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Thirteen Days: The Road to the First World War
At the end of WWI, Germany was demonised. The Treaty of Versailles contained a 'war guilt' clause pinning the blame on the aggression of Germany and accusing her of 'supreme offence against international morality'. Thirteen Days rejects this verdict. Clive Ponting has made a thorough study of the incredibly complex diplomatic documents. His interpretation also rejects the thesis that Europe in 1914 had reached such a boiling point that war was bound to erupt and the theory that the origins of the War lay in a mighty arms race. He argues that the War occurred primarily because of the situation in the Balkans, while he gives full weight to Austria-Hungary's desire to cripple Serbia instead of negotiating, and to Russia's militaristic programme of expansion.
Clive Ponting begins with a dramatic recreation of the assassination in Sarajevo on 28 June. He then examines how things spiralled out of control during the weeks that led to war. The tension builds as his story criss-crosses the capital cities of Europe and describes developments day by day, and, latterly, hour by hour.
The First World War destroyed the old Europe. During four years of fighting nearly nine million soldiers were killed and twenty-one million wounded; over ten million civilians died. By the end of the War, three great European empires - Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia - had disintegrated. Why did the War happen? In 1914, the states of Europe had been at peace for forty years, and every diplomatic dispute had been resolved peacefully.
Thirteen Days describes failures of communication, fateful decisions and escalating military moves; it is an extraordinary narrative of personalities and diplomacy in the dying weeks of an era in which telephone networks were in their infancy and governments relied on telegrams in code and face-to-face meetings of ambassadors.
Clive Ponting begins with a dramatic recreation of the assassination in Sarajevo on 28 June. He then examines how things spiralled out of control during the weeks that led to war. The tension builds as his story criss-crosses the capital cities of Europe and describes developments day by day, and, latterly, hour by hour.
The First World War destroyed the old Europe. During four years of fighting nearly nine million soldiers were killed and twenty-one million wounded; over ten million civilians died. By the end of the War, three great European empires - Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia - had disintegrated. Why did the War happen? In 1914, the states of Europe had been at peace for forty years, and every diplomatic dispute had been resolved peacefully.
Thirteen Days describes failures of communication, fateful decisions and escalating military moves; it is an extraordinary narrative of personalities and diplomacy in the dying weeks of an era in which telephone networks were in their infancy and governments relied on telegrams in code and face-to-face meetings of ambassadors.
- GenresHistoryNonfiction
384 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2003
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
August 8, 2014
Ponting begins his book by rejecting '...the common view of [Germany's] primary responsibility for the war'. Sadly much of the evidence he goes on to offer supports this, the academically accepted view.
From the 'Blank Check' to Berlin's haranguing of Vienna to declare war on Serbia and subsequent failure to assist the efforts of third parties to mediate, Ponting provides a balance of evidence to suggest that Germany played not just a part, but the principal role in escalating an assassination in Sarajevo to the point of global crisis. He also offers primary source evidence of Berlin's diplomatic efforts to avoid the blame for the outcome of their actions.
Of 30 July 1914, Ponting argues that the ... Russian decision to order general mobilisation was the one move in the crisis that was bound to produce a European war. This conveniently ignores the fact that Russian mobilisation did not lead inexorably to war, and while Russian decision makers would have deduced that their own mobilisation would trigger a corresponding German reaction, they could not have known that for Germany, mobilisation and war were one and the same thing. These charges can be laid upon Germany alone.
Germany's only military plan, the Schlieffen Plan, demanded a speedy and direct transition from mobilisation to war - and all before Russia could complete its own mobilisation. Many senior German politicians and diplomats were entirely unaware of the details of this plan, so it beggars belief that their Russian, French or even allied Austro-Hungarian counterparts might know of its details and implications. Unlike the Russians and Austro-Hungarian military staffs who were prepared and able to amend their mobilisation plans, The German General Staff refused to do so, knowing that this allowed no other avenue but war with Russia and France, violating Belgian neutrality on the way and in all probability dragging the British Empire in.
If the densely inter-woven brocade of 'isms' - Nationalism, Miltarism, Imperialism, Social Darwinism - formed the necessary and always dangerous critical mass, it was Germany's Schlieffen Plan alone that provided the initiator for the massive chain reaction that would engulf Europe and the world in the Great War.
The main body of Ponting's book follows the diplomatic to-ing and fro-ing of the 13 days leading up to the British declaration of war in concise daily chapters; I read each of these on its centenary. They offer many interesting and colourful anecdotes, personal portraits and insights, but do nothing to dispel the orthodoxy that the lion's share of responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 rests deservedly in Berlin.
From the 'Blank Check' to Berlin's haranguing of Vienna to declare war on Serbia and subsequent failure to assist the efforts of third parties to mediate, Ponting provides a balance of evidence to suggest that Germany played not just a part, but the principal role in escalating an assassination in Sarajevo to the point of global crisis. He also offers primary source evidence of Berlin's diplomatic efforts to avoid the blame for the outcome of their actions.
Of 30 July 1914, Ponting argues that the ... Russian decision to order general mobilisation was the one move in the crisis that was bound to produce a European war. This conveniently ignores the fact that Russian mobilisation did not lead inexorably to war, and while Russian decision makers would have deduced that their own mobilisation would trigger a corresponding German reaction, they could not have known that for Germany, mobilisation and war were one and the same thing. These charges can be laid upon Germany alone.
Germany's only military plan, the Schlieffen Plan, demanded a speedy and direct transition from mobilisation to war - and all before Russia could complete its own mobilisation. Many senior German politicians and diplomats were entirely unaware of the details of this plan, so it beggars belief that their Russian, French or even allied Austro-Hungarian counterparts might know of its details and implications. Unlike the Russians and Austro-Hungarian military staffs who were prepared and able to amend their mobilisation plans, The German General Staff refused to do so, knowing that this allowed no other avenue but war with Russia and France, violating Belgian neutrality on the way and in all probability dragging the British Empire in.
If the densely inter-woven brocade of 'isms' - Nationalism, Miltarism, Imperialism, Social Darwinism - formed the necessary and always dangerous critical mass, it was Germany's Schlieffen Plan alone that provided the initiator for the massive chain reaction that would engulf Europe and the world in the Great War.
The main body of Ponting's book follows the diplomatic to-ing and fro-ing of the 13 days leading up to the British declaration of war in concise daily chapters; I read each of these on its centenary. They offer many interesting and colourful anecdotes, personal portraits and insights, but do nothing to dispel the orthodoxy that the lion's share of responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 rests deservedly in Berlin.
February 15, 2017
Great book about the diplomacy or lack of it leading up to the First World War. In the age of telegraphs everyone was one step behind the other, the ambassadors where inclined to be more friendly to the country they where in than their own country. I never new that although Austria - Hungry started the war she was only at war with Serbia until a few weeks into the war.
May 15, 2025
Very detailed, blow by blow, account of the diplomatic manoeuvrings in the lead up to the outbreak of World War One.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews