How We Know: An Exploration Of The Scientific Process

by Martin Goldstein, Inge F. Goldstein

The portraits of Freud, Shakespeare, Einstein, and Leonardo da Vinci on the cover symbolize a major theme of How We Know -that the creative imagination plays a role in the sciences no less than in the arts, and that scientific discoveries have an aesthetic beauty of their own that can be enjoyed by the nonscientist. Written to be understood by readers without proper scientific training, the main features of scientific method are illustrated by the use of case histories of research and discovery. The book also explores such questions as the nature of scientific understanding of the world, how theories are invented, how they are tested experimentally, and whether the scientist is ever "objective."The broad scientific experience of Martin and Inge Goldstein has made them aware not only of the distinctive features of diverse disciplines, but also of the common ground all fields of science share. This book was written in the belief that these common features of the scientific enterprise can be communicated to the nonscientist, and that it is important both for science and for society as a whole that this be done. How We Know offers help to those mystified and confused by the methods and aims of science. It firmly establishes science as a product of human beings acting in human ways, a process where the search for beauty can be as compelling as the search for truth.

Genres: Science, Nonfiction

376 pages, Paperback

Published March 22, 1981

About the author

Dr. Marty Goldstein's Smith Ridge Veterinary Center is in South Salem, New York. He received his D.V.M. from the Cornell University College of Veterinary Medicine and has been at the forefront of integrative medicine for pets for decades. He has many cats and dogs, all of which are quite old and healthy. Dr. Goldstein is also the author of The Nature of Animal Healing.

Reviews

[Jiang Qin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book talks about lot of misconceptions about scientific discoveries which are even prevalent today. It’s a must read for PhD students or PhD supervisors
1. Research is not know where to dig and you get the answer. It’s doing experiments that give you unexpected results that make us think and explain.
2. Hypothesis is genius work. Vary by person.
3. Discoveries are by time. Calculus cannot be discovered even by genius such as Newton or Leibniz 100 earlier than it should be ; and can be discovered by a common brain 100 years later. Because scientific discoveries are community work, borrowing mind from each other.
4. Experiments mean the end of personal authority
5. Scientific discoveries are for general knowledge, unlike novels for special characters.
6. Cultural roots influence science.
7. Science need all kinds of people, if you’re unique, come here.

Great book!

[Alfred Stappenbeck · Rating 2 out of 5]

Is science superior to witchcraft?

The authors should have titled their book "How we don't know". Dr Martin and Inge Goldstein are unable to answer the question: "Is science superior to witchcraft?" Rather than attempting to convince you of this point by my own statements I will let the book speak for itself.

"It would not be correct to say that modern science provides a better explanation than witchcraft for the things the Azande wish to explain. Rather, the questions the Azande seek answers for are different from the ones science tries to answer. Why did this particular cut in the foot get infected, while dozens of other such cuts did not? Why did the granary collapse just when people were sitting under it?" Page 266

"As we will see, the belief in witchcraft fulfills many of the criteria of a scientific system: it provides understanding, it is generally applicable to a wide range of phenomena, and it is based on experimental evidence." Page 262

"As we pointed out, the Azande belief in witchcraft has many features of a scientific system. First, it has great explanatory power and is of great generality in application: it explains more of the events and misfortunes of daily life than any Western scientific system does. Also, it supported by experimental evidence: the stubbed toe that becomes infected, the wooden bowl that splits, the granary that collapses. Further experimental evidence is provided by the poison oracle.

One may ask, but what about the truth or falsity of the belief in witchcraft itself? Can that not be subject to an experimental test that would convince the Azande of its falsity?

Here we must remember a point made many times in this book: testing a theory is not a routine procedure. What kind of experimental evidence will be considered relevant is always a subjective judgment of the Scientific community involved." Page 271

"Is what we have called the scientific method, as developed mainly in Western societies, a better, surer road to truth and understanding than any other? Or is truth relative, and what is true in one culture false in another, with no objective way to decide? We are not trying to answer these questions. Our purpose is a much less ambitious one: to make the reader aware that such questions exist.
However solid and universal scientific knowledge may seem, it should be recognized that it is a culturally determined kind of knowledge, expressed in the language--in both the literal and conceptual senses of the word language—of a particular culture, and it depends in complex ways on the unspoken assumptions of that culture." Page 272

So there you have it, science is a “culturally determined kind of knowledge,...”. The authors are unwilling to state clearly that science is superior to witchcraft. In fact they are unwilling to say science is capable of certainty.

"We will show at length why experimental facts that agree with a theory don't really ”prove” it correct, and why even if they disagree they don't always ”prove" it wrong." Page 7

Now you must be wondering how is this book able to take this position? I think I can help explain it. I believe this view is a result of a denial of our ability to know or grasp an external, objective existence.

"It is apparent that seeing— the sense we think of as most directly putting us in touch with facts—is learned rather than automatic. We see with our minds, not with our eyes, and we are subject to whatever unconscious biases and misconceptions are produced by the training that teaches us to see.

We are not arguing a case for disbelieving what we see. We have no choice, really. However, being aware that perception is not passive observation but rather a learned use of our intellectual faculties, however unconsciously it is done, should alert us to the possibility that things need not be what they seem, and that changes in our own thinking may change what we see. " pages 17 and 18

This distorting effect is how the authors arrive at logical fallacies like ad populum, that even they have to admit.

"Thus, we conclude that, although facts indeed are stubborn things, they are inextricably interwoven with our prior hypotheses and our cultural prejudices. It is best to think of them as having a man-made component rather than being purely objective facets of an already existing nature, although they can be as tangible and inescapable as such other man-made objects as 10-ton trucks. " Page 21

"So facts are not really independent of the observer and his theories and preconceptions. However, at any one time, in any one culture, it is usually possible for most observers to agree on them. To put it better, facts are what all observers agree on." Page 21

"It is the job of the consensus of scientists to decide which theory works and which one does not, and in the long run it tends to correct the mistakes of the enthusiast and retain what is worthwhile in his work." Page 112

Finally, we have the admission of ad populum and the excuse that it’s all we have.

"This allows for the possibility that the informed and interested observers could all be wrong. It has happened in the past and will happen again. But it is the best we can do, and it is what makes science possible." Page 22

Why stop there, here is some more ad populum!

"We cannot repeat often enough that one of the greatest misconceptions about science is that the "facts" are there, clear cut, well defined, and inescapable, and that scientific investigation starts with them. The reality is quite different. Faced with any problem, we quickly realize that the number of facts that we might consider is enormous, and we must rather begin with some choice of which ones we will assume are relevant and which are not. If we do not begin with some preconceptions as to which are worth looking at, we can't begin at all. And if it is pointed out that preconceptions might mislead us, we can only answer that this is a risk we must take. The most useless advice we can be given when starting out on a problem is that we should rid our minds of all preconceptions. We should rid our minds only of the false ones, but which are they?" Page 163

No answer is given on that last question about knowing which preconceptions to throw out. Again we see the admission of guilt and then the inability to provide any solution.

"In part, the distinction can be made on the basis that, in the long run, the subjective sense of understanding must be accepted by a scientific community: science is not concerned with "private" facts and experiences but with public ones. That this is so does not imply that questions of scientific truth are settled by majority vote. Scientific communities have wholeheartedly adhered to erroneous beliefs for long periods of time, as have other kinds of communities of human beings. There have been examples of great discoveries being initially rejected with scorn by the majority, although this happens less often than the reader may think. The operative term in the first sentence above is "in the long run.” It is not an absolute assurance of the value of the insight, but it is what we rely on. We have little choice." Page 197

You might be drawing the conclusion that this book is just an exception and I just happened to have picked the rotten one in the bunch. Possibly, but I suspect not. The review below doesn’t prove my point but it indicates a blindness to these problems. T.A. Scott writing his review of this book in the April 1979 periodical “Biochemical Education”, writes

“Certainly it is an ideal book for school teachers, and for the layman interested in the scientific process. It can be strongly recommended to school pupils from the beginning of "O" level work to the end of the sixth form. It could be useful reading for arts student who wants an insight into the scientific process, and it might be included in a reading list for the "A" level general paper, and for Oxbridge scholarship work. But it should be pointed out that the reviewer, who is a professional scientist, derived much pleasure and not a little instruction from this first-rate book.”

I fully admit that whomever T.A. Scott is you have no reason to treat him as an authority. Also, this is one individual. To learn more about the overall issue I believe is prevalent in modern science, do some searches on the topic of “Facts Theory Laden” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory-l.... This is well traveled ground that is not unique to the Goldstein’s.

[Jeffrey Romine · Rating 3 out of 5]

I guess it takes a rare person to read a book on general science published over thirty years ago. I found it in a used bookstore in Billings, MT. As a mixture of science and epistemology, I found it touched on many topics I like thinking about.

[Susan · Rating 5 out of 5]

rereading today...

[James Henry · Rating 4 out of 5]

Truly fascinating ...