Putin's Russia

by Lilia Shevtsova

This revised edition includes and examination of the recent presidential and parliamentary elections and their effects on Putin's leadership and Russia. Praise for the previous edition: "Out of her blunt, often acerbic, account come shrewd insights into Putin's transformation from an implausible, contrived successor into a dominator unchallenged by oligarchs, legislators, or regional bosses, let alone a democratic opposition." —Foreign Affairs "Shevtsova is one of the most astute and independent-minded observers of the Russian political scene." —Times Literary Supplement "Offers many insights into Kremlin court politics, as well as Mr. Putin and his foes." —The Economist "This well-informed Russian observer offers a straightforward situation report. Shevtsova's scorecard will interest serious Russia watchers." —Booklist "An insightful account of how the Russian president is swaying on a pendulum between reform and stability." —Survival "A timely, expert book." —Washington Post

Genres: Politics, Russia, History, Nonfiction, Political Science

457 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2003

About the author

Lilia Shevtsova (Лилия Фёдоровна Шевцова) chairs the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, dividing her time between Carnegie’s offices in Washington, DC, and Moscow. She has been with Carnegie since 1995.

Previously, Shevtsova was a professor of political science at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, deputy director of the Institute for International Economic and Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and director of the Center of Political Studies in Moscow. She has been a visiting professor at the University of California at Berkeley, Cornell University, and Georgetown University as well as a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Shevtsova was also a member of the executive council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, founding chair of the Davos World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on the Future of Russia, and member of the Global Agenda Council on Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Currently, Shevstova is a member of the Editorial Board for the American Interest, Pro et Contra, Demokratizatsiya, and the Journal of Democracy. In addition to participating in the Davos World Economic Forum’s ongoing Global Redesign Initiative program, she is a senior research associate at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Economics and an associate fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). She is also a member of the board for the Institute for Human Sciences at Boston University, the Women in International Security international association, the Liberal Mission Foundation, and the New Eurasia Foundation.

Shevtsova is the author and editor of fifteen books, including: Putin’s Russia (revised and expanded edition; Carnegie Endowment, 2005); Russia—Lost in Transition (Carnegie Endowment, 2007); Lonely Power (Carnegie Moscow Center and ROSSPEN, 2010; English edition: Carnegie Endowment, 2010); and Change or Decay with Andrew Wood (Carnegie Endowment, 2011).

Reviews

[Mai Alsharif مي الشريف · Rating 3 out of 5]

الكتاب طويل جدا .. 500 صفحة تقريبا ..لذلك لا يناسب من يريد ان يعرف بوتين و سياسيته بشكل مختصر ولكن يشرح لك تفاصيل الاحداث و ردات الفعل داخل الكرملين و عواصم العالم لاحداث و اراء بوتين.. في النهاية كشف لي الكتاب ان بوتين ليس بأنظف من يلتسين ولكنه اذكى و شبابه خدمه

[Dmitry · Rating 2 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Несмотря на то, что книга написана хорошо, и даже сегодня читать её интересно, тем не менее, для 2026 года книга устарела. Пускай книгу и можно рассматривать с точки зрения истории, в частности книга неплохо передаёт дух завершающегося правления Ельцина, а так же даёт хорошие описание политики Путина в первые годы его правления, однако ближе к концу, в частности, когда автор описывает внешнюю политику Путина, становится очевидным, что книга устарела очень сильно. Поэтому в качестве исторической литературы, книга не плохая, но для понимания сегодняшнего Путина, книга не актуальна почти полностью. К примеру, автор пишет о тех политических проблемах, с которыми в будущем столкнётся Путин, но как мы знаем, ни одна из этих проблем не поколебала его трон. Да что уж говорить, даже война, кровавая и бессмысленная, не смогла поколебать власть Путина в России. Можно долго рассуждать, почему не произошло его падение, но факт остаётся фактом: на сегодняшний день (19.06.26) Путин всё ещё президент России и ему подчиняются все силовые министерства и ведомства. Ситуация может измениться в какой-то момент, но может и не измениться.

Начало восхождения Путина к власти описывается в книге хорошо, как например, автор упоминает и про Семью (Ельцина) и про чуть ли не всеобщую поддержку Путина со стороны парламентских партий, вернее очень слабую борьбу за пост президента как будто всё уже изначально было предопределено кто станет президентом. Что-то типа борьбы было, в частности Лужков и Примаков что-то там пытались сделать, кому-то противостоять, но по ощущениям, Россия к концу 90-ых полностью вернулась на круг авторитаризма, когда власть сменяется с помощью элитных договорённостей, а не с помощью народные выборы.

The SPS liberals, in their desire to be part of the government at any cost, were prepared to continue in the role of stabilizer that they had taken on during the Yeltsin administration. The SPS was in the same trap that Democratic Russia—the first Russian democratic movement formed in Gorbachev’s time—had fallen into when it supported Yeltsin in his power struggles in the early 1990s. Democratic Russia, too, had tried to become the president’s ally, hoping to get its share. But when Yeltsin ignored it, the movement accepted the role of unrequited ally, supporting the president despite it all.
<…>
They became an important element in Yeltsin’s shadow spider web, initiating moderate reforms from time to time. Who will do it, if not us? the liberals in power asked. Ultimately they, like the Communists, became a stabilizing element of the regime.
<…>
But in the final analysis, the stabilizing role of the SPS liberals within the framework of elected monarchy discredited the idea of liberal democracy. Moreover, the splintering of economic liberalism and democracy inevitably led to lawless, oligarchic capitalism; there simply could be no other kind of capitalism under such conditions, where economic freedom was not accompanied by political freedom and the rule of law, and economic freedom was limited by the manipulations of the state apparatus.

Демократы дискредитировали себя как в самом начале правления Ельцина, когда солидаризировались с ним по вопросу расстрела Белого дома, проведением нечестной приватизации и бандитизмом на улицах страны так и своей поддержкой Путина и лозунгом «Путина в президенты, Кириенко в Думу». Уже тогда вопрос с демократией в России был закрыт и закрыт надолго.

It was, simultaneously, a complex transfer of personal power, the perpetuation of the ruling corporation, and the endorsement of the formed-by-Yeltsin elected monarchy. The corporation had taken its time selecting the heir, expended great effort destroying its real or imagined foes, and used every means possible to reach its goals—from smear campaigns against opponents of the Chechen war to provoking society’s neurasthenia. To call things by their real names, the process was a conspiracy by the Kremlin entourage to hand over power to a specific person and to ensure his success.
<…>
In this situation, Putin needed only to turn his de facto presidential powers into de jure ones. Vladimir Vladimirovich was doomed to win because he could not lose there was no one to lose to, and he could not lose. Even if he had wanted to.
<…>
A huge factor in Putin’s victory was that he was the only candidate sponsored by the ruling group, which had employed “administrative resources” to neutralize his opponents and organize support for him. The central and local authorities on all levels did everything possible to get him the win—“everything possible” being a multitude of methods, from persuading and pressuring voters to harassing other candidates to assuring a “correct” count of the vote.

Далее автор рассматривает правление Путина в первые несколько лет, а так же все те события, с которыми он столкнётся, но обо всём этом мы и так знаем и я не вижу смысла повторяться. Главное тут другое – замена больного Ельцина на молодого и здорового Путина, повышения цен на нефть, за которым последовал расцвет российской экономики и политика которую можно обозначить фразой «вставание с колен», поиска новой идеологии, которую попробуют слепить из консерватизма, православия и победы во Второй мировой войне. Для меня тут главное другое: где пролегает граница между искренним мнением граждан РФ, с одной стороны, и навязанным мнением путинской пропаганды, с другой.

Now completely different words filled the air — stability, statehood, order,и sovereignty, greatness, power, patriotism.
<…>
During the turbulent Yeltsin years, the motto was “We must change to survive.” Now many Russians, seeking calm, subscribed to another principle: “Change is dangerous and risky.” Because only a minority benefited from Yeltsin’s reforms, the great majority did not want any more experiments. And it seemed that the winning minority was not very interested in changes either, afraid of a new redistribution of power and property. Many opted to settle with what they had.
<…>
At the same time, Russians continued to borrow the Western lifestyle—and elites the most actively of any social group. The more successfully the ruling class followed Western standards in their lives, the more it turned to supporting superpower status for Russia, as if looking for a cover for its foreign ways. It was amusing to listen to people who drove the most expensive foreign cars, owned villas on the Côte d’Azur, sent their children to school in Switzerland and England, and kept their money in Western banks weigh in with typically Soviet opinions on the decline of the West and the need to “rebuff ” it.
Suddenly, both in the ruling class and in the rest of society, the desire to return to traditional Russian values and seek tranquility and healing in them was manifesting itself. More and more frustrated Russians began to think that Russia was doomed to follow its “special path” of development. And the characteristics of this special path are a strong, centralized government, power concentrated in the hands of the leader, and a superpower ideology.

Лично я считаю, что это не был выбор россиян, а это была фиксация факта отсутствие демократии, когда россияне на примере Путина и «Единой России» увидели, что от их мнение в этой стране совершенно ничего не зависит, к какому мнению российское путинское правительство и подталкивало. В итоге, россияне просто ушли в быт, благо в тот момент цены на нефть лезли вверх, а за ними и общее благосостояние страны.




Although the book is well-written and remains an interesting read even today, it is nonetheless outdated as of 2026. While the book can certainly be viewed from a historical perspective—in particular, it effectively captures the spirit of the waning years of Yeltsin’s presidency and provides a good description of Putin’s policies during the early years of his rule—toward the end, especially when the author discusses Putin’s foreign policy, it becomes clear that the book has become very outdated. Therefore, as a work of historical literature, the book isn’t bad, but it is almost entirely irrelevant for understanding Putin today. For example, the author writes about the political problems Putin will face in the future, but as we know, none of these problems has shaken his hold on power. Needless to say, not even a bloody and senseless war has been able to undermine Putin’s power in Russia. One could spend a long time speculating about why he hasn’t been ousted, but the fact remains: as of today (June 19, 26), Putin is still the president of Russia, and all security ministries and agencies are under his control. The situation may change at some point, but it may not.

The book provides a good account of the beginning of Putin’s rise to power; for example, the author mentions both the (Yeltsin) family and the nearly unanimous support Putin received from the parliamentary parties, or rather, the very weak contest for the presidency, as if it had been predetermined from the start who would become president. There was something resembling a contest—in particular, Luzhkov and Primakov tried to do something, to oppose someone—but it feels as though, by the end of the 1990s, Russia had fully returned to a cycle of authoritarianism, where power is transferred through elite agreements rather than through popular elections.

The SPS liberals, in their desire to be part of the government at any cost, were prepared to continue in the role of stabilizer that they had taken on during the Yeltsin administration. The SPS was in the same trap that Democratic Russia—the first Russian democratic movement formed in Gorbachev’s time—had fallen into when it supported Yeltsin in his power struggles in the early 1990s. Democratic Russia, too, had tried to become the president’s ally, hoping to get its share. But when Yeltsin ignored it, the movement accepted the role of unrequited ally, supporting the president despite it all.
<…>
They became an important element in Yeltsin’s shadow spider web, initiating moderate reforms from time to time. Who will do it, if not us? the liberals in power asked. Ultimately they, like the Communists, became a stabilizing element of the regime.
<…>
But in the final analysis, the stabilizing role of the SPS liberals within the framework of elected monarchy discredited the idea of liberal democracy. Moreover, the splintering of economic liberalism and democracy inevitably led to lawless, oligarchic capitalism; there simply could be no other kind of capitalism under such conditions, where economic freedom was not accompanied by political freedom and the rule of law, and economic freedom was limited by the manipulations of the state apparatus.

The Democrats discredited themselves both at the very beginning of Yeltsin’s rule—when they sided with him on the White House shooting, the conduct of corrupt privatization, and the gangsterism rampant on the country’s streets—and through their support for Putin and the slogan “Putin for President, Kirienko to the Duma.” Even back then, the issue of democracy in Russia was dead and buried—and would remain so for a long time.

It was, simultaneously, a complex transfer of personal power, the perpetuation of the ruling corporation, and the endorsement of the formed-by-Yeltsin elected monarchy. The corporation had taken its time selecting the heir, expended great effort destroying its real or imagined foes, and used every means possible to reach its goals—from smear campaigns against opponents of the Chechen war to provoking society’s neurasthenia. To call things by their real names, the process was a conspiracy by the Kremlin entourage to hand over power to a specific person and to ensure his success.
<…>
In this situation, Putin needed only to turn his de facto presidential powers into de jure ones. Vladimir Vladimirovich was doomed to win because he could not lose there was no one to lose to, and he could not lose. Even if he had wanted to.
<…>
A huge factor in Putin’s victory was that he was the only candidate sponsored by the ruling group, which had employed “administrative resources” to neutralize his opponents and organize support for him. The central and local authorities on all levels did everything possible to get him the win—“everything possible” being a multitude of methods, from persuading and pressuring voters to harassing other candidates to assuring a “correct” count of the vote.

The author then examines Putin’s first few years in office, as well as all the events he would face, but we already know all this, and I see no point in repeating it. The main point here is something else—the replacement of the ailing Yeltsin with the young and healthy Putin, the rise in oil prices, which was followed by a boom in the Russian economy, and a policy that can be summed up by the phrase “rising from knees,” as well as the search for a new ideology that they would try to cobble together from conservatism, Orthodox Christianity, and victory in World War II. For me, the main issue here is different: where does the line lie between the sincere opinions of Russian citizens, on the one hand, and the opinions imposed by Putin’s propaganda, on the other?

Now completely different words filled the air — stability, statehood, order,и sovereignty, greatness, power, patriotism.
<…>
During the turbulent Yeltsin years, the motto was “We must change to survive.” Now many Russians, seeking calm, subscribed to another principle: “Change is dangerous and risky.” Because only a minority benefited from Yeltsin’s reforms, the great majority did not want any more experiments. And it seemed that the winning minority was not very interested in changes either, afraid of a new redistribution of power and property. Many opted to settle with what they had.
<…>
At the same time, Russians continued to borrow the Western lifestyle—and elites the most actively of any social group. The more successfully the ruling class followed Western standards in their lives, the more it turned to supporting superpower status for Russia, as if looking for a cover for its foreign ways. It was amusing to listen to people who drove the most expensive foreign cars, owned villas on the Côte d’Azur, sent their children to school in Switzerland and England, and kept their money in Western banks weigh in with typically Soviet opinions on the decline of the West and the need to “rebuff ” it.
Suddenly, both in the ruling class and in the rest of society, the desire to return to traditional Russian values and seek tranquility and healing in them was manifesting itself. More and more frustrated Russians began to think that Russia was doomed to follow its “special path” of development. And the characteristics of this special path are a strong, centralized government, power concentrated in the hands of the leader, and a superpower ideology.

Personally, I believe that this was not a choice made by the Russian people, but rather a confirmation of the absence of democracy—when, through the example of Putin and “United Russia,” Russians realized that their opinions had absolutely no bearing on anything in this country, a conclusion that Putin’s government had been pushing them toward. As a result, Russians simply retreated into their daily lives, especially since oil prices were soaring at the time, and with them, the country’s overall prosperity.

[Darshani Workman · Rating 3 out of 5]

"Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." Winston Churchill.

This is how I felt about Russia before and after the book!
Although dated now, it was informational to get insight, perhaps not really understand, the history and politics of Russia during Putin's ascension to presidency at the turn of the century.

[Leslie · Rating 1 out of 5]

Quite dry...
but very informative if you are interested in the political history of russia

[Kris Wijoyo · Rating 3 out of 5]

bukunya cerita banyak tentang intrik2 politik di Russia...buku ini rada anti sama putin...ini buku masuk koleksi perpus Fordisnam lho.

[Stephen · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is now outdated, but was excellent at the time.

[Abe]

A brief analysis of then President Putin's policies.

[Hassan Shatti]

good

[EBTESAM · Rating 5 out of 5]

باهي