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Language, Sense and Nonsense: A Critical Investigation into Modern Theories of Language
Book by Baker, G. P., P. M. S. Hacker
Paperback
First published January 1, 1984
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About the author
Gordon P. Baker
18 books2 followersGordon Park Baker was an American-English philosopher. His topics of interest included Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gottlob Frege, Friedrich Waismann, Bertrand Russell, the Vienna Circle, and René Descartes. He was noted for his collaboration with Peter Hacker and his disagreements with Michael Dummett.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
December 8, 2024
It is not easy to review this book. And this is because I am so totally in agreement that it somehow feels wrong to talk about it. On the other hand looking at the impact it had one should definitely talk about it.
I did not read the book at the time it came out because I thought I knew what they were going to say. And reading it now I see I was right. And really, all they say you would come up yourself with a bit of Wittgensteinian background and some common sense.
But seriously, what is it about? They try nothing less than to show that the Philosophy of Language to a large extent is deeply wrong. Truth-conditional semantics "will not be ranged with Newtonian mechanics and Mendelian genetics in the museum of the history of science, but it will be relegated to the basement to moulder away in the company of phrenology and the theory of humours..." (p. 389)
I hope they are right, but if so, then not because of Baker and Hacker. Which is a pity.
"Philosophers and linguists alike seem to be virtually unanimous in adhering to the principle that the meaning of a sentence is its truth conditions, as well as to the corollary that the meaning of subsentential expressions are to be explained as their contributions to the meaning of sentences in which they occur." (p. 121)
Interestingly, the idea that it is truth that is primary (like Davidson said, to know what it means for a sentence to be true amounts to understanding a language) that is, one must understand the "truth-conditions" to understand meaning as well as the Chomskyan view that there is a special ability in humans that enables them to understand "infinitely" many sentences although they learned only a few, can be traced back to Wittgenstein. To "young Wittgenstein" as they call him (which always made me think of young Sheldon)
This is historically important. But not important to the question. Both claims, Baker and Hacker argue are fundamentally wrong. Absurd. Bizarre. It is a pleasure to read this (but, of course, it is a different question whether this kind of language helps their cause.)
I did not read the book at the time it came out because I thought I knew what they were going to say. And reading it now I see I was right. And really, all they say you would come up yourself with a bit of Wittgensteinian background and some common sense.
But seriously, what is it about? They try nothing less than to show that the Philosophy of Language to a large extent is deeply wrong. Truth-conditional semantics "will not be ranged with Newtonian mechanics and Mendelian genetics in the museum of the history of science, but it will be relegated to the basement to moulder away in the company of phrenology and the theory of humours..." (p. 389)
I hope they are right, but if so, then not because of Baker and Hacker. Which is a pity.
"Philosophers and linguists alike seem to be virtually unanimous in adhering to the principle that the meaning of a sentence is its truth conditions, as well as to the corollary that the meaning of subsentential expressions are to be explained as their contributions to the meaning of sentences in which they occur." (p. 121)
Interestingly, the idea that it is truth that is primary (like Davidson said, to know what it means for a sentence to be true amounts to understanding a language) that is, one must understand the "truth-conditions" to understand meaning as well as the Chomskyan view that there is a special ability in humans that enables them to understand "infinitely" many sentences although they learned only a few, can be traced back to Wittgenstein. To "young Wittgenstein" as they call him (which always made me think of young Sheldon)
This is historically important. But not important to the question. Both claims, Baker and Hacker argue are fundamentally wrong. Absurd. Bizarre. It is a pleasure to read this (but, of course, it is a different question whether this kind of language helps their cause.)
April 20, 2012
This book is a very interesting critique of some trends in philosophy of language and linguistics. First, the authors give a very gloomy account of truth theories of meaning, and it's a difficult but rewarding read. Next, they try to make a complete mockery out of Chomskyan linguistics, something which they do surprisingly well - albeit I don't share their fierce criticism I still have to admit that a lot of what they say is very interesting and poses serious questions for any cognitive linguist. It's a shame that this book is not more widely read!
January 8, 2025
Some good stuff in here. It's a head-on attempted takedown of whole chunks of modern analytical-style philosophy and, better yet, of the entire enterprise of Chomsky-flavoured linguistics, so an effort to be applauded.
On the other hand it's a bit bloated and repetitious. The style is tiresomely smug-public-schoolboyesque, and incidentally chauvinistic. One can follow the arguments, pretty much, without having to be too deep into advanced formal logic and the like (of 40-odd years ago); but they could have used a stern editor.
I remember hearing of this duo quite a bit when I was frolicking in the groves of Academe, though I don't remember much about what I heard, only that they didn't appeal. They remind me of one or two of my more unappealing fellow studes, whose faces loom up in my mind as I read their confident demolition job. It's off-putting.
On the other hand, they do have some good points and an overall good point (viz., modern linguistics and much of then-modern Anglo-Am philosophy are barking up entirely the wrong tree and getting nowhere interesting at great length).
They don't seem to have convinced the fields as a whole, since both disciplines continue about their futile business to this day, probably even more prolifically now than then, though still without anything worthwhile to show for it. But ain't that just like life?
On the other hand it's a bit bloated and repetitious. The style is tiresomely smug-public-schoolboyesque, and incidentally chauvinistic. One can follow the arguments, pretty much, without having to be too deep into advanced formal logic and the like (of 40-odd years ago); but they could have used a stern editor.
I remember hearing of this duo quite a bit when I was frolicking in the groves of Academe, though I don't remember much about what I heard, only that they didn't appeal. They remind me of one or two of my more unappealing fellow studes, whose faces loom up in my mind as I read their confident demolition job. It's off-putting.
On the other hand, they do have some good points and an overall good point (viz., modern linguistics and much of then-modern Anglo-Am philosophy are barking up entirely the wrong tree and getting nowhere interesting at great length).
They don't seem to have convinced the fields as a whole, since both disciplines continue about their futile business to this day, probably even more prolifically now than then, though still without anything worthwhile to show for it. But ain't that just like life?
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews