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American Diplomacy 1900-1950
For over 50 years, Kennan's "American Diplomacy" has been a standard work on American foreign policy. Drawing on his considerable diplomatic experience, he offers an overview & critique of the foreign policy of an emerging great power whose claims to rightness often spill over into self-righteousness, whose ambitions conflict with power realities, whose judgmentalism precludes the interests of other states, & whose domestic politics frequently prevent prudent policies & result in overstretch. Keenly aware of the dangers of military intervention & the negative effects of domestic politics on foreign policy, he identifies troubling inconsistencies in the areas between actions & ideals--even when the strategies in question turned out to be decided successes. As America grapples with its new role as one power among many--rather than as the "indispensable nation" that sees "further into the future"--Kennan's perceptive analysis of the past is all the more relevant. Today, as then, the pressing issue of how to wield power with prudence & responsibility remains, & his cautions about the cost of hubris are still timely. Refreshingly candid, "American Diplomacy" cuts to the heart of policy issues that continue to be hotly debated today. "These celebrated lectures, delivered at the University of Chicago in 1950, were for many years the most widely read account of American diplomacy in the first half of the 20th century."--Foreign Affairs, 'Significant Books of the Last 75 Years'
Foreword
1. The war with Spain
Mr. Hippisley & the open door
America & the Orient
World War I
World War II
Diplomacy in the modern world
2. The sources of Soviet conduct
America & the Russian future
Foreword
1. The war with Spain
Mr. Hippisley & the open door
America & the Orient
World War I
World War II
Diplomacy in the modern world
2. The sources of Soviet conduct
America & the Russian future
144 pages, Mass Market Paperback
First published January 1, 1951
108 people are currently reading
2221 people want to read
About the author
George F. Kennan
127 books118 followersFrom Wikipedia:
George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005) was an American advisor, diplomat, political scientist, and historian, best known as "the father of containment" and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War. He later wrote standard histories of the relations between Russia and the Western powers.
In the late 1940s, his writings inspired the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. foreign policy of "containing" the Soviet Union, thrusting him into a lifelong role as a leading authority on the Cold War. His "Long Telegram" from Moscow in 1946, and the subsequent 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" argued that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist and that its influence had to be "contained" in areas of vital strategic importance to the United States. These texts quickly emerged as foundational texts of the Cold War, expressing the Truman administration's new anti-Soviet Union policy. Kennan also played a leading role in the development of definitive Cold War programs and institutions, most notably the Marshall Plan.
Shortly after the diploma had been enshrined as official U.S. policy, Kennan began to criticize the policies that he had seemingly helped launch. By mid-1948, he was convinced that the situation in Western Europe had improved to the point where negotiations could be initiated with Moscow. The suggestion did not resonate within the Truman administration, and Kennan's influence was increasingly marginalized—particularly after Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State in 1949. As U.S. Cold War strategy assumed a more aggressive and militaristic tone, Kennan bemoaned what he called a misinterpretation of his thinking.
In 1950, Kennan left the Department of State, except for two brief ambassadorial stints in Moscow and Yugoslavia, and became a leading realist critic of U.S. foreign policy. He continued to be a leading thinker in international affairs as a faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study from 1956 until his death at age 101 in March 2005.
George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005) was an American advisor, diplomat, political scientist, and historian, best known as "the father of containment" and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War. He later wrote standard histories of the relations between Russia and the Western powers.
In the late 1940s, his writings inspired the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. foreign policy of "containing" the Soviet Union, thrusting him into a lifelong role as a leading authority on the Cold War. His "Long Telegram" from Moscow in 1946, and the subsequent 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" argued that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist and that its influence had to be "contained" in areas of vital strategic importance to the United States. These texts quickly emerged as foundational texts of the Cold War, expressing the Truman administration's new anti-Soviet Union policy. Kennan also played a leading role in the development of definitive Cold War programs and institutions, most notably the Marshall Plan.
Shortly after the diploma had been enshrined as official U.S. policy, Kennan began to criticize the policies that he had seemingly helped launch. By mid-1948, he was convinced that the situation in Western Europe had improved to the point where negotiations could be initiated with Moscow. The suggestion did not resonate within the Truman administration, and Kennan's influence was increasingly marginalized—particularly after Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State in 1949. As U.S. Cold War strategy assumed a more aggressive and militaristic tone, Kennan bemoaned what he called a misinterpretation of his thinking.
In 1950, Kennan left the Department of State, except for two brief ambassadorial stints in Moscow and Yugoslavia, and became a leading realist critic of U.S. foreign policy. He continued to be a leading thinker in international affairs as a faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study from 1956 until his death at age 101 in March 2005.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 51 reviews
June 23, 2009
I was inspired to read this book because I was taking the Foreign Service exam, but it was a quick, eye-opening read that I recommend to all. First of all, Kennan is as smart and wise as people say he is. Second, everyone who is lost in the hazy world of modern technology and 24-hour instant everything would do well to read this for the sheer fact that it reminds you our grandparents and their grandparents knew a thing or two about the world, too. Third, this book presented so many lessons from the first half of the twentieth century that, if heeded, could have possibly lessened some of the damage of the second half of the twentieth century. Finally, I love George Kennan's wisdom about Russia/the Soviet Union. There are lessons in what he says that we still haven't heeded about dealing with empires and perceived "enemies." Straightforward, informative, and interesting, this book is small but worthy.
July 30, 2019
The content wasn't bad, but it wasn't really as amazing as reviewers would have you believe. If George Kennan was the only person from whom one ever heard foreign policy arguments, then I could understand why one would think of these lectures as so monumental.
July 24, 2015
A must read..... The beautiful logic of realism, applied with evenhanded sensitivity and strategic wisdom, a clear affirmation of the need for American reemphasis of reason over ideology and civilian over military concerns. Not to mention it's incredible ability to dispel myths about the traditions of American international relations and the fall of the Soviet Union.
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February 11, 2020It is an essential to the study of international affairs.
December 16, 2016
Two years ago, I did a series of lectures at a local university on ‘the History of American Diplomacy.’ Over two semesters, I consistently infuriated about half of each class with my thesis that, despite some significant successes over the centuries, American diplomacy is, for a host of historical reasons, rather dysfunctional. My students, from a conservative region, were offended that I would criticize ‘their’ country—ignoring the fact that I’d served for over 30 years as an American diplomat, was an avid student of history, and sort of knew what I was talking about.
The late George F. Kennan, architect of America’s Soviet Containment Policy, and a veteran American diplomat himself, in his book American Diplomacy: 1900-1950, which reproduces a series of lectures he gave at the University of Chicago in the 1950s, agrees with me. While he is less blunt about it (in my lectures I described American diplomats as sometimes being ‘sheep in wolves clothing,’ a blunt terminology the staid Kennan would never use), he does not hesitate to describe the hubris of the US Government as it pursues its foreign policy around the globe, excoriating other countries for behavior that we ourselves are often guilty of, and demanding countries take actions that we refuse to take.
Kennan focuses on the period 1900 to 1950, from the Spanish American War, and America’s brief flirtation with colonization, to the outbreak of the Korean War, and describes in detail the forces that shape the country’s foreign policy, and often significantly impact the methods we employ to pursue that policy. While he is circumspect in his criticism, he leaves no doubt that American diplomacy is a product of a domestic system that focuses on short-term goals, does not make actions conform to ideals, and often takes no lessons from the past.
As we prepare to witness what might be the most historic political transition in American history, one that will have a far-ranging impact (whether negative or positive, it’s too early to say) on our international relations. It behooves us as citizens, then, to understand the factors that, though distant, can impact our lives significantly.
American Diplomacy is a good starting point for understanding how the world really works.
I received this book as a gift.
The late George F. Kennan, architect of America’s Soviet Containment Policy, and a veteran American diplomat himself, in his book American Diplomacy: 1900-1950, which reproduces a series of lectures he gave at the University of Chicago in the 1950s, agrees with me. While he is less blunt about it (in my lectures I described American diplomats as sometimes being ‘sheep in wolves clothing,’ a blunt terminology the staid Kennan would never use), he does not hesitate to describe the hubris of the US Government as it pursues its foreign policy around the globe, excoriating other countries for behavior that we ourselves are often guilty of, and demanding countries take actions that we refuse to take.
Kennan focuses on the period 1900 to 1950, from the Spanish American War, and America’s brief flirtation with colonization, to the outbreak of the Korean War, and describes in detail the forces that shape the country’s foreign policy, and often significantly impact the methods we employ to pursue that policy. While he is circumspect in his criticism, he leaves no doubt that American diplomacy is a product of a domestic system that focuses on short-term goals, does not make actions conform to ideals, and often takes no lessons from the past.
As we prepare to witness what might be the most historic political transition in American history, one that will have a far-ranging impact (whether negative or positive, it’s too early to say) on our international relations. It behooves us as citizens, then, to understand the factors that, though distant, can impact our lives significantly.
American Diplomacy is a good starting point for understanding how the world really works.
I received this book as a gift.
January 14, 2018
George Kennan provides an unflattering assessment of the Wilson administration's overall diplomatic accomplishments. The father of post-WWII "realism" Kennan approaches the history of WWI with the expressed purpose of
gleaning lessons which will enhance American security in the present (i.e. 1951). Since much of Kennan's thought came to influence American foreign policy Kennan's work blurs the line of distinction between source document and popular monograph.
It is virtually impossible from the perspective of 1993 to view his assessment of WWI outside the context of the Cold War. It is the Soviet threat which concerns Kennan. Hence, his primary criticism of America's approach to WWI is that America aided in the destruction of Europe's balance of powers and ultimately opened the door to Nazi and then Soviet expansionism. If only America had recognized in 1914 that its interests were involved in this European conflict, and not sought the total defeat of Germany after its entrance into the war, the conflict could have been brought to a close more quickly and we would not have had to fight a war against Nazism (not to mention the Cold War). Yet, even Kennan admits in this short piece that popular opinion would have been extremely hard to sway in favor of military intervention before April 1917, or for moderation once the fight was joined. Certainly unhappy with President Wilson's leadership, Kennan is even less happy with the functioning of democracy. Therein lies the rub.
For Kennan, the central problem in American foreign policy is how to maintain the external trappings of democracy while gutting its content. As such Kennan's interpretation of history goes beyond traditionalism (which focuses on the policies of elites) and enters the realm of elitism, urging the positive role of elites in determining what is "best" for the benighted American nation.
gleaning lessons which will enhance American security in the present (i.e. 1951). Since much of Kennan's thought came to influence American foreign policy Kennan's work blurs the line of distinction between source document and popular monograph.
It is virtually impossible from the perspective of 1993 to view his assessment of WWI outside the context of the Cold War. It is the Soviet threat which concerns Kennan. Hence, his primary criticism of America's approach to WWI is that America aided in the destruction of Europe's balance of powers and ultimately opened the door to Nazi and then Soviet expansionism. If only America had recognized in 1914 that its interests were involved in this European conflict, and not sought the total defeat of Germany after its entrance into the war, the conflict could have been brought to a close more quickly and we would not have had to fight a war against Nazism (not to mention the Cold War). Yet, even Kennan admits in this short piece that popular opinion would have been extremely hard to sway in favor of military intervention before April 1917, or for moderation once the fight was joined. Certainly unhappy with President Wilson's leadership, Kennan is even less happy with the functioning of democracy. Therein lies the rub.
For Kennan, the central problem in American foreign policy is how to maintain the external trappings of democracy while gutting its content. As such Kennan's interpretation of history goes beyond traditionalism (which focuses on the policies of elites) and enters the realm of elitism, urging the positive role of elites in determining what is "best" for the benighted American nation.
February 18, 2022
Summary: A compilation of Kennan’s six Charles R. Walgreen lectures, two articles on US-Soviet relations originally from Foreign Affairs, and two Grinnell lectures.
George F. Kennan (1904-2005) was one of the foremost thinkers, and at times, shapers of American foreign policy. He is perhaps most famous for the “long telegram” in 1946 from Moscow to the American Secretary of State, on how the U.S. should relate to post-war Stalinist Soviet Union. This telegram and two subsequent articles in Foreign Affairs which appear in this volume, served as the intellectual basis of the American policy of containment which prevailed until the end of the former Soviet Union in 1989.
This work actually consist of three parts. The first reviews American diplomacy from the Spanish-American War through World War 2 in six lectures sponsored by the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation. The second part reprints the two Foreign Affairs articles, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” and “America and the Russian Future.” The third part consists of two Grinnell lectures given in 1984, one a retrospective of the Walgreen lectures, and the other a review of American foreign policy in Korea and Vietnam and our present military-industrial complex.
One of the basic threads that runs through the Walgreen lectures is that our diplomacy flowed out of “legalistic-moralistic” foundations or situational, politically shaped responses that lacked “any accepted, enduring doctrine for relating military strength to political policy, and a persistent tendency to fashion our policy toward others with a view to feeding a pleasing image of ourselves rather than to achieving real, and desperately needed results in our relations with others. The lectures start with our war with Spain launched without any clear policy but shaped by popular mood. The second focuses on the “Open Door” policy with China where what appeared to be noble foreign policy poorly apprehended the material interests of the other powers involved. The third lecture looked at our pre-Maoist diplomacy with China and Japan, over-sentimentalizing China, over-vilifying Japan, and failing to work toward a balance of powers between Russia, China, and Japan that may have averted war, and possibly the rise of Communist China (I doubt this, given the corruption of the Chiang Kai-shek government).
In the fourth lecture, he observes the irony of our entering World War 1 because of the violation of our neutrality, and then rationalizing it as a great fight for the values of civilization when in fact we acceded to the gutting of Germany which led to the second war. With the second war, we allowed ourselves to begin at a place of weakness that created the necessity of dependency on Russia and then adopted an idealized vision of the post war future that failed to realistically face the price Russia would exact for its alliance. He concludes for a diplomacy of professionalism and realism rather than a moralistic-legalistic effort to project American ideals.
Part two reflects the working out of Kennan’s ideas in relation to the Soviet Union. He argues that it is vitally important to understand the ideology of the communist conflict with capitalism, the infallibility of the Kremlin and the concordant concentration of power in what amount to a dictatorship. It is here, that recognizing the difficulties of relating to Soviet power, that he contends for a policy of disciplined “containment.” He writes:
“In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward ‘toughness’ ” (p. 119).
The second article he argues that America should not directly challenge the Soviet Union, but allow it to decay from within, a consequence we watched unfold in the 1980’s.
The first of the Grinnell lectures basically reprises the Walgreen lectures and then considers Korea and Vietnam. He contends that our assessment of Communist global expansionist ambitions to be flawed, especially in Vietnam where he assessed Ho to first of all be a nationalist. In Korea, we failed to reckon with how our military presence in Japan, shutting out the Soviet Union, would be perceived as a threat warranting “consolidation of its military-political position in Korea, with all our efforts costing 54,000 casualties to achieve merely the status quo ante. I find this a bit troubling as he seems to infer that it would be fine if all of the Korean peninsula were communist. I don’t suspect today’s South Koreans, as much as they would like to see the reunification of Korea, would prefer communist rule. But there is an interesting question of whether a different settlement was possible if we had settled things differently with Japan, a historic enemy of Russia.
The second lecture argues that the large scale militarization of the U.S. in the post war reflected mistaken notions of Soviet global conquest and the folly of the nuclear arms race. He argues that having made these dispositions we cannot walk back commitments either to Japan or to NATO. His call is simply for a greater humility in our diplomacy, and that example is more powerful than demand. He hoped a budget of over $250 billion for our military would not be necessary. (Now it is over $750 billion).
I am writing this on the eve of what may be a massive Russian invasion of Ukraine, once part of the former Soviet Union. I cannot help but think of Kennan’s observations about both the communist mindset in Russia, humiliated in 1989, but hardly extinguished, and our lack of steady, professional diplomacy in the years since while the Putin government has been an implacable constant. I’m troubled by the corrosion from within, not of Russia but our own country, and the danger that this could further undermine a steady realism in our foreign policy.
A larger issue that Kennan raises is whether it is possible to have a “moral” diplomacy. One the one hand we may often be deceived by our own claims to morality or blind to other factors in international situations. Yet humility is a moral virtue. The recognition of human dignity inherent in our commitments to democracy is moral. Perhaps this compact volume was not the place to unpack whether a moral, if not moralistic diplomacy is possible. Perhaps we need to turn to his spiritual mentor, Reinhold Niebuhr, to explore these arguments, elaborated in Moral Man and Immoral Society and other works. Whatever we might conclude, Kennan’s call for a professional, unpoliticized and unmilitarized diplomacy that takes develops a long term approach to American diplomacy is worth considering.
George F. Kennan (1904-2005) was one of the foremost thinkers, and at times, shapers of American foreign policy. He is perhaps most famous for the “long telegram” in 1946 from Moscow to the American Secretary of State, on how the U.S. should relate to post-war Stalinist Soviet Union. This telegram and two subsequent articles in Foreign Affairs which appear in this volume, served as the intellectual basis of the American policy of containment which prevailed until the end of the former Soviet Union in 1989.
This work actually consist of three parts. The first reviews American diplomacy from the Spanish-American War through World War 2 in six lectures sponsored by the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation. The second part reprints the two Foreign Affairs articles, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” and “America and the Russian Future.” The third part consists of two Grinnell lectures given in 1984, one a retrospective of the Walgreen lectures, and the other a review of American foreign policy in Korea and Vietnam and our present military-industrial complex.
One of the basic threads that runs through the Walgreen lectures is that our diplomacy flowed out of “legalistic-moralistic” foundations or situational, politically shaped responses that lacked “any accepted, enduring doctrine for relating military strength to political policy, and a persistent tendency to fashion our policy toward others with a view to feeding a pleasing image of ourselves rather than to achieving real, and desperately needed results in our relations with others. The lectures start with our war with Spain launched without any clear policy but shaped by popular mood. The second focuses on the “Open Door” policy with China where what appeared to be noble foreign policy poorly apprehended the material interests of the other powers involved. The third lecture looked at our pre-Maoist diplomacy with China and Japan, over-sentimentalizing China, over-vilifying Japan, and failing to work toward a balance of powers between Russia, China, and Japan that may have averted war, and possibly the rise of Communist China (I doubt this, given the corruption of the Chiang Kai-shek government).
In the fourth lecture, he observes the irony of our entering World War 1 because of the violation of our neutrality, and then rationalizing it as a great fight for the values of civilization when in fact we acceded to the gutting of Germany which led to the second war. With the second war, we allowed ourselves to begin at a place of weakness that created the necessity of dependency on Russia and then adopted an idealized vision of the post war future that failed to realistically face the price Russia would exact for its alliance. He concludes for a diplomacy of professionalism and realism rather than a moralistic-legalistic effort to project American ideals.
Part two reflects the working out of Kennan’s ideas in relation to the Soviet Union. He argues that it is vitally important to understand the ideology of the communist conflict with capitalism, the infallibility of the Kremlin and the concordant concentration of power in what amount to a dictatorship. It is here, that recognizing the difficulties of relating to Soviet power, that he contends for a policy of disciplined “containment.” He writes:
“In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward ‘toughness’ ” (p. 119).
The second article he argues that America should not directly challenge the Soviet Union, but allow it to decay from within, a consequence we watched unfold in the 1980’s.
The first of the Grinnell lectures basically reprises the Walgreen lectures and then considers Korea and Vietnam. He contends that our assessment of Communist global expansionist ambitions to be flawed, especially in Vietnam where he assessed Ho to first of all be a nationalist. In Korea, we failed to reckon with how our military presence in Japan, shutting out the Soviet Union, would be perceived as a threat warranting “consolidation of its military-political position in Korea, with all our efforts costing 54,000 casualties to achieve merely the status quo ante. I find this a bit troubling as he seems to infer that it would be fine if all of the Korean peninsula were communist. I don’t suspect today’s South Koreans, as much as they would like to see the reunification of Korea, would prefer communist rule. But there is an interesting question of whether a different settlement was possible if we had settled things differently with Japan, a historic enemy of Russia.
The second lecture argues that the large scale militarization of the U.S. in the post war reflected mistaken notions of Soviet global conquest and the folly of the nuclear arms race. He argues that having made these dispositions we cannot walk back commitments either to Japan or to NATO. His call is simply for a greater humility in our diplomacy, and that example is more powerful than demand. He hoped a budget of over $250 billion for our military would not be necessary. (Now it is over $750 billion).
I am writing this on the eve of what may be a massive Russian invasion of Ukraine, once part of the former Soviet Union. I cannot help but think of Kennan’s observations about both the communist mindset in Russia, humiliated in 1989, but hardly extinguished, and our lack of steady, professional diplomacy in the years since while the Putin government has been an implacable constant. I’m troubled by the corrosion from within, not of Russia but our own country, and the danger that this could further undermine a steady realism in our foreign policy.
A larger issue that Kennan raises is whether it is possible to have a “moral” diplomacy. One the one hand we may often be deceived by our own claims to morality or blind to other factors in international situations. Yet humility is a moral virtue. The recognition of human dignity inherent in our commitments to democracy is moral. Perhaps this compact volume was not the place to unpack whether a moral, if not moralistic diplomacy is possible. Perhaps we need to turn to his spiritual mentor, Reinhold Niebuhr, to explore these arguments, elaborated in Moral Man and Immoral Society and other works. Whatever we might conclude, Kennan’s call for a professional, unpoliticized and unmilitarized diplomacy that takes develops a long term approach to American diplomacy is worth considering.
April 6, 2019
George F. Kennan makes some good points. He very strongly supports the balance of power in Europe, so as to protect American interests. While I can certainly get behind this to an extent, I would consider it breaching the notion of traditional sovereignty in some ways. While I do not support extension of a nation's borders, I do not necessarily support military intervention or choking economic sanctions, due to the historical examples of countries doubling down and expanding anyway (see: Imperial Japan, among others). I do agree with Kennan on the need for avoiding the legalistic-moralism that has gripped America, as it has gotten us into trouble in the past. We need to be selective in our engagements abroad, as not every country we nation build in will welcome us in, nor should they. Respect for a country's sovereignty is first and foremost. Additionally, I am with Kennan on nuclear weapons. Maintaining balance of power through the absolute annihilation of human life is a level of lunacy that can only be summed up by watching Doctor Strangelove. Overall, a solid read, although I will definitely have to re-read it, as I missed a bit.
November 1, 2019
Dense but valuable. Key concepts can be extracted from each lecture. Jingoism and internal intrigues, the capacity of foreign policy to be vassalized by the domestic situation and sentiments, the dangers of legalistic-moralistic approach to foreign policy, the incapacity to wage limited war by democracies due to their binding to values, the dangerous habits that the industrial military complex breeds, the mistake of Vietnam and more.
May 20, 2012
Kennan may have been misguided or naive in some of his conclusions. Nevertheless, he makes some really astute observations about American society and politics that still ring true today. A must read.
May 4, 2018
This book was pretty interesting. It was nice to hear from someone whole lives around the time and actually had a say in what was going on as Kennan did. A great little book to read if you want to learn more about the background of the World Wars!
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August 1, 2019Essays about American foreign policy by the most influential Cold War thinker. Insightful and lucid, well worth a quick read. Somehow it's sort of comforting to recall that America was always pretty fucked up, although the last few years we have been pushing it pretty hard.
January 21, 2015
Hard to make an assessment of it as a book, since it is a primary source first and foremost. If you want to understand the thinking behind containment and the cold war, this is your book.
April 6, 2015
✭✭✭✭✭
August 21, 2019
A series of lectures by George Kennan which even though dated, still remain heavily relevant to American foreign policy today.
October 13, 2025
George F. Kennan's American Diplomacy Copyright 1951
George F. Kennan, the architect of the Cold War “containment” doctrine, is often best understood through his biographies. But to hear the man himself, in his own eloquent and cutting prose, is an entirely different experience. American Diplomacy, a series of lectures delivered at the University of Chicago in 1951, is not a narrative history but a brilliant, critical autopsy of half a century of American foreign policy. Reading it today, his diagnosis of a nation struggling to reconcile its moral self-image with the harsh realities of global power feels startlingly relevant.
Kennan’s central thesis is that the United States entered the world stage lacking a coherent strategic foundation, relying instead on a dangerous cocktail of “legalistic-moralistic” abstractions, public emotion, and a naive faith in its own virtue. He frames this by asking a poignant question on page 10: “how did a country so secure become a country so insecure?” His answer, in part, is that American security was always a historical accident, a gift of geography and the British Royal Navy that Americans mistakenly attributed to their own superior wisdom.
The book unfolds as a series of case studies that systematically dismantle American myths. He describes the Spanish-American War not as a noble crusade but as a conflict driven by the “fantastic war mongering of a section of the American press” and the “able, quiet intrigue” of a few men like Theodore Roosevelt, leading to an empire acquired almost by accident. The Open Door Policy for China, a cornerstone of American policy, is revealed as a doctrine drafted by a British official (Mr. Hippisley) and pursued as an "obsession"—a simplistic "bumper sticker" approach, as Kennan might put it today, that was meaningless amidst the complex realities of Asian power politics.
His lectures on the World Wars are even more critical. He argues that America’s entry into both conflicts was marred by a failure to understand legitimate European interests, a susceptibility to British propaganda, and a public opinion shaped by “highly vocal minority” of politicians and commentators. He saves his sharpest barbs for the idealistic sloganeering that, in his view, made a durable peace impossible. He quotes Wilson’s own pre-war wisdom against a punitive “peace forced upon the loser,” only to see Wilson himself succumb to the very war hysteria that produced the flawed Treaty of Versailles—a peace born when “war hysteria and impractical idealism [lay] down together.” Kennan suggests a forgotten alternative: a sober recognition of the European balance of power, a concept he insists is a “political necessity.”
For the Cold War specialist, the final section is the book’s pièce de résistance. It includes the famous “X Article,” “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” where Kennan lays out the logic of containment. He describes the Soviet Union as a persistent, wind-up toy that will only stop when it meets an “unanswerable force.” This is the classic formulation of containing Russian expansive tendencies through the “adroit and vigilant application of counter-force.” But Kennan the historian is also Kennan the prophet; he anticipates that change will come not through total victory, but from within, from a future younger generation—a prediction vindicated decades later.
Yet, the book’s enduring power lies less in its specific Cold War prescriptions and more in its timeless critique of American diplomatic habits. Kennan lambasts the Congress and the press for fostering a “diplomacy by dilettantism.” He warns that democracy “fights in anger” and seeks the illusory and dangerous goal of “total victory,” which is “short of genocide.” Most profoundly, he argues that true success in foreign policy occurs not when an enemy retreats, but “when something happens inside a man’s mind.”
American Diplomacy is a challenging, often uncomfortable read. It is the work of a professional diplomat despairing of a political culture that prefers moral crusades to strategic patience, and public slogans to private compromise. While one may not agree with all his conclusions—particularly his deep skepticism of democracy’s role in foreign policy—his diagnosis is powerful. In an era where foreign policy is often reduced to tweets and soundbites, Kennan’s call for strategic humility, historical awareness, and professional expertise remains an essential and sobering lesson.
George F. Kennan, the architect of the Cold War “containment” doctrine, is often best understood through his biographies. But to hear the man himself, in his own eloquent and cutting prose, is an entirely different experience. American Diplomacy, a series of lectures delivered at the University of Chicago in 1951, is not a narrative history but a brilliant, critical autopsy of half a century of American foreign policy. Reading it today, his diagnosis of a nation struggling to reconcile its moral self-image with the harsh realities of global power feels startlingly relevant.
Kennan’s central thesis is that the United States entered the world stage lacking a coherent strategic foundation, relying instead on a dangerous cocktail of “legalistic-moralistic” abstractions, public emotion, and a naive faith in its own virtue. He frames this by asking a poignant question on page 10: “how did a country so secure become a country so insecure?” His answer, in part, is that American security was always a historical accident, a gift of geography and the British Royal Navy that Americans mistakenly attributed to their own superior wisdom.
The book unfolds as a series of case studies that systematically dismantle American myths. He describes the Spanish-American War not as a noble crusade but as a conflict driven by the “fantastic war mongering of a section of the American press” and the “able, quiet intrigue” of a few men like Theodore Roosevelt, leading to an empire acquired almost by accident. The Open Door Policy for China, a cornerstone of American policy, is revealed as a doctrine drafted by a British official (Mr. Hippisley) and pursued as an "obsession"—a simplistic "bumper sticker" approach, as Kennan might put it today, that was meaningless amidst the complex realities of Asian power politics.
His lectures on the World Wars are even more critical. He argues that America’s entry into both conflicts was marred by a failure to understand legitimate European interests, a susceptibility to British propaganda, and a public opinion shaped by “highly vocal minority” of politicians and commentators. He saves his sharpest barbs for the idealistic sloganeering that, in his view, made a durable peace impossible. He quotes Wilson’s own pre-war wisdom against a punitive “peace forced upon the loser,” only to see Wilson himself succumb to the very war hysteria that produced the flawed Treaty of Versailles—a peace born when “war hysteria and impractical idealism [lay] down together.” Kennan suggests a forgotten alternative: a sober recognition of the European balance of power, a concept he insists is a “political necessity.”
For the Cold War specialist, the final section is the book’s pièce de résistance. It includes the famous “X Article,” “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” where Kennan lays out the logic of containment. He describes the Soviet Union as a persistent, wind-up toy that will only stop when it meets an “unanswerable force.” This is the classic formulation of containing Russian expansive tendencies through the “adroit and vigilant application of counter-force.” But Kennan the historian is also Kennan the prophet; he anticipates that change will come not through total victory, but from within, from a future younger generation—a prediction vindicated decades later.
Yet, the book’s enduring power lies less in its specific Cold War prescriptions and more in its timeless critique of American diplomatic habits. Kennan lambasts the Congress and the press for fostering a “diplomacy by dilettantism.” He warns that democracy “fights in anger” and seeks the illusory and dangerous goal of “total victory,” which is “short of genocide.” Most profoundly, he argues that true success in foreign policy occurs not when an enemy retreats, but “when something happens inside a man’s mind.”
American Diplomacy is a challenging, often uncomfortable read. It is the work of a professional diplomat despairing of a political culture that prefers moral crusades to strategic patience, and public slogans to private compromise. While one may not agree with all his conclusions—particularly his deep skepticism of democracy’s role in foreign policy—his diagnosis is powerful. In an era where foreign policy is often reduced to tweets and soundbites, Kennan’s call for strategic humility, historical awareness, and professional expertise remains an essential and sobering lesson.
January 10, 2021
George F Kennan, developer of the "Containment Theory" toward Soviet Communism in the 1940s and former American Diplomat to the Soviet Union in the immediate years after the Second World War, gave a series of lectures in 1951 at the University of Chicago that became this book. In it, Kennan covers American foreign policy from the Spanish American War of 1898 to the foreign policy of his own age. Given that these notes were written only 6 years after the end of the Second World War and in the thick of the Korean conflict, Kennan's insights in these pages are fascinating.
Kennan advocates a professional American foreign policy, a foreign policy that is predicated on principles and doctrines rather than the narrow special interests that so often animate national politics. Kennan illuminates America's transition from a fiercely isolationist nation focused on the settling of its own frontiers to its rise as a colonial power in 1898. The Open Door Policy in China in the early 20th Century established the United States as a major player in world affairs shortly afterward. The 20th Century has been filled with catastrophes in international relations; two world wars and the rise of International Communism. How could these catastrophes have been averted? Kennan outlines his ideas in these pages. And as an expert in the Soviet Union and International Communism, Kennan closes out these pages by sharing his thoughts on Soviet foreign policy and how the United States should related to the Soviet Union.
This book is essential reading for any student of foreign affairs. Even though this book is 70 years old now, its observations and historical perspective are indispensable to the serious student. I would highly recommend this book to any student of international relations.
Kennan advocates a professional American foreign policy, a foreign policy that is predicated on principles and doctrines rather than the narrow special interests that so often animate national politics. Kennan illuminates America's transition from a fiercely isolationist nation focused on the settling of its own frontiers to its rise as a colonial power in 1898. The Open Door Policy in China in the early 20th Century established the United States as a major player in world affairs shortly afterward. The 20th Century has been filled with catastrophes in international relations; two world wars and the rise of International Communism. How could these catastrophes have been averted? Kennan outlines his ideas in these pages. And as an expert in the Soviet Union and International Communism, Kennan closes out these pages by sharing his thoughts on Soviet foreign policy and how the United States should related to the Soviet Union.
This book is essential reading for any student of foreign affairs. Even though this book is 70 years old now, its observations and historical perspective are indispensable to the serious student. I would highly recommend this book to any student of international relations.
January 28, 2023
I'm a bit embarrassed that it took me this long to get to this book, which is a quick and relatively easy intro to the history of American foreign policy during our stint as a great power. Kennan spends the first few chapters on pre-Cold War American history, and while I certainly have some quibbles with some of his interpretation, the focus on the pathologies that outlive the specific events (moralism/legalism, hubris, disregard for local context and on-the-ground expertise, mirror imaging) is evergreen. Not that it's especially novel - if you've read E.H. Carr or Reinhold Niebuhr, the realist critique isn't new. But whereas Carr and Niebuhr are dense (and borderline unreadable for someone who doesn't love reading about this stuff) Kennan does it in 100 relatively digestible pages. The second part of the book includes the famous "Mr. X" essay on containment that gets excerpted and misrepresented in every IR/history 101 class and some subsequent lectures expanding on the theme. I forgot how much this is a product of its time and WASP-y author (sure, mirror imaging is bad...but generally, attributing behavior to a country's "Asiatic character" might be worse). But here too, Kennan does a good job of highlighting the deficiencies in our own "national character" and its tendency to approach power politics as a Manichean struggle. Overall, this book is hardly groundbreaking, but is probably worth a read for anyone semi-interested in U.S. foreign policy...and certainly the practitioners that can't be bothered to read anything over 150 pages.
August 24, 2024
Kennan has interesting ideas on US foreign policy. His history generally follows what would nowadays be called the realist school, though with some exceptions.
I think the best parts of the book are the historical sections. While Kennan does neglect some of the political economy of the decisions made by the US, and focuses a little too much on either public opinion or the whims of a few men, I think it is generally an alright history up until World War I/II. After that, I think he shuns international "moralism" a little too much. For instance, he talks about how Germany could have been stopped from engaging in rapid expansion in the 1930s if the US and other Allied powers had been more forceful in their actions to stymie them. However, he later in the same chapter goes on to say how Japan should have been listened to and appeased more to prevent war. While the situations are of course not analogous, Kennan's inability to look under the hood at the inner workings of states somewhat hampers his analysis in this section. He does do this intrastate analysis quite well in the first chapter of Part 2 on the USSR though.
I think the best parts of the book are the historical sections. While Kennan does neglect some of the political economy of the decisions made by the US, and focuses a little too much on either public opinion or the whims of a few men, I think it is generally an alright history up until World War I/II. After that, I think he shuns international "moralism" a little too much. For instance, he talks about how Germany could have been stopped from engaging in rapid expansion in the 1930s if the US and other Allied powers had been more forceful in their actions to stymie them. However, he later in the same chapter goes on to say how Japan should have been listened to and appeased more to prevent war. While the situations are of course not analogous, Kennan's inability to look under the hood at the inner workings of states somewhat hampers his analysis in this section. He does do this intrastate analysis quite well in the first chapter of Part 2 on the USSR though.
October 16, 2024
“The Russian writer Antonio Chekhov, who was also a doctor, once observed that when a large variety of remedies were recommended for the same disease,” (s.20)
Kings can have subjects: it is a question whether a republican can.(s.21)
`For if we are not to learn from our mistakes, where shall we learn?
“Fact speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable validity”(s.98)
“in 1831 de Tocqueville, writing from the United states, correctly observed: “The more I see of this country the more I admit myself penetrated with this truth: that there is nothing absolute in the theoretical value of political institutions, and that the efficiency depends almost always on the original circumstances and the social conditions of the people to whom they are applied” (s.112)
Kings can have subjects: it is a question whether a republican can.(s.21)
`For if we are not to learn from our mistakes, where shall we learn?
“Fact speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable validity”(s.98)
“in 1831 de Tocqueville, writing from the United states, correctly observed: “The more I see of this country the more I admit myself penetrated with this truth: that there is nothing absolute in the theoretical value of political institutions, and that the efficiency depends almost always on the original circumstances and the social conditions of the people to whom they are applied” (s.112)
December 30, 2022
Most Americans today won't know who Kennan was, but he was the talk of DC back in the 50s. The man was a premier diplomat, who served all over the world and through the State Department, and was the key architect of America's policy of containment during the Cold War - Kennan convinced multiple administrations that cooler heads and a focus on diplomacy over bombs would lead to the collapse of the USSR - with the two notable failures (that he explores in the tail end of this book) of Korea and Vietnam.
This is a great exploration of how America approached the Cold War, with some key lessons for what to do - and not do - today with Russia and China.
This is a great exploration of how America approached the Cold War, with some key lessons for what to do - and not do - today with Russia and China.
December 29, 2024
Most Americans today won't know who Kennan was, but he was the talk of DC back in the 50s. The man was a premier diplomat, who served all over the world and through the State Department, and was the key architect of America's policy of containment during the Cold War - Kennan convinced multiple administrations that cooler heads and a focus on diplomacy over bombs would lead to the collapse of the USSR - with the two notable failures (that he explores in the tail end of this book) of Korea and Vietnam.
This is a great exploration of how America approached the Cold War, with some key lessons for what to do - and not do - today with Russia and China.
This is a great exploration of how America approached the Cold War, with some key lessons for what to do - and not do - today with Russia and China.
April 23, 2025
“On balance, we have little to be ashamed about. The rest of the world can be thankful that if a great world power had to arise on this magnificent North American territory in the last three centuries (and this could not have been avoided), it was one as peaceably and generously minded as this one. The offenses we have offered to our world environment since the establishment of our independence have been ones arising as a rule not from any desire on our part to bring injury to others or to establish power over them, but from our attempts to strike noble postures and to impress ourselves.”
- George Kennan
- George Kennan
May 21, 2018
It is a well written and easy to read analysis of the American Foreign policy from 1900 to 1955. The book is divided into two parts. The first part analyses the American war with Spain, America's open door policy on China, America and its antagonisms with Japan, World War 1 and World War 2 . The second part analysis America's relations with the Soviet Union and it attempts to visualise what the future relationship between America and Russia should look like in the future. It is indeed interesting to read this latter part bearing in mind the strenuous relationships between America and Russia.
August 29, 2023
I'm glad I read this - a very concise introduction to Kennan's thoughts on the American experience in foreign diplomacy during the early 20th century. The foreword by John Mersheimer also teases much of the critical insight out of his writings. For me this was just an introduction to Kennan and his ideas and experience of conducting foreign policy and diplomacy and I plan to read more of his writings.
April 29, 2025
Really well-interesting. This book was published nearly 75 years ago and the wisdom and insight about foreign policy and international relations beats most of what is "known" and practiced today. Kennan is a clear thinker and a great writer. I can't believe I didn't read this earlier. I'm glad I read it now.
July 16, 2021
The nearly 50 pages of introduction by John Mearsheimer, in which he disagrees with Kennan's thesis before I even had the chance to be properly introduced to it by Kennan himself, left a bit of a sour taste. I did enjoy the lectures, though. The Foreign Affairs articles were less interesting.
June 2, 2022
The chapters on Russia were very very enlightening and such a contrast to today's politics. Kennan was wise beyond his years in his approach to the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as regimes that differ from the United States. I only wish that today's policy makers held that same compassion.
December 6, 2023
Kennan really knows his stuff. He also loves to talk. A lot. Someone could articulate as well as him while making it much more concise. With that said, I did learn a lot and his content is still interesting.
March 11, 2022
Plot: none
Characters: none
Description: 10
Conversations: none
Flow: 9
Structure: 10
Bookmark pages/phrases: 11
Ending: 9
~a must to a better understanding of America and psychology in general~
Characters: none
Description: 10
Conversations: none
Flow: 9
Structure: 10
Bookmark pages/phrases: 11
Ending: 9
~a must to a better understanding of America and psychology in general~
Displaying 1 - 30 of 51 reviews