidency is that the U.S. was able to keep the peace while simultaneously containing communist expansion during the 1950’s by credibly threatening to use nuclear weapons. That doctrine or policy became know as “massive retaliation,” meaning that the U.S. made it clear that it would use nearly its entire stock of nuclear weapons in any conflict. To Dwight Eisenhower, there were to be no small wars — it was all or nothing. Thomas argues (as does Jim Newton in Eisenhower: The White House Years, to be reviewed in the next post), Eisenhower was so credible that no one, not even the audacious and provocative Mao Zedong, was willing to risk war with the U.S.

Eisenhower (Ike) benefited from his experience as a card shark. He took up poker at West Point, and won so often and so much that he had to quit to save his reputation. Then he took up bridge, and “was a fierce, take-no-prisoners player.” Both games require intelligence, skill at strategy and forecasting, confidence, and the ability to read one’s opponents. Ike, his staff secretary said, was adept at all of these traits.

These were skills he would take with him to the presidency.

Ike’s first major challenge was to extricate the US from the Korean War. He was elected partially on his promise, “I shall go to Korea.” President Truman famously queried, “What will he do when he gets there?” What he did shortly after returning was to raise the stakes of fighting for the other side. Some historians have claimed that Ike warned the Chinese, using the intermediary of India, that if the war continued the U.S. might feel compelled to use nuclear weapons. Indeed, some of Ike's advisors later claimed these secret signals turned the tide. But Thomas questions this, in part because Nehru claims he never passed on the message. In any event, Ike greatly increased the bombing of dams and power plants, causing widespread flooding and ruining a year’s rice crop. The ensuing threat of famine was “deeply destructive and demoralizing” in and of itself to North Korea. In addition, the death of Stalin (who supported a dragged-out war to bleed the West), contributed to bringing the North Koreans and Chinese to the negotiating table.

Eisenhower was terribly concerned about the dangers of nuclear war. Accordingly, he developed a coherent strategy to avoid it. Unlike his Army Chief of Staff, the four star general Maxwell Taylor, and other advocates of developing the military ability to fight small wars, Ike thought small wars led to big wars, and in the nuclear age that might mean total war. The way to avoid small wars was to threaten big wars from the beginning, and mean it. Ike wrote that Taylor’s doctrine of flexible response:

...was dependent on an assumption that we are opposed by a people who think as we do with regard to the value of human life. But they do not, as shown in many incidents from the last war.... In the event they should decide to go to war, the pressure on them to use atomic weapons in a sudden blow would be extremely great.”

[Ultimately, General Taylor, critical of Eisenhower’s military policies, retired from active service in July 1959.]

Ike expended serious efforts to induce the Soviets to engage in mutual reduction in arms. At the 1955 Geneva conference (see picture, above), he proposed “Open Skies,” a policy that would allow the Soviet and American reconnaissance planes to freely fly over each other's territory. He wanted to reduce the threat of surprise attack, "the great fear of the new nuclear age."

The Russians would not accept because (as we learned later) they were so weak they did not want the US to have a realistic appraisal of their strength.

But the U.S. was even better at craftiness with Ike at the helm. Thomas writes:

His ability to save the world from nuclear Armageddon entirely depended on his ability to convince America’s enemies—and his own followers—that he was willing to use nuclear weapons. This was a bluff of epic proportions.”

Thomas credits Eisenhower with many other wise choices during his presidency, such as his management of the Suez crises of 1956, his handling of volatile and dangerous characters like Chiang Kai-Shek and Curtis LeMay, his decision to emphasize ICBMs rather than bombers, and his avoidance of involvement in Vietnam despite the pleas of the French.

[It should be noted that Eisenhower was critical of the way the US under Lyndon Johnson fought the Vietnam war. Ike’s philosophy was to avoid a war unless you were willing to fight to win. One can only wonder how Ike’s Korean policy of relentless attacks on civilian targets, coupled with the threat of nuclear war, might have fared in Vietnam.]

Ike recognized and regretted that part of the price of avoiding nuclear war was convincing the US populace that the threat was both terrible and real. Yet he avoided letting the country devolve into a modern Sparta or a garrison state. Two bon mots from Thomas in the final chapter summarize the thrust of the book:

Ike was more comfortable as a soldier, yet his greatest victories were the wars he did not fight.”

Lincoln went to war to save the Union. Eisenhower avoided war to save the world.”

Evaluation: This is an excellent book not only for those not yet born during this period, but also for those who were around, but unaware of just how dangerous a time it was.

[Mike (HistoryBuff) · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ike’s Bluff is an interesting read. You learn a lot about the behind-the-scenes stuff that went on during some very turbulent and scary events during the Eisenhower administration. Ike used his experience as a consummate bridge player to bluff not only his fellow card players but world leaders as well. At the time, being the world's only real nuclear superpower, Ike could get his way in the foreign arena by bluffing his way to peace.
From the Korean war to the events of the Suez Canal, Evan Thomas will keep the reader engaged page after page. For someone, like me, lacking in the history of the 1950’s this book is for you. Enjoy.

[Godlarvae · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ike was a legend in my home while I was 8 to 16 years old. My Salt Lake City grandparents included him in their evening prayers daily, my Grandmother Gibson concerned that he was "not looking at all well". As it turned out, he was not well. He was no "caretaker" of American Government either, as modern historians have relegated him. He had been Supreme Commander of Allied Forces who brought Nazi Germany to its knees, a result of his vast experience and talents of working with those who would not be worked with! His folksy, mid west, homespun style was pre-meditated to indicate "all's well" while dealing with the thorniest of post war issues in realistic and pragmatic ways, communism being the great bugaboo of the age.
He was the man of the times who had the skills to do a monumental but largely unappreciated through ignorance of those he served, his tactic. He took responsibility, was the calming influence over the cowboys he'd served with during the War, now in positions of immense and significant power. (They'd not grown to understand how their WWII methods, so important at that time, had become archaic, obsolete, and dangerous.)
I was amazed at how much history I'd forgotten, molded and effected by this most enigmatic of men.
Thanks, Ike.

[Steve · Rating 4 out of 5]

https://bestpresidentialbios.com/2017...

“Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World” by Evan Thomas was published in 2012. Thomas is the author of nine books; he was a writer and editor for over three decades at Newsweek and Time Magazine. He also taught journalism for over a decade at Harvard and Princeton. His most recent book, “Being Nixon: A Man Divided,” was published in 2015.

Not intended to be comprehensive, Thomas’s book is almost exclusively focused on Eisenhower’s two-term presidency – and on foreign policy issues, in particular. The author’s primary thesis is straightforward: by implying he might use nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Soviet Union (even if only a “bluff”) Eisenhower insured they would never be used by any nation. But because Ike never revealed his inner-most thoughts to anyone, it is a thesis which ultimately cannot be proven.

Thomas’s narrative generally proceeds chronologically through Ike’s presidency, beginning with his inauguration in 1953. But there are numerous side-trips and diversions – particularly in early chapters – that look back into his pre-presidency and provide anecdotes and observations which assist in filling out his portrait. Readers familiar with Eisenhower’s life will recognize these detours as the author pieces together Ike’s persona. Others, however, may feel as though they are watching a jigsaw puzzle being haphazardly assembled.

Ardent fans of the thirty-fourth president will notice that Thomas provides no new significant revelations about Eisenhower and few new penetrating insights. What is new is the emphasis Thomas puts on Eisenhower’s “Cold War” strategy and the author’s reliance on diaries from, and interviews with, his subject’s aides, secretary, doctor and family members which reveal fresh nuances about this president’s character and personality.

While not possessing quite the dramatic style of David McCullough or Candice Millard, Thomas has a journalist’s eye for detail and knows how to engage his audience. And rather than becoming bogged down with stiff, scholastic explanations of complex events (such as the genesis of the Korean War or the CIA’s involvement in an Iranian coup) he is able to distill the essence of those moments into crisp, comprehensible observations.

Several aspects of the book are particularly noteworthy for being exceptionally descriptive, informative or insightful. Among these are the portraits he paints (over several chapters) of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, CIA chief Allen Dulles and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In addition, he provides a far deeper and more interesting behind-the-scenes examination of the nuclear arms race during Eisenhower's presidency than I've seen elsewhere.

Given the book’s emphasis on foreign policy issues, the author’s decision to reserve significant space for the president’s day-to-day health issues seems unusual. But his role as apologist for Eisenhower’s domestic civil rights record is even more curious. And, more generally, serious readers of history will find the book’s tone tilted slightly toward sensational journalism rather than hard-hitting history.

Overall, however, Evan Thomas's "Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World" provides an interesting if somewhat narrow view of the Eisenhower presidency. Given its scope it cannot replace a traditional biography of Eisenhower. But it pursues an interesting thesis and provides significant insight into his public and private personas and serves as a compelling supplemental text on the thirty-fourth president.

Overall rating: 3¾ stars

[Jean · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is primarily about Eisenhower’s foreign policy and how he successfully kept the United States out of a major war during his eight years as president, which was his major goal. I have just finished reading “The Brother” by Stephen Kinzer about John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State and Allen Dulles his head of the CIA. The two books complement each other to give me a more complete picture of the Eisenhower era. I lived through this period in history and it does not seem like it was that long ago, on the other hand, so much has happened since the ‘50s it seem like a long time ago. Reading these two book helps understand the problems of today. Eisenhower’s ambiguity is a recurring theme in the book. His style was to avoid telling anyone his definite views on a subject. Eisenhower was a shrewd operator who never let anyone know whether he would use nuclear weapons or not.

The author uses the Hungarian uprising of 1956 as an example of one of Eisenhower’s best and worst moments for his policy of “take a hard line—and bluff”. Though he successfully avoided a major war the Soviet Union over Hungary, choosing containment over confrontation, and his administration’s rhetoric about “rolling back” communism encouraged Hungarians to expect America’s support which did not come. A “CIA backed clandestine radio stations” had been encouraging Hungarians to fight.

Eisenhower let John Foster Dulles carry the rhetoric for his administration. Ike willing let himself appear disengaged, even weak to unbalance his opponents. The author states that Eisenhower skill at concealment, deception and secrecy turned Allen Dulles loose at the CIA. Mostly Thomas portrays Eisenhower in a favorable light.

I found the book interesting and with “The Brothers” gave me a good over view of the 1950’s international politics. I read this as an audio book downloaded from Audible. Brian Troxell did an excellent job narrating the book. This book was worth a 3.5 but we can not do half so I did a 4.

[Brian Eshleman · Rating 4 out of 5]

How can we get people to read another biography of Eisenhower? We can call it Eisenhower and the World, or something like that, and then mostly give the standard fare of an Eisenhower biography. Or, like this one, we can call it Ike's Bluff, as though the focus of the book is on a particular scene or strategy, and then focus mostly on a narrative of Eisenhower's biography centered around his presidential years.

I'll give Thomas a fourth star because he seems to penetrate Eisenhower's reserve to a greater extent than the other writers do. True to his title, he talks about Eisenhower as shrewd strategist and then explains how placid appearance or garbled syntax helped to advance his aims.

[Harold · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a view of Eisenhower's foreign policy during his presidency. There is nothing about Eisenhower the General and World War II, nor his election, and very little about his domestic policy.

That makes it a shorter but less interesting book than (but an excellent companion piece to) Eisenhower in War and Peace by Jean Edward Smith.

The Bluff is Eisenhower's policy that there would be no contained wars with the US. If we went to war, it would be Nuclear Holocaust.

What is fascinating about Eisenhower is how close to his vest he held his cards. Even his closest advisors didn't really know whether he was serious, and he was comfortable with befuddling the press and the public with double-talk (which often made him look dimwitted) rather having to look smart and say more than he wanted to.

Like Smith's book, I put this down ready to vote for Eisenhower, probably to my parent's chagrin. But he was more interested in being smart than appearing smart, and in doing good rather than being popular. No doubt that was easier for him than subsequent presidents because he had such public goodwill as a result of his heroics in WWII, But even still his presidency is a remarkable story of success and progress.

Yes, I would vote for him, but not play cards with him.

[Peter Tillman · Rating 4 out of 5]

An exceptionally fine popular history, well-written and well researched. Recommended, 3.8 stars.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

I will say Evan Thomas has written an interesting book here that takes us inside the frequently overlooked and seemingly forgettable presidency of Eisenhower, but unfortunately doesn't tell us anything new. The book lacks any sense of direction and treats international incidents as unique happenstances rather than putting them into a larger context. Ike's failures are glossed over and not examined in detail. We see hardly any mention of Iran or Guatemala. The entire story lacks a clear focus.

Everyone remembers the stereotype of Ike as a bored Mr. Bluster-esque fuddy-duddy, or as an old grandpa quietly presiding over American prosperity, inevitably compared unfavorably with the youthful New Frontiersmen of JFK's presidency. But the 1950s were only peaceful because Eisenhower made them so. Eisenhower relied on covert operations instead of, and in preference to, conventional military force. He institutionalized covert operations precisely by creating mechanisms to manage them. He operated behind the scenes and by indirection, which served him well given that nuclear war could break out at any time. He was also not easily intimidated, having commanded in a world war alongside the likes Churchill, Roosevelt, de Gaulle and Stalin. Eisenhower was always careful to show a willingness to use nukes, not just publicly but privately as well. Thus, he gave actual teeth to the strategy of nuclear deterrence.

Another forgotten episode that Thomas recalls is how Eisenhower secretly orchestrated the downfall of the self-appointed communist-hunter Senator McCarthy, whom Eisenhower disliked and was careful not to attack publicly.

Ike had the U-2 spy plane pictures coming in, so he knew how pitiful the Soviet threat really was. He knew the most dangerous place for Khrushchev to be was at a crowded public summit meeting where he could rant at will, so he avoided them. (He reached out to the Soviet leadership for detente after Stalin died, but was rebuffed.)

Eisenhower was never a kindly grandfatherly caretaker sort of person. By now, I think everyone already knows that he was a shrewd strategic thinker and master manipulator of the bureaucracy. And kept the peace for his entire administration. He was certainly far far better at that than the presidents that came after him ... only Reagan was able to match Eisenhower's abilities and accomplishments.

In actuality, Eisenhower kept the Soviet Union wary and cautious by deliberately confusing them and being unpredictable to them. He even joked about his ability to deliberately cause confusion. He ended the Korean conflict by credible threats of using nuclear weapons [he publicly fired "Atomic Annie", the Army's 280mm atomic cannon, at Frenchman's Flat and then openly shipped some of them to Korea] ... immediately after that, the Chinese agreed to a cease fire ... , by using the Air Force to not only bomb previously ignored targets but also by dropping fragmentation bombs on Chinese troops camping in the open to demonstrate what the atomic cannon might do]. During World War II, one of the issues was that the British and American bombers were unable to navigate to their targets; Eisenhower knew that if we had to go to war against the Soviets, similarly our forces would be unable to find their targets ... so he ordered and supervised the U-2 airplane design and operations ... and he was the first to study the film after each mission ... to map the Soviet Union and determine the actual strength of their military. [Eisenhower knew before the U-2 operations began that it would only be a year or so before one of them was shot down; the CIA gave him that assessment in advance. He was surprised that it was able to operate as long as it did. But he badly needed the information it could bring back.]

Also contrary to its title, the book is only modestly about the largely successful containment of the Soviets, instead giving much more emphasis to Ike's often unsuccessful efforts to contain the burgeoning military-industrial-nuclear-congressional complex. Many other histories wrongly present Ike's famous "military-industrial complex" farewell warning as a badly belated recognition of the situation.

In all, an interesting book.

[Ron · Rating 4 out of 5]

“It is remarkable how little concern men seem to have for logic, statistics, and even, indeed, survival: we live by emotion, prejudice, and pride.” DDE

Another timely correction to the popular and scholarly evaluation of the presidency of Dwight David Eisenhower. For years both the media and academia have repeated a false, sometimes willfully so, image of our 34th president.

“The hatchet job was one of the most lasting and effective in political history.”

Thorough research and clear prose undergird Thomas’s work. Unlike what we read at the time and since, he reveals who leaked what to whom, who shot whom, and what was Eisenhower saying, doing, and even thinking. Much material drawn from oral histories and diaries of principals, not then available.

“Ike was careful not to reveal his most intimate thoughts about a weapon he abhorred but might have to use. Yet even if Eisenhower had ruled out nuclear weapons, he never would have revealed it for one simple, if profound reason: he knew that, to be credible about using the bomb as a deterrent to war or a prod to diplomacy, he had to show a willingness to use nuclear weapons—not just in his public statements but in his most private deliberations. Because there is, over time, no such thing as a secret policy in Washington.”

If there are bad guys in this story, it is not the leaders of opposing nations; it is Americans--the press, military leaders, and even his own administration who pursued their own agendas because they didn’t understand or agree with his. Many of those bull-headed generals and admirals should have been fired.

“Eisenhower had a healthy skepticism about the grandiose schemes of the military. He knew how the top brass used worst-case scenarios to fright their civilian masters into spending more on unnecessary new weapons systems and pet boondoggles.”

I’ve watched every president since Eisenhower closely enough to recognize the deceits which promoted or demoted them to the public. That most of what we’ve been told about Eisenhower was misleading, if not outright fabrication, is therefore no surprise. He was a great twentieth century president. He was not a perfect man; he would have been bewildered and ineffective today. But for that time and that place he was essential.

“When Ike wrote about his ‘honesty of purpose,’ he had been perfectly sincere, but honesty of purpose did not always require honesty of means.”

Many recent presidents (Bush and Obama) have drawn a “line in the sand” only to have it crossed, then have neither the resolve nor the means to do anything about it. Eisenhower, in contrast, masked his means and sometimes even his goals to increase his leverage with friend and foe alike.

“I am to avoid all situations that tend to bring about such reactions as irritation, frustration, anxiety, fear, and, above all, anger. When doctors give me such instructions, I say to them, ‘Just what do you think the Presidency is?’”

The job just about killed him, several times. He was ill and tired at the end, but he kept the faith and fought the good fight.

“The United States was blessed to be led by a man who understood the nature of war better than anyone else, and who had the patience and wisdom, as well as the cunning and guile, to keep the peace.”

[Al · Rating 2 out of 5]

I might have given this book three stars, but marked it down because it badly violates the "truth in naming" convention. Full title, as given: Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World. This title is ludicrous and does not describe the book; someone at Marvel Comics must have come up with it. I'll deal with this more below. But first, let me say that the book IS actually a reasonably straightforward and lightweight account of certain aspects of Eisenhower's presidency, namely his approach to dealing with foreign relations, and his personality and health issues. As such, I found it mildly interesting because I was relatively uninformed. I'm confident, however, that recent biographies of Eisenhower probably deal with these issues just as well, and also include other important biographical material.
So what's with "Ike's Bluff?" I understand a bluff to be defined as taking a strong stand on something when you can't back your play if someone challenges you. That's not what Mr. Thomas describes Eisenhower as doing. First, he repeatedly describes an Eisenhower whose operating style consciously involved making inconclusive statements and vague threats, leaving his opponents (mainly the USSR) to draw their own conclusions, with Eisenhower hoping that they would be afraid of what he might do if they became too aggressive. Next, Thomas makes it clear, again repeatedly, that while the Russians tried mightily to pretend they had overpowering WMD and bombers (this WAS actually a bluff on their part), Eisenhower knew--because of U2 overflights-- that Russia did NOT have any significant nuclear or bomber capability and therefore the dreaded "missile gap" was a myth. So, Eisenhower actually held all the cards, and didn't have to bluff. It also begs the question of why he wasn't more direct in dealing with them.
Also, what "Secret Battle to Save the World" is he talking about? The only thing secret about it was that Eisenhower saw fit, for whatever reason (apparently known only to him), to withhold the fact that he knew the Russians' claim to heavy throw weight was a fiction. It seems that the only thing this concealment accomplished was to leave Americans in the '50s living in the mistaken belief that on any given day, the Russians might decide to unleash a nuclear holocaust. It's hard to compute the emotional and financial damage this did to the country.
So, this title is a mystery, and since I spent most of the book trying to figure out why Mr. Thomas used it, it was a distraction. Conclusion: If you're interested in learning about Eisenhower, you'll probably do better to read another biography.

[Andrew Glasgow · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the first book I've read on Eisenhower, so I found it very informative. I was particularly interested on how Eisenhower managed the very difficult task of facing down the Russians on one side, while dealing with McCarthy on another side, the growing military industrial complex on a third front, and a corrupt and ineffectual CIA on a fourth side. It is a testament to Eisenhower's strength of character and his true patriotism that he stayed true to his beliefs and tried to steer the country on the straight and narrow. It's very clear his WW II role as Supreme Allied Commander (dealing with egotistical generals and difficult allies) prepared him well for the political maneuvering required by the presidency. What was most surprising about the book (which the title suggests) was how it illustrated his skill in poker and bridge helped to make him an effective negotiator and strategist on both the foreign and domestic issues.

In many ways, his leadership of the country during a pivotal time of post war adjustment and international intrigue reminds me of Washington - leading by force of character when other powerful forces would have forced the nation off course for selfish and foolish reasons.

Ike certainly had flaws and made some mistakes, but the overall impact of the book should be to elevate his stature amongst American president. A 2011 Gallup poll that ranks him 13th (BEHIND Clinton, Obama, GW Bush, and Carter) makes me want to puke and move to Costa Rica. Of course that same poll, by ranking Reagan, Clinton and Kennedy ahead of George Washington, effectually illustrates the colossal failure of our educational system and why it can be fairly stated that a very significant percentage of Americans are political morons.

[Relstuart · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well written and enjoyable biography focused on the challenges Eisenhower faced during his time as president.

Generally, I am not confident that we ever know for certain what hour was the finest of someone’s life. In part, because we all make small private choices along the way that make all the difference in helping us be best version of ourselves in what others might notice as our finest hour. And who can say which decision made all the difference when our conduct mattered in a public way?

That said, from my limited knowledge and vantage point, I think Eisenhower's finest hour was probably leading up to D-Day. On the night before the invasion, in private, Eisenhower wrote an apology speech taking full responsibility for the failure of the attack in case it failed. "Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops," Eisenhower wrote. "My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone." He underlined the final two words to highlight his own responsibility.

It would have been easy to share the blame or deflect it noting all the hard work accomplished by so many that went into planning and executing the D-Day invasion. But Eisenhower wasn't that kind of leader. During the hours of anxiety waiting to see whether the invasion was a success, he prepared to accept the consequences of losing, and take responsibility for an outcome he had little control over.

This book doesn't delve into this part of Eisenhower's life. However, I like to think that it does cover what may be his second finest moment well. Eisenhower had a terrible temper. The author highlights how his mother challenged him to control it and he struggled with it his whole life. The book details how Eisenhower worked hard to get the Russians to sit down with him and work on an agreement that would limit nuclear proliferation. Russia was initially skeptical, but after significant effort and outreach, a time was set and the leaders of some of the world’s greatest powers of Eisenhower’s time came together to discuss the issue. The prime minister of England, De Gaulle for France, (West) Germany’s Prime Minister, President Eisenhower, and the leader of Russia, Nikita Khrushchev.

Unfortunately for Eisenhower, the Russians were able to intercept an American spy plane and shoot it down prior to the meeting. American military leaders made initial disingenuous announcements about the plane, its mission, and where it was trying to make it appear the plane wasn’t really spying on the Russians. This made Khrushchev furious. And he vented his anger at Eisenhower at the meeting. Khrushchev cursed and called Eisenhower a liar, ranting and screaming at Eisenhower for about 45 minutes to begin the meeting. Imagine, you are the leader of the United States of America, one of the most powerful nations on earth, a man accustomed to being treated with respect as a military general officer for years and then as president, and you are there in front of the few people in the world that could rightly claim to be your peers, and you get treated like this. Eisenhower sat there and took it in silence. He didn’t yell back at Khrushchev, he didn’t argue with him and try tell him how Khrushchev was an evil man leading a nation that did terrible things to its own people, he didn’t stomp out of the room. He stayed at the table and let Khrushchev continue to rage at him, likely in hopes something could still be salvaged from the situation with some sort of agreement. It takes a strong will to conquer your temper, endure that kind of verbal abuse, to choose not to fight back, in hope that you can still find something good in a bad situation. That day Eisenhower didn’t win the peace agreement he wanted. But, he won against himself when he maintained control of his emotions/temper under difficult circumstances.

[Noah Goats · Rating 4 out of 5]

There was a time in the years after he left office that Eisenhower was considered a presidential mediocrity. After political passions had a chance to cool and historians had an opportunity to review his presidency dispassionately they became more positive. He has now been called "underrated" so many times that maybe it's time to retire that word. If everyone thinks you are underrated, after all, it's impossible for your to actually be underrated.

With "Ike's Bluff" Evan Thomas has written yet another glowing Eisenhower biography, this one focusing on his foreign policy (with a large dose of info on his health while in office). Thomas argues that Eisenhower's policy of massive retaliation (aka, let's drop the bomb on the commies if they push us too hard), which my history teachers through high school and college all interpreted as being foolish, dangerous, and simpleminded militaristic bluster, was actually a brilliant bluff. The United States and its allies simply didn't have the means of keeping the huge Soviet army from invading Europe if they wanted to. The only thing holding them back was the threat of nuclear annihilation. He used the threat of nukes to keep the United States out of the kinds of wars that his predecessor and successors would drag the country into. The fact is, once he used his stature as America's greatest general to pull us out of Korea, he kept the country out of war for the rest of his eight years in office. He used that same stature to keep military expenditure down and to push back on the more bloody minded in the military and national leadership. And he did all this while suffering from all sorts of medical issues: stroke, intestinal problems, hear attack.

[Isidore · Rating 3 out of 5]

Pleasant to read, but not a revelation like Thomas's book on Nixon.

This is a loosely-assembled collection of vignettes and ruminations on the strategies whereby Eisenhower sought to avoid war during his presidency. Thomas argues that Ike's long-derided policy of "mutually-assured destruction" was actually more effective in keeping peace than the "flexible response" approach adopted by Kennedy and Johnson, which led to the horrors of Vietnam—exactly the kind of pointless "brush-fire war" that Eisenhower explicitly tried to avoid.

Thomas makes extensive use of archival materials and oral histories and has dug up a lot of fresh anecdotes and bits of information, but the end result seems to me a little slight. Some of the stories and observations turn up more than once, suggesting the book was not carefully edited.

Thomas's kindly nature (rare among historians) comes through, and one is happy to have spent time with him. Ike, on the other hand, remains determinedly enigmatic.

[Curtis Salinger · Rating 3 out of 5]

Knew next to nothing about Eisenhower, now I do

[Jason · Rating 3 out of 5]

Evan Thomas is one of my favorite popular historians. And he’s certainly one of the most versatile with a wide range of titles that run the historical gamut.

By his own admission, Thomas is most interested in the nature of power: who gains it, wields it, executes it, and the consequences of it on both America and the world. The Cold War features prominently in Thomas’ chronicles of power building. To date, he has written two excellent early histories of the Cold War. His first, “The Wise Men,” co-authored with Walter Isaacson, showcased the lives, influences, and lasting legacies of the men who created America’s Cold War foreign policy framework. His second Cold War tome, “The Very Best Men,” shed light on the work of the men who labored in the shadows, but exerted enormous power, for good and ill, in building the CIA.

Thomas has returned to the Cold War in his latest book, “Ike’s Bluff.” It is yet another edition in a growing library that is reevaluating the legacy of our 34th president. Thomas trains a fixed eye on Eisenhower’s relentless efforts at preventing the Cold War from becoming a hot war. In presenting such a narrow view of Eisenhower, Thomas is able to show us the real Eisenhower and the picture is not always pretty.

Ike could be a real son of a bitch: temperamental, volatile, deceptive, cunning, ruthless. What you saw was not what you got. As Thomas and other historians are now making clear, Eisenhower was an adroit politician and a master manipulator. Much of Eisenhower’s legacy can be summed up in what did not happen in the 1950s: the superpowers did not meet in a nuclear conflagration; Armageddon was avoided. Thomas shows the reader just how hard it was to hold on to that peace and the physical and mental toll it inflicted on Eisenhower.

Yet as fascinating as this history is, Thomas’ story falls short. The book was at times a chore to read, lacking the fluidity of his other works. Some sections were over-written, under-edited. Deviations into Ike’s gastrointestinal problems (Eisenhower suffered from severe flatulence), his Jeckyl and Hyde treatment of his primary physician, and his complex relationship with his son, John, take up too much space. While all are part of Eisenhower’s story, the time Thomas spends on these matters made for a disjointed, sometimes zig-zagging reading experience.

Still, Thomas should be commended for highlighting an important, and largely unknown, part of modern history; he should be applauded for providing further evaluation that now rightly places Eisenhower in the pantheon of near-great, if not, great presidents. It’s just that I think Thomas could have done it in a few less pages, with a little less redundancy, and even less “literary flatulence”.

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

I always liked Ike without knowing too much about his presidency, and after reading this book I still mostly like him, but I have a much better picture of his pros and cons, and there’s plenty of each. We get a balanced assessment of a president who used his accrued respect from his military career to stave off the wolves at the gate by playing a tenuous and stressful game of chicken with the Russians, wherein Ike took Teddy Roosevelt’s “Big Stick” policy to the max and used an all-or-nothing policy that kept us out of “brush-fire wars” that could have turned into something worse. Later presidents weren’t able to pull that off, and Ike paid the price with terrible stress-related health issues and having to look like a do-nothing president on the outside to keep the real challenges between himself and the decision makers of the world in a behind-the-scenes-type forum. Tough gig, but he mostly pulled it off. However, Ike definitely had his faults. He was a walking temper tantrum who refused to directly confront or admonish a lot of reckless spy-game addicts and war-hungry bureaucrats in his administration, and he should have. Ike also never publicly stood up to McCarthy even though he didn’t like the man or his methods. And Ike signed off on (or at least didn't prohibit) a lot of government-toppling CIA activity that would turn around and bite us on the ass over time. But all in all, I’m just as intrigued by Ike’s two terms as I was when I started reading, and I feel much more informed. He remains a fascinating figure. It’s an interesting and informative book that I recommend for anyone looking to find out more about the presidency and/or the Cold War.

[Ted Hunt · Rating 3 out of 5]

The author does a pretty nice job of conveying the way that Eisenhower kept his intentions concerning the use of nuclear weapons to himself during his Presidency. I have always admired how he was willing to take the criticism about the so called "missile gap" because he knew that it did not exist (yet could not say why he knew this- the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union).

However, I have some problems with the reverential treatment that Eisenhower gets. The CIA backed coups in Iran and Guatemala are described without any hint of the long term repercussions of both of these events. One of the reasons that the U.S. is dealing with an unfriendly, and perhaps soon to be nuclear, Iran is that so called "successful" 1953 CIA operation. I also questioned the author's labeling of Eisenhower's behavior in the 1957 Little Rock school crisis as "decisive." There was no need for this book on foreign policy to even touch on civil rights, but sending in U.S. troops three weeks after the crisis began is not what I would call decisive. Governor Faubus was able to defy federal authority for three weeks, which only encouraged others in the South to resist. Eisenhower could have taken a far more forceful approach, but he did not.

Finally, I was very disappointed that the author did not bother checking his facts about the year of Admiral Yamamato's death (it was 1943, not 1944). It is such an easy thing to check, so what could account for a mistake like this? And it makes one wonder what else he got wrong.

[Don · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thomas focuses his book on the decisions Eisenhower made to keep from ending up in a war with the USSR. Compared to our current president, Eisenhower was eminently qualified to serve as Commander in Chief. He had decades of experience with management, diplomacy, and making hard decisions.

Despite his military background, Eisenhower was surprisingly suspect of a growing military and an increasing nuclear weapons stockpile. He did not think we need too large of a force to keep the peace.

During his eight years, Eisenhower was able to keep the United States out of international conflicts. In contrast, in just three years a much less experienced Kennedy got caught up with the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam.

Presidents can make a difference and Eisenhower was a good man to have in his position for the times.

There are many personal anecdotes in the book. Thomas interviewed Eisenhower's son John who served with him in the White House and also talked to his grandchildren Susan and David.

An amusing story early in the book relates to a policy that Eisenhower instilled for his cabinet meetings. He would have his Agriculture Secretary Erza Taft Benson say a prayer at the start of the meeting. Once the meeting had already gone on for a while, when Eisenhower declared, "Jesus Christ, we forgot to say the prayer!"

[Thomas Isern · Rating 4 out of 5]

A biography definitely worth the time spent reading it. Thomas pulls together the revisionist historical literature on Eisenhower that has been proliferating ever since restrictions began to come off Ike's papers in Abilene. He is a popular writer, but he uses the literature astutely and credits it. At some points I think he may push it a bit too far; there are times, for instance, when he argues that Ike deployed malapropisms and turgidity as a conscious strategy, whereas from what I have seen of Ike's papers, there are other reasons Ike so frequently misspoke. On the other hand, Thomas does not shrink from Ike's weaknesses and foibles. The treatment of medical matters, for instance, makes you wonder how a guy who was so astute in global affairs could be so naive about his own health, but I think such was the case. In the end Thomas reaches what I think is a perfectly reasonable conclusion that makes the degree of revisionism--just how positively Ike is portrayed--not exactly relevant. The country was fortunate that Dwight Eisenhower was president during the 1950s. He was a stabilizing force in panicky times. He exercised restraint and kept his counsel when others over-reacted and talked too much. A man we can accept, warts and all, and learn from.

[Don · Rating 3 out of 5]

When I started this book I found the introduction to be generally poor. So I was going to reject it. But, I don't have any other books on Eisenhower and I wanted to know just why he's considered one of the top ten presidents (the CSPAN presidential scholar poll) in our country's history.

Thankfully, the book's writing evolved somewhat so that I was able to tolerate it overall. I can't say it was very well structured, however. Thomas tends to skip around quite a bit throughout Ike's presidency that trying to understand the general timeline was difficult (to note - this book only covered 1952 to about 1962 in detail with some references to his upbringing).

There were a few interesting points discovered about Ike's personality - he was truly the exterior shell of strong confidence, a master at diversion and double-talk, and clearly a leader. But, internally he was a mess - bouts of angry outbursts privately, high blood pressure, was addicted to Seconal to sleep at night.....obvious that the stress of the cold war and US politics was being suppressed as much as he could that eventually led to his strokes.

I can't recommend this as any type of authoritative biography of Ike - but, as a side read of his presidency there might be some merit.

[victor harris · Rating 2 out of 5]

Okay, but spent too much time talking about Ike's golf game and not enough about his diplomacy. Also repetitive in spots, discussing Ike's temperament. The point was clinched early and didn't need repeated anecdotes.

[David Zimmerman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Evan Thomas has written a fascinating, though not riveting look at President Eisenhower’s two terms in office. I’m not sure that anyone could write a “gripping” account of those years, but there is a fair amount of chaff in this work that could be removed, and Ike’s Bluff would likely be a 5-star read.

As with any man, there is ample opportunity to criticize President Eisenhower; yet there is much to admire. He bore on his shoulders the substantial weight of America’s post-war excursion into the age of nuclear weapons. It is frightening to think of what might have happened if either Eisenhower or the United States were of a less noble character. Add to this the weight of China’s intervention in the Korean War, Russia’s development of its own nuclear bomb, the beginnings of the space race, and it is not difficult to see that Eisenhower’s presidency might have led to another world war, rather than the Cold War for which, I believe, Eisenhower can be credited.

Reading of these events, the people involved, and the decisions that were ultimately made, with 60 years of hindsight for perspective, and there is much to be admired about the leadership Eisenhower provided to our nation and the world. With a disarming affability, he steered our nation away from nuclear conflict, while keeping the US militarily and politically strong.

As significant as the international events were, it must not be overlooked that Eisenhower was at the helm during the early push for desegregation and the development of America’s post-war economy. The author does not devote as much space to these issues as he might have, but he does give us enough material to appreciate the decisions Eisenhower made.

This is a book worth reading for the insight it gives to the decades of the Fifties and the man who led our nation through them. It can also help us better understand the challenges every president faces when he is placed into that office by the vote of those whom he will govern. No man serves in that office perfectly, but Eisenhower served in it well.

[Urey Patrick · Rating 3 out of 5]

In a word, disappointing – the book’s content does not live up to the promise of its title. Eisenhower’s strategy of massive retaliation may have been a planned bluff, but it was a mistake that had long-term consequences that the author never examines. It limited the United States to an all or nothing nuclear response to every provocation. That may have been daunting for our enemies initially, but it was not a bluff that could have remained valid for long. Even the Soviets soon realized that the United States really would not sacrifice New York for the sake of Budapest, or Saigon. And Eisenhower’s strategy was not the sole overweening policy the author would have us believe – else why the landing of Marines in Lebanon? Why the maintenance of land forces in Korea? Eisenhower may have minimized the use of conventional forces and the ratio of conventional to strategic nuclear capabilities, but he did not forsake one for the other.

That said, the book spends precious little time and space on Eisenhower’s strategic policies and decisions making. There is little of the inner deliberations and interplay between advisers and advocates of alternatives. There is little to nothing of Eisenhower’s thinking, speaking or interaction with other world leaders. Instead, the author presents a contradictory picture of Eisenhower as, on one hand, a shrewd manipulative secretive executive and on the other hand, a querulous, angry, spoiled old man with a volcanic temper who is victimized by the actions of his subordinates. It just doesn’t square. Eisenhower the five-star general did not tolerate the abuses of authority and chain of command issues that the author tells us Eisenhower the President chafed over and suffered from. I don’t buy it.

The volcanic temper is a constant thread that affects everything Eisenhower does – and the actions of those around him. One wonders if his staff and advisers avoided giving him information and best advice to avoid the consequences of his temper? The author implies it. His son John, and adviser to his Chief of Staff, was the apparently the preferred bearer of bad news because others wanted to avoid the temper tantrums that apparently resulted with regularity. It did not work. Eisenhower blew up at work and at play. His son and his wife refused to play cards with him because of his temper. His doctor, a life-long friend and confidant, nearly had his leg broken when Eisenhower blew up over a bad shot and threw a golf club at him. The author recounts an anecdote about Eisenhower grabbing an adviser by the lapels and starting to shake him, stopping only when he realized others were present. He was careful to hide his temper from the public, but what consequences did it have in private? Eisenhower comes across as a pampered and ill-tempered old man who is regularly victimized by his temper, and by subordinates who don’t follow direction or policy but whom he cannot control or change or remove. He lives a life of privilege and isolation, enjoying the largesse of wealthy friends and associates as a right – he expects it. One wealthy benefactor even maintains an office for him at her ranch in the west for those occasional times he spends time there. It is a disturbing portrait of a supposed man of the people who is not. It is also a disturbing portrait of how we as a society tend to wrap our leaders in an insular cocoon of privilege and aristocratic perks paid for by admirers and benefactors. Augusta National Golf Course built a house for him and Mamie on the course – the Eisenhower cabin, still there. It is not a good thing – then or now. On those few occasions he actually comes in contact with segments of the general population, he dislikes it, does not understand it and reacts with anger. I think the author means to paint Eisenhower in a more favorable light than conventional history has done and I agree that Eisenhower deserves to be so re-evaluated. Unfortunately, the author does not succeed in that endeavor. And sadly, looking at Eisenhower the man and the personality, the author succeeds in diminishing the historical image giving us a petty, angry and ill-tempered man who cannot even engage in recreational pursuits without erupting in rage at the expense of those around him. "Shoot the messenger" seems to be the preferred policy. One is left to wonder how that must have limited Eisenhower's information and staffing. It does not seem to be such a focal point of other biographical works regarding Eisenhower.

The author quite rightly dispels the so-called “bomber gap” and the subsequent “missile gap” with the Soviet Union that proponents of massive defense build-ups and administration political critics used to advance their agendas. He does not explore what if any affects the strategy of massive retaliation had in fostering the “gap” critics, or its affects on Soviet strategies and priorities in the ensuing years. Rather, the Soviet technical, military and cultural backwardness is presented as indications that the threat represented by international communism was somehow unrealistic because of the diminished capacity (temporary though it was) of the Soviets to follow through. There is no consideration of the very real existential danger to the United States that was embodied in international communism. Neither does the author examine how international communism reacted to Eisenhower’s policies and strategies, the long term consequences and changes that resulted from those policies and strategies. But then, as I said before, the content of the book does not live up to the promise of the title. If it did, these issues and questions among many others would be addressed.

Finally, there are factual mistakes. For example, Japanese Admiral Yamamoto did not die in 1944 – it was April 1943 – and the WWII hero Thomas Lanphier mentioned in the text was not the leader of the aerial ambush of Yamamoto. He was one of 16 pilots on the mission led by more senior officer – one of four specifically assigned to go for the transports carrying Yamamoto while the others kept the fighter cover away. Georgi Zhukov was a brutal, merciless killer of Germans, his fellow Russians, his soldiers and a practitioner of retributive assault on a vast, almost incomprehensible scale – rape, pillage and murder in the wake of his armies advances. He was a survivor of the Soviet system, and of Stalin’s purges and institutional terror. Zhukov was not a compatriot in arms with Eisenhower, nor was he a kindred spirit. The implications herein that he was are wishful, as are too many other undue liberties taken with Eisenhower’s thoughts, motives and underlying rationales.

[Andrew Warren · Rating 4 out of 5]

In it's time, Eisenhower's presidency was viewed as bland and uneventful, with a figurehead who lacked vigor and didn't instigate much real change in the world. Ike's Bluff shows that, yes, some of those accusations are true, particularly regarding Ike's lack of leadership in calling for domestic policies that would reduce systematic racial inequalities. It shows a flawed man who struggled to keep his temper in check, was isolated by the nature of his office, and naively put too much faith in some of his subordinates.

However, it also shows a man who possessed the immense strength of will to avoid a potentially world-ending war with the Soviet Union while simultaneously reigning in the excessive spending of America's newfound "military-industrial complex." His seemingly counterintuitive policy of massive-retaliation, born from decades of military service and a penchant for card games that centered around reading and manipulating his opponents, both kept the Soviets in check and kept the US from getting involved in costly/deadly "brushfire wars" like Vietnam and Afghanistan. His philosophy was always "if you fight, fight to win," which heavily implied his willingness to use nuclear weapons. In spite of his tough talk and bold policies, those few who knew Ike well didn't believe that he would ever actually order the use of nuclear weapons on civilians. Fortunately for the world, the Soviets believed his bluff and never opted to test his hand.

Ike's Bluff reinforced to me how important it is to consider the character of the people we want to sit in the positions of power in the world, particularly the US president. There is immense weight to nearly every decision. The stakes are too high to justify the selection of an egotistical, callous politician who lacks integrity and doesn't accept responsibility for their decisions, regardless of political leanings and party affiliation.

[Greg Brown · Rating 2 out of 5]

Bleh. Author clearly wants you to admire and like Eisenhower but the book's contents are either unconvincing or damning.

For unconvincing, take the book's central argument: Eisenhower was actually just bluffing every time he pondered or threatened to use nuclear weapons, bluffing so hard that even his own aides believed he would use them. This is Thomas' inference from Ike being a devoted poker and then bridge player, which is pretty bizarre. Ike was repeatedly saying in internal meetings that they should treat nukes as they would any conventional weapon, and asking about the possibilities of using some in crises. He was just bluffing his own staff?

For damning, take Eisenhower's method of public communication: deliberately bland and sometimes confusing to avoid revealing any actual information. When it worked, Ike was able to deftly avoid topics... but when it didn't, it made him look disastrously out of touch. And oftentimes the very topics they wanted to avoid were avoided for not so good reasons! Or take his pretty lax treatment of personnel, keeping not only Allan Dulles around but also his brother John Foster Dulles. Ike kept John Foster around to play the bad cop to his good cop routine, but that just places JF's extremism even more his fault.

And even if you're willing to forgive Eisenhower for pushing the CIA's reign of terror as cheaper than a larger conventional army, the book itself is kinda repetitive. Again and again we hear about his temper. So many anecdotes about his temper. And his health is terrible all the time too.

Anyways, a good breezy overview of Eisenhower's foreign policy, but not a particularly insightful one. Or at least, not brimming with the sort of insights it thinks it's giving.