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A Diplomatic History of The American Revolution
This introduction to the diplomacy of the American Revolution presents a fresh, realistic, and balanced portrait of revolutionary diplomats and diplomacy."The best single-volume introduction to the diplomacy of the American Revolution that we have." -H.M. Scott, University of St. Andrews, Scotland"This book certainly will become the new standard account of the subject....The book's many footnotes and its annotated bibliography provide a rich survey of research in the field. Specialists as well as students should profit from this work. Highly recommended for public and university libraries."-Library Journal"The book appears to be designed for use by students but most historians will find it thought-provoking."-Journal of the Early Republic"This will become the successor to Bemis's The Diplomacy of the American Revolution for at least as many years as that work has been the standard. Dull's writing is clear and often elegant, the positions are convincing, and the footnotes and bibliography are an important contribution in themselves."-Lawrence Kaplan, Kent State University
236 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1985
52 people want to read
About the author
Jonathan R. Dull
15 books4 followersJonathan R. Dull is the retired senior associate editor of The Papers of Benjamin Franklin series.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
September 24, 2020
i had to read this for a foreign policy class. it was overall pretty informative and provided an in-depth look into how the basis of modern american diplomacy was formed.
February 17, 2017
A short but dense history of the war’s diplomacy, with an emphasis on the European balance of power. Dull does a fine job putting all developments into their international context. He also debunks the more traditional narratives about the American mission’s supposed “idealism” or the effect of Saratoga. The narrative is clear and well-organized.
Dull’s arguments are judicious, and he emphasizes the realpolitik behind the France’s motives in supporting the colonists, as well as how the era’s communications made diplomacy evolve at a relatively slow pace. Ironically, America’s victory depended heavily on the aid of nations that whose motives had little to do with America and who ultimately reaped few benefits from the outcome of the war.
Dull ably describes Franklin’s mission in Paris and the many obstacles he faced, as well as his cleverness in manipulating France’s grievances from the last war. Dull describes the role of the European balance of power, the influence of smaller nations, and the Revolution’s impact in Europe, France’s alliance with Spain, the reluctance of the Spanish to take a more active role, the diplomatic isolation of Britain, and Britain’s eventual anxiety for peace, and how the Americans agreed to a separate peace to the chagrin of the French. Dull concludes that, ironically, Britain gained the most from peace while France gained the least, and that Britain’s war-weariness was the most significant factor in its search for peace. He also disputes the idea that the revolution in America triggered such movements elsewhere.
Still, the significance of some developments is never explained, and the narrative is rather lifeless. It doesn’t add much new, either. His treatment of Shelburne also seems a bit flat.
Dull’s arguments are judicious, and he emphasizes the realpolitik behind the France’s motives in supporting the colonists, as well as how the era’s communications made diplomacy evolve at a relatively slow pace. Ironically, America’s victory depended heavily on the aid of nations that whose motives had little to do with America and who ultimately reaped few benefits from the outcome of the war.
Dull ably describes Franklin’s mission in Paris and the many obstacles he faced, as well as his cleverness in manipulating France’s grievances from the last war. Dull describes the role of the European balance of power, the influence of smaller nations, and the Revolution’s impact in Europe, France’s alliance with Spain, the reluctance of the Spanish to take a more active role, the diplomatic isolation of Britain, and Britain’s eventual anxiety for peace, and how the Americans agreed to a separate peace to the chagrin of the French. Dull concludes that, ironically, Britain gained the most from peace while France gained the least, and that Britain’s war-weariness was the most significant factor in its search for peace. He also disputes the idea that the revolution in America triggered such movements elsewhere.
Still, the significance of some developments is never explained, and the narrative is rather lifeless. It doesn’t add much new, either. His treatment of Shelburne also seems a bit flat.
April 30, 2008
Most Americans of the Cold War generation grew up being educated in modestly sized (and modestly funded) elementary school classrooms. Almost inevitably, these rooms held a map of the world, one in which the United States lay directly in the center and the Soviet Union was left split in half on the edges. Not surprisingly, many Americans grew up assuming that their country and their history were central to the global experience. For this reason, American scholars might be surprised to open Jonathan R. Dull’s A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution and find not a map of the continental United States, but instead one of eighteenth-century Europe. But by page four, readers will come to understand Dull’s cartographic choice. He contends that “in studying the origins of American diplomacy we as Americans must be careful…to avoid the all-too-human tendency to believe ourselves the central point around which the world revolves.” For the entire 163 pages of his text, Dull makes good on this promise.
In A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution, Jonathan Dull examines diplomacy’s role—and especially European diplomacy—in the American Revolution. For this reason, his title is slightly deceiving. Dull focuses on an international perspective over America’s emerging foreign relations. While notable American diplomats such as Benjamin Franklin and John Adams get their due, Dull pays more attention to their French, Spanish, British, Russian, and even Polish counterparts. He uses these old-world diplomats, and monarchs, to endorse his thesis: namely, that the outcome of the American revolution relied less on American diplomats actions and more on the self-interested parties of Europe who strained against the threat of an overwhelming English empire.
The book begins with a brief explanation of the “Balance of Power” paradigm. This theory states that “because each state fears for its own security it theoretically will be impossible for any single state to dominate all the others; as soon as one state threatens to become too strong, the other will combine forces to prevent its dominance” (4). In the mid-eighteenth century, that state was England. Dull utilizes statistics to show the supremacy of English power, most notably their overwhelming naval superiority. England’s growing power posed a threat to eighteenth-century Europe’s delicate balance of treaties and alliances. For this reason, the American Revolution provided European diplomats with an opportunity to reshape the power structure of Europe away from England. Dull concludes that without repeated English diplomatic ineptitude, America might not have achieved liberty. His final message is one of caution: that “the moral of the American Revolution thus may be the unpredictability, the expense, and the danger of war” (163).
Dull cites many key diplomatic events that led to America’s victory over the greatest military power in the globe. He describes how sectional disputes hindered inter-union consensus and that all states agreed: by 1776 the British naval blockade needed to be broken. This break required foreign intervention. The Continental Congress jumped at a chance to ally with both France and Spain. The former country—a seemingly constant enemy of the British—offered their assistance early on, and for this reason America’s nascent alliance with France has become common knowledge. Spain, on the other hand, had more reservations on joining a Franco-American alliance. Dull paints this often overlooked nation as Machiavellian in nature, a true player in global power politics. He even goes so far as to state that “it is almost inconceivable that France and the United States could have defeated Britain without Spanish help” (109). His arguments on this point comprise, arguably, the most intriguing and valuable section of A Diplomatic History.
During the American revolution Spain hoped to achieve three goals: end the British presence in Gibraltar and Minorca, regain control of Florida, and oust English timber-cutters in Central America. The Spanish had no compunction on which side might better help them attain their goals. Spanish diplomats were so shrewd at the negotiating table that desperate American and Franco forces left room for Spain to join in an alliance at any later date. Early French naval failures made a Spanish alliance even more necessary. Biding its time, Spain finally offered to mediate the conflict between Britain and France “prudently waiting to make any decisions herself until her annual treasure ships had arrived.” Dull argues that domestic pressures within England made the return of Gibraltar impossible, as it stood as a symbol of British influence. Spain finally sided with France, on the condition that they conduct a joint invasion of England, an invasion that was staged outside Plymouth in 1779.
Historians should find A Diplomatic History a stylistic success. Dull’s writing style, with concise sentences and vigorous language, will appeal to graduate students of U.S. Diplomatic history. And the book’s modest size—163 pages—make it an ideal read for undergraduates. His brief character sketches add just enough background to introduce figures, but not enough to dilute his flow. Readers receive brief explanations as to why the Kings and Queens of Europe conspicuously endorsed England’s isolation during the Revolutionary period. Dull makes his arguments logically, following a chronology based on diplomatic records. The bulk of Dull’s methodology focuses less on primary sources, however, and more on synthesizing more current monographs and collections of correspondences. For example, he relies heavily on the Labaree and Willcox’s The Papers of Benjamin Franklin as well as his own previous work The French Navy and American Independence. For this reason, A Diplomatic History will appeal most to experts in the field looking for new angles on a much covered topic.
One work that Dull never really delves into is Samuel Flagg Bemis’s The Diplomacy of the American Revolution. True, Dull takes Bemis’s work into consideration in his introductory chapter by stating that it remained a standard in the field since its publication in 1935. He then states that his own work provides much needed updates in the field. To be fair, other diplomatic historians reviewed this 1985 work positively. In The Journal of Southern History, Clifford Egan suggests that Dull’s book “certainly will become the new standard account of the subject,” while in The American Historical Review Paul Varg states that Dull should be “complimented for his thoroughness.” Nevertheless, both of these reviewers assert that Bemis’s work still begs attention. But neither reviewer is as scathing as Bradford Perkins. In the June 1986 edition of Reviews in American History, Perkins takes Dull’s work to task. He points out the lack of depth in Dull’s latest addition to the field, and comments that while “solid,” this addition to the field is “disappointing.” Perkins concludes that when it comes to Diplomatic histories of the American Revolution, Bemis’s work still reigns supreme.
In A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution, Jonathan Dull examines diplomacy’s role—and especially European diplomacy—in the American Revolution. For this reason, his title is slightly deceiving. Dull focuses on an international perspective over America’s emerging foreign relations. While notable American diplomats such as Benjamin Franklin and John Adams get their due, Dull pays more attention to their French, Spanish, British, Russian, and even Polish counterparts. He uses these old-world diplomats, and monarchs, to endorse his thesis: namely, that the outcome of the American revolution relied less on American diplomats actions and more on the self-interested parties of Europe who strained against the threat of an overwhelming English empire.
The book begins with a brief explanation of the “Balance of Power” paradigm. This theory states that “because each state fears for its own security it theoretically will be impossible for any single state to dominate all the others; as soon as one state threatens to become too strong, the other will combine forces to prevent its dominance” (4). In the mid-eighteenth century, that state was England. Dull utilizes statistics to show the supremacy of English power, most notably their overwhelming naval superiority. England’s growing power posed a threat to eighteenth-century Europe’s delicate balance of treaties and alliances. For this reason, the American Revolution provided European diplomats with an opportunity to reshape the power structure of Europe away from England. Dull concludes that without repeated English diplomatic ineptitude, America might not have achieved liberty. His final message is one of caution: that “the moral of the American Revolution thus may be the unpredictability, the expense, and the danger of war” (163).
Dull cites many key diplomatic events that led to America’s victory over the greatest military power in the globe. He describes how sectional disputes hindered inter-union consensus and that all states agreed: by 1776 the British naval blockade needed to be broken. This break required foreign intervention. The Continental Congress jumped at a chance to ally with both France and Spain. The former country—a seemingly constant enemy of the British—offered their assistance early on, and for this reason America’s nascent alliance with France has become common knowledge. Spain, on the other hand, had more reservations on joining a Franco-American alliance. Dull paints this often overlooked nation as Machiavellian in nature, a true player in global power politics. He even goes so far as to state that “it is almost inconceivable that France and the United States could have defeated Britain without Spanish help” (109). His arguments on this point comprise, arguably, the most intriguing and valuable section of A Diplomatic History.
During the American revolution Spain hoped to achieve three goals: end the British presence in Gibraltar and Minorca, regain control of Florida, and oust English timber-cutters in Central America. The Spanish had no compunction on which side might better help them attain their goals. Spanish diplomats were so shrewd at the negotiating table that desperate American and Franco forces left room for Spain to join in an alliance at any later date. Early French naval failures made a Spanish alliance even more necessary. Biding its time, Spain finally offered to mediate the conflict between Britain and France “prudently waiting to make any decisions herself until her annual treasure ships had arrived.” Dull argues that domestic pressures within England made the return of Gibraltar impossible, as it stood as a symbol of British influence. Spain finally sided with France, on the condition that they conduct a joint invasion of England, an invasion that was staged outside Plymouth in 1779.
Historians should find A Diplomatic History a stylistic success. Dull’s writing style, with concise sentences and vigorous language, will appeal to graduate students of U.S. Diplomatic history. And the book’s modest size—163 pages—make it an ideal read for undergraduates. His brief character sketches add just enough background to introduce figures, but not enough to dilute his flow. Readers receive brief explanations as to why the Kings and Queens of Europe conspicuously endorsed England’s isolation during the Revolutionary period. Dull makes his arguments logically, following a chronology based on diplomatic records. The bulk of Dull’s methodology focuses less on primary sources, however, and more on synthesizing more current monographs and collections of correspondences. For example, he relies heavily on the Labaree and Willcox’s The Papers of Benjamin Franklin as well as his own previous work The French Navy and American Independence. For this reason, A Diplomatic History will appeal most to experts in the field looking for new angles on a much covered topic.
One work that Dull never really delves into is Samuel Flagg Bemis’s The Diplomacy of the American Revolution. True, Dull takes Bemis’s work into consideration in his introductory chapter by stating that it remained a standard in the field since its publication in 1935. He then states that his own work provides much needed updates in the field. To be fair, other diplomatic historians reviewed this 1985 work positively. In The Journal of Southern History, Clifford Egan suggests that Dull’s book “certainly will become the new standard account of the subject,” while in The American Historical Review Paul Varg states that Dull should be “complimented for his thoroughness.” Nevertheless, both of these reviewers assert that Bemis’s work still begs attention. But neither reviewer is as scathing as Bradford Perkins. In the June 1986 edition of Reviews in American History, Perkins takes Dull’s work to task. He points out the lack of depth in Dull’s latest addition to the field, and comments that while “solid,” this addition to the field is “disappointing.” Perkins concludes that when it comes to Diplomatic histories of the American Revolution, Bemis’s work still reigns supreme.
January 5, 2025
Solid introduction to an overall view of diplomacy during the American revolution. Dull primarily focuses on the European balance of power. Personally, I think he gives far too much credit to France and later Spain in American independence—virtually nothing in Americas credit to their own war effort, diplomatically or otherwise. He also spends some time discussing the importance of Russia, which I failed to see as very serious. In the wrap up, he argues the greatest loser was Spain, which seems reasonable in they would come to lose all of their holdings in North America, and Gibraltar, and claims the biggest winner as Britain—perhaps fair?
Do note, this book is NOT about the diplomatic history of AMERICA in the American revolution, rather, a diplomatic history of the involved parties in the American revolution. (Although he leaves out all of Africa—including Morocco who plays a role in early American recognition). Overall, if you want a view of the political landscape of the European nations during the revolution, this book is perfect. Besides his theory that the deceleration of independence was chiefly a foreign policy document—which I find rather convincing—Dull spends little time on the American home front. Still, a solid book a quick read. I do wish he wrote more chronologically and included dates as he often intertwined anecdotes out of order.
Do note, this book is NOT about the diplomatic history of AMERICA in the American revolution, rather, a diplomatic history of the involved parties in the American revolution. (Although he leaves out all of Africa—including Morocco who plays a role in early American recognition). Overall, if you want a view of the political landscape of the European nations during the revolution, this book is perfect. Besides his theory that the deceleration of independence was chiefly a foreign policy document—which I find rather convincing—Dull spends little time on the American home front. Still, a solid book a quick read. I do wish he wrote more chronologically and included dates as he often intertwined anecdotes out of order.
January 30, 2020
Gives a fairly traditional view on the American Revolution. Focuses heavily on France's involvement and Benjamin Franklin's role in the Revolution. Builds on historiography of Flagg Bemis.
April 20, 2020
Read this classic in graduate school at Mississippi State University two times.
March 5, 2022
Very interesting overview of the American Revolution from a European perspective. I liked the shorter chapters, it helped me focus in on what was being talked about.
September 20, 2017
This book was - sorry for the awful pun - painstakingly dull. The kind of book that I found myself reading but not understanding.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews