What do you think?
Rate this book
Wargames: From Gladiators to Gigabytes
Where did wargames come from? Who participated in them, and why? How is their development related to changes in real-life warfare? Which aspects of war did they capture, which ones did they leave out, how, and why? What do they tell us about the conduct of war in the times and places where they were played? How useful are they in training and preparation for war? Why are some so much more popular than others, and how do men and women differ in their interest? Starting with the combat of David versus Goliath, passing through the gladiatorial games, tournaments, trials by battle, duels, and board games such as chess, all the way to the latest simulations and computer games, this unique book traces the subject in all its splendid richness. As it does so, it provides new and occasionally surprising insights into human nature.
342 pages, Paperback
First published April 30, 2013
3 people are currently reading
121 people want to read
About the author
Martin van Creveld
65 books128 followersMartin Levi van Creveld is an Israeli military historian and theorist.
Van Creveld was born in the Netherlands in the city of Rotterdam, and has lived in Israel since shortly after his birth. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he has been on the faculty since 1971. He is the author of seventeen books on military history and strategy, of which Command in War (1985), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977, 2nd edition 2004), The Transformation of War (1991), The Sword and the Olive (1998) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999) are among the best known. Van Creveld has lectured or taught at many strategic institutes in the Western world, including the U.S. Naval War College.
- wikipedia.org
Van Creveld was born in the Netherlands in the city of Rotterdam, and has lived in Israel since shortly after his birth. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he has been on the faculty since 1971. He is the author of seventeen books on military history and strategy, of which Command in War (1985), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977, 2nd edition 2004), The Transformation of War (1991), The Sword and the Olive (1998) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999) are among the best known. Van Creveld has lectured or taught at many strategic institutes in the Western world, including the U.S. Naval War College.
- wikipedia.org
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
January 6, 2015
An uneven work, with a lot of solid information but some lazy errors and a significant portion wasted on wrongheaded and irrelevant ranting.
Van Creveld is a respected authority on military issues, but as in The Culture of War, he seems to have outlived his prime. This is a sometimes odd, meandering sort of history of many activities that are thought of as wargames and some that may not be, such as the ancient rituals of single combats, combats of champions, gladitorial combat, dueling, and jousting. He writes about the development of board games based on war from chess and go forward, through the development of more realistic games used for training and planning starting with the Prussians, as well as force-on-force live maneuvers.
From there he moves into the strictly modern era and writes about computer-based wargames, paintball, airsoft, virtual reality, and the use of lasers to simulate weapons, both civilian laser tag and the more realistic and sophisticated military systems. Here was where I started seeing mistakes and questionable, arbitrary statements unsupported by data or logic. He criticizes the practice of having units stationed long-term at training bases like the U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin in the California desert, to act as the opposing force (OPFOR) for visiting units, on the basis that the OPFOR unit gets to know the terrain better than the visiting unit will and this gives them an edge. That's not wrong, that's just realistic. He says the OPFOR create special tactics to "game the system" that take advantage of the training environment and rules but aren't realistic, but he offers no examples. Being a career Marine, I never got to the NTC, although I was stationed at the USMC counterpart at Twentynine Palms, so I don't know. But I'd like him to explain that criticism.
I know he's wrong, and just sloppy-lazy wrong, when he talks about military laser-based systems. He says "The best available equipment will register hits 500 feet away in full sun and over 900 in the shade (the difference, of course, is one of the things that separates the game from real war ..." I trained with MILES gear (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) as far back as the mid-1980s, and even then that system accurately reflected the ranges of different weapons - 500 to 800 yards for M16 rifles, 1100 yards for machine guns, over a mile for a tank cannon. This book is copyrighted in 2013. Van Creveld specifically talks about the MILES system, but didn't bother to check his facts. For someone presenting himself as an authority, that's not acceptable.
It's in the last part of the book that Van Creveld starts to sound unhinged, though, in the section he titles "The Female of the Species." Here he renews the theme he beat to death in The Culture of War, his belief that women can't possibly be effective in combat - here he seems to argue that because of this they have no place in wargaming. He's wrong on both counts. He spends 36 pages arguing that for there to be any chance of equality when women fight men, they have to "matched either with dwarfs or with handicapped men", and more in that vein. In my training as a Marine officer, there were women in my company in Officer Candidates School and again in the six-month follow-on school, the Basic School, which was mostly field combat training. I would readily trust my life to some of my classmates, male and female, and there were a small number I wouldn't have wanted anywhere near me in combat, again both male and female. It's not gender that matters most, it's character, and next after that is physical capabilities. To function in ground combat, a soldier or Marine needs a range of physical capabilities. Fewer women than men have those abilities, but there are men who lack them too, and assignment to combat should be based on character and on those abilities, not on what's inside someone's underwear.
Not to be slowed down by mere facts, this author drags in every example of ridiculous women-in-combat-situations he can find, mainly in venues like pro wrestling (really?), and ignores the many examples of women serving with distinction in real combat roles, from fighter pilots to truck drivers caught in ambushes, not to mention very capable female boxers, wrestlers, and MMA fighters. He can't conceive of men and women interacting in any way that isn't sexualized, and he seems to have a serious case of "Madonna/slut" syndrome. This is especially ironic given that he is a professor emeritus at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, in Israel - a country in which women are conscripted and serve in the military at a higher rate than anywhere else in the world or in history.
Van Creveld is a respected authority on military issues, but as in The Culture of War, he seems to have outlived his prime. This is a sometimes odd, meandering sort of history of many activities that are thought of as wargames and some that may not be, such as the ancient rituals of single combats, combats of champions, gladitorial combat, dueling, and jousting. He writes about the development of board games based on war from chess and go forward, through the development of more realistic games used for training and planning starting with the Prussians, as well as force-on-force live maneuvers.
From there he moves into the strictly modern era and writes about computer-based wargames, paintball, airsoft, virtual reality, and the use of lasers to simulate weapons, both civilian laser tag and the more realistic and sophisticated military systems. Here was where I started seeing mistakes and questionable, arbitrary statements unsupported by data or logic. He criticizes the practice of having units stationed long-term at training bases like the U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin in the California desert, to act as the opposing force (OPFOR) for visiting units, on the basis that the OPFOR unit gets to know the terrain better than the visiting unit will and this gives them an edge. That's not wrong, that's just realistic. He says the OPFOR create special tactics to "game the system" that take advantage of the training environment and rules but aren't realistic, but he offers no examples. Being a career Marine, I never got to the NTC, although I was stationed at the USMC counterpart at Twentynine Palms, so I don't know. But I'd like him to explain that criticism.
I know he's wrong, and just sloppy-lazy wrong, when he talks about military laser-based systems. He says "The best available equipment will register hits 500 feet away in full sun and over 900 in the shade (the difference, of course, is one of the things that separates the game from real war ..." I trained with MILES gear (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) as far back as the mid-1980s, and even then that system accurately reflected the ranges of different weapons - 500 to 800 yards for M16 rifles, 1100 yards for machine guns, over a mile for a tank cannon. This book is copyrighted in 2013. Van Creveld specifically talks about the MILES system, but didn't bother to check his facts. For someone presenting himself as an authority, that's not acceptable.
It's in the last part of the book that Van Creveld starts to sound unhinged, though, in the section he titles "The Female of the Species." Here he renews the theme he beat to death in The Culture of War, his belief that women can't possibly be effective in combat - here he seems to argue that because of this they have no place in wargaming. He's wrong on both counts. He spends 36 pages arguing that for there to be any chance of equality when women fight men, they have to "matched either with dwarfs or with handicapped men", and more in that vein. In my training as a Marine officer, there were women in my company in Officer Candidates School and again in the six-month follow-on school, the Basic School, which was mostly field combat training. I would readily trust my life to some of my classmates, male and female, and there were a small number I wouldn't have wanted anywhere near me in combat, again both male and female. It's not gender that matters most, it's character, and next after that is physical capabilities. To function in ground combat, a soldier or Marine needs a range of physical capabilities. Fewer women than men have those abilities, but there are men who lack them too, and assignment to combat should be based on character and on those abilities, not on what's inside someone's underwear.
Not to be slowed down by mere facts, this author drags in every example of ridiculous women-in-combat-situations he can find, mainly in venues like pro wrestling (really?), and ignores the many examples of women serving with distinction in real combat roles, from fighter pilots to truck drivers caught in ambushes, not to mention very capable female boxers, wrestlers, and MMA fighters. He can't conceive of men and women interacting in any way that isn't sexualized, and he seems to have a serious case of "Madonna/slut" syndrome. This is especially ironic given that he is a professor emeritus at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, in Israel - a country in which women are conscripted and serve in the military at a higher rate than anywhere else in the world or in history.
November 23, 2020
A few observations:
Creveld uses a lot of old sources, particularly in the early chapters. This doesn't inspire confidence that his descriptions are fully up to date with current scholarship.
I don't think he understands videogames. Indeed, he seems to imply that a key difference between strategy games and shooters is that strategy games are turn-based and shooters real-time, thus ignoring games like Age of Empires, Total War, and Company of Heroes. It is also somewhat absurd that he picks an obscure title like Forge of Freedom as his one example of a strategy game instead of any of those listed above, or Civilization, Hearts of Iron, Command and Conquer, etc.
In general, the book is strongest on aspects related directly to militaries, which makes sense as that is closest to Creveld's usual forte. Bits on reenactment and amateur hex-based wargaming are too cursory and anecdotal.
Creveld uses a lot of old sources, particularly in the early chapters. This doesn't inspire confidence that his descriptions are fully up to date with current scholarship.
I don't think he understands videogames. Indeed, he seems to imply that a key difference between strategy games and shooters is that strategy games are turn-based and shooters real-time, thus ignoring games like Age of Empires, Total War, and Company of Heroes. It is also somewhat absurd that he picks an obscure title like Forge of Freedom as his one example of a strategy game instead of any of those listed above, or Civilization, Hearts of Iron, Command and Conquer, etc.
In general, the book is strongest on aspects related directly to militaries, which makes sense as that is closest to Creveld's usual forte. Bits on reenactment and amateur hex-based wargaming are too cursory and anecdotal.
August 12, 2016
Yikes! The hardcover is selling for over a hundred on Amazon. Save some of your money. Kindle might be the best bargain if you're really interested in the subject or the author. He is a prolific one, whose Supplying War & The Transformation of War are considered classics by some. This is an adequate introductory history on war games, whatever they may be. The author takes a stab at it, but throws his net a bit far, I think. Included in the author's survey are war games pertaining to religious rites, judicial combat, and trial by combat. He also focuses on war games as learning exercises/ exercises in preparedness for actual war, and as entertainment. The former categories do not seem to be "games" at all, while the latter do. This problem categorizing appears to be the result of the contaminative nature of what is construed to be "entertainment". Practically anything watchable for enjoyment, whether that be its direct purpose or not. If people gather and enjoy a good duel, this activity warrants the appellation of "war game." I'm inclined to view war games as lacking actual war's seriousness, though remaining similar to war for purposes of knowledge or entertainment, and therefore judicial combat & religious rites should be excluded as non-applicable . A duel is really neither a "war", nor a "game". The author attaches religious rites to gladiatorial games, thus making his connection. These seem very separate to me. Religious rites may placate the gods through the entertaining arena combat, perhaps, as the author states, yet the vehicle is not its passenger and shouldn't be confused as such. Of course, a book does need fleshing out, and nothing fleshes out a book better than stepping away from a relevant topic by including one maybe less so, yet capable of filling pages. Speaking of which, the penultimate chapter on women and war games is nothing less than creepy. The author's personal misogynistic views are happily unpacked, though this helps educate as to the nature of war games hardly at all. To summarize: Women hardly play; they'd likely get beat anyway; they're best left to flashing male players while spectating, or adding chess skills to a career in prostitution, or having a discreet dinner with the author. There is much that is fine with this book, but chapter 7 isn't a part of it. His survey of military games, however, appears comprehensive, if somewhat rudimentary. His notion that war games are separated from actual war by removal of "the continuation of politics" is probably superficially correct, but factually inaccurate. I suspect the author is aware of this. Gladiators and their contests are exhaustingly, if not exhaustively, dealt with at the beginning. Tournaments are wandered through. The similarities enumerated between sport and war games are rather interesting, as well. The author explores the change of strategic planning after the emergence of nuclear weapons and its effects on war gaming with adequate deftness. The rise of the computer is given its proper space, with its Battlezone & Metal Gear. The use of simulation with the rise of complex technology is expounded upon. Still, I can't help walking away from this work thinking it could have been better: more detailed, more interesting, Better written. The center of the book contains most of whatever meat you'll find. The bread holding it may leave you with a "gamey" taste in your mouth.
December 30, 2013
Why do men (mostly) play at war? For religious reasons, to settle disputes, to train or plan for real war, and for entertainment. From tribal mock battles and Roman gladiators, to tournaments, single combat, and duels, to board games and computer-based simulations, van Creveld takes the reader through an exhausting—excuse me, I should say exhaustive—history of wargames in their many forms and roles in their respective societies.
I learned that I would like very much not to travel back to ancient Rome, nor would I like to prove my case with a fight to the death. I also learned that video games, laser tag and paintball have converged with reality to the extent that playing at war and preparing for the real thing are sometimes indistinguishable.
van Creveld draws lines between war, wargames and other games. It's not always obvious, but history provides many examples to illustrate the differences. The framing of games and sports as wargames also helps to explain why we may have the games, and perhaps part of their appeal.
In his whirlwind tour of the subject—spanning thousands of years in a little over 300 pages—the author raises questions that warrant a follow-up. In particular, to what extent have wargames and simulations influenced strategy and the outcomes of real wars since Prussia instituted gaming as a planning methodology in the late 19th century? Applying the lessons to the present, to what extent does the historical record support the expectation that strategists employing simulations gain an advantage from their use?
I learned of Martin van Creveld from an old friend who recommended his earlier book, The Transformation of War, which I also recommend. Again with his new book, van Creveld provides history, thoughtful analysis, and stimulating arguments. You don't have to agree with him, but wrestling with what he writes is a worthy exercise.
I learned that I would like very much not to travel back to ancient Rome, nor would I like to prove my case with a fight to the death. I also learned that video games, laser tag and paintball have converged with reality to the extent that playing at war and preparing for the real thing are sometimes indistinguishable.
van Creveld draws lines between war, wargames and other games. It's not always obvious, but history provides many examples to illustrate the differences. The framing of games and sports as wargames also helps to explain why we may have the games, and perhaps part of their appeal.
In his whirlwind tour of the subject—spanning thousands of years in a little over 300 pages—the author raises questions that warrant a follow-up. In particular, to what extent have wargames and simulations influenced strategy and the outcomes of real wars since Prussia instituted gaming as a planning methodology in the late 19th century? Applying the lessons to the present, to what extent does the historical record support the expectation that strategists employing simulations gain an advantage from their use?
I learned of Martin van Creveld from an old friend who recommended his earlier book, The Transformation of War, which I also recommend. Again with his new book, van Creveld provides history, thoughtful analysis, and stimulating arguments. You don't have to agree with him, but wrestling with what he writes is a worthy exercise.
September 14, 2014
This is a book, by a military historian, about things that aren't quite wars. That covers an incredible range, from staged tribal conflicts, to duels, to computer games. I enjoyed the breadth, but it did leave me wishing to know more about the various topics, and wondering just how they fit together. The chapters are largely independent, making this a good book to browse in.
It would have been better to have a slightly more systematic conclusion, trying to compare and contrast all the different strands of the book. Even without that though I thought it was worth reading.
It would have been better to have a slightly more systematic conclusion, trying to compare and contrast all the different strands of the book. Even without that though I thought it was worth reading.
June 17, 2014
Assez déçu par celui-ci, pourtant j'adore les ouvrages précédents de l'auteur, et le sujet me tiens à coeur, mais au final pas grand chose de neuf dans ce livre, qui étend le "wargame" à toutes les simulations guerrières, des jeux du cirque aux jeux PC, en passant par le duel judiciaire et les échecs. Bref ça part un peu dans toutes les directions mais il n'en ressort pas grand chose, dommage.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews