This edition includes a substantial new preface by the author, in which he discusses repression, determinism, transference, and practical rationality, and offers a comparison of Aristotle and Lacan on the concept of desire. MacIntyre takes the opportunity to reflect both on the reviews and criticisms of the first edition and also on his own philosophical stance.
Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre was a British-American philosopher who contributed to moral and political philosophy as well as history of philosophy and theology. MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981) is one of the most important works of Anglophone moral and political philosophy in the 20th century. He was senior research fellow at the Centre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics (CASEP) at London Metropolitan University, emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and permanent senior distinguished research fellow at the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture. During his lengthy academic career, he also taught at Brandeis University, Duke University, Vanderbilt University, and Boston University.
I enjoyed this 1958 book (and was sorry not to have access to the more recent 30 page introduction - I must try to track it down!). It is a careful and intelligent exploration of Freud’s concept of the unconscious. MacIntyre traces Freud’s journey from an approach to the mind that is based on neurophysiology and materialism to one where neurophysiological concepts are replaced by psychological ones but are still treated as causal entities. Interestingly and usefully, MacIntyre describes pre-Freudian ideas of unconscious motivation and notes how novelists were taking an increasing interest in this sort of thing before Freud’s theories. So even before Freud one might notice some activity that seems purposive but that the agent does not seem unaware of. Drawing this to her attention, she may acknowledge the purpose (either as something she had always been seeking to do or something she now accepts she does want to do). Similarly, someone might claim that they want to end a relationship but continue to do things designed to sustain it (or vice versa!). Pre-Freudian observers could note the contradiction between her words and her deeds and perhaps even say that although she does not realise this, she is keen for the relationship to continue.
MacIntyre talks a lot about reasons (and intentions, motives, purposes) and causes, but he does not fully clarify his views on the differences between them. Ultimately, his conclusion is that Freud’s concept of the unconscious is necessary if the Unconscious is seen as a type of entity. For MacIntyre, Freud does an incredible job in providing new descriptions of certain aspects of human behaviour, but he does not demonstrate the existence of a new type of entity. If his new descriptions enable us to formulate hypotheses, then those hypotheses can be explored empirically and without having to hypothesise an unconscious mind. I don’t think this essay by MacIntyre fully gets the point of what Freud was trying to do (and did), but it is a careful and thoughtful piece of analysis.
The real value of this book is its updated 30-page preface, which all too briefly takes stock of the development of Freudian psychoanalytic theory and its significance for Aristotelian moral philosophy.
A small, early work from MacIntyre, written to force himself to delve into the psychoanalytic tradition. The introduction added more recently is perhaps more useful to understanding his thought. One of the central insights of the main of the book is that while the Freudian psychoanalytic tradition is not necessarily susceptible to the usual positivist criticisms, psychoanalysis, as a practice, functions separately from psychoanalytic theory and is thus not beholden to its de facto shortcomings.