What do you think?
Rate this book
The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World
Why do we try to use military force to solve our political problems? And why, when our forces win the military battles does this still fail to solve those problems? It is because the force lacks utility. From Iraq to the Balkans, and from Afghanistan to Chechneya, over the past fifteen years there has been a steady stream of military interventions that have not delivered on their promise for peace, or even political resolution. The Utility of Force explains this anomaly at the heart of our current international system.
415 pages, Kindle Edition
First published September 29, 2005
139 people are currently reading
2585 people want to read
About the author
Rupert Smith
7 books10 followersGeneral Sir Rupert Smith retired from the British Army in 2002. His last appointment was Deputy Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe 1998-2001, covering NATO's Balkan operations, including the Kosovo bombing, and the development of the European Defence and Security Identity.
Prior to that he was the general Officer Commanding in Northern Ireland, 1996-1998; Commander UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, 1995; the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff for Operations, 1992-1994; and General Officer Commanding 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 1990-1992, including the Gulf War.
He was educated at the Haileybury and Imperial Service College and later at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_S...
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/people...
Prior to that he was the general Officer Commanding in Northern Ireland, 1996-1998; Commander UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, 1995; the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff for Operations, 1992-1994; and General Officer Commanding 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 1990-1992, including the Gulf War.
He was educated at the Haileybury and Imperial Service College and later at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_S...
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/people...
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 58 reviews
February 19, 2024
Why the Strongest Armies May Lose the Newest Wars
Right now in Somalia some of the strongest formal armies on earth is being fought to a standstill by relatively smaller more nimble units, some even insurgents using rocket-propelled grenades, rifles and improvised roadside bombs. This should not come as a surprise. Meanwhile a powerful modern military in the middle east may be winning battles, but its country being politically devastated to the point it may never recover.
Since the war on terror Military theorists around the globe a shift in warfare—nonstate actors, asymmetric threats, technology proliferation, etc.—and suggested that the military
forces currently fielded by Western nations are expensive but not nimble enough to deal with these new liabilities. Until politicians do realize this, traditional armies, applying traditional wisdom, will continue to misapply their power and invite defeat at the hands of seemingly inferior enemies.
General Smith has more credentials than many of his American peers. Being with the British Army for over 40 years of service, this included command positions in Northern Ireland, Iraq and the Balkans. He maintains that the world has entered a new era dominated by nebulous, open-ended conflicts that are as much political as military.
His experiences mean held commands at each level and at all forms of combat, and gained his appreciation of this firsthand. Second (although not stated as overtly) much of his command experience has been as part of coalitions, which he recognizes will likely be the future of warfare rather than individual nation-states.
Finally, he organizes modern war into the wars of Napoleon—into three distinct forms of war, corresponding roughly to three historical periods: interstate industrial war, the Cold War (which he regards as primarily an anomaly of the era of mutually assured destruction), and (paraphrasing Mao's
"on guerilla warefare") as “war amongst the people.”
The meaning is that modern enemies who do not wear a uniform but move freely “amongst the people” knowing that they can provoke collateral damage and win political favor. (A classic example of this is keeping camera crews new schools and hospitals then using them to stage rocket attacks on enemy troops. The inevitable counter-attack getting innocent civilians killed, and harvesting international sympathy.)
Smith uses this idea to examine past conflicts, touching even on the guerrilla fighters operating on the Iberian Peninsula during Napoleon. The book is not strictly scholastic nor to be seen as such but rather a skillfully presented observation of modern war trends... Before the war in Ukraine.
The writing style presents many unique and insightful ideas. It will be a bit slow going for for those who don't study war and military affairs in depth, and it's an excellent observation of modern guerilla warefare.
8.5/10 It helps explain the nature of a lot of non-nation-state conflicts one sees in the news. That said, his argument that “industrial war” – aka. the traditional wars of the Napoleonic and early twentieth-century era – have been entirely replaced with wars “amongst the people”... doesn't hold up.
Ukraine and the Gulf Wars show us otherwise.
Right now in Somalia some of the strongest formal armies on earth is being fought to a standstill by relatively smaller more nimble units, some even insurgents using rocket-propelled grenades, rifles and improvised roadside bombs. This should not come as a surprise. Meanwhile a powerful modern military in the middle east may be winning battles, but its country being politically devastated to the point it may never recover.
Since the war on terror Military theorists around the globe a shift in warfare—nonstate actors, asymmetric threats, technology proliferation, etc.—and suggested that the military
forces currently fielded by Western nations are expensive but not nimble enough to deal with these new liabilities. Until politicians do realize this, traditional armies, applying traditional wisdom, will continue to misapply their power and invite defeat at the hands of seemingly inferior enemies.
General Smith has more credentials than many of his American peers. Being with the British Army for over 40 years of service, this included command positions in Northern Ireland, Iraq and the Balkans. He maintains that the world has entered a new era dominated by nebulous, open-ended conflicts that are as much political as military.
His experiences mean held commands at each level and at all forms of combat, and gained his appreciation of this firsthand. Second (although not stated as overtly) much of his command experience has been as part of coalitions, which he recognizes will likely be the future of warfare rather than individual nation-states.
Finally, he organizes modern war into the wars of Napoleon—into three distinct forms of war, corresponding roughly to three historical periods: interstate industrial war, the Cold War (which he regards as primarily an anomaly of the era of mutually assured destruction), and (paraphrasing Mao's
"on guerilla warefare") as “war amongst the people.”
The meaning is that modern enemies who do not wear a uniform but move freely “amongst the people” knowing that they can provoke collateral damage and win political favor. (A classic example of this is keeping camera crews new schools and hospitals then using them to stage rocket attacks on enemy troops. The inevitable counter-attack getting innocent civilians killed, and harvesting international sympathy.)
Smith uses this idea to examine past conflicts, touching even on the guerrilla fighters operating on the Iberian Peninsula during Napoleon. The book is not strictly scholastic nor to be seen as such but rather a skillfully presented observation of modern war trends... Before the war in Ukraine.
The writing style presents many unique and insightful ideas. It will be a bit slow going for for those who don't study war and military affairs in depth, and it's an excellent observation of modern guerilla warefare.
8.5/10 It helps explain the nature of a lot of non-nation-state conflicts one sees in the news. That said, his argument that “industrial war” – aka. the traditional wars of the Napoleonic and early twentieth-century era – have been entirely replaced with wars “amongst the people”... doesn't hold up.
Ukraine and the Gulf Wars show us otherwise.
November 26, 2019
General Rupert Smith published his book, “The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World”, to critical acclaim. The UK's Evening Standard called it “provocative and startling … an update of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu for our time”. The popular military historian and journalist Max Hastings added in the Sunday Telegraph that it was “hard to overstate the devastating nature of this book as an indictment of almost everything the West has done in recent years, and is doing today. If [it] does not prompt red faces in Downing Street and at the White House, it is only because their occupants are too shameless to be capable of embarrassment.” Nick Ryan called it “fascinating” and “essential reading for all politicians and supporters of military ventures.” After receiving such critical acclaim, I was expecting a book that would be a rival of Sun Tzu, Niccolò Machiavelli and Carl von Clausewitz, but I was so wrong.
Put bluntly, it is simply very long-winded, repetitive and rather banal. Moreover, more than half of the book is just an overview of military history: starting from the French Revolutionary/Napoleonic wars; the impact of Napoleon, Clausewitz and Moltke the elder on the development of military theory (it also goes into a bit of Clausewitz and highlights his concept of the “trinity”); the impact that technology had on the development of warfare; the World Wars; the Cold War and how this conflict led to the demise of industrial war; finally, on page 267 of 404, Smith begins to discuss his conception on the new paradigm of warfare – “wars amongst the people”. Throughout the entirety of the book, Smith tends to drift towards a narrative description of events and away from a critical analysis of history. For example, he spends around 10 pages just describing what happened during the Korean war – which, for those who do not know much about the war, is appropriate – he does not use this war to develop ideas, rendering the narrative description of what happened in the war to be rather pointless. Then, and this is the biggest problem with the book, it takes Smith too long to convey and develop rather simple ideas. For instance, when trying to state that a military’s overall capability is dependent upon means, way and will, the author raves on for 419 words (it needs to be quoted in full because it is emblematic of Smith’s writing style):
“Throughout these pages we have seen how political will is an essential ingredient to success in war. The will to triumph, to carry the risks and bear the costs, to gain the reward of victory, is immense; as Napoleon had, ‘The moral is to the physical as three to one.’ And, indeed, in assessing capability we should weight this factor accordingly. But as with the means and the trial of strength, here too the way is important: the way the force is being used will have a direct impact on the will to take the risk, bear the burden and endure to the end. And once again the way is the business of the general: he must have the confidence of both his command and his political masters that he knows the way. And so, having analysed and understood the necessary components, we can finnaly attempt to assess the overall capability of a force as a product of the trial of strength and a clash of wills: the means multipled by the way multiplied by the will times three. For those of a mathematical bent I express it as a formula:
“Capability = Means x Way^2 x 3Will
“But always remember Foucault’s dictum: power is not a possession but a relationship. So we must only ever understand the capability of a force as being relative to that of its opponent. We must therefore assess the capability of each, and then complete the two.
“I use the mathematical formulation to illustrate the complexity of judging a force’s true capability as opposed to counting its inventories. It allows an assessment of the other factors, the role of the leaders in particular, in prosecuting a conflict or confrontation in the face of the opponent’s action. Indeed, seen this way it is clear that the capability of a force is the product of all three factors compared to the opponent’s; if any of them is zero then there is no capability. As we will see, one of the endemic problems of our modern conflicts is the lack of political will to employ force rather than deploy forces – meaning will is close to zero – which is why many military interventions fail: the force capability is voided. Equally, the means of war, particularly the availability of manpower, are crucial: there must be at least one man or once again the capability will be zero. To go in the other direction it is well to remember Lenin’s dictum that ‘quantity has a quality of its own’.” (242-243)
Moving to the General’s ideas we must answer a question: how do they hold up?
“War no longer exists”, writes General Smith at the opening of his book. He attempts to clarify this statement by the end of the paragraph and suggests that “war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in international affairs” are over. Clearly, though, they are not because most “non-combatants” would regard the events that the General participated in during the 1990s, and events in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, as war. Moreover, as demonstrated by the fact that the author can no longer sustain this assertion for more than a page, Smith’s argument is that war, nowadays, is just “war amongst the people”.
Moving past this sloppy and, quite possibly, deliberate hyperbolic statement, General Smith argues in this book that “industrial war” – aka. the interstate wars of the Napoleonic and early twentieth-century era – have been replaced with wars “amongst the people”. This change in paradigm has resulted in a change in the utility of force. While many have recognized this change to have taken place, not many have come up with effective solutions to the problem.
The need to adapt and the inflexibility of the American military was evident during their Kosovo campaign – a campaign where Smith became involved as DSACEUR three months prior to the commencement of operations. As identified by the General, except for General Wesley K. Clark – who paints a similar picture in his book “Waging Modern War” – most senior US military personnel were deeply set in their industrial air-power ways.
General Smith has identified six characteristics of contemporary war:
• “The ends of war have changed from the pursuit of outright victory to the creation of conditions which would allow for the “The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided
• We fight amongst the people, not on the battlefield
• Our conflicts tend to be timeless, even unending
• We fight so as to preserve the force rather than risking all to gain the objective
• On each occasion, new uses are found for old weapons and organizations which are the products of industrial war
• The sides are mostly non-state, comprising some form of multinational grouping against some non-state party or parties.”
While I may disagree with the General’s previous statement that interstate warfare is over (for example, the First and Second Gulf War were all examples of interstate war, and the Western intervention into Libya was, as some people may forget, a limited interstate war), the General’s view on the characteristics of “wars amongst the people” is largely correct. In the concluding section of the book he provides some ways for us to deal with this “new” style of warfare. Overall, though, I do not think the General’s recommendations and his identifying characters of wars amongst the people are that unique and are rather obvious. The fact that this book is being hailed as a work of scholarship comparable to the flawed classics by Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz is disturbing: has our knowledge of military history and ways to adapt to changing circumstances degenerated to the point where we need the obvious to be stated?
Put bluntly, it is simply very long-winded, repetitive and rather banal. Moreover, more than half of the book is just an overview of military history: starting from the French Revolutionary/Napoleonic wars; the impact of Napoleon, Clausewitz and Moltke the elder on the development of military theory (it also goes into a bit of Clausewitz and highlights his concept of the “trinity”); the impact that technology had on the development of warfare; the World Wars; the Cold War and how this conflict led to the demise of industrial war; finally, on page 267 of 404, Smith begins to discuss his conception on the new paradigm of warfare – “wars amongst the people”. Throughout the entirety of the book, Smith tends to drift towards a narrative description of events and away from a critical analysis of history. For example, he spends around 10 pages just describing what happened during the Korean war – which, for those who do not know much about the war, is appropriate – he does not use this war to develop ideas, rendering the narrative description of what happened in the war to be rather pointless. Then, and this is the biggest problem with the book, it takes Smith too long to convey and develop rather simple ideas. For instance, when trying to state that a military’s overall capability is dependent upon means, way and will, the author raves on for 419 words (it needs to be quoted in full because it is emblematic of Smith’s writing style):
“Throughout these pages we have seen how political will is an essential ingredient to success in war. The will to triumph, to carry the risks and bear the costs, to gain the reward of victory, is immense; as Napoleon had, ‘The moral is to the physical as three to one.’ And, indeed, in assessing capability we should weight this factor accordingly. But as with the means and the trial of strength, here too the way is important: the way the force is being used will have a direct impact on the will to take the risk, bear the burden and endure to the end. And once again the way is the business of the general: he must have the confidence of both his command and his political masters that he knows the way. And so, having analysed and understood the necessary components, we can finnaly attempt to assess the overall capability of a force as a product of the trial of strength and a clash of wills: the means multipled by the way multiplied by the will times three. For those of a mathematical bent I express it as a formula:
“Capability = Means x Way^2 x 3Will
“But always remember Foucault’s dictum: power is not a possession but a relationship. So we must only ever understand the capability of a force as being relative to that of its opponent. We must therefore assess the capability of each, and then complete the two.
“I use the mathematical formulation to illustrate the complexity of judging a force’s true capability as opposed to counting its inventories. It allows an assessment of the other factors, the role of the leaders in particular, in prosecuting a conflict or confrontation in the face of the opponent’s action. Indeed, seen this way it is clear that the capability of a force is the product of all three factors compared to the opponent’s; if any of them is zero then there is no capability. As we will see, one of the endemic problems of our modern conflicts is the lack of political will to employ force rather than deploy forces – meaning will is close to zero – which is why many military interventions fail: the force capability is voided. Equally, the means of war, particularly the availability of manpower, are crucial: there must be at least one man or once again the capability will be zero. To go in the other direction it is well to remember Lenin’s dictum that ‘quantity has a quality of its own’.” (242-243)
Moving to the General’s ideas we must answer a question: how do they hold up?
“War no longer exists”, writes General Smith at the opening of his book. He attempts to clarify this statement by the end of the paragraph and suggests that “war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in international affairs” are over. Clearly, though, they are not because most “non-combatants” would regard the events that the General participated in during the 1990s, and events in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, as war. Moreover, as demonstrated by the fact that the author can no longer sustain this assertion for more than a page, Smith’s argument is that war, nowadays, is just “war amongst the people”.
Moving past this sloppy and, quite possibly, deliberate hyperbolic statement, General Smith argues in this book that “industrial war” – aka. the interstate wars of the Napoleonic and early twentieth-century era – have been replaced with wars “amongst the people”. This change in paradigm has resulted in a change in the utility of force. While many have recognized this change to have taken place, not many have come up with effective solutions to the problem.
The need to adapt and the inflexibility of the American military was evident during their Kosovo campaign – a campaign where Smith became involved as DSACEUR three months prior to the commencement of operations. As identified by the General, except for General Wesley K. Clark – who paints a similar picture in his book “Waging Modern War” – most senior US military personnel were deeply set in their industrial air-power ways.
General Smith has identified six characteristics of contemporary war:
• “The ends of war have changed from the pursuit of outright victory to the creation of conditions which would allow for the “The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided
• We fight amongst the people, not on the battlefield
• Our conflicts tend to be timeless, even unending
• We fight so as to preserve the force rather than risking all to gain the objective
• On each occasion, new uses are found for old weapons and organizations which are the products of industrial war
• The sides are mostly non-state, comprising some form of multinational grouping against some non-state party or parties.”
While I may disagree with the General’s previous statement that interstate warfare is over (for example, the First and Second Gulf War were all examples of interstate war, and the Western intervention into Libya was, as some people may forget, a limited interstate war), the General’s view on the characteristics of “wars amongst the people” is largely correct. In the concluding section of the book he provides some ways for us to deal with this “new” style of warfare. Overall, though, I do not think the General’s recommendations and his identifying characters of wars amongst the people are that unique and are rather obvious. The fact that this book is being hailed as a work of scholarship comparable to the flawed classics by Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz is disturbing: has our knowledge of military history and ways to adapt to changing circumstances degenerated to the point where we need the obvious to be stated?
August 3, 2008
One of the most far-sighted and at the same time down-to-earth studies of modern warfare I've ever read; General Smith is brilliant, and I would like to have served with him (wrong country's military, though, as he's British.)
If it is possible to take a stance on war that is simultaneously humane and ruthless, utterly pragmatic and deeply moral, this book illuminates that philosophy.
The author traces the evolution of how people have thought about and fought wars from the beginnings of history until now. He makes a strong case that due to habit, laziness of thought, and the prioritization of pleasing corporate campaign donors and pork-barrel constituencies rather than building the most effective military we can, we are absolutely ready to fight the USSR in Europe, which will never happen, but not at all organized, trained, or equipped to handle fourth generation warfare, i.e. what General Smith calls 'war amongst the people', and offers the Palestinean Intifada and the IRA's tactics in Northern Ireland as examples.
He is refreshingly candid about his own experiences, both some mistakes from which he learned and some deeply frustrating ones in which forces of which he was part were given an impossible mission in the Balkans, expected to bring about peace without being allowed to do more than make empty threats against the Bosnian Serbs until late in that war.
To sum it up, we're ready for high-intensity nation-versus-nation industrial warfare but not for what we've been facing since the end of World War II.
To the extent that recent events indicate things are getting better in Iraq, it's because General Petraeus is smart enough to take an approach that is basically the same as that recommended by this author, i.e. the military equivalent of beat cops doing community policing in neighborhoods vs. SWAT teams roaring in with guns blazing. Not nearly as dramatic but much more effective, and not nearly as hard on the civilian population caught in the middle.
Anyone interested in national security, military affairs, or the defense industry should read this book, at least once, preferably multiple times with a highlighter.
If it is possible to take a stance on war that is simultaneously humane and ruthless, utterly pragmatic and deeply moral, this book illuminates that philosophy.
The author traces the evolution of how people have thought about and fought wars from the beginnings of history until now. He makes a strong case that due to habit, laziness of thought, and the prioritization of pleasing corporate campaign donors and pork-barrel constituencies rather than building the most effective military we can, we are absolutely ready to fight the USSR in Europe, which will never happen, but not at all organized, trained, or equipped to handle fourth generation warfare, i.e. what General Smith calls 'war amongst the people', and offers the Palestinean Intifada and the IRA's tactics in Northern Ireland as examples.
He is refreshingly candid about his own experiences, both some mistakes from which he learned and some deeply frustrating ones in which forces of which he was part were given an impossible mission in the Balkans, expected to bring about peace without being allowed to do more than make empty threats against the Bosnian Serbs until late in that war.
To sum it up, we're ready for high-intensity nation-versus-nation industrial warfare but not for what we've been facing since the end of World War II.
To the extent that recent events indicate things are getting better in Iraq, it's because General Petraeus is smart enough to take an approach that is basically the same as that recommended by this author, i.e. the military equivalent of beat cops doing community policing in neighborhoods vs. SWAT teams roaring in with guns blazing. Not nearly as dramatic but much more effective, and not nearly as hard on the civilian population caught in the middle.
Anyone interested in national security, military affairs, or the defense industry should read this book, at least once, preferably multiple times with a highlighter.
January 20, 2019
Recommended to me by somebody that had served with the author, and for good reason - Gen. Rupert Smith displays a dazzling knowledge of military history and theory, pairing them with insights and recommendations for the modern military.
I found plenty of notable ideas here, but they were all too often buried within numerous long-winded reiterations of the same point. "Ah" I would think, "That's a great point!". I would then read that point again five times over the next ten pages. Five chapters later he would decide to insert it once more.
Five stars for fine analysis of military history and bringing strategic theory up to date. One star docked for repetition and inane sentences that added padding to a fine book, such as "You should conceal your intelligence because your opponent can deduce your intentions and actions from that knowledge, and by keeping him unaware you can surprise him".
I found plenty of notable ideas here, but they were all too often buried within numerous long-winded reiterations of the same point. "Ah" I would think, "That's a great point!". I would then read that point again five times over the next ten pages. Five chapters later he would decide to insert it once more.
Five stars for fine analysis of military history and bringing strategic theory up to date. One star docked for repetition and inane sentences that added padding to a fine book, such as "You should conceal your intelligence because your opponent can deduce your intentions and actions from that knowledge, and by keeping him unaware you can surprise him".
July 10, 2024
Raar boek om te reviewen. Bij somige delen kon ik het niet neerleggen, dat gaat dan vooral om de geschiedenis delen. Andere delen waren oprecht zzzzzzzzzzzzzz. Omdat de geschiedenis delen toch echt super nice waren, toch een 4.
June 25, 2019
Smith posits that a new paradigm of warfare now exists ("War Amongst the People") yet our military institutions are still wildly geared towards conventional/industrial war (the paradigm of a now bygone era according to Smith).
Smith's rendering of this new paradigm (and how to effectively adapt to it) make the book a worth while read. However, he seems to give the impression that this new paradigm of "War Amongst the People" has (or at least should) completely replaced the old paradigm of conventional/industrial warfare. However, as Mearsheimer's writings show
, Great Power rivalries are far from over, and as long as these rivalries exist (or even their mere possibility exists), nation-states have no choice but to maintain robust conventional military capabilities.
I ultimately accept Smith's notion of "War Amongst the People"; I don't accept it as a panacea though. We need to be able to operate effectively in both paradigms he discusses. As a British General, I think his nation's declining role in the world, their concept of collective security in the international realm, and his own personal experiences (some of which he discusses in detail later in the book) predisposed him to see all the answers to Western militaries' problems in understanding and adapting to his new paradigm. All that being said, if you do you find yourself in "War Amongst the People" (which Western militaries certainly have a lot lately- and may continue to), Smith has plenty of important lessons to impart.
For me, the real question is: how do we man, train, equip, and organize in order to function in both modes of warfare?
War Amongst the People: SOCOM, Marine Corps?
Conventional/Industrial War: Army, Air Force, Navy?
Crossover and compliment as required?
Smith's rendering of this new paradigm (and how to effectively adapt to it) make the book a worth while read. However, he seems to give the impression that this new paradigm of "War Amongst the People" has (or at least should) completely replaced the old paradigm of conventional/industrial warfare. However, as Mearsheimer's writings show
, Great Power rivalries are far from over, and as long as these rivalries exist (or even their mere possibility exists), nation-states have no choice but to maintain robust conventional military capabilities. I ultimately accept Smith's notion of "War Amongst the People"; I don't accept it as a panacea though. We need to be able to operate effectively in both paradigms he discusses. As a British General, I think his nation's declining role in the world, their concept of collective security in the international realm, and his own personal experiences (some of which he discusses in detail later in the book) predisposed him to see all the answers to Western militaries' problems in understanding and adapting to his new paradigm. All that being said, if you do you find yourself in "War Amongst the People" (which Western militaries certainly have a lot lately- and may continue to), Smith has plenty of important lessons to impart.
For me, the real question is: how do we man, train, equip, and organize in order to function in both modes of warfare?
War Amongst the People: SOCOM, Marine Corps?
Conventional/Industrial War: Army, Air Force, Navy?
Crossover and compliment as required?
May 2, 2019
I'm giving it five stars in advance, because it is not aimed at the junior officer levels. Nevertheless, it is amazing in explaining some basic ideas (Trinity of People/army/government, clash of will, trial of strength) and explaining them through ample and well-researched examples from 1750 until 2003. It gave me a sense of what the challenges are at the most senior level. In addition, it's much more practical and thought-out than 'the new rules of war' I read lastly, while even introducing the same elements of changing paradigm. I recommend it to anyone interested in the phenomenon of conflict.
November 25, 2023
General Smith's Paradigm remains relevant in our current geopolitical world, with the many lessons of the utility of force remaining absent in the many theaters of war we see today.
"The enemy is amongst the People, and the purpose of any use of military Force and other power is to differentiate between the enemy and the people, and to win the latter over to you."
"The enemy is amongst the People, and the purpose of any use of military Force and other power is to differentiate between the enemy and the people, and to win the latter over to you."
November 19, 2008
Rupert Smith's "The Utility of Force" is part of a growing number of books that looks at the practice of peacekeeping and counter-insurgency, topics that seem to get more newspaper coverage than book-length treatments.
Smith, who had previous experience commanding the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, ponders about why conventional forces are pretty useless in counter-insurgency and peacekeeping missions, and examines what change of thinking is needed in the employment of force (as opposed to deployment, where you send them there to do what?).
The "change of thinking" part is a little tricky, since force is being used to create a condition of stability so that local political institutions can become functional again.
But the time element doesn't get addressed well enough. We're used to measuring our wars by definite measure--battles won, ground gained. If you can do that in less than a few years, then a democracy can maintain political support from the voters.
Maintaining a security regime and waiting for the locals to get their act together is not easily measured and can take years. To the folks back home, it is a pointless repetition of bad news or no news. Smith correctly notes that most wars today are going to be guerilla conflicts and peacekeeping missions. The practical elements of policing these situations is evident in the book. The political element, while addressed at the prescriptive level, receives little practical treatment. Smith the general had to deal with elected and appointed political officials, but his job obviously did not require him to deal with selling a policy to voters. How to do that will be found in somebody else's book.
Smith, who had previous experience commanding the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, ponders about why conventional forces are pretty useless in counter-insurgency and peacekeeping missions, and examines what change of thinking is needed in the employment of force (as opposed to deployment, where you send them there to do what?).
The "change of thinking" part is a little tricky, since force is being used to create a condition of stability so that local political institutions can become functional again.
But the time element doesn't get addressed well enough. We're used to measuring our wars by definite measure--battles won, ground gained. If you can do that in less than a few years, then a democracy can maintain political support from the voters.
Maintaining a security regime and waiting for the locals to get their act together is not easily measured and can take years. To the folks back home, it is a pointless repetition of bad news or no news. Smith correctly notes that most wars today are going to be guerilla conflicts and peacekeeping missions. The practical elements of policing these situations is evident in the book. The political element, while addressed at the prescriptive level, receives little practical treatment. Smith the general had to deal with elected and appointed political officials, but his job obviously did not require him to deal with selling a policy to voters. How to do that will be found in somebody else's book.
January 19, 2016
I bought this book after it was recommended by someone who served with the author. It is very good and discusses warfare from it's early days right up until recently.
I've no doubt it's required reading in military academies. His thesis revolves around how force is utilised (The Utility of Force) and it explains many paradoxes on armed conflict - for example how the French and the Americans were both defeated in Vietnam.
A must read for anyone who wonders why countries with massive armed forces cannot defeat a infinitely smaller force and how the new dimension of Media in Warfare is such a powerful multiplier for organisations like Daesh and Boko Haram.
I've no doubt it's required reading in military academies. His thesis revolves around how force is utilised (The Utility of Force) and it explains many paradoxes on armed conflict - for example how the French and the Americans were both defeated in Vietnam.
A must read for anyone who wonders why countries with massive armed forces cannot defeat a infinitely smaller force and how the new dimension of Media in Warfare is such a powerful multiplier for organisations like Daesh and Boko Haram.
July 23, 2017
War can't be separated from politics. General Smith agrues that with the shift to asymertical wars, or "wars among the people" as he called it, that has taken even great significance. And yet, we still try to fight wars and prepare for wars between two countries.
Why I started this book: I checked out a digital version from the library.
Why I finished it: Sheer stubborness. This book was so hard to me to plow through, something about the style of Gen. Smith's writing stopped me in my tracks. The combination of British author and military jargon made it very dense reading.
Why I started this book: I checked out a digital version from the library.
Why I finished it: Sheer stubborness. This book was so hard to me to plow through, something about the style of Gen. Smith's writing stopped me in my tracks. The combination of British author and military jargon made it very dense reading.
April 17, 2021
The Utility of Force is a book with some valuable insights, but one that is ultimately about twice as long as it ever needed to be to deliver them. It's probably best to get the discussion of its shortcomings out of the way first. This could have been a brilliant extended article or series published by RUSI, Foreign Policy or Proceedings, or even a highly successful short book in the ~100-page range, marketed in the same manner as your shorter business/management books, but aimed at an audience of military and policy professionals. Instead, it's near 450 pages, much of it fluff: very broad and generic historical narratives, pages of supposedly illustrative charts and so on. It's difficult to determine why this is the case. One possibility is that Sir Rupert had some kind of prepaid contract to deliver 400+ pages, and realized halfway through that he was out of material and they wouldn't just let him triple-space it and use 14-point font. It certainly reads that way at times. More charitably, it's probable that he and his editors misread his likely reading audience as being the general public, who could not be counted on to know that the Napoleonic Wars had happened, or anything else about the history of human conflict in the past 250 years. While it would be great if more voters gave detailed thought to national security strategy, it's probably not the case, and to even an amateur historian or moderately well-informed interested person, this book is going to drag with extended descriptions of basic facts that you already know.
Which is a pity, because the author is not wrong on his main points, and these points are both insightful and highly relevant as countries such as the United Kingdom and United States make very basic and consequential decisions about national security in an era of constrained resources and increasing international competition. Viz:
-- The enormous conscript armies, armed by mass production, that were characteristic of the Napoleonic Wars and World Wars in the 20th Century, are obsolete and would be useless in practice, because any country that would require such an army to subdue would also be able to employ nuclear weapons against it, rendering it irrelevant or, as the General would describe it, "lacking in utility." This has, of course, been true since at least the 1960s, if not earlier, but is still not widely appreciated by those who bemoan our inability to re-fight World War Two.
-- In the absence of a permanent national mobilization, force preservation of a country's small, expensively equipped, professional military becomes a key policy consideration, in much the same way that pre-industrial armed forces were constrained by the inability of their governments to replace them. This limits the scale of the objectives that can be sought, much as it did in the 1700s.
-- Given that it is essentially impossible for a modern great power -- or even a middle power like Iran or Italy -- to be outright conquered, limited conflicts fought for limited objectives, under constrained conditions and closely tied to less violent forms of competition and to civil and diplomatic conditions are likely to be the norm. The conflict in Bosnia, the bane of so many Western military establishments who saw it as a distraction from their "real" business of winning the next World War, exemplifies this, and provides many of the author's anecdotes, given his close involvement there. This has always been true to an extent: war is an extension of politics by other means, after all. However, the extent to which the World Wars have set the tone of the American, Russian and Chinese military establishments for the last century has obscured this even among military leaders who should know better. The recent emphasis on so-called "gray zone" conflict is a symptom of national military establishments finally beginning to learn this lesson.
Overall recommendation: skim it. Gain insight from the good parts, don't feel bad about skipping the filler material.
Which is a pity, because the author is not wrong on his main points, and these points are both insightful and highly relevant as countries such as the United Kingdom and United States make very basic and consequential decisions about national security in an era of constrained resources and increasing international competition. Viz:
-- The enormous conscript armies, armed by mass production, that were characteristic of the Napoleonic Wars and World Wars in the 20th Century, are obsolete and would be useless in practice, because any country that would require such an army to subdue would also be able to employ nuclear weapons against it, rendering it irrelevant or, as the General would describe it, "lacking in utility." This has, of course, been true since at least the 1960s, if not earlier, but is still not widely appreciated by those who bemoan our inability to re-fight World War Two.
-- In the absence of a permanent national mobilization, force preservation of a country's small, expensively equipped, professional military becomes a key policy consideration, in much the same way that pre-industrial armed forces were constrained by the inability of their governments to replace them. This limits the scale of the objectives that can be sought, much as it did in the 1700s.
-- Given that it is essentially impossible for a modern great power -- or even a middle power like Iran or Italy -- to be outright conquered, limited conflicts fought for limited objectives, under constrained conditions and closely tied to less violent forms of competition and to civil and diplomatic conditions are likely to be the norm. The conflict in Bosnia, the bane of so many Western military establishments who saw it as a distraction from their "real" business of winning the next World War, exemplifies this, and provides many of the author's anecdotes, given his close involvement there. This has always been true to an extent: war is an extension of politics by other means, after all. However, the extent to which the World Wars have set the tone of the American, Russian and Chinese military establishments for the last century has obscured this even among military leaders who should know better. The recent emphasis on so-called "gray zone" conflict is a symptom of national military establishments finally beginning to learn this lesson.
Overall recommendation: skim it. Gain insight from the good parts, don't feel bad about skipping the filler material.
August 13, 2021
The Utility of Force travels through the history of industrial war, contrasting it with the development of the “war amongst the people” paradigm. The thesis of the book is that war as we understand it has changed, and we need to think about force differently if we are to employ it to good effect.
A thoughtful book, this had many interesting ideas. Smith’s choice not to use references bothered the academic in me, especially as so much of his argument was based in either historical conflicts or current debates in the literature. The author’s personal insight as a result of his military service was where I felt he really added value, speaking candidly and analytically about his experiences. The text has started to date since its 2005 publication, but this does show where the argument holds weight and where it potentially falls down.
In short, a useful book but one to be taken with a pinch of salt in places. It is a heavy read but worth it on the whole.
A thoughtful book, this had many interesting ideas. Smith’s choice not to use references bothered the academic in me, especially as so much of his argument was based in either historical conflicts or current debates in the literature. The author’s personal insight as a result of his military service was where I felt he really added value, speaking candidly and analytically about his experiences. The text has started to date since its 2005 publication, but this does show where the argument holds weight and where it potentially falls down.
In short, a useful book but one to be taken with a pinch of salt in places. It is a heavy read but worth it on the whole.
February 4, 2022
This book is worth a read by any member of the profession of arms or government services expected to engage in operations overseas. Smith clearly knows the business of force and communicates so effectively. Overall, this book could be boiled down to just its introduction and conclusion chapters to glean everything of value but there are some good examples throughout, particularly in Part 3. The most impressive part of this book is that its insights were released in 2007, most of which would appear to be self evident today. So it is fairly prescient in its depiction of current competition and conflict. However, I would have liked to see him address the threats of major interstate conflict within his paradigm. Of course, I am writing this 15 years after he wrote the book when the world context has shifted so much with the reappearance of the Russian threat and the rise of China.
October 22, 2023
Main theory is that industrial war has shifted to conflicts and confrontations among the people and was written by a British General with incredible experience in fighting war among the people. The book has some great points and planning considerations for the new paradigm. An interesting link to our military (very small, costly to maintain) resembles the European Armies before Napoleon and the French revolution. I am just still being sold that the industrial war is finished.
abandoned
July 6, 2020I had a very hard time getting myself to sit down and read this book. The various historical bits were interesting, especially the opportunity to read about the Vietnam conflict through foreign eyes, but it seemed like a hard slog -- whether that was caused by or the cause of me having a hard time sitting down to read it isn't obvious.
So, no rating.
So, no rating.
April 20, 2022
Well written, although dense, this book provides many good points in support of a COIN centric approach to war. However, the author in my view overstates his case for transitioning the army T/O and doctrine to a mostly COIN type operating system and discounts the value of deterance of having robust conventional military forces
July 8, 2025
A distinctive set of ideas are illuminated here. However, for all of the author's emphasis on considering the necessity of non-military means when conducting conflicts, these subjects are given very little space.
Additionally, there is a degree of repetition; the thesis put forward is quite bold, but the author uses a limited set of points in outlining his proposition.
Additionally, there is a degree of repetition; the thesis put forward is quite bold, but the author uses a limited set of points in outlining his proposition.
March 2, 2022
..the Futility of Force perhaps ? instead might be a welcome sequel.. obtained a free sample on kindle.., meant to be a modernization of the 'Vom Kriege' by (Prussian) von Clausewitz....
..not for me ... very stark.. doesn't hide the basic reason for armies to kill and destroy opposite side...
..not for me ... very stark.. doesn't hide the basic reason for armies to kill and destroy opposite side...
October 4, 2017
A little long-winded but I feel like I better understand the military perspective regarding international affairs now. Definitely worth a read.
November 8, 2017
Bit dated as he didn't take in account new phenomena like ISIS. Main principles remain valid though.
April 11, 2019
Military view but good brush up on history. Very male and selective though. Needs to be read with other things
June 13, 2019
Very clear insights that are well illustrated.
May 18, 2020
Too much history for my taste and too little reflection on the career and events the author has participated in.
December 15, 2021
The author takes a long winding road to get to the point. And the journey was not as interesting and fun as a topic like this had the potential of being.
November 25, 2023
Fantastically informative, judicious, and convincing. An education in itself.
November 17, 2024
Really unfocused and repetitive
May 29, 2025
This book is a masterpiece! Everyone involved in the military must read it
It is very easy to read, simple concepts that explain the evolution of the use of force from napoleon to the modern era
It is very easy to read, simple concepts that explain the evolution of the use of force from napoleon to the modern era
September 22, 2025
Excellent lessons in history and strategy.
October 20, 2007
General Rupert Smith (UK, Ret.) wrote this after reflection on 40 years of service, including UN duty in the Balkans. The theme of the book is that the nature of conflict has changed, and those who think about the use of national power (diplomatic, information, military, economic). Smith identifies 6 major trends:
- The ends for which we fight are changing
- We fight amongst the people
- Our conflicts tend to be timeless
- We fight so as not to lose the force
- On each occasion new uses are found for old weapons
- The sides are mostly non-state
As he discusses the evolution of modern conflict, and the information(media) and intelligence focus (as opposed to purely physical) of future conflict, he has as a backdrop the United Nations intervention in the Balkans during the 1990s. And the ineffectiveness of the UN forces there, culminating in the massacre of 7,000+ Bosnians by the Serbs in the "safe area" of Srebrenica. Smith points out that the UN members essentially employed a tactic (use of blocking forces) to counter a strategy (Serbian desire to dominate the Balkans) and the Serbians used a wide range of means (propaganda, military, diplomatic) to make the UN military forces irrelevant.
Smith is mostly documenting a problem, one that he views as difficult, and something for U.S. and western nations need to deal with. Because as long as there is a desire to have a world that is not full of the arbitrary violence, ethnic massacres, generators of hate, the west and those that have allied with them will ask their militaries and other instruments of power to enter these parts of the world. And these militaries will have to learn how to operate in these settings. Smith's challenge is that they be sent in a thoughtful way, that the ends are considered with the quality, quantity and purpose of the forces made appropriate to the ends desired. And just how you decide this, are lessons yet to be learned.
This is not an easy book to read. Every passage is meant to be read, then the consequences of every idea thought through. Even the descriptions of historical events have to be mulled in consideration of many facets and the environment around them. But the reader is rewarded with many considerations of thought and issues to debate. And a context for reading anything else in this subject area.
- The ends for which we fight are changing
- We fight amongst the people
- Our conflicts tend to be timeless
- We fight so as not to lose the force
- On each occasion new uses are found for old weapons
- The sides are mostly non-state
As he discusses the evolution of modern conflict, and the information(media) and intelligence focus (as opposed to purely physical) of future conflict, he has as a backdrop the United Nations intervention in the Balkans during the 1990s. And the ineffectiveness of the UN forces there, culminating in the massacre of 7,000+ Bosnians by the Serbs in the "safe area" of Srebrenica. Smith points out that the UN members essentially employed a tactic (use of blocking forces) to counter a strategy (Serbian desire to dominate the Balkans) and the Serbians used a wide range of means (propaganda, military, diplomatic) to make the UN military forces irrelevant.
Smith is mostly documenting a problem, one that he views as difficult, and something for U.S. and western nations need to deal with. Because as long as there is a desire to have a world that is not full of the arbitrary violence, ethnic massacres, generators of hate, the west and those that have allied with them will ask their militaries and other instruments of power to enter these parts of the world. And these militaries will have to learn how to operate in these settings. Smith's challenge is that they be sent in a thoughtful way, that the ends are considered with the quality, quantity and purpose of the forces made appropriate to the ends desired. And just how you decide this, are lessons yet to be learned.
This is not an easy book to read. Every passage is meant to be read, then the consequences of every idea thought through. Even the descriptions of historical events have to be mulled in consideration of many facets and the environment around them. But the reader is rewarded with many considerations of thought and issues to debate. And a context for reading anything else in this subject area.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 58 reviews