The Russo-Ukrainian War

by Serhii Plokhy

Urgent, compelling reading from the author of Chernobyl on the defining conflict of our times: do you know what is at stake in Ukraine?

On 24 February 2022, Russia stunned the world by launching an invasion of Ukraine. In the midst of checking on the family and friends who were now on the front lines of Europe's largest conflict since the outbreak of the Second World War, acclaimed Ukrainian-American historian Serhii Plokhy inevitably found himself attempting to understand the deeper causes of the invasion, analysing its course and contemplating the wider outcomes.

The Russo-Ukrainian War is the comprehensive history of a war that has burned since 2014, and that, with Russia's attempt to seize Kyiv, exploded a geo-political order that had been cemented since the end of the Cold War. With an eye for the gripping detail on the ground, both in the halls of power and down in the trenches, as well as a keen sense of the grander sweep of history, Plokhy traces the origins and the evolution of the conflict, from the collapse of the Russian empire to the rise and fall of the USSR and on to the development in Ukraine of a democratic politics.

Based on decades of research and his unique insight into the region, he argues that Ukraine's defiance of Russia, and the West's demonstration of unity and strength, has presented a profound challenge to Putin's Great Power ambition, and further polarized the world along a new axis. A riveting, enlightening account, this is present-minded history at its best.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Ukraine, Russia, Politics, War, Russian History

416 pages, Paperback

First published May 9, 2023

About the author

Serhii Plokhy is a Ukrainian and American historian. Plokhy is currently the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History and Director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, where he was also named Walter Channing Cabot Fellow in 2013. A leading authority on Eastern Europe, he has lived and taught in Ukraine, Canada, and the United States. He has published extensively in English, Ukrainian, and Russian. For three successive years (2002-2005) his books won first prize of the American Association for Ukrainian Studies.

For his Ukrainian-language profile, please see: Сергій Плохій

Reviews

[Henri · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is very much on why rather than what and how.

When I first saw this book announced I thought, well that’s rather than foolish isn’t it. Plokhy is one of the best English language historians of Ukraine - why would he attempt a history of the war that hasn’t yer completed- surely it can be done via a reportage medium rather than a book. I was wrong in my assumption that this would be the chronicle of the war. Well it is, for a small part a chronicle of the key events of the war. Mostly though, this is an explainer to how we got there. Starting in late 1980s Plokhy charts the fall of the Soviet Union and then tracks the developments of the Russian and Ukrainian state (side by side in chapters for easy of comparison (something tell me the comparison in the mind of the reader is intended)). This is done meticulously yet concisely all the way up to Feb 24 2023. Understandably by the time of book’s release a lot will happen that author just cannot cover. Plokhy concludes with a short chapter discussing the world order and how it has been shaped by the war.

Overall if you want a general history of the war or description of the fighting from the trenches you won’t find those in this book. If you want to understand why the war is fought in the first place - why the Russians attacked, why they keep on going, and why Ukraine is so united in fighting back -this is the book for you.
Thank you to Penguin for a very early reading copy.

[Paul Bryant · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is in two halves, before 22 February 2022 and after. I needed the first part (but not the second) because after all the millions of words spouted forth by the journalists and professors, still my brain could not quite grasp exactly why Putin decided to roll his tanks.

There was a belief in Tsarist times and Soviet times that there were three Russian peoples, the Great Russians, the Little Russians (Ukraine) and the White Russians (Belarus). During the Empire and then the USSR the borders were really quite notional, it was kind of a case of what’s yours is mine, what’s mine is yours, one big happy family.

But gradually there arose a belief that there was such a thing as a separate Ukrainian nation. Putin has written about this – he blames Polish intellectuals in the 19th century. And this was done deliberately by “the west”, according to Putin’s view, in order to erect “a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia”.

Well a barrier is one thing, but a springboard is a whole other thing. Putin might not mind a barrier but when the Ukrainian constitution was changed on 7 February 2019 to include the strategic objectives of joining the EU and NATO, then for Putin the barrier was now very clearly becoming a springboard.

But I still don’t quite get it – does Putin think that if Ukraine was part of NATO there would be suddenly a military threat to Russia that wasn’t there before? Existing NATO states Latvia and Estonia already border Russia since 2004. And we all know that NATO cannot get into any direct confrontation with Russia without provoking WWIII. (Whilst at the same time noting that this is now a proxy war.)

There is a psychological/cultural/historical component to this conflict – it’s personal. And this must be why some essential thing about this terrible situation still eludes me. One thing this book told me is that Ukrainians and their politicians themselves have been dreadfully conflicted about the orientation of their own country – towards Russia or towards the West. And there have been two revolutions (Orange 2005, Maidan 2014), leading to the question when is a revolution a coup?

I may say this book is a grand one for finding problems of definition – what is an annexation? What is a valid referendum? What is an independent republic? What is democracy?

I appreciated Professor Plokhy’s carefully colourless account of a dreadfully tangled, complex history. But Putin’s war still seems - to put it mildly – a gross, reckless, weird miscalculation.

[Jonathan O'Neill · Rating 4 out of 5]

4.5 ⭐️

4.5 but with an expiry date, I feel. This will inevitably be superceded by anything written post-war.

[Agnė · Rating 5 out of 5]

I am biased with my rating.
A good informative narration of Russia's war against Ukraine which is insightful and summarizes the most important points of countries' histories, war progress as well as covers Europe, USA and China's approaches and views on the war.
I cannot say that I learned a lot from this book as I am following the war on a daily basis, however, the book establishes a good ground for someone who wants to know that the war is about, why Russia is so agressive and why Ukraine is fighting this war and, most importantly, why Ukraine is winning.

[Jonfaith · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found this interesting if uneven, which is probably to be expected. It is a first draft of history.Plokhy’s work dovetails nicely with The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America and I found some tangents intriguing, especially the attention given to Boris Yeltsin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Plokhy is interested in events and precedents, not ideas. I think this would have benefitted from more of the latter. His notion that the war had thwarted Putin's cherished goal of a multipolar matrix was rather arresting. Putin’s actions solidified the idea of G2.

[Shawn Denegre-Vaught · Rating 5 out of 5]

I’m being honest, I knew very little about the history of tension between Ukraine and Russia. This book taught me so much, and not only about Russo-Ukrainian war/politics/history, but about how it’s connected to so much more than those two countries. It’s truly a world conflict. I recommend everyone to read this. Serhii Plokhy does a phenomenal job of making such a complex history digestible in a way that lets you understand such a heavy topic. Glory to Ukraine!

[Mircea Petcu · Rating 5 out of 5]

Imperialiștii ruși și-au imaginat originile națiunii ruse în Kievul medieval al epocii cnejilor. Acea națiune fusese divizată de invadatorii străini, de la mongoli la polonezi, dar fusese reunită de țarii ruși, pentru a deveni din nou consolidată și invincibilă. Rușii pot trasa, într-adevăr, până la Kiev originile religiei lor, ale limbii scrise, literaturii, artelor, codului juridic și ale dinastiei lor conducătoare. Încercările lor de a revendica Kievul ca sursă a etnicității, limbii și culturii populare s-au dovedit însă problematice. Călătorii din Moscova au constatat că localnicii din Kiev vorbeau o limbă diferită de a lor și aveau o cultură distinctă. Dar acest lucru nu a contat prea mult, deoarece mitul originilor kievene ale Rusiei fusese întipărit în conștiința elitelor rusești încă de la sfârșitul secolului al XIV-lea.

Mai aproape de prezent, dezintegrarea Uniunii Sovietice a devenit ireversibilă pe 1 decembrie 1991, când cetățenii Ucrainei au mers la urne pentru a decide dacă doresc ca țara lor să devină independentă. 92% au votat pentru independență. Zbigniew Brzezinki remarca la câțiva ani după căderea Uniunii Sovietice: "Fără Ucraina, Rusia încetează să mai fie un imperiu, dar cu Ucraina subjugată și apoi subordonată, Rusia devine automat un imperiu".
Așadar, restaurarea proiectului imperial rus sub orice formă depinde de capacitatea Rusiei de a aduce Ucraina în sânul ei.

Putin se teme de extinderea UE și NATO, dar și de existența democrației ucrainene, ce poate funcționa ca un contra-model și ca un stimul pentru opoziția din propria țară. Este remarcabil că democrația ucraineană a rezistat, în ciuda tentativelor președinților Kravciuk și Kucima de a imita modelul de regim super-prezidențial din Rusia. Principala explicațíe este că niciun partid politic și nicio elită regională nu au fost suficient de puternice pentru a captura parlamentul și a-și impune voința asupra întregii țări. Antagonismele din societatea ucraineană au salvat democrația.

în a doua jumătate a cărții sunt prezentate operațiunile militare (primul an de război).

Recomand

[Brian Griffith · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a valuable resource on the war's background history and events up to early 2013. But it has a kind of "breaking news" approach to reporting the war, giving details of blow-by-blow events one after the next. Plokhy captures the determination and courage of Ukrainian patriots, and optimistically describes the solidification of global support for Ukraine's freedom and international law. But in light of more recent fraying of the alliance against Russia's aggression, the book seems more hopeful than confident. One detail that concerned me was that the book discusses the issues surrounding Russia's expansion of oil and gas exports, but it never mentions the demolition of the Nord Stream pipeline to Europe.

[Nazarii Zanoz · Rating 4 out of 5]

Це хороша книжка, ще одна із великого переліку книжок авторства пана професора, котру варто рекомендувати знайомим іноземцям. Вона наче про перший рік повномасштабної війни, але сконструйована так, аби продемонструвати, звідки ноги ростуть і чому не могло статися инакше. З детальними екскурсами в исторію чи всередину загадошної російської душі. Оскільки книжка про війну в 2022-му, то й тон її під кінець стає таким дуже обнадійливим. Дуже цікаво її читалося в цьому плані наприкінці року 2023-го, коли в українському суспільстві (і не тільки) витали вже зовсім инші настрої. Це вкотре і дуже добре демонструє, наскільки непевною штукою є війна і наскільки все залежить від купи причин, нюансів, фактів і т.д. і т.п.
Рекомендую, навіть, якщо ви все це знаєте і були свідками багатьох подій

[Vishy · Rating 4 out of 5]

#BookReview – The Russo - Ukrainian War : The Return of History by Serhii Plokhy

I've wanted to read Serhii Plokhy's history of Ukraine, 'The Gates of Europe', for a while now. But when I discovered that he has written a book about the current war in Ukraine, I decided to read that first.

'The Russo - Ukrainian War : The Return of History' looks at the history behind the current war in Ukraine. It goes back a few centuries and describes Ukrainian history and how Ukraine's relationship with Russia has evolved across the centuries. It describes how Russia and Russians viewed Ukraine, which helps us understand the current situation better. It also describes how Ukrainians viewed themselves, which helps us understand their resistance in the current war. This history is the first one-fourth of the book. The rest of the book describes the war in Ukraine, how things changed from one day, one week, one month to the next. This book covers one year of the war. It also describes the role that different countries – allies, friends, enemies, rivals, neutral actors – played in the current war.

Serhii Plokhy's book is very detailed, insightful, and informative. As he himself is Ukrainian, we are privileged to get an insider's view on things. The writing is functional and straightforward and describes things in a matter-of-fact way. There is none of the literary flourish that one might expect from a historian from the British Isles like John Keay or Norman Davies, though Serhii Plokhy occasionally quotes a literary line (I remember there was one quote from Nikolai Gogol. The exact quote went like this – ""It’s a rare bird that can reach the middle of the Dnieper," wrote Nikolai Gogol in his description of Ukraine’s largest river, referring metaphorically to its width."). There are some details and conclusions and generalizations in the book that we can nitpick on, as it always happens in any book on history. But overall the book is good, it stands on solid ground, and the conclusions derived in the final chapter are solid and insightful.

As an Indian, I found this particular passage in the book very interesting.

"With the outbreak of war, not only China but also India emerged as a beneficiary of Russia’s eastward turn for its exports of oil and gas. Like China, India reaffirmed its commitment to the principles of state sovereignty and the inviolability of international borders but refused to condemn or criticize Russia publicly for its aggression against Ukraine. Thus, the world’s largest democracy sided with the authoritarian Russian government and complicated relations with its key ally, the United States. The policy of “strategic ambiguity” adopted by New Delhi was deeply rooted in history, as India had considered Moscow a strategic partner since the times of the Cold War, when it refused to condemn the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and its invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979. But there was more than history involved when it came to India’s formally neutral but essentially pro-Moscow attitude. Russian arms supplies were one of the factors influencing New Delhi’s position; the desire not to push Russia closer to China and Pakistan—India’s main rivals in the area—was another; and finally there was the tempting economic opportunity of access to Russian energy resources at fire-sale prices."

It is an interesting passage, it is a strong passage, and it hits the nail on the head. When the war in Ukraine started last year, I wrote a long post condemning the Russian government for starting the war. One of my oldest friends, one of my closest friends, who is Russian, was extremely upset with what I wrote. She asked me why I wrote a critical post like this, when my own government was staying neutral on the war. When I thought about it, I myself wondered why the Indian government didn't condemn the war, why it didn't condemn the naked, brazen Russian aggression. It has been one-and-a-half years since the war started, and the Indian government continues to be mum on the issue. During the Cold War era, India was a poor country which couldn't afford to have an independent foreign policy. But the Indian government of that time showed great moral leadership and condemned South African apartheid (everybody condemns apartheid now. But at that time, everyone was quiet.) The Indian government of that time also condemned the Israeli government's oppression of Palestine and Palestinians. But now the Indian government has kept quiet in the face of brazen aggression, just because it can get some cheap oil. I know this is how foreign policy is conducted – there are no morals, and countries put their self-interest first and just support their friends or keep quiet when they are doing wrong, while they condemn their enemies for the same thing. At the beginning of the pandemic, in early 2020, Azerbaijani troops with the support of Turkey invaded Armenia and occupied part of Armenian territory. The international media kept quiet about that. Western European and North American countries just ignored it. Azerbaijan-Turkey did exactly the same thing that Russia did in Ukraine. But because Turkey is a member of NATO, no one wanted to offend Turkey and they just kept quiet. The same countries which were jumping around when Russia brazenly invaded Ukraine, kept quiet when Azerbaijan-Turkey did the exact same thing in Armenia. These days, Azerbaijan is continuing its seige on Artsakh, which is an enclave filled with Armenians, and everyone is keeping mum. Armenia which suffered a genocide inflicted by Turkey in the early part of the 20th century continues to suffer because of the brazen aggression by Azerbaijan and Turkey. So this is how foreign policy is conducted – keep mum when your friends are doing bad things, but condemn your enemies when they are doing the same thing. For someone like me, I feel sad and disappointed that the Indian government has kept quiet and stayed neutral on the Russian aggression in Ukraine. As the great Venus Williams once said about someone else in a different context, I feel that India is on the wrong side of history here. It is sad, because I think this is one thing that even the infamous Boris Johnson got right.

I'm glad I read Serhii Plokhy's 'The Russo - Ukrainian War : The Return of History'. It is insightful and detailed and makes us think a lot.

Have you read Serhii Plokhy's 'The Russo - Ukrainian War : The Return of History'? What do you think about it?

[Martin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the best book you’re going to read on the origins and the first year of the war. At least until Russia opens their archives. Which is to say that it sets the standard for the foreseeable future. And the afterword alone is worth the price of admission

[william mathews · Rating 2 out of 5]

A Rather Warped, Partisan History

This is less history and more Ukrainian nationalist chauvinism. Plokhy cannot restraint his visceral hatred not just of Putin but, like White House, willows a bias against Russia and Russians that borders on racialism.

Plokhy follows the standard US Establishment line on this war like the Harvard flunkydung he is. No recognition for the US breech of commitments to restrain NATO expansion eastward. It started early and was pushed aggressively by the Clinton's, Albright and the "democracy promotion" teams of NGOs, CIA and State Department. Add to that the Clinton's set up Yeltsin with plenty booze and bucks to buy re elections and plan de facto exclusion of Russia from international security organizations. The unexpected was Putin's unexpected success in making Russia solvent.

Overlooked entirely is Ukraine utter dependence on US financial and military assistance. Ukraine was a failed state in 2021, defaulting on international payments, running on decades of inflationary fumes, covered by various assistance from Russia.

As Zelensky's honoring the Nazi Ukrainian veteran of the SS in Canada shows, Plokhy has soft shaped the profound links of Ukrainian Nationalists. to the Nazis, fascism and anarchism. In this Plokhy is by no means alone. Biden did his very best a US viceroy in Kyiv after the fascist coup in 2014 to support and sustain the Nationalist bloc of Poroshenko and the reign of right wing terror by Right Sector, Azov Brigade, Svoboda and Banderistas from Galicia.

Now it is a sad war. Obama and the West were well aware that Putin was not planning a global hegemony when he occupied Crimea and Donbas, he was just responding to the US brokering of the Orange Revolution redux. This war is about Russia's legitimate national security interests given the US pressure to push NATO eastward and assert imperialist aims under the cover of a re assertion of Wilsonian national self determination of peoples, a most fatally flawed and utterly bogus foreign policy agenda.

Finally, the impact of the nasty war must also be assessed in the US, which brokered Ukraine with promises of unlimited assistance at a time when the US was teetering on the brink of becoming a failed state with a revolving debt and inflationary crisis compound by a latent civil war and a constitutional crisis. Few things aggravate inflation more than military spending and wartime destruction (expand deficits and money supply to produce weapons that are destroyed). And, boy, what a wonderful war it is, the Americam imperialism dream: finally a country more than willingl to sacrifice its people and assets, and all we have to do is feed the military industrial complex with deficits to finance profits for the super rich of American capitalism. Glory to Ukraine!

[Todd · Rating 4 out of 5]

If journalism is the first rough draft of history, this book attempts to be the second for the War in Ukraine. It was published in May 2023 and covers events from February 2022 through March 2023 with digressions through feudal history, Soviet history, and the Russian invasions of Georgia and the Crimea. Between various chapters, Plokhy the author modulates between taking the long view and zooming all the way in for the blow by blow in the battlefield. The heart of the book really synthesizes much of the reporting that was first told in 2014 and 2022. It's definitely a balancing act to strike the right mix between history, events, and analysis. This book has an adequate mix of content at the various levels. Since the reporting from the mainstream media has been pretty thorough, we probably could have used less reporting and more mid range analysis. Also, at times you can feel Plokhy putting his finger on the scale. With more time and space those shortcomings could have been smoothed out. Ultimately, eggs have to be cracked to make an omelet. No one says writing a rough draft to history is easy, especially as events are still unfolding. This was a decent to solid effort at one such draft.

[Steffi · Rating 3 out of 5]

I think I came across this book "The Russo-Ukrainian War (2023) by Harvard Professor for Ukrainian history Serhii Plokhy through an OK review at the Responsible Statecraft outlet. I assume there's a lot of hawkish think tank books out there so trying to find books that are less 'politically motivated' to really understand the very long origin of the conflict. Also, I've realized from engaging with a few wars over the past twenty years, in matters of war, there's no good and evil, there's always so much of everything, war is messy and contradictory (while propaganda is two dimensional) so let's embrace this (intellectually, morally).

This is only my second book after "Russia’s Road to War with Ukraine: Invasion Amidst the Ashes of Empires" (2022) by Samir Puri on Ukraine which I loved (a lot more) as it looked more closely at one of the central questions for me whether (actually 'how' and 'why not') we could have integrated Russia more closely into Europe's security architecture post 1989, a core progressive demand, essentially (precisely to avoid a NATO-Russia confrontation, including in its proxy forms in Syria and elsewhere).

So, I was primarily hoping to find further answers to this (focus on the period 1991-2022) in this latest book.

Liberals: no, I am not defending Putin. Russia's attack on Ukraine remains indefensible. I am just trying to see how we went from the end of the cold war to a new cold war confrontation (not so cold) in a matter of 30 years (Gaza being the most 'civilizational war' thus far re the west vs pretty much the entire 'non-west', btw, waiting for Hamed Dabashi's piece on this).

A few take aways:

#1 The impact of 9/11 and the war on terror, especially Iraq on a new bipolar world order and imperial confrontations is important to understand the bigger picture. Also a conclusion from much of my other foreign policy soul searching is how defining the war on terror, especially Iraq war and the subsequent 'democracy crusades' are for the many wars of the past 23 years of this century.

Interestingly re 9/11 was a call by the then fairly new Putin to Bush Jr two days before the attacks sharing intel as well as Putin's early efforts to cooperate with the US on the war on terror. The illegal war on Iraq and the US subsequent imperialist wars under the banner of the 'responsibility to project ' defending democracy etc changed this (generally alienated the global south, in some way Gaza is what 'they' always feared would happen: the mass killing of brown folks in the name of western values, with US and EU doing nothing to stop this.). In a kind of eerie timing, Russia 'suddenly' emerged as an enemy precisely the moment, the US pulled out of Afghanistan where they officially started the war on terror 20 years before (at the same time in summer 2021 Putin and Biden met in Geneva and had several talks, while US and others had very solid evidence of Russia's plan to attack Ukraine).

#2 Ukraine was literally from day one a very special case and a red line for Russia. And in the early days of independence this was understood across the board and a fragile trilateral (Ukraine, Russia, US/West) agreement was (nuclear) disarmament of Ukraine in exchange for security guarantees in exchange for Ukraine not joining NATO. Russia never fully accepted Ukraine sovereignty and as long as. Putin is in Power never will if that meant Ukraine moving out too far of its sphere of influence and towards the west (also using both EU and Ukraine dependence on Russian gas as a stick). This is classic imperialist behavior by Russia.

#3 The book delves quite deeply into Putin's psyche and his sense of omnipotence and his destiny to recreate some Greater Russia etc (in a way it's as messianic as Bush et al global war on terror slash democracy crusade and bringing light and democracy through the power of the sword to the uncivilized folks). There's a funny part where they ask the Russian foreign minister who's advising Putin on foreign policy "Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and Alexander II—Russian emperors of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries" 😂 Anyway, it's a valid question from the liberals as to whether one can negotiate with someone like Putin (my answer is yes).

#4 I am still cracking up over apparatchik in the book called 'Leonid Slutsky' 😂

#5 The book also covers of course the invasion as such. It's written by an Ukrainian whose family is there etc, I get the emotional connection but the whole bravery and heroism language simply doesn't sit well with me. I also found it strange when the author provides an account of the failed take over of Kyiv: "The Russians were rushing things: instead of the lengthy air bombardment that had characterized US operations in Iraq, they combined air bombardment with their ground offensive into a single stage" maybe I am willfully misreading this but isn't this a good thing that Russia didn't follow US bombardment playbook?

#6 There were a few instances of reported western reactions to Russian atrocities against civilians (eg alleged genocide in Bucha)and I was stopping myself from thinking 'well, Gaza...' but then realized that this is important, it's not whataboutism, whataboutism is already liberal framing, it's western hypocrisy which is also racist as some lives matter more than others. So, yes, Bucha is a war crime and so is Gaza. We need to condemn and stop both with equal, because principled, measure.

#7 So a core question remains why the Turkey sponsored negotiations (Istanbul talks) towards the very end of March 2022 failed, when Ukraine offered neutrality in exchange for security guarantees. The book is murky on this. Elsewhere I've read due to western, especially US and UK pressure who saw it beneficial to weaken Russia through this war and then upped the military support. I don't know but it matters so very much.

#8 There's an interesting chapter on the battle of for Kharkiv, home of many Russian writers including Russian nobel prize in literature winner Ivan Bunin. After year's in Syria, I have thought a lot about the irreversible damage to a country's cultural heritage caused by wars and it's horrifying to read how many museums/ artwork were destroyed as part of Russia's bulldozing of Kharkiv, which was Ukraine's capital at one point in (Soviet) Ukraine history.

#8 So the book must have been written in early 2023, when there was still excitement around these grand counteroffensives (including the mother of all counteroffensives, the liberation of Kherson) in which I am very little interested or can get excited about as it's for me just a loss of live and destruction of civilian infrastructure with ensuing humanitarian needs. I can't get all hyped about military technology. Plus, a year later in 2024, it looks like Russia has gained the upper hand as Ukraine's military capability depends on sustained western support at scale and in foreign policy, this doesn't exist.

#9 Interesting how the way France and Germany's trilaterals efforts in late spring 2022 to negotiate with Putin in mid 2022 an end to the war are portrayed almost as a betrayal (especially compared to Boris fucking Johnson's unconditional military support- this alone should be a red flag). Germany and France were, as per the book "pushing for a speedy end of the war at thr cost of Ukrainian concessions" with their "peace crusades" ending in June 2022 when everyone jumped on the 'Ukraine must win' bandwagon. Well, this language didn't last long.

#10 Of course, since the author is not a Marxist, what's totally absent is a political economy analysis, how much of the conflict is driven by competition in global financial capitalism, especially post global financial crisis. As so often in these liberal account of foreign policy, the economy (aka capitalism) is totally absent. Anyway, we've got this covered ourselves.

[Dimitar Angelov · Rating 4 out of 5]

Предвид че войната още е в своя ход, книгата е ценна (от гледната точка на историка) преди всичко с анализа на процесите, факторите и събитията, които довеждат първо до анексирането на Крим през 2014 и по-късно до пълномащабната агресия на Русия през февруари 2022 г. Диагнозата на Плохи според мен е напълно точна: Русия е последната недоразпаднала се европейска империя. Тя е и последната създадена такава на Континента, поради което и процесите на деколонизация не можаха да я обхванат по същото време и по същия начин както Османската, Британската, Японската, Френската, Нидерландската и Белгийската империи преди това (Испанската и Португалската доста по-рано). Различните империи преживяват по различен начин своя разпад. При някои, като в случая на Британската, това става бавно и постепенно, минавайки през много нива на дезинтеграция, при други като в случая на Германия (която е трудно да се определи като световна империя, но със сигурност прави опит да стане такава), начинът се оказва унищожителна война срещу всички останали. Русия, още по-важно - голяма част от руското общество (социологическите проучвания са ясни), искрено приема, че "естествените" граници на и без това най-голямата им държава са други. Русия не се стреми да възстанови пределите на СССР, а тези на Руската империя, достигнати през 18-19 век. Идеологическата основа на тази геополитическа цел е сложна амалгама от панславизъм (в който русите са арийците на "славянската" раса), православие, в което държавата-империя е пред църквата, и специално пригоден мултиетнически национализъм (евразийство), който да обясни как славяни и чеченци са един "народ". Функцията на повечето империи е била преди всичко икономическа, в руския вариант, като че ли икономиката крепи империята. Времето на империите и имперската политика от 19 век обаче е в миналото, твърди Плохи. Въпросът е как тези империи се разпадат - мирно или с война (и с каква война).

*Бележка към превода. Изд. "Прозорец" трайно се придържат към политиката да не превеждат (или поне да копират) бележките под линия на почти всички исторически книги, които публикуват. Така че и тук бележките под линия липсват, а в оригинала такива има.

[Igor Mogilnyak · Rating 5 out of 5]

4,5⭐️

Не так все художньо сприймається, як у книгах автора про Бандеру і сересер, в основному тут факти першого року повномасштабної війни. Але це як завжди у Плохія - цікаво читати і добре написано.

[Keen Reader · Rating 4 out of 5]

Written during the first full year of the conflict between March 2022 and Feb 2023 this details the history of the relationship between the two nations and also the first year or so of the Russian invasion. This is clearly a painful account to write for Plokhy as this has directly impacted on his own friends and family, displacing and in some cases killing them.

This reminds you how much desperation, incompetence and making it up as you go along is involved in warfare. You tend to forget how poor and inaccurate weaponary and bombs can be, which usually means the death and displacement of innocent civilians rather than killing combatants. And the sheer idiocy and recklessness of Putin bombing towns, cities and regions where Russian is the main spoken language and culture is clearly not going to give him much help on the propaganda front.

On the other hand we see the remarkable level of invention and sophistication from the Ukrainians which has allowed them to fend off the Russians against overwhelming odds, especially in the initial stages when they were getting very little support from western nations.

The energy, economic and political ramifications make for very interesting reading too, we see the many ways in which leaders of other nations have had to scrap, fight and compromise with the fallout, such as that re-animated corpse (AKA Joe Biden) being forced to make the embarrassingly shameful concession to Saudi Arabia by granting their Crown Prince sovereign immunity in the Khashoggi civil case against him.

Russia’s conduct in the illegal invasion of Ukraine has clearly been beyond appalling from start to finish, but then how many of the current dominant or western nations across the world have behaved in exactly the same way in other nations?...

Having written on various aspects of Ukraine many times before, Plokhy recycles and reuses much of his material, adding new and relevant details. But this time round he seems to have polished up his act, there is less flab in here and this means that this reads like an informed and lively account.

[Liudmyla · Rating 4 out of 5]

Нічого нового для себе я в цій книзі не знайшла, хіба що освіжилися в пам'яті події початку 1990х, що відбувалися на росії - мене вони особливо ніколи не цікавили, окрім як в контексті "а як це вплине на Україну", тому дещо і призабулося.

На початку - досить лаконічний екскурс в історію українсько-російських стосунків протягом попередніх століть, і так само лаконічно подано перебіг першого року повномасштабного вторгнення.

Що не сподобалося:
1) в книзі, в основному присвяченій повномасштабній війні, всього один (!!!) раз згадано Головнокомандувача ЗСУ В. Залужного, який "зовні схожий на плюшевого ведмедика" (дослівна цитата). А ще про нього сказано таке - він не служив в радянській армії і є новим поколінням офіцерів (майже як з НАТО); він напередодні вторгенння таємно переміщував війська і техніку, чим ускладнив ворогу можливість виявити і знищити їх. Це все про генерала, який зробив, мабуть, найбільше для оборони країни. В той же час згадок про єрмака і навіть арестовича в книзі більше, ніж про головкома. Не знаю, як на мене, фігура Залужного ну на декілька порядків у всіх сенсах значущіша, ніж якихось всратих арестовича чи єрмака.
2) якось все так позитивненько описано, все виглядає досить оптимістично для України. Таке враження від книги залишилося, наче після нашої остаточної перемоги пройшло десь років із 40, росія повалена (тут краще підійшло б російське "повєржена", але я не знайшла точніший відповідник українською) і втоплена в болоті. Можливо, так і треба - хоча б щось писати зараз в позитивному ключі для підняття бойового духу, але коли в тебе стійке відчуття, що ми всі летимо в пизду, якось не дуже той бойовий дух піднімається від позитивно-оптимістичних книг, а навіть навпаки. Не знаю. Зрозуміло, що наприкінці 2025 року ми знаємо трохи більше інформації, ніж в лютому 2023 (коли писалася книга), і приводів для позитиву все менше і менше, особливо з огляду на позицію чи радше відсутність якоїсь притомної позиції США, але в мене і в 2023 далеко не було таких позитивних настроїв.

Взагалі книга написана для іноземців, які зовсім не розуміються на глибинних причинах цієї війни. От з цієї точки зору книга дуже ок, вона намагається пояснити, чому росія вторглася в Україну і чому це було неминуче

[Taher Bellah · Rating 5 out of 5]

Serhi Plokhy strikes again!

[Peter · Rating 5 out of 5]

‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ Serhii Plokhy's The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History (2023) is a Wagnerian opera of the very volatile relationship between Russia and Ukraine from its Cossack origins to the present. This is a book that deserves to be read by anyone interested in the historical foundations of the current war in Ukraine.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ Plokhy's credentials are rock solid. Plokhy is now on the faculty of Harvard University and he serves as the director of its Ukrainian Studies program, He is a Ukraine-born historian of Ukraine and of the Cold War Era. His books are as wide-ranging as the geopolitical arena, the Cold war, the Chernobyl disaster, and the Cuban missile crisis.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ But don't expect an easy read. The Russo-Ukrainian War is a densely-packed history of the political and diplomatic agreements (and disagreements) between Ukraine and Russia, and of the myths promoted by Vladimir Putin as justification for Russia's recent invasion of Ukraine. Like Der Ring des Nibelungen, it has an unwieldy cast of characters going back more than 450 years with a long history of agreements made and broken. Wagner would be proud.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ The genesis of the book is Vladimir Putin's 2021 release of a 20-page paper titled On the Historical Unity Between Russians and Ukrainians (see here) . This is Putin's obiter dictum on the historical relationship between the two states and, with hindsight, it is the intellectual fodder for his annexation of Crimea and the Donbas in 2014 and his 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The question of Putin's historical accuracy has inspired a number of responses, among them is Plohky's The Russo-Ukrainian War.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ The essence of Putin's paper is a call to arms, a cry for the need to put the toothpaste back in the tube by unifying the twins. Putin argues that Ukraine was Russia's fatherland and that Ukraine is "Little Russia" to Russia's "Great Russia." They are two peas in a pod, genetic twins that not even God can put asunder. His view is based largely on his convenience guiding a carefully cultivated reading of Russian history, and on similarities between the two states in language, religion, and culture.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ The propagandistic quality of Putin's paper is perhaps most stark in his reference to the deaths of 48 Russian separatists on May 2, 2014. Putin presents this as the murder of innocents by Ukrainian "neo-nazis." The record suggests otherwise: a parade of Ukraine supporters of independence in Odesa , some armed, was attacked by Russian separatists, armed with clubs, home-made grenades and guns.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ In the melee, the outnumbered separatist were trapped in a building where a fire broke out and 48 separatists died. This was clearly a tragedy but not an indication that the separatists were innocents or that Naziism was involved. Perhaps Putin made the link to Naziism because the event was one week before Russia's annual Victory Day, a celebration of the German defeat in 1945. (see here)
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ Plokhy begs to differ on many of the ideas advanced by Putin. On the language question, he argues that the dissimilarities outweigh the similarities: yes, both use a variation of the Cyrillic alphabet, and yes, both have many words in common (estimates of about 50%–60% of words are common). But, he argues, the linguistic differences go well beyond simple differences in dialect.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ Furthermore, both countries have very different political histories: Ukraine's Cossack origins gave it a strongly democratic leaning; Russia has always been at the "autocracy" end of the spectrum. On the existential question of Ukraine's independence, Plokhy identifies a long history of Russian pledges affecting Ukraine's independence fouled by subsequent Russian reversals.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ In short, Plohky claims that Putin's success on today's battlefield would not restore Russia to its former self; rather, it would create a new entity – a Ukraine once again subservient to the Federation of Russia.

Foundations: The Kyivan Rus'

‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ The origin of Ukraine was the Slavic tribes from the Eastern Europe and the Baltics that migrated southeastward to the area between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea well before Russia became Russia. By the 8th century these newly settled Slavs merged into a community called Kyivan Rus'. This was well before the Duchy of Muskovy bloomed into Russia in the 15th century with the coronation of Ivan III in 1462 and his 1471 defeat of the competing duchy of Novgorod.


Slavic Tribes 700-850AD

‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ Today we remember the Kyivan Rus' as Cossacks – fiercely independent warriors associated with the Russian Steppes. During the Kyivan Rus' ascendance, Constaninople was the regional power center, a status achieved by its wealth derived from its location as the eastern terminus of the Silk Road, as a major seaport, and as the center of Rus' religion – the Eastern Orthodox Church. Constantinople was essential to Kyivan Rus' trade, and it was a protector of the Kievan Rus' in hostile times.


Russia: 1300-1796

‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ A significant early figure in Kyivan Rus' history is Rurik, the founder of the Rurikid dynasty. His grandson, Vladimir (the Great) is Russia's patron saint. Vladimir was born circa 960AD. In 970AD Rurik granted the Grand Duchy of Novgorod to his illegitimate son, Vladimir, making Vladimir the Grand Prince of Novgorod. In 972AD Vladimir's older and legitimate half-brother, Yaropolk, was given Kiev and became Grand Prince of Kyiv.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ This was not an amicable division: collateral succession was the norm at that time, with property passing to a single heir, typically the eldest son. Yoropolk, the eldest, objected to Vladimir's grant and in 977AD the "Great Feudal War of Succession" began. Vladimir won and in 980AD he became Grand Prince of both Novgorod as well as Grand Prince of Kiev. In 988AD the pagan Vladimir was baptized into the Eastern Orthodox Church centered in Constantinople.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ Vladimir's region of Novgorod and Kiev was the genesis of Ukraine. In 2016, after his annexation of Crimea, Putin famously recognized Kievan Rus' as the origin of Russia and Saint Vladimir as the father of Russia. This recognition was in the form of a statue of St. Vladimir elected in Moscow, near the Kremlin. The "Monument to Vladimir the Great" is a massive 58-foot statue of warrior-saint Valentine, sword in one hand and cross in the other, overlooking his Russian landscape. It has become a meme for Putin.

Monument to Vladimir the Great, 2016

‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ The timing of this memorialization is important – after the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. With hindsight, the monument appears to be less an acknowledgement of the past than a look forward into the future. "Ukraine," it seems to say, "is an integral part of Russia, and the restoration of Russia's historical connection with Ukraine will not end at the annexation of Crimea."

Ukraine's Early History

‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ In 1240AD Batu Khan's Mongolian "Golden Horde" invaded the Byzantine Empire centered at Constantinople. The disruption Constantinople's ability to serve as the Kyivan Rus' protector and regional power shifted toward the Duchy of Muscovy, which would expand to incorporate much of the Kievan 'Rus territory.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ In 1259AD, after a Mongolian civil war, the Mongol Empire broke up into eight Khanates, each representing a different area of control. The area of modern Ukraine became part of the Crimean Khanate and it remained under Mongol control until Ivan the Great drove the Mongols out of "All Rus'" in 1480.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ The first political entity that was essentially "Ukrainian" emerged in 1648, almost two hundred years after the eviction of the Mongols. The form it took was the Cossack Hetmanate, also called the "First Hetmanate;" its official title was The Zaporizhian Host and its core was central Ukraine. The Hetmanate was an independent entity that provided military service to Muskovy ("Russia") in exchange for its protection.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ In 1682 Peter I (the Great) became "Tsar of All Russia" and in 1721, four years before his death, he was elevated to Emperor. In the interim, frictions between the Hetmanate and the Tsar arose and in 1708 the Hetmanate rebelled. The rebellion was quelled and the Hetmanate;s status was reduced to "The Government of Kiev," with a corresponding reduction in its powers. In 1764 Peter III's successor, Catherine II ("the Great"), abolished the title "Hetman" and the Cossack Hetmanate became "The Little Russia Governorate." Thus, the Cossack area of Russia became "Little Russia." By 1781 the last vestiges of the Hetmanate's administrative apparatus had disappeared and the Hetmanate was fully incorporated into Russia.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ The Cossacks ("Ukrainians") had lost their independence. They had come to "Russia" seeking the protection withdrawn by Constantinople, and what they found instead was absorption, a veiled form of invasion. The subservience of Ukraine to Russia that began in 1764 and was completed in 1781 was the result of political force and Putin's scenario of Russia emerging from the egg of Ukraine is a myth; in effect, Ukraine and Russia coexisted until Ukraine was subsumed by Russia.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ In his 2021 Kremlin paper Putin claimed that the notion of Ukrainian independence was the result of a great geopolitical error by Vladimir Lenin when the USSR was created in 1922: Lenin insisted that the document creating the Soviet Union recognize the right of any SSR to secede from the USSR. That assurance – an inducement for individual states to agreed to become SSRs – was a "time bomb" in the creation of the USSR. That bomb went off when the USSR disbanded in 1991 and modern Ukraine – the successor to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic that initially joined the USSR – took the exit door following after a general referendum that included Crimea: Only a minority of Ukrainians were "Russian" but 82 percent voted to secede; a majority of Crimeans were Russian, but still 54 percent voted for secession. Had Lenin's "time bomb" in the USSR constitution been respected, modern Ukraine's independence would have been settled. Instead,Putin chose to treat the right to secede as an error requiring correction.

The Status of Crimea

‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ The Crimean peninsula is an island with one narrow land bridge to Ukraine. It long served as a major locus for export or import of good between Eastern Europe and the Ottoman Turks at Constantinople, and on to the Mediterranean Sea through the Bosporus.
Crimea is a significant strategic and economic asset, as well as a longtime locus of conflict. Its balance between Russianness and Ukraineness has shifted over time. Crimea was part of the Russian Empire under the Tsar from 1783 to 1918. Until the end of the Crimean War in 1856, the port of Sevastopol had been the home of the Tsar's Black Sea Fleet, and after the end of the Russo-Turkish War in 1878 it returned to that status.
At the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922, Crimea was attached to the Russian Federation of Socialist Republics: it was "Russian." But in 1954, under Nikita Khrushchev, it was transferred from the Russian Federation to the Ukraine SSR. Khrushchev claimed that this was an acknowledgment of the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslava in 1654 (see below) but larger motives were at play.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ At the time of Ukrainian entry to the USSR, Crimea was included in the Ukraine SSR, leading one to think that Crimea would share Ukraine's status after the 1992 referendum on independence. That was the case – until Putin's 2014 annexation of Crimea by force.

Ukrainian Indpendence

‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ Ukraine nationalists can point to a number of instances when Russia said Ukraine was independent; their opponents can also find many instances when the answer was otherwise. It's impossible for a layman to determine when an assurance is credible and when it is not. I suspect that even experts on diplomacy and international relations have no clear criteria to measure credibility. Until that time when we can determine whether an assurance is in good faith, its a "She says – He says" dilemma.
‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎ ‎‎ But there are notable instances when Ukraine was or was not clearly independent. Some milestones are shown in the table below.

[Dorin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Plokhy does a very useful and welcome thing. He gives us a crash course on Russo-Ukrainian relations prior to the beginning of the military conflict in 2014 and the all-out war in 2022. I had, of course, known much of what he summarized here (from others; he writes extensively on the subject in his other books, which I have not read), but I still found events and connections of which I was not aware. As one thing leads to another, the short summary of the history between these two countries and peoples (about half the book) leads to the analysis of hostilities in the first year of the war.

I followed the war since Russia invaded Ukraine, but Plokhy has two advantages: he is Ukrainian, connected to everything that happens in his country, and he is also a very good writer. I was impressed at how well he structured his book, making sense of what, at times – when I was following developments live –, seemed confusing. He does not stop only on the battlefield of military hostilities, but also on the international stage.

I found his writing compelling and convincing, even though it is clear that he is not an impartial observer. Sometimes emotions get the better of him, and sometimes it is clear that we see everything through the eyes of a Ukrainian historian. But I can forgive these shortcomings (when it comes to different interpretations of older history, involving my own country) and also his emotions and subjectivity.

In this war there is no such thing as objectivity. I don’t think there was a clearer case in history, at the start of a war, where everyone saw who was right and who was wrong, who is the aggressor and who is the victim. We, naturally, picked sides, and I, as Plokhy, know what side I am on.

As the Russian war in Ukraine tragically continues, I think Plokhy should continue his endeavour in documenting everything that is happening. He is very good at it.

“It’s up to every government to decide how much of the burden its people are ready to carry. But it is equally necessary we get the message through to our people – what is our neighbour’s problem today will be our problem tomorrow. We are in danger when our neighbour’s house is on fire.”
(Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas)

4.3/5

[Indrek Ojam · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mõned väljavõtted:

"Minu peamine väide on, et see, mida me praegu [Vene-Ukraina sõja näol] näeme, pole täiesti uus fenomen. Mitmeski mõttes on see konflikt üsna vanaaegne vene eliitide poolt peetav imperialistlik vallutussõda, mille algatajad peavad end Vene impeeriumi ja Nõukogude Liidu ekspansionismi pärijateks ja jätkajateks"

*
1993. a sügise kohta:
"Kaitseminister Pavel Gratšov ja kõrgemad sõjaväelased jäid Jeltsinile truuks. Nõudnud presidendilt kirjalikku käsku pealinna sisenemiseks ja saades selle 3. oktoobri varastel hommikutundidel, andis Gratšov oma sõduritele Moskvas käsu. Ta palus isiklikult ühe Moskva jõe sillal oleva tanki meeskonnal sihtida parlamendihoone kabinetti, milles töötas Ruslan Hasbulatov: "Näed, see on Hasbulatovi kabinet, kas sa saad otse sinna tulistada?" Kapten kinnitas, et saab küll. Parlamendi pihta avati tuli, selle kaitsjatetest käidi lihtsalt jõuga üle ja nad vahistati. Jeltsin sulges tosinaid poliitilisi organisatsioone ja ajalehti, sh kommunistide väljaande "Pravda".
Järgmisel päeval telefonivestluses Bill Clintoniga esitas Jeltsin toimunut demokraatia võiduna. Nõukogude poliitilise diskursi traditsioonis kutsus ta oma vastaseid fašistideks. "Nüüd, kus need sündmused on selja taga, pole meil enam turumajanduse tulekuks takistusi", kinnitas Jeltsin Clintonile..Clinton oli varmalt valmis oma vene liitlast toetama. "Sa tegid kõik täpselt nii, nagu sa pidid tegema, ma õnnitlen sind selle puhul, kuidas sa asjadega toime tulid", kuulutas ameerika president.
Rünnak demokraatiale toimus päise päeva ajal Washingtoni silme all ja nende heakskiiduga."

*

"Ukraina rolli nõukogude impeeriumi lagunemisel on raske alahinnata. Nad polnud selles mitte ainult võtmelise tähtsusega osalised, vaid aitasid tagada ka lagunemise rahumeelse käigu..Ukraina venelased ei kartnud sugugi iseseisva Ukraina riigi tekkimist, vaid andsid sellele oma enamuse toetuse, muutes Nõukogude Liidu lagunemise mitte ainult paratamatuks, vaid ka suures osas rahumeelseks sündmuseks."

*

"Mis puutub Venemaasse, siis 2004. aasta oranži revolutsiooni võit oli suureks hoobiks nii Kremli sise- kui ka välispoliitilistele huvidele. "See oli meie 9/11," kuulutas Kremlile lähedane vene politoloog Gleb Pavlovski"

***
Raamatu esimene pool on suurepärane ajalooline ülevaade Vene ja Ukraina suhetest ja sündmustest, mis kõik praegust olukorda on kujundanud, alates varasest uusajast viimase sajandivahetuseni. Vaadeldakse paralleelselt, kuidas Venemaa magab üheksakümnendatel maha oma momendi demokratiseerumiseks ja kuidas Ukraina kõigist raskustest ja oma oligarhia-probleemist hoolimata säilitab pluralismi ja kodanikuühiskonna. Samas võib tulla lõpus masendus, kuna raamat kirjutati 2022-2023 ja see lõpeb optimistlikult. Trumpi teist ametiaega ja tema Ukraina reetmist ei olnud siis veel paista ja kõik näis minevat ülesmäge.

[Ore · Rating 4 out of 5]

A thorough and engaging introduction to relations between Russia and Ukraine, and the ensuing Russo-Ukrainian War that begun in 2022. Plokhy demonstrates that the tense relationship between the two countries is one rooted in a shared ethnic origin that has evolved and become warped over the centuries. The Russian invasion is not an anachronism, nor an unexplained cooling of relations between the two nations. Rather, it forms part of a drawn out and sustained attack on Ukrainian identity, and the persistance of the Russian imperialist dream that has taken on many forms, in both theory and practice, since the 15th century.

The book focuses on Russian and Ukrainian developments following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. It highlights Russian persistance in weakening Ukraine whilst recognising it as the most important element of any imperial revival, be it the Tsarist Empire or Soviet Empires (whose flags have been raised in St Petersberg last month), or as a commonwealth, as envisioned by Yeltsin.

Whilst Putin envisaged the invasion to be short, swift, and without much European intervention, it is clear that his strategy was more informed by the force of his predecessors' ideas than by the reality of a strong Ukrainian identity and a unified European response. Key invasions, such as those of the cultural capital Kharkiv, Kherson, the Crimea and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, are shown as gruelling conflicts initiated by a worn-out and paranoid Russian army.

Surprisingly, Plokhy ends by turning to Asia, showing the future of the conflict not in the hands of the Russians, but in the hands of China. Hinting at a new world order following the Cold War, he predicts Russia's capabilities will be secondary to those of their far larger and faster-growing ally. The War is situated in its even more alarming global context - one which not only threatens Ukraine, but which threatens to alter the geopolitical landscape in the most drastic fashion since the 1990s.

Despite this, there is a message of hope that rings throughout this account. Certainly, the War has only strengthened Ukrainian identity, encouraged a revival of Ukrainian culture, and solidified its unwavering commitment to its own territories and peoples in the face of a political tragedy its history books have become all too familiar with.

[Ira Kolomiets · Rating 4 out of 5]

What can I say… it’s a great book to listen to if you want to remember/learn what was (and still is unfortunately) going on between russia and Ukraine. Very detailed historical book about the full invasion and a little bit more.
Taking 1 star off for Kiev not Kyiv in the audio… drove me nuts while listening

[Dmitry · Rating 1 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Здесь темнота, здесь холод крошит камень стен
На стёклах льда следы измоленных колен
Здесь ярость слов, лишь искра стёртого кремня
И языки колоколов кричат, печаль внутри меня

But I overdressed on purpose to show by my appearance that I was collected and prepared to carry out my duties, whatever they might be in wartime conditions, no matter the news from the front lines.

Конечно, в этих словах автора мы можем найти стремление привести себя в порядок в прямом смысле слова. Однако с моей точки зрения, во фразе «prepared to carry out my duties» скрывается идея сделать всё возможное, чтобы помочь своей стране. Является ли участие в политическом проекте, каким является данная книга, таким «carry out my duties»? Я думаю да. Автор написал лишь часть той правды, что имела место между Россией и Украиной. Объяснить читателям, что автор сказал лишь часть правды, довольно сложно, ибо для этого нужно быть в курсе очень сложной и запутанной истории, как самой Украины, так и её отношений с её соседом – Россией. Тем не менее, я считаю, что автор намеренно упростил историю, чтобы предоставить иностранцам простой и понятный взгляд на то, что произошло между Россией и Украиной, ведь если показать иностранцами более подробную, сложную и запутанную картину, иностранцы могут начать относится к Украине более скептически. Это не значит, что они посчитают оправданным российское вторжение, а в том плане, что и российские политики и украинские политики сделали всё возможное, чтобы война случилась (хотя, пропорции вины, конечно, разные).

Начинает автор издалека – Киевской Руси. Я считаю, что о Киевской Руси и Московии нужно читать отдельные книги, поэтому я пропустил эту часть. Далее идёт крайне поверхностный обзор советской истории, включая Голодомор. Я не вижу проблемы в том, чтобы упомянуть Голодомор, ведь он действительно был, точнее голод 30-х, который был в Украине, Казахстане и России. Правда автор упоминает только голод в Украине. Как показывает книга In Wartime Stories from Ukraine, эхо Голодомора до сих пор звучит в душах украинцев, как будто эта трагедия случилась позавчера. Однако в книге In Wartime Stories from Ukraine затрагивается ещё одна тема – преступления сторонников Бандеры и УПА, в особенности совершённые по отношению к евреям. Однако Serhii Plokhy ничего не пишет об этом, как будто этого и не было. Автор книги In Wartime Stories from Ukraine показывает, что Украина разделена на два лагеря: если для одних, действия Бандеры и УПА, были преступлением, то для других – действия Сталина и советской власти. Serhii Plokhy упоминает только преступления советской власти. Единственное что он пишет по поводу УПА и сторонников Бандеры, это:

In 1943 the Bandera faction assumed leadership of the 100,000-strong Ukrainian Insurgent Army, a guerrilla force that fought against the Polish Home Army and the Nazis <…>

И дальше добавляет:

The Soviets did their best to discredit the Ukrainian nationalists by condemning their early collaboration with the Germans and exposing the participation of some OUN members in the Holocaust and the ethnic cleansing of Poles during the German occupation of Ukraine.

Согласно автору, это всё советская пропаганда придумала, и никто никого камнями не забивал и граждан Польши не трогал (автор решил сделать то же самое что и с темой голода в СССР в 30-х годах, т.е. не упоминать некоторые исторические факты).

Далее автор, внезапно, начинает пересказывать историю прихода Ельцина к власти. Вот какое отношение это имеет к сегодняшнему дню, учитывая, что этот период крайне сложный и о нём пишутся отдельные книги (да и касается он РФ, а не Украины)? Дело в том, что автор давно написал книги, как по истории Украины, так и по теме крушения СССР и прихода Ельцина к власти. Поэтому ему ничего писать заново не нужно, он всё уже давно написал. Зачем он включил эти темы в эту книгу? Я думаю исключительно по политическим соображениям. В общем, я не вижу смысла в чтении этих глав, за исключением главы, в которой автор пишет о разоружении Украины 1991, но об этом лучше прочитать в книге Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War, в которой этот вопрос рассматривается более подробно.

Ну а далее идёт самое главное – правление Путина. Первое что я заметил, это полное отсутствие причин, почему Россия так невзлюбила Украину после 2004 года. Что касается «цветных революций», то этот аргумент не выдерживает критики, ибо подобные революции были и в Армении, и в Киргизии (целых три!) и совсем недавно произошёл переворот в Казахстане. Но ни в одном из трёх случаев Россия не напала на страну. Автор никак не объясняет такое поведение России. Но я могу объяснить. Дело, конечно, не в Оранжевой Революции или, лучше сказать, не столько в ней, а в том, на каких лозунгах пришли лидеры Оранжевой Революции. Суммировать их идеи можно цитатой из книги Constructing the Narratives of Identity and Power: Self-Imagination in a Young Ukrainian Nation: «Ukraine is a postcolonial, postgenocidal, posttotalitarian country with Holodomor as the core symbol of such victimization, which continues now because the Ukrainian language and culture are oppressed by the dominant Russian language». Поэтому не удивительно, что политическим наследством Ющенко стала не борьба с коррупцией и построение современного государства по европейскому образцу (быть в ЕС не значит стать ЕС), а, во-первых, оправдание ОУН-УПА, во-вторых, признание Романа Шухевича Героем Украины и, в-третьих, продвижение темы Голодомора как преднамеренного геноцида украинцев устроенного русскими. Пишет ли об этом Serhii Plokhy? Нет.

Далее мы подходим к событиям 2014, но прежде чем сказать о них, нужно упомянуть газовую войну между РФ и Украиной. О чём она? В конце 2005 года Россия решила пересмотреть цены на газ для постсоветских стран, включая Беларусь, прибалтийские страны, Грузию, Армению, Молдавию и Азербайджан. Цены для Украины также были пересмотрены. Однако как сказано в книге Powering Europe Russia, Ukraine, and the Energy Squeeze, ни Украина, ни Беларусь не могли платить за газ по европейским ценам. Если с Белоруссией Кремль договаривается, то с Украиной начинается газовая война. Кремль не мог прекратить поставки газа через Украину, ибо тогда он не выполнил бы свои контракты, заключённые с европейскими странами, но и Украина не собиралась платить за газ по европейским ценам и просто забирала часть газа себе. Тупик. Как я понимаю, Кремль посчитал, что в таком случаи Украина должна дать что-то натурой. Возможно, такое явление как «Янукович и Партия Регионов» и являются такой натурой за оплату газа. Однако и тут проблема, ибо как показывает книга Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia, Янукович также не рвался выполнять все указы от Москвы (при помощи России он начал строить персоналистскую диктатуру) и именно поэтому, даже будучи премьер-министром, он так и не узаконил русский язык в качестве второго государственного.

Так почему в 2014 Путин начал военный конфликт, если дело в газе? Дело не только в газе, дело в политическом PR, т.е. причине, почему Путин должен продолжать править РФ (формальный союз РФ, Белоруссии и Украины был бы большим PR-событием оправдывающим пребывание Путина у власти (в 2014 альтернативой стал Крым)). В глазах населения он должен выглядеть сильным правителем, который держит под контролем соседей, но украинские политики показали, что он не только формально не контролирует Украину, но даже не способен заставить её платить европейские цены (они унизили главного великоросса, т.е. «а царь то - не настоящий»). События 2014 показали России не только откровенное недружелюбие политической украинской элиты и части украинского народа к России (которая спонсировала их газом), но и что главным тут являются ЕС и США, а не славянский «старший брат». Другими словами, через призму Кремля, ЕС может выбирать, кто станет в Украине президентом (Ющенко), а Россия, нет (её кандидата – Януковича – свергли при первой же возможности). Да, там ещё сыграли свою роль политически элиты Донбасса, но….

Короче. Ничего об этом автор не пишет. У автора всё просто: Россия напала на Украину, потому что исторически пытается уничтожить украинскую государственность и украинцев как таковых (см. историю с Голодомором). Однако я считаю, что история отношений двух стран намного более сложная и автор намеренно её не показал. Да, всё что я написал, не оправдывает вторжения 2022 (и даже 2014). Почему же в таком случаи автор не показал полную картину того что происходило? Потому что тогда англоязычный читатель запутается. Нужна предельно простая и понятная картина, в которой нет никакой двусмысленности. И ещё. Автор потерял в этой войне кузена, поэтому эта книга не про информацию, а про эмоции. Поэтому в этой книге нет историка Serhii Plokhy, а есть украинец Serhii Plokhy.

But I overdressed on purpose to show by my appearance that I was collected and prepared to carry out my duties, whatever they might be in wartime conditions, no matter the news from the front lines.

Of course, in these words of the author, we can find the author's desire to fix himself up (freshen up) in the literal sense of the word. However, from my point of view, the phrase "prepared to carry out my duties" hides the idea of doing everything possible to help one's country. Is participating in a political project, as this book is, such a "carry out my duties"? I think so. The author wrote only a part of the truth that took place between Russia and Ukraine. It is difficult to explain to readers that the author has told only a part of the truth because to do so, one must be aware of the complex and intricate history of both Ukraine itself and its relations with its neighbor, Russia. Nevertheless, I believe that the author intentionally simplified the history to give foreigners a simple and understandable view of what happened between Russia and Ukraine because, if you show foreigners a more detailed, complex, and confusing picture, one may become more skeptical of Ukraine. This is not to say that they would consider the Russian invasion justified, but in the sense that both Russian politicians and Ukrainian politicians did everything possible to make the war happen (although the proportions of blame are different, of course).

The author starts from afar - Kievan Rus'. I believe that one should read separate books about Kievan Rus and Muscovy, so I skipped this part. Then, there is an extremely superficial review of Soviet history, including the Holodomor. I don't see a problem mentioning the Holodomor because it really was, or rather, the famine of the 30s, which was in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia. However, the author only mentions the famine in Ukraine. As the book "In Wartime Stories from Ukraine" shows, the echo of the Holodomor still echoes in the souls of Ukrainians as if this tragedy happened the day before yesterday. However, "In Wartime Stories from Ukraine" touches on another topic - the crimes of Bandera and UPA supporters, especially those committed against Jews. However, Serhii Plokhy does not write anything about it, as if it never happened. The author of "In Wartime Stories from Ukraine" shows that Ukraine is divided into two camps: while for some, the actions of Bandera and the UPA were a crime, for others, the actions of Stalin and the Soviet regime. Serhii Plokhy mentions only the crimes of the Soviet regime. The only thing he writes about the UPA and Bandera supporters is:

In 1943 the Bandera faction assumed leadership of the 100,000-strong Ukrainian Insurgent Army, a guerrilla force that fought against the Polish Home Army and the Nazis <…>

And further adds:

The Soviets did their best to discredit the Ukrainian nationalists by condemning their early collaboration with the Germans and exposing the participation of some OUN members in the Holocaust and the ethnic cleansing of Poles during the German occupation of Ukraine.

According to the author, it was all made up by Soviet propaganda, so Ukrainians did not kill anyone with stones and did not touch Polish citizens (the author decided to do the same as with the topic of famine in the USSR in the 30s, i.e. not to mention some historical facts).

Then, the author suddenly begins to retell the story of Yeltsin's rise to power. What does it have to do with today, given that this period is extremely complicated & separate books are being written about it (and it concerns the Russian Federation, not Ukraine)? The thing is that the author has long ago written books, both on the history of Ukraine and on the collapse of the USSR and Yeltsin's rise to power. Therefore, he does not need to write anything new - he wrote everything long ago. Why did he include these topics in this book? I think for ideological reasons. In general, I see no point in reading these chapters, except for the chapter in which the author writes about Ukraine's disarmament in 1991, but it is better to read about it in the book Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War, which deals with this issue in more detail.

And then there is the most important thing - Putin's rule. The first thing I noticed was the complete absence of reasons why Russia disliked Ukraine so much after 2004. As for "color revolutions," this argument does not stand up to criticism because there were similar revolutions in Armenia, in Kyrgyzstan (as many as three!), and, recently, there was a coup in Kazakhstan. But in none of the three cases did Russia attack the country. The author does not explain this behavior of Russia in any way. But I can explain it. The point, of course, is not in the Orange Revolution or, better to say, not so much in it, but in the slogans on which the leaders of the Orange Revolution came. To summarize their ideas, we can quote from Constructing the Narratives of Identity and Power: Self-Imagination in a Young Ukrainian Nation: «Ukraine is a postcolonial, postgenocidal, posttotalitarian country with Holodomor as the core symbol of such victimization, which continues now because the Ukrainian language and culture are oppressed by the dominant Russian language». Therefore, it is not surprising that Yushchenko's political legacy was not the fight against corruption and building a modern state on the European model (being in the EU does not mean becoming the EU), but, first, the justification of OUN-UPA, second, the recognition of Roman Shukhevych as a Hero of Ukraine and, third, the promotion of the Holodomor as a deliberate genocide of Ukrainians organized by the Russians. Does Serhii Plokhy write about it? No.

Then we come to the events of 2014, but before we talk about them, we should mention the gas war between Russia and Ukraine. What is it about? In late 2005, Russia decided to revise gas prices for post-Soviet countries, including Belarus, the Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova and Azerbaijan. Prices for Ukraine were also revised. However, as stated in the book Powering Europe Russia, Ukraine, and the Energy Squeeze, neither Ukraine nor Belarus could pay for gas at European prices. If the Kremlin negotiates with Belarus, a gas war with Ukraine begins. The Kremlin could not stop supplying gas through Ukraine because then it would not fulfill its contracts with European countries, but Ukraine was not going to pay for gas at European prices and simply took some gas for itself. Deadlock. As I understand it, the Kremlin felt that, in such a case, Ukraine should give something in kind. Perhaps such a phenomenon as "Yanukovych and the Party of Regions" is such an in-kind payment for gas. However, there is also a problem, because as the book Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia shows, Yanukovych was also not eager to fulfill all the decrees from Moscow (he started building a personalist dictatorship with Russia's help) and that is why, even as prime minister, he never legalized Russian as a second state language.

So why did Putin start a military conflict in 2014 if it's about gas? It's not just about gas - it's about political PR, i.e., the reason why Putin should continue to rule the Russian Federation (a formal union of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine would be a great PR event to justify Putin staying in power (in 2014, the alternative was Crimea)). In the eyes of the population, he should look like a strong ruler who keeps his neighbors under control, but Ukrainian politicians have shown that he not only does not formally control Ukraine but is not even capable of making it pay European prices (they humiliated the chief of the Great Russians; "the Tsar is not a real Tsar"). The events of 2014 showed Russia not only the blatant unfriendliness of the Ukrainian political elite and part of the Ukrainian people towards Russia (which sponsored them with gas) but also that the EU and the U.S., not the Slavic "big brother," are in charge here. In other words, through the prism of the Kremlin, the EU can choose who will become president in Ukraine (Yushchenko), but Russia cannot (its candidate - Yanukovych - was overthrown at the first opportunity). Yes, the political elites of Donbas also played a role there, but...

In short. The author does not write anything about it. The author makes it simple: Russia attacked Ukraine because it is historically trying to destroy Ukrainian statehood and Ukrainians as such (see the Holodomor story). However, I believe that the history of relations between the two countries is much more complex, and the author intentionally did not show it. Yes, everything I wrote does not justify the invasion of 2022 (or even 2014). Why didn't the author show the full picture of what happened? Because then the English-speaking reader would be confused. What is needed is a simple and clear picture with no ambiguity. Also. The author lost his cousin in this war, so this book is not about information but about emotions. Therefore, there is no historian Serhii Plokhy in this book, but a Ukrainian citizen Serhii Plokhy.

[Jacob Stelling · Rating 4 out of 5]

Probably the best book I have read on the Ukraine war to date, given how it uses a long-durée perspective to explain shifting relations between Russia and Ukraine across the centuries, and pertinently analysing how this informs many of the events of our time.

Goes into technical detail surrounding the key battles and advances in recent years, and is only limited by its dating (there is no discussion of recent Russian advances, for example). Overall a very strong account of this long conflict and the future of East-West relations.

[Andres Felipe Contreras Buitrago · Rating 4 out of 5]

El libro es muy bueno, nos ayuda entender muy bien el conflicto actual entre Rusia y Ucrania, es importante todo el contexto histórico que nos brinda el autor, ahora bien, los últimos capítulos, que narran el primer año de la guerra son los más débiles, se vuelven muy descriptivos y sin mucha profundidad y análisis, cosa que si hacía bien los primeros; no obstante, ello no le quita el mérito de ser un gran texto.

En el primer capítulo se nos describe el surgimiento de la Rus de Kiev, en éste se nos aborda cómo los moscovitas no consideraban a los de Kiev como creyentes ortodoxos sino que los consideraban como corrompidos debido al dominio de Reyes católicos, es bajo este mismo contexto que la mancomunidad polaco lituana controla gran parte de Kiev, de aquí es que surge el estado cosaco ucraniano que buscaba más libertad en la búsqueda de esa mayor autonomía necesitaban aliados para hacer frente a la mancomunidad por ello juran lealtad al zar, los rusos retomarían estas tierras con el fin de proteger supuestamente a los ortodoxos, pero con Pedro el grande y posteriormente con Catalina II se empezarían a recortar las autonomías de los cosacos, esta última se anexaría territorios al sur de Ucrania y la propia península de Crimea

Durante la década de 1830 el mayor enemigo de Rusia era el nacionalismo polaco por ello es que desde Moscú se intentó reforzar el nacionalismo ruso, aunque ello no impidió que se forjaran los primeros nacionalismos ucranianos, frente a esto, es que se prohíben publicaciones en el idioma ucraniano; no obstante, en la región ucraniana controlada por los habsburgo si se podía publicar en la lengua ucraniana.

En este capítulo también se nos aborda la idea paneslavista de que Rusia debía proteger a los ortodoxos de la península balcánica, en el contexto de la Primera Guerra mundial es que Ucrania obtiene su soberanía en la que los dirigentes bolcheviques se dieron cuenta que había mucha soberanía nacional en el territorio por ello les dieron la independencia a Ucrania, el nacionalismo ucraniano no se detendría ahí, puesto que siguió con organizaciones como la radical organización de nacionalistas ucranianos lidera por Bandera la cual luego se revelará contra los nazis.

La importancia de Ucrania para la Unión Soviética se vio reflejada en la entrega que hizo esta de Crimea, esto se hizo con el fin para acelerar la recuperación de esta región tras la guerra, otra cosa que denota la gran importancia de Ucrania para la Unión Soviética es la gran producción de acero y hierro, además de una gran población que vivía allí, posterior a esto se nos relata la desintegración de la Unión Soviética en la cual Ucrania logra su independencia.

En el segundo capítulo se inicia con el relato de que Boris yeltsin usó un decreto para disolver las dos cámaras legislativas, esto se hizo según él para impedir que se siguiera obstaculizando las reformas económicas; sin embargo, estas reformas habían llevado la pobreza a muchas personas en el País con lo cual se denotó un gran fracaso de estas reformas económicas para transformar a Rusia, el problema de disolver estas dos cámaras es que volvía al presidente ilegítimo según la Constitución, por ello se crea una nueva Constitución la cual fue aprobada por el pueblo ruso en donde se le daban más poderes al presidente.

Mientras que Rusia se volvió un estado más autoritario y militar, a causa de la Primera Guerra chechena, en los que había que sumar una recesión económica la cuál era amortiguada por los hidrocarburos de Rusia, cosa que no pasaba en Ucrania, este último país tenía una mejor democracia como se puede ver implícito en su dinamismo regional y en el que el pueblo ucraniano no quería que el presidente tuviera más poderes, por el contrario, se potencializará aún más las instituciones democráticas ucranianas.

Una nueva Constitución en Ucrania hizo que el gobierno fuera mixto entre presidencial y parlamentario es importante destacar aquí que el Parlamento ucraniano nunca estuvo dominado por una sola fuerza política ya que muchos partidos compartían poderes. Mientras tanto en Rusia borís yeltsin aspiraba a su segundo mandato en este el buscó apoyo de los oligarcas rusos que se habían hecho rico con las nuevas privatizaciones que se habían hecho en Rusia, estos magnates apoyaron la reelección de yeltsin el cual logró hacerse con el poder pero no duraría mucho en éste debido a sus problemas de salud es allí cuando surge la figura de Vladimir Putin, el cual se mostraba como alguien muy leal y era una figura muy destacada en la Segunda Guerra chechena en la cual Putin logró hacerse con la victoria cosa que no había pasado en la Primera Guerra chechena.

En Ucrania las crisis económicas sirvieron para darle más poder a los comunistas, y en este mismo sentido, unas grabaciones contra el presidente Kuschma mostrarían la corrupción que había en el estado ucraniano, lo que sumado al asesinato de un periodista opositor, llevaría a que se efectuaran protestas en el territorio, frente a esto el presidente buscó un sucesor, Víctor yanukovich, el cual se enfrentó a Víctor yushchenko, este último intentaría ser asesinado por medio de un envenenamiento, se llevaron a cabo las elecciones y hubo un intento de fraude eso movilizó a la ciudadanía en lo que se denominó como la revolución naranja se volverían a repetir las elecciones y la victoria sería esta vez para yushchenko

El tercer capítulo inicia con el miedo a que hubiera una guerra civil en Rusia y Ucrania con la diferencia de que aquí habían armas nucleares, ucrania tenía armas nucleares pero no tenía los códigos para lanzarlas, solo quería renunciar a estas armas a cambio de reconocer su soberanía como país, esto se llegó a efectuar con el memorando de Budapest en el cual se garantizaba la soberanía ucraniana, se le entregaba dinero y se le suministraba combustible a sus nuevas centrales nucleares. Posterior a este memorándum se firmó un tratado de amistad con Rusia en el cual se transferiría mucha de la flota del mar negro a Rusia, este capítulo termina con los intentos de incorporar a Rusia a la OTAN y al G7 pero esta relación amistosa tendría sus primeros percances con el bombardeo de la OTAN que hace a Serbia.

El cuarto capítulo inicia con la buena amistad que tenía Putin con Bush luego de los atentados del 11 de septiembre, incluso Estados Unidos llegó a albergar bases militares en Asia central con el fin de luchar contra los talibanes, pero las relaciones entre estos dos países se volverían tensas a causa de: la retirada de Estados Unidos sobre el tratado de misiles antibalísticos, la expansión de la OTAN hacia los estados bálticos y por último la decisión de Bush de invadir Irak.

El triunfo de la revolución naranja en Ucrania fue un duro golpe a Moscú, este tenía miedo de que la democracia ucraniana llegará hasta las puertas de Moscú, es bajo este contexto que Putin abole las elecciones regionales y limita las actividades de partidos políticos y ONGs, las revoluciones de colores como la revolución de las rosas harían que Moscú perdiera influencia en su espacio de interés, Ucrania Por su parte tendría deseos de unirse a la OTAN y a la Unión Europea, es con este alejamiento de esta que Moscú usaría el gas como un arma para influir en Ucrania.

En la conferencia de seguridad de Múnich, Putin criticaría el papel de Estados Unidos en El Mundo ya que este socavaba el orden internacional por medio de la invasión a Irak y de la expansión de la OTAN, y esto no detuvo a la OTAN para que en Bucarest tuvieran en mente la incorporación de Georgia y Ucrania, esta idea no fue apoyada por Francia y Alemania, esta invitación tendría su fin con la invasión de Rusia a Georgia en el 2008, es con estos antecedentes más la elección de Victoriano kovic en el 2010 y la elección de Barack Obama en Estados Unidos que Ucrania se alejaría de Occidente, esto sirvió para que Moscú tuviera en mente la idea de un espacio económico euroasiático que le hiciera competencia a la Unión Europea esto se vio facilitado por un presidente ucraniano más afín a Rusia el cual emprendió acciones muy similares a las que hizo Putin al otorgarle más poderes al presidente y que su mandato estuviera lleno de corrupción, empero, yanukovich seguía con la idea de unirse a la Unión Europea pero para adherirse a ella debía liberar a Yulia Timoshenko.

Rusia por su parte al ver los intentos de Ucrania de acercarse a la Unión Europea inició una guerra económica contra Ucrania prohibiendo productos procedentes de ella, pero también dio algunos incentivos para alejarse de esta organización como el préstamo de 15000 millones de dólares es en este contexto es que yanukovich no firma el acuerdo de asociación con la Unión Europea e inician las protestas del euromaidán que dan como resultado la huida de Víctor yanukovich.

El quinto capítulo inicia con la decisión de Putin de anexionarse la península de Crimea esto aprovechándose del vacío de poder que habían, uno de los justificantes para anexionarse esta península fue la ley que aprobó el Parlamento ucraniano para promocionar la lengua ucraniana, en esta fase de la anexión es que Putin saca a yanukovich de Ucrania y justifica la anexión debido al miedo de un ataque nacionalista ucraniano contra los rusos étnicos de la península. La anexión empezó cuando hombres fuertemente armados tomaron el Parlamento de Crimea allí nombraron un primer ministro de Crimea afín a Rusia, es aquí cuando salen a la calle tártaros apoyando a Ucrania y otros manifestantes apoyando a Rusia la anexión terminaría de completarse con el referéndum en el cual ganó la reunificación de Crimea con Rusia

El sexto capítulo es el proyecto de una nueva Rusia imperial en los cual es Rusia tenía como propuesta una Ucrania federal en las cuales prácticamente cada región sería semi independiente y, es aquí cuando surgen las protestas en el donbass apoyando a Rusia como en esta región es que en milicias prorrusas toman edificios gubernamentales aunque el Gobierno de Kiev logra socavar algunas protestas prorrusas las fuerzas de seguridad en la región eran débiles y el Ejército se sentía como perdedor luego del euromaidán, a la población del donbass se veía como la perdedora luego de las protestas de la revolución de la dignidad ya que al entrar en el mercado de la Unión Europea se sentían en inferioridad de competir, frente a la toma de milicias prorrusas del donbass es que surgen los batallones voluntarios para luchar en el donbass, los cuales fueron apoyados por empresas y oligarcas ucranianos, una de las grandes victorias fue la del batallón azov en la recuperación de mariupol, y frente al avance ucraniano en el donbass los rusos usaron su artillería para atacar posiciones ucranianas.

La guerra escaló aún más luego el derribo de un avión de Malasia Airlines, lo cual conllevó a que la Unión Europea y Estados Unidos impusieran sanciones económicas a Rusia, ya para agosto del 2014 el ejército ruso había entrado al conflicto en Ucrania es aquí cuando surgen los acuerdos de minks los cuales no sirvieron para resolver el conflicto en el donbass. Este capítulo finaliza con una nueva Ucrania que nace de este conflicto la cual era ahora un país mucho más homogéneo y con más deseos de defender su soberanía se procede a la destrucción de monumentos comunistas y se hace más común el uso de la lengua ucraniana.

En el séptimo capítulo nos encontramos con la elección de zelenski el cual encarnaba un deseo de cambio frente al continuismo de la oligarquía y la corrupción de poroshenko, es con este presidente que se hacen mayores acercamientos hacia la OTAN, ya serían el 2021 que se concentrarían tropas rusas en la frontera de Ucrania como se hacen públicos los datos de una posible invasión de rusia a ucrania, es aquí cuando putin hace una serie de exigencias como como la de retirar tropas de la OTAN en Polonia y los estados bálticos

Se tenía la creencia de que Kiev caería en pocos días incluso se llegó a hablar de armar a los partisanos ucranianos con Javelins y stingers. Por otra parte, se hablaba de sugerirle al presidente un gobierno en el exilio que al final no es tomada en cuenta, hasta los últimos días antes de la invasión, Putin negaba que lo iba a hacer

Todo cambió el 21 de febrero cuando Putin apoyó la independencia de los dos estados títeres del donbass, los argumentos que usó Putin para la invasión era el supuesto genocidio que hacía Ucrania contra los rusos étnicos, para ello llevó a cabo una operación militar especial que se decía con el fin de desmilitarizar y desnazificar a Ucrania. Se pensaba que esta operación duraría unos pocos días ya que en las primeras tropas que entraron a Ucrania habían policías antidisturbios y trajes de gala para el desfile de la victoria.

El octavo capítulo inicia con los planes para asesinar al presidente Zelennski el cual nunca abandonó Kiev, ya se narra la importante batalla en el aeropuerto internacional Antonov en las que pocas tropas rusas no pudieron hacer frente al gran fuego de artillería que se hacía, se nos mencionan las emboscadas que sufrieron los tanques rusos debido a grupos móviles que venían armados con armas antitanques, una causa de la derrota rusa para tomar Kiev fue que nunca tuvieron la superioridad aérea ya que no destruyeron los sistemas antiaéreos, y también estaba la creencia que el servicio federal de seguridad ruso había hecho creer a Putin de que a los soldados rusos los iban a recibir con los brazos abiertos cosa que no pasó debido al gran apoyo que tuvo zelenski y los grandes deseos que habían de victoria en el país.

Durante la ocupación rusa de algunos pueblos cerca de Kiev se presionaban a líderes locales para cooperar con los rusos en caso de que no lo hicieran eran secuestrados o en muchos casos asesinados, una de las mayores atrocidades de los rusos durante la ocupación de bucha fue la masacre de civiles, también en este capítulo se nos mencionan los refugiados producto de la guerra en los cuales se destacan mujeres y niños, aunque hay que decir que muchos volvieron a sus pueblos una vez eran liberados.

En el noveno capítulo tenemos unos misiles rusos que no son tan precisos en sus objetivos y que dañan infraestructura civil, tenemos los intentos rusos de conquistar jarkiv esto a causa de: primero, jarkiv era un centro de transporte necesarios para la campaña militar, en segundo lugar, la ciudad se trataba de un lugar rusofono, en tercer lugar, jarkiv se encontraba cerca de la frontera rusa por lo cual no era necesario extender tanto las líneas de suministros en el intento de conquistar esta ciudad se usaron bombas de racimo.

Tenemos otra ciudad que aunque fue conquistada por los rusos resistió mucho mariupol, la cual era muy importante para la economía ucraniana aportaba el 7% al PIB ucraniano, mariupol fue asediada por mucha artillería, los altos al fuego no fueron respetados por los rusos lo cual llevó al bombardeo de refugios civiles y hospitales maternos. En el donbass las ciudades eran tomadas luego de ser arrasadas completamente; no obstante, la ofensiva en el donbass vería su fin con la entrada de los cohetes de artillería de alta movilidad lo cuales atacaban a los depósitos de municiones rusos.

En el décimo capítulo centrado en el mar negro se nos describe la toma de una represa y con ello la toma de kherson la conquista de este territorio se dio por la traición de muchos miembros de la inteligencia ucraniana los cuales les dieron informaciones a los rusos sobre los campos de minas, los rusos intentaron tomar odesa pero fracasaron inclusive se llevó a cabo el hundimiento de un buque insignia ruso

En el undécimo capítulo tenemos los planes de Ucrania para el inicio de una contraofensiva , todo esto empezó con el uso de himars contra las líneas de suministros rusas y el ataque a los puentes que conectaban la ciudad de kherson, pero esto solo era una fachada ya que la ofensiva se llevó a cabo en kharkiv para sorpresa de los rusos y aliados occidentales, en esta ofensiva muchos soldados rusos huirían y dejarían muchos suministros , en esta época es que se llevan a cabo referéndums en los cuales hombres armados obligaban a la gente a votar para la anexión de cuatro provincias a Rusia, en octubre es que se lleva a cabo la voladura del puente de Crimea y se llevaría finalmente a cabo la retirada de los rusos de jersón.

En el capítulo doce, ya tenemos las primeras sanciones económicas de estados unidos hacia Rusia por la independencia de las dos regiones del donbass, se llevan a cabo la congelación de activos rusos y se desconecta a los bancos rusos del servicio de mensajería, además que la unión europea pone plazos para dar fin a la importación de hidrocarburos.

Uno de los grandes países que ayudaron A Ucrania fueron los estados bálticos, polonia y Gran Bretaña. Alemania Por su parte tendría una gran relación de amistad con Rusia a causa de su gran dependencia al gas ruso cosa que se vio reflejada en el north stream dos inclusive el primer paquete de ayuda alemán para Ucrania fueron solo cascos, lo cual mostraba que Alemania no hacía lo suficiente por Ucrania. Otro país que intentó ser mediador fue Francia que por medio de Macron trató de apaciguar a Putin de iniciar su invasión inclusive tenía la idea de que Rusia se integrará a Europa

En el último capítulo tenemos todo el contexto de la visita de Nancy pelosi a Taiwán y la relación entre China y Rusia en los cuales se destaca la declaración de una amistad sin límite entre estos dos países inclusive se dice que la invasión se hizo después de finalizar los Juegos de Invierno en China ya que en este país también se pensaba que la invasión sería corta el problema es que China no mostraría mucho su apoyo a Rusia ya que valoraba la integridad territorial de un país puesto que éste tenía el caso de Taiwán, inclusive los medios de comunicación chinos al principio se mostraron favorables a la invasión pero luego se mostraron críticos. Turquía por su parte se mostraría como una mediadora entre Rusia y Ucrania llegando incluso a crear un corredor estratégico para la exportación de grano ucraniano.

En las sanciones económicas rusas muchas empresas abandonarían El País y se reducirían mucho la importación de microchips, es aquí donde surgen países como China e India que son receptores del petróleo ruso que iban en un principio a la Unión Europea

Por último tenemos en el epílogo a una Ucrania que saldrá mucho más unida luego de esta guerra se nos habla también de cómo Estados Unidos estaba muy centrado en Medio Oriente y no atendió a la crisis que pasaban en países como Georgia o Ucrania inclusive su retirada en Afganistán alentó mucho más a Putin de invadir, este último teniendo pocos aliados como lo son Bielorrusia o Irán o nisiquiera china da asistencia militar a rusia, lo único que nos deja todo este conflicto es un mundo mucho más bipolar entre China y Estados Unidos.

En conclusión un excelente libro para conocer el contexto de la invasión rusa a Ucrania, aunque hay ciertos aspectos que no son muy abordados a profundidad como la guerra del Donbas o la revolución naranja.

[Eugenia · Rating 5 out of 5]

Раджу прочитати всім і кожному. Від 90-х і до 2023. Я попідкреслювала безліч цікавих фактів. Читати було боляче, здивовано, гірко, десь відчувала гордість, десь палала моя…душа. Це скарб.

[Simo · Rating 2 out of 5]

I live far away from this current war, and I am only interested in it in a historical sense.

I felt that this book, while not claiming to be neutral, it certainly could have benefited from making an effort to provide more context on the claims that Russia had as reasons for the war. Most importantly, for the denazification claim, the author spent very few words completely disregarding it.
I know the author is Ukrainian, but I had hoped that he would show more context awareness.

Having said that, it is very apparent that Russia was the aggressor in this war and that it could have been prevented had they chosen not to wage it.

Perhaps we will have to wait for the war to end for us to get a proper historical account of the events of the war. This book does fall short, I am afraid.

[Jan Smolinski · Rating 4 out of 5]

An exceptionally thorough recounting of the first months of this horrible war. Once the memories are not as fresh anymore this text will remind us of all those stories of unimaginable human strength and suffering in Ukraine.

The book starts with a very brief history of Ukraine, Russia and the area which I would have wished to be a bit more complete since it provides important background to the current conflict.