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Hierarchy, History, and Human Nature: The Social Origins of Historical Consciousness
"Here is a book that I can strongly recommend for a variety of reasons. It is well written, it is scholarly, but its greatest appeal lies in the posing of an important question and in the offering of a satisfying (to this reviewer, at least) answer."— Journal of Historical Geography
"This is an intriguing and stimulating study of historical differences in the indigenous historiography of parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe."— American Anthropologist.
"This is an intriguing and stimulating study of historical differences in the indigenous historiography of parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe."— American Anthropologist.
- GenresAnthropologyHistory
384 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 1988
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August 8, 2021
Brown links the writing of history to closed and open societies. Closed societies view hierarchy as being fixed in human nature. History is written mythically to support that narrative. India’s caste-ridden culture is a prime example. In open societies, seen in Confucian China for example, such built-in hierarchies don’t exist. There is, rather, an egalitarian view of human nature in which hierarchy depends on skill and merit. History in these societies tends to be “sound,” without those mythical elements to justify status and privilege. Brown discusses other cultures as well, but he is careful not to paint with too broad of a brush. Thus, he claims that Taoism in China was a closed system; Homeric Greece and Renaissance Vienna were closed, but Ionic Greece and Renaissance Florence were open.
This tie between culture systems and historicity (ways of writing history) seems like it might be an odd corner of anthropological research, but there is a broader theme to this book. Brown rejects a caste-like, fixed notion of human nature in which hierarchical advantage is built into the fabric of culture. But he also rejects what he calls extreme cultural relativism in which humans are seen to be born with a blank slate, merely waiting for culture’s imprint. In Brown’s view, human nature does contain a universal tendency toward hierarchy, whether it’s through caste or through meritocracy systems where pride in achievement often goes hand-in-hand with disdain for those with less talent. He writes that “Some specific universals of the human psyche must underlie the tendency of individuals to claim hereditary distinction even when meritocracy is the societal norm….I see no reason to preclude the possibility that certain features of human nature are among the conditions that limit or channel cultural development in general, and, in this particular case, lead to the two syndromes connected with caste and meritocracy.”
This Brown study has implications for historical judgement. Under cultural relativism, it is inherently impossible to make judgements about a different time or place. Each culture, in time or place, has its own standard, and there is no absolute standard from which to judge right or wrong. Moreover, those who write about history are bound up in their own cultural worldview, making it impossible to transcend their own subjectivity. If I understand Brown correctly, he is saying that historians are able to judge other cultures and other historical times in terms of this closed (mythological) or open (objective, at least in principle) standard. Brown’s conclusion also bumps into the assertions by many that prehistoric peoples were egalitarian by nature, and it is development (specifically, “surplus”economies) that results in inequality. Brown at least implies that this argument, highly speculative given limited evidence, is wrong.* Hierarchical tendencies are part of human nature.** While some cultures are better than others at encouraging or discouraging such tendencies, these are but expressions of an underlying biological form.
*Brown hedges a bit when he writes that “when it comes to hierarchy – among literate peoples anyway – human minds seem to think very much alike, in spite of wide separation in space and time,” suggesting that pre-literate people be different. Brown uses the language of mind but mind is more than likely the expression of an inner emotional predisposition.
**While not his example, the USA might be a good case in point. It proclaims egalitarianism, except for Indians and Blacks. For Whites, it is a meritocracy. Those who fail do so because they were and are, inherently or otherwise, without merit.
This tie between culture systems and historicity (ways of writing history) seems like it might be an odd corner of anthropological research, but there is a broader theme to this book. Brown rejects a caste-like, fixed notion of human nature in which hierarchical advantage is built into the fabric of culture. But he also rejects what he calls extreme cultural relativism in which humans are seen to be born with a blank slate, merely waiting for culture’s imprint. In Brown’s view, human nature does contain a universal tendency toward hierarchy, whether it’s through caste or through meritocracy systems where pride in achievement often goes hand-in-hand with disdain for those with less talent. He writes that “Some specific universals of the human psyche must underlie the tendency of individuals to claim hereditary distinction even when meritocracy is the societal norm….I see no reason to preclude the possibility that certain features of human nature are among the conditions that limit or channel cultural development in general, and, in this particular case, lead to the two syndromes connected with caste and meritocracy.”
This Brown study has implications for historical judgement. Under cultural relativism, it is inherently impossible to make judgements about a different time or place. Each culture, in time or place, has its own standard, and there is no absolute standard from which to judge right or wrong. Moreover, those who write about history are bound up in their own cultural worldview, making it impossible to transcend their own subjectivity. If I understand Brown correctly, he is saying that historians are able to judge other cultures and other historical times in terms of this closed (mythological) or open (objective, at least in principle) standard. Brown’s conclusion also bumps into the assertions by many that prehistoric peoples were egalitarian by nature, and it is development (specifically, “surplus”economies) that results in inequality. Brown at least implies that this argument, highly speculative given limited evidence, is wrong.* Hierarchical tendencies are part of human nature.** While some cultures are better than others at encouraging or discouraging such tendencies, these are but expressions of an underlying biological form.
*Brown hedges a bit when he writes that “when it comes to hierarchy – among literate peoples anyway – human minds seem to think very much alike, in spite of wide separation in space and time,” suggesting that pre-literate people be different. Brown uses the language of mind but mind is more than likely the expression of an inner emotional predisposition.
**While not his example, the USA might be a good case in point. It proclaims egalitarianism, except for Indians and Blacks. For Whites, it is a meritocracy. Those who fail do so because they were and are, inherently or otherwise, without merit.
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