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Old Friends, New Enemies #1
Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy Volume I: Strategic Illusions, 1936-1941
Strategic Illusions, 1936-1941. Using Japanese as well as British official, private, and published sources, Professor Marder is the first scholar to have studied this subject from both sides and to give a rounded account of an extraordinary story.
554 pages, Hardcover
First published September 17, 1981
13 people want to read
About the author
Arthur J. Marder
24 books3 followersThe son of Maxwell J. Marder and Ida Greenstein, Arthur Jacob Marder was raised in Boston, Massachusetts. He attended Harvard University, where he obtained his Bachelor's degree in 1931, his master's degree in 1934, and his Ph.D. in 1936 with a study of British naval policy 1880-1905.
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August 5, 2020
A tragedy of Force Z told in three parts.
Is 15 greater than 9(+1)?
This book focuses on the viewpoints of the navies of Britain and Japan. Former allies (though Marder states it was never intimate), those parties were now rivals in the South East Asia. British interests centered around Singapore, a key route in multiple directions.
In the early twentieth century the naval powers weighed their respective strengths according the numbers of battleships and battlecruisers (“capital ships”) each side had. Following the Washington and London Naval Treaties, in the 1930s Britain had 15 capital ships while Japan had 9 (sneakily actually 10).
So, 15 is greater than 9(+1)… …right? Well, as Marder makes clear, Britain’s global spanning empire and dominions had a few issues up to December 1941:
- Spanning the globe tends to leave you rather thin, and it takes time to get where you want to go (in this case, Singapore)
- Imagine owning your car for 25 years. And it's 30,000 times as big. Now imagine how often you might need to fix and update it, and how long that might take (three and a half years for Queen Elizabeth).
- Oh, you’ve been at war with Germany since September 1939, and Italy since June 1940. You lose your allies the French in June 1940.
- Did I say you had 15? Well you’re at war, so start subtracting, right from the first month with the Royal Oak. Wait four years before you get another.
Marder’s narrative leads to Britain desperately needing the help of the United States. Diplomatic discussions include practically begging the United States to base the US Pacific Fleet at Singapore. Marder thinks this would have been a great idea and, on United States’ refusal: This may have been one of their biggest mistakes of the whole war. Marder admits that such a deployment was a political impossibility, and does not develop how it would have occurred in practice.
Britain was also willing to appease Japan (such as closing the Burma Road for three months in 1940) and considered leaving the Netherlands East Indies in the lurch, an interesting policy in light of how appeasement went in 1930s Europe.
Japan also had a few issues which this book does not tease out. The worst case for Britain was fighting Japan alone, which fits the scope of this book. The worst case for Japan was fighting a combination including Britain and the US (and potentially Russia), which does not quite fit. The strategic/operational options created by the Kidō Butai (the Japanese carrier force) also fail to make the cut, since it was deployed against the United States at Pearl Harbor. Marder does include useful information about the Japan’s pre-war naval construction (“Replenishment”) programmes which, put against America’s authorised naval construction, sets outs pretty well that Japan had a narrow (and ultimately imaginary) window to strike before embargoes and overwhelming Allied superiority would force Japan to surrender without battle:
A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman told a foreign correspondent (7 February) that Japan had no plans for building battleships of 43,000 tons. He was correct: rough plans drawn up in the autumn of 1936 and for which materials had been stockpiled called for mastodons of 64,000 tons or nearly 72,000 tons when fully laden.
What also comes up repeatedly is the idea of Britain sending East a flying squadron of two or more fast capital ships. While Marder does not say that the conception for Force Z drew directly from years of these discussions, the implication is there for the reader.
Looking at each other
In the middle section Marder describes the qualities of the respective weapons and men each side had. I will leave it to those more expert than me to judge Marder’s assessments, other than perhaps his statement No Japanese capital ship was sunk by gunfire during the war, which is flatly wrong in respect of the Kirishima.
The real value is Marder’s documentation as to how each side rated the other. The Japanese were more concerned about the Americans but appeared to rate the Royal Navy highly. The British however underrated the Japanese, with issues beyond the scuttlebutt of Japanese aeroplanes made of cardboard and eyes too narrow to see properly. British intelligence made assumptions about the range and effectiveness of Japanese bombers and, based on the evidence provided by Marder, somewhat arbitrarily decided that the Imperial Japanese Navy would be as efficient as the Italians (rated relatively lowly by the British), perhaps even less so. There was a bald refusal to accept that the Japanese had produced the best torpedoes in the world.
While Marder engages in a bit of cultural/racial reading of the Japanese, I believe it would be unfair to say his views are without nuance. It is a valid point that the Japanese Naval Academy at Etajima was brutal and perhaps overdid the physical fitness elements (and Britain’s equivalent Dartmouth gets a few swipes as well). It is also worth pointing out that Marder turns to a wide range of Japanese sources throughout his book and while some have come into question (e.g. Fuchida), direct quotes from participants should not be disregarded
Denouement
So Force Z, made up primarily of the new battleship Prince of Wales and the old battlecruiser Repulse are sent with deliberate fanfare to Singapore in late 1941 to deter the Japanese. In that respect, it fails.
So, as Marder asks, does Force Z withdraw and wait until there are more capital ships nearby (7 minimum according to the strategic plans) or act as a flying squadron, as previously hinted at? Force Z’s commander Admiral Tom Phillips goes with the latter choice, deploying his ships aggressively. While criticised after the fact, the decision makes sense in the context of how the British underrate the capabilities of Japan’s naval and air units. Marder’s groundwork in the previous sections gives us an understanding of the willingness to take a risk. Marder draws on the evidence of contemporaries that Phillips was not a first-class sea commander but it appears only one other Admiral (Somerville of Force H) would definitely have made a different decision at the time:
The operation was a gallant one, commanded by an Admiral who was as brave as a lion in what he did, who took a chance, knowing the risk, and did the best he could with what he had.
Force Z sorties shortly after Pearl Harbor, with near misses accruing to both sides. However, while by no means ignorant and possibly unlucky, the British do not fully appreciate how narrow the margin between success and failure is. Marder’s narrative of the journey and eventual sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse from the perspective of both sides is sober and pitched well emotionally, showing respect for all viewpoints. It was not just a case of blunderers running up against a fanatical enemy. Both sides were trying their best and taking what came, though Marder ends a chapter with Phillips’ wrong turn at the beginning of the final battle, noting that was not a great start.
You don’t need to read this book, but Marder combines personalities with wider strategic machinations. It’s not a “stirring” narrative, but a very human one.
Is 15 greater than 9(+1)?
This book focuses on the viewpoints of the navies of Britain and Japan. Former allies (though Marder states it was never intimate), those parties were now rivals in the South East Asia. British interests centered around Singapore, a key route in multiple directions.
In the early twentieth century the naval powers weighed their respective strengths according the numbers of battleships and battlecruisers (“capital ships”) each side had. Following the Washington and London Naval Treaties, in the 1930s Britain had 15 capital ships while Japan had 9 (sneakily actually 10).
So, 15 is greater than 9(+1)… …right? Well, as Marder makes clear, Britain’s global spanning empire and dominions had a few issues up to December 1941:
- Spanning the globe tends to leave you rather thin, and it takes time to get where you want to go (in this case, Singapore)
- Imagine owning your car for 25 years. And it's 30,000 times as big. Now imagine how often you might need to fix and update it, and how long that might take (three and a half years for Queen Elizabeth).
- Oh, you’ve been at war with Germany since September 1939, and Italy since June 1940. You lose your allies the French in June 1940.
- Did I say you had 15? Well you’re at war, so start subtracting, right from the first month with the Royal Oak. Wait four years before you get another.
Marder’s narrative leads to Britain desperately needing the help of the United States. Diplomatic discussions include practically begging the United States to base the US Pacific Fleet at Singapore. Marder thinks this would have been a great idea and, on United States’ refusal: This may have been one of their biggest mistakes of the whole war. Marder admits that such a deployment was a political impossibility, and does not develop how it would have occurred in practice.
Britain was also willing to appease Japan (such as closing the Burma Road for three months in 1940) and considered leaving the Netherlands East Indies in the lurch, an interesting policy in light of how appeasement went in 1930s Europe.
Japan also had a few issues which this book does not tease out. The worst case for Britain was fighting Japan alone, which fits the scope of this book. The worst case for Japan was fighting a combination including Britain and the US (and potentially Russia), which does not quite fit. The strategic/operational options created by the Kidō Butai (the Japanese carrier force) also fail to make the cut, since it was deployed against the United States at Pearl Harbor. Marder does include useful information about the Japan’s pre-war naval construction (“Replenishment”) programmes which, put against America’s authorised naval construction, sets outs pretty well that Japan had a narrow (and ultimately imaginary) window to strike before embargoes and overwhelming Allied superiority would force Japan to surrender without battle:
A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman told a foreign correspondent (7 February) that Japan had no plans for building battleships of 43,000 tons. He was correct: rough plans drawn up in the autumn of 1936 and for which materials had been stockpiled called for mastodons of 64,000 tons or nearly 72,000 tons when fully laden.
What also comes up repeatedly is the idea of Britain sending East a flying squadron of two or more fast capital ships. While Marder does not say that the conception for Force Z drew directly from years of these discussions, the implication is there for the reader.
Looking at each other
In the middle section Marder describes the qualities of the respective weapons and men each side had. I will leave it to those more expert than me to judge Marder’s assessments, other than perhaps his statement No Japanese capital ship was sunk by gunfire during the war, which is flatly wrong in respect of the Kirishima.
The real value is Marder’s documentation as to how each side rated the other. The Japanese were more concerned about the Americans but appeared to rate the Royal Navy highly. The British however underrated the Japanese, with issues beyond the scuttlebutt of Japanese aeroplanes made of cardboard and eyes too narrow to see properly. British intelligence made assumptions about the range and effectiveness of Japanese bombers and, based on the evidence provided by Marder, somewhat arbitrarily decided that the Imperial Japanese Navy would be as efficient as the Italians (rated relatively lowly by the British), perhaps even less so. There was a bald refusal to accept that the Japanese had produced the best torpedoes in the world.
While Marder engages in a bit of cultural/racial reading of the Japanese, I believe it would be unfair to say his views are without nuance. It is a valid point that the Japanese Naval Academy at Etajima was brutal and perhaps overdid the physical fitness elements (and Britain’s equivalent Dartmouth gets a few swipes as well). It is also worth pointing out that Marder turns to a wide range of Japanese sources throughout his book and while some have come into question (e.g. Fuchida), direct quotes from participants should not be disregarded
Denouement
So Force Z, made up primarily of the new battleship Prince of Wales and the old battlecruiser Repulse are sent with deliberate fanfare to Singapore in late 1941 to deter the Japanese. In that respect, it fails.
So, as Marder asks, does Force Z withdraw and wait until there are more capital ships nearby (7 minimum according to the strategic plans) or act as a flying squadron, as previously hinted at? Force Z’s commander Admiral Tom Phillips goes with the latter choice, deploying his ships aggressively. While criticised after the fact, the decision makes sense in the context of how the British underrate the capabilities of Japan’s naval and air units. Marder’s groundwork in the previous sections gives us an understanding of the willingness to take a risk. Marder draws on the evidence of contemporaries that Phillips was not a first-class sea commander but it appears only one other Admiral (Somerville of Force H) would definitely have made a different decision at the time:
The operation was a gallant one, commanded by an Admiral who was as brave as a lion in what he did, who took a chance, knowing the risk, and did the best he could with what he had.
Force Z sorties shortly after Pearl Harbor, with near misses accruing to both sides. However, while by no means ignorant and possibly unlucky, the British do not fully appreciate how narrow the margin between success and failure is. Marder’s narrative of the journey and eventual sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse from the perspective of both sides is sober and pitched well emotionally, showing respect for all viewpoints. It was not just a case of blunderers running up against a fanatical enemy. Both sides were trying their best and taking what came, though Marder ends a chapter with Phillips’ wrong turn at the beginning of the final battle, noting that was not a great start.
You don’t need to read this book, but Marder combines personalities with wider strategic machinations. It’s not a “stirring” narrative, but a very human one.
Displaying 1 of 1 review