Dynamics of Faith

by Paul Tillich

One of the greatest books ever written on the subject, Dynamics of Faith is a primer in the philosophy of religion. Paul Tillich, a leading theologian of the twentieth century, explores the idea of faith in all its dimensions, while defining the concept in the process. This graceful and accessible volume contains a new introduction by Marion Pauck, Tillich's biographer.

Genres: Theology, Religion, Philosophy, Nonfiction, Christianity, Spirituality, Faith

147 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1957

About the author

Paul Tillich was a German-American theologian and Christian existentialist philosopher. Tillich was – along with his contemporaries Rudolf Bultmann (Germany), Karl Barth (Switzerland), and Reinhold Niebuhr (United States) – one of the four most influential Protestant theologians of the 20th century. Among the general populace, he is best known for his works The Courage to Be (1952) and Dynamics of Faith (1957), which introduced issues of theology and modern culture to a general readership. Theologically, he is best known for his major three-volume work Systematic Theology (1951–63), in which he developed his "method of correlation": an approach of exploring the symbols of Christian revelation as answers to the problems of human existence raised by contemporary existential philosophical analysis.

Reviews

[Ben De Bono · Rating 4 out of 5]

For an evangelical like myself, my assessment of this book depends a great deal on perspective. If I'm viewing Paul Tillich as a Christian theologian than the book, while still insightful and interesting, is hugely problematic. While it probably wouldn't be correct to fully associate Tillich with theological liberalism, he's obviously quite influenced by it and shares much in common with it (i.e. his denial of the virgin birth and the bodily resurrection of Christ). Whether or not we can fully see him as part of the liberal tradition, Tillich's theology is far from orthodox.

On the other hand, if I choose ti view Tillich not as a Christian theologian but as a general (rather than specifically Christian) philosopher of religion, the book becomes invaluable. This perspective doesn't eliminate the theological problems I have with Tillich but it does push them into the background. Tillich's insights into the nature of faith and types of faith are quite well presented and challenging. I found his insights into doubt and courage to be especially powerful and am looking forward to reading more of his thoughts on the topic in The Courage To Be. I also found his analysis of religious symbols to be quite well done. It gave words to several ideas I've been thinking through regarding things such as sacrament and liturgy.

For evangelicals Tillich isn't without his problems. However, that shouldn't stop us from exploring what Dynamics of Faith has to offer. With proper discernment and awareness of its shortcomings, the book is a wealth of insight and comes highly recommended.

[Rawabi · Rating 2 out of 5]

ما تؤمن به ، هو همّك الأقصى .. كما يعرفه مؤلف الكتاب .
و أن تتمسك به و إن كان يهدد حياتك الإجتماعية و الإقتصادية
فالإيمان حرية ، إختيارك لما تؤمن به حرية ، تنتهي حريتك حين يبدأ همّك الأقصى في التأثير على حياتك حسب ما يتطلبه الأمر

يفصل المؤلف بين الفعل و الإيمان ، فالإيمان مُدرك ، و إيمانك لا يعني عدم وعيك بالقيم الأخلافية فبالتالي أي تصرف يبدر منك لا يكون دافعه الإيمان بشكل مباشر ؛ فالإيمان لا يعني غيابك عن الوعي أو تحكم فكرة الإيمان منفردة بما تفعل ، و إن كانت سببًا في فعلك ؛ فالإيمان ليس السبب الوحيد.

الإيمان يعني الوعي بوجود مقدس ، وجود المقدس مهم في حياة الإنسان ، و لا يستوجب أن يكون هذا المقدس خير و أخلاقي دائمًا ، و هذا ما يجعل من الإيمان أحيانًا خطرًا مالم يتيقن من ماهية المقدس و من خيريته .

" الشك الجدي هو تأكيد الإيمان ."

ينقد كذلك النظر إلى الإيمان كفعل إجتماعي دوغمائي ، و كأنه لا يخص الفرد وحده ! و يبرر ذلك بالأسباب التاريخية و الأزمنة التي أخرست العقل لوجود إيمانٍ ما ، و يذكر أن الإيمان يعني الفكرة < التعبير عنها بحاجة لغة < اللغة تعني تواصل <التواصل يعني جماعة .
لذا فالإيمان يتطلب جماعة .
يُكبت استقلال الفرد بإيمانه في حالة تدخل سُلطة مدنية لتحكم تلك الجماعة المؤمنة .فعلى السلطة المدنية أن تسمح بإظهار صور إيمان مخالفة . و لو منعوا ذلك فقد أزالوا فعل الشجاعة و المجازفة المنتميان للإيمان ، و تحوّل الإيمان إلى نمط سلوكي ، و يفقد كونه غاية قصوى .
كذلك يواجه الإيمان خطرًا أن يُصيّر إيمانًا ساكنًا حين تتحكم السلطة الدينية فيما يُشك و مالايُشك فيه.

ذكر في فصل ماليس بالإيمان ، مدى تأثير وخطر إرغام الإيمان أن يكون جزءًا مما تقوم عليه حياتنا اليومية و أفكارنا تجاه العلوم الحديثة و الاجتماعية كذلك ...
فيقول :" معرفتنا بالعالم ( بما في ذلك معرفتنا بذواتنا كجزء من العالم ) هي قضية بحث نجريه بأنفسنا أو يجريه أولئك الذين نثق بهم . و هي ليست قضية إيمان . و بُعد الإيمان ليس بعدًا للعلم أو التاريخ أو علم النفس . و قبول الفرضية المحتملة في هذه العوالم ليس إيمانًا ، بل اعتقاد أولي يجب أن تجربه المناهج الدراسية ، و لابد أن يتغير مع كل اكتشاف جديد " .
فهذه الصراعات بين المعرفة و الإيمان توجد فهمًا مغلوطًا في الإيمان سببه السلطات الدينية .

ينقد محاولة تفنيد الأساطير الدينية بالعلم الحديث كـ تفنيد مولد المسيح بيولوجيًا ، و البعث بالفيزياء ، فالله أعلى من العلم الحديث و لا يجب تشخيصه ليحمل صفاتنا وقوانينا .


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الكتاب صعب مما اضطرني إلى تجاوز مقاطع و صفحات عدة منه ، قراءته تاخذ وقت و تحتاج تركيز و لعل الترجمة و المحتوى يزيدان صعوبته .
لعلِّ بعد زمنٍ طويل أرغب بإعادة قراءته فقد تكون قراءتي الثانية أوضح و أيسر .

[Wil Roese · Rating 3 out of 5]

Paul Tillich defines faith as being in a state of ultimate concern or loving something with all our mind, body and spirit Examples of an object of our ultimate concern include money, success, God, and our nation. The object of our ultimate concern becomes our god. If we put our faith in something other than the ultimate, than that faith can be destructive. Therefore, there is always a risk in faith and this risk causes doubt. This doubt is overcome by courage which is one aspect of faith. Faith involves the whole personality: our intellect, our will, and our emotions. Faith must be distinguished from belief although belief is an aspect of faith. Therefore arguments for a belief or even a will to have a belief can not produce faith alone. The emotional aspect of faith is the feeling of unconditional dependence but again faith can not be limited to an emotional feeling.

We can only express the object of our ultimate concern symbolically as the object itself is beyond our grasp. Here Tillich makes the distinction between a sign and a symbol. Wile both point to some reality beyond themselves a sign does so only by convention while a symbol participates in that reality to which it points. Symbols reveal a reality that can not be understood without them and also reveal a before hidden, corresponding area of our soul. Works of art can act as symbols in these ways. Symbols can not be invented but come to have a life of their own. Faith goes beyond belief in a story/myth to acceptance of the ultimate concern to which the story symbolically points. Accepting the story literally destroys its symbolic meaning and makes it unable to point us to the ultimate. The literal interpretation of the story comes from belief in a god confined to space and time and makes the symbol an idol.

Tillich next discusses two types of faith; ontological faith and moral faith. Oncologic faith is the faith of being. It is the experience of the ultimate. Moral faith is the faith to be what the ultimate intended us to be. There is a constant tension between these two forms of faith.

Faith and reason are thought to be in conflict with each other only by those who misunderstand the true meaning of faith. Reason is what makes us human and any "faith" that tries to destroy reason is dehumanizing. Faith is built on reason for it takes reason to distinguish our ultimate concern from our other concerns. Tillich defines reason as the "meaningful structure of the mind and reality." Although faith is based on reason it is not confined to reason but reaches out to that with is beyond the grasp of reason, for our reason is finite. Faith is the ultimate fulfillment of reason. Science deals with the physical universe and faith deals with our ultimate concern which is beyond the physical universe. Conflicts occur when science tries to deal with issues beyond the physical universe or faith tries to deal with issues of the physical universe. The relationship between faith and philosophy, in the traditional sense, is more complicated because they both deal with ultimate reality but faith uses symbols and philosophy uses concepts. The reason for the different tools is the fact that the philosophy remains distinct from the ultimate reality/concern. In the symbol of God are the concepts of life, being, sprit, and love. In the symbol of the fall is the concept of man's estrangement from his essential nature.

The truthfulness of our faith can be looked at subjectively and objectively. Our faith is subjectively true if it what we are really ultimately concerned about and it is objectively true if it what is really the ultimate. There can be no faith without the participation of that which is ultimate. If there is no revelation of the ultimate, than man can not have faith in this ultimate. Faith, as our ultimate concern, integrates all other aspects of our life. Love is an inseparable aspect of faith. True love contains both eros and agape. Acton is the expression of love. Not only does faith exist in community but there can be no community of any kind without a shared faith. One faith can only be attacked by another faith.

[Zachary · Rating 5 out of 5]

Paul Tillich minces no words. “Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned: the dynamics of faith are the dynamics of man’s ultimate concern.” So starts Tillich’s Dynamics of Faith, one of his more popular books in which he redefines an often misunderstood spiritual term, that is faith, and explores the implications of this redefinition for modern religious life. “There is hardly a word in the religious language, both theological and popular, which is subject to more . . . distortions and questionable definitions than the word ‘faith,’” Tillich explains in his introductory remarks, and his claim is perhaps even more true in our twenty-first century “spiritual” milieu. Tillich’s aim, then, “is to try to reinterpret the word and remove the confusing and distorting connotations . . . to convince some readers of the hidden power of faith within themselves and of the infinitive significance of that to which faith is related.” Tillich achieves this objective and delivers an accessible and crystallized summation of his systematic theology in this svelte volume, first published in 1957.

In the first chapter, “What Faith Is,” Tillich expounds upon his redefinition of faith as ultimate concern with the claim that it is a centered act that necessitates the participation of the total personality. He asserts that “faith is the most centered act of the human mind,” which is “not an act of any of [a person’s] rational functions, as it is not an act of the unconscious, but . . . an act in which both the rational and the nonrational elements of [a person] are transcended.” In this sense, faith is ecstatic, and as such allows one to stand outside of oneself while at the same time nevertheless remaining oneself “with all the elements which are united in the personal center.” Faith in no way requires or is the result of “the will to believe,” nor is it an emotional outburst. In ecstasy, faith is both rational and nonrational, a unification of “an awareness of truth and of ethical value . . . past loves and hates, conflicts and reunions, individual and collective influences.”

One of the most critical claims Tillich makes in the first chapter of the book concerns the universality—and essential non-ethical nature—of faith itself. Faith always has a content toward which it is directed and everyone has faith, insofar as everyone has an ultimate concern. Any content that contains the element of the unconditional and of ultimacy “carries the quality of divinity,” thus “one can understand why almost every thing ‘in heaven and on earth’ has received ultimacy in the history of human religion.” The Christian God, money, power, humanity itself—any of these can be the content of faith, that is, one’s ultimate concern. Moreover, that which concerns one ultimately becomes holy, yet what is holy “lies below” the delineation between Good and Evil, and is in fact “both divine and demonic . . . creative and destructive.” Insofar as there is true and idolatrous faith, “the holy which is demonic, or ultimately destructive, is identical with the content of idolatrous faith,” while the holy which is true or divine “becomes justice and truth” and is ultimately creative. Tillich maintains that “our ultimate concern can destroy us as it can heal us. But we can never be without it.”

Tillich’s second chapter, “What Faith Is Not,” eruditely dispels with the distortions of faith that are still so prevalent in our ordinary discourse. The problem, for Tillich, is that each of these distortions—the “intellectualistic,” the “voluntaristic,” and the “emotionalistic”—reduces faith to one of the functions of the whole personality when, as noted above, faith involves the participation of the whole personality. While this chapter is excellent for its clarity and real relevance, for reasons of brevity, I wish to more closely examine chapters three and four, which explore the “Symbols of Faith” and “Types of Faith,” respectively. For these chapters alone, one should read this book.

With respect to symbols, Tillich claims that one’s “ultimate concern must be expressed symbolically, because symbolic language alone is able to express the ultimate.” Tillich makes a clear distinction between symbols and signs: while both point beyond themselves to some other content, “signs do not participate in the reality of that to which they point,” whereas symbols do participate in that to which they point (for example, “the flag participates in the power and dignity of the nation for which it stands,” Tillich notes). Symbols are important because they “open up levels of reality which otherwise are closed for us.” Art, for instance, allows access to dimensions that cannot be reached except via artistic symbols. The same is true for music. And just as symbols open up levels of reality, they also “unlock dimensions and elements of our soul which correspond to the dimensions and elements of reality.” In other words, we find ourselves at stake in symbols, which tell us more about opaque aspects of ourselves that we otherwise could not possibly know. God is the most fundamental symbol for ultimate concern, whether one’s ultimate concern is the nation or some imprecise notion of “success.” The symbol of God “is always present in any act of faith, even if the act of faith includes the denial of God,” Tillich explains. Where there is ultimate concern, the symbol of God is always at play and cannot be denied, since “ultimate concern cannot deny its own character as ultimate”; otherwise it would not truly be an ultimate concern. This analysis clarifies what is meant by atheism: it “can only mean the attempt to remove any ultimate concern,” that is, utter indifference about one’s own existence. Few people, if any, would therefore qualify as true atheists as per this definition.

In the fourth chapter, “Types of Faith,” Tillich describes two types of faith: ontological and moral. As is the case with Tillich’s other classifications, his delineation of types of faith clarifies and differentiates different impulses many of us (if not all of us) have felt with respect to our own ultimate concerns. The ontological type of faith manifests in “here and now” encounters with reality, wherein “the holy is first of all experienced as present.” This type of faith “breaks into ordinary reality, shakes it and drives it beyond itself in an ecstatic way.” Tillich describes it as “sacramental,” and as such it constitutes “the state of being grasped by the holy through a special medium.” One potential hazard of this type of faith is when the sacramental object is taken as holy in itself. The faithful erroneously overlooks the fact that the sacramental object points beyond itself, and “its character as the bearer of the holy . . . disappears in the act of faith.” The moral type of faith, on the other hand, focuses on the idea of the law derived from God that requires moral obedience. Tillich identifies juristic, conventional, and ethical strands of this type of faith, the differences between which do not concern me here. The point is that the moral type of faith “demands personal and social holiness in the sense of justice and love”; our ultimate concern, in accordance with this faith, contains both descriptive and normative elements—who we essentially are and what we should strive to be. Moral perfection is perhaps one risk run in this type of faith. In the end, Tillich insists that these two types of faith are incomplete. Faith strives to unify the two “in the experience of the holy,” yet in the ordinary life of faith “they diverge and are driven to conflicts and mutual destruction.” He notes that in broad terms Roman Catholicism has prioritized the sacramental faith while Protestantism has prioritized the moral faith, and that “the Pauline experience of the Spirit as the unity of all types of faith” offers a desirable way forward—the unity of the ecstatic and the personal, of the sacramental and the moral, of the mystical and the rational.

Chapters five and six examine “The Truth of Faith” and “The Life of Faith,” the former of which serves to illuminate the fact that faith and reason are neither incompatible nor mutually exclusive, while the latter concerns the manifestation of faith in the life of the individual (“The concern of faith is identical with the desire of love,” Tillich writes, “reunion with that to which one belongs and from which one is estranged”). Once more, for reasons of brevity, I leave these chapters less closely examined, despite my belief that they, too, are just as essential as the rest of the book. It is difficult to overstate how important this volume is for twenty-first century theists (and supposed atheists, for that matter) from all religious traditions, and especially from Christianity. Tillich’s redefinition of faith and his clear-cut and indubitable assertions about the mutual compatibility of faith with scientific, historical, and philosophical truths have yet to take hold. Commentators concerned with the purported conflict between faith and science have consistently overlooked Tillich, who offers us a way out of this reductionist conversation and into more substantive discussions about what concerns us ultimately. Even in 1957, Tillich himself was keenly aware of how people would continue to misunderstand faith: “If faith is understood as what it centrally is, ultimate concern, it cannot be undercut by modern science or any kind of philosophy. And it cannot be discredited by its superstitions or authoritarian distortions within and outside churches, sects and movements. Faith stands upon itself and justifies itself against those who attack it, because they can attack it only in the name of another faith. It is the triumph of the dynamics of faith that any denial of faith is itself an expression of faith, of an ultimate concern.” I feel compelled to shout these truths from the mountaintops in the hope that they may someday reach the lecture halls and classrooms of secular academia.

[Keith Wilson · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Keep the faith.”

When I sometimes say that at the end of a counseling session, I get a lot of funny looks. I should probably explain what I mean.

People are apt to be confused if they don’t think they have a faith. They’re likely to misunderstand if they think I mean they should keep going to church or believe some dogma or recite some creed. People don’t expect to be proselytized or exhorted on religious issues by their shrinks.

While I sometimes think a person might benefit from some kind of religious activity like prayer, worship, singing, serving soup to the poor, or attending potluck dinners; that’s not what I’m saying. What I’m saying refers to something far deeper than that. When I urge a person to keep the faith, I do so because I saw something in the client that could help him. I saw faith.

Faith is often confused with belief, belonging, or trust; but I think the theologian, Paul Tillich said it best: “Faith is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern.”

Never mind, he didn’t say it best. Tillich said it succinctly; but to say it well, he should have said it in a way that could be readily understood. Let me give it a shot.

Faith is when you’re stubborn about something that really matters.

We all know what stubbornness is. Identifying what really matters is the hard part. When my kids were little, they’d get stubborn about not eating their peas. I’d say, you’re not leaving this table till you eat your peas. I’m capable of being stubborn, too. Is this an example of being stubborn about what really matters? I think not.

If I was super stubborn, I would have tied them to chairs for weeks and given them nothing to eat but peas. If they as were stubborn as I, they would have starved to death. I wanted them to eat their peas because it would be good for their health; but if I took it that far, I’d be undermining their health. They refused to eat their peas because they wanted to preserve their autonomy; but how much autonomy do you have when you’re starved to death? It’s clear that eating or not eating peas should never matter that much. A thing that really matters, a worthy ultimate concern, is a thing best kept indeterminate; something my kids could pursue by not eating peas one minute and eating them the next, and by me by insisting on the peas one minute and giving them to the dog the next.

Tillich had a term for when you’re stubborn about something which is not an ultimate concern: he called it demonic faith. If I had put so much faith in peas to starve my kids to death, that would have been demonic, indeed. To use another Tillichian term, I would have made peas into an idol. Idolatry is thinking something really matters when it doesn’t.

It’s easy to spot demonic faith and idolatry in things like addictions, violence, abuse, compulsions, racism, nationalism, and an enraged couple who are so intent on proving a point to each other that they destroy their love. It’s harder to spot it when you’re in its grip. That’s why it’s important to never lose sight of your true values.

You might say what really matters is to always be looking for what really matters and be stubborn about finding it. That’s actually something that matters more than keeping it when you think you’ve found it. Being completely stubborn about keeping something you think really matters will get you in as much trouble as I might have gotten in with the peas. It’s better to be always looking for something that matters and never being sure you’ve found it. The moment you’re completely stubborn about keeping anything, is the moment you are no longer stubborn about finding what really matters.

In other words, the way to keep the faith when you don’t think you have any is to be always looking for something deserving of your faith.

Or, as Tillich said, keeping the faith is to be ultimately concerned.

So, keep the faith.

Keith Wilson writes about the intersection of psychotherapy and philosophy in his blog series, The Reflective Eclectic

[Majid Saleh · Rating 4 out of 5]

بواعث الإيمان:
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هذا من الكتب الثقيلة على النفس، ثقيل بمصطلحاته الجديدة كليا عليّ. ثقيل بصياغته. ثقيل بالترجمة التي لا أستطيع أن أتخيل كيف يمكن لمترجم آخر أن يجعلها أبسط دون أن يتخلى عن الدلالات المهمة التي ذهب إليها تيليش . ثقيل بترتيب موضوعاته. وثقيل كذلك بصفحاته الأولى التي اعتدت أن تأتي في كتب الفلسفة عموما خفيفة الظل ممهّدة بمكر لمضمون الكتاب دون أن تفضح عن وعورة متنها.
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هدف الكاتب من هذا الكاتب واضح جدا، فهو لاهوتي* أصيل يدمج بين الفلسفة وما يمكن تسميته أصول الدين. وهنا تحديدا يقصد الإيمان ومنشأه الذي عزاه إلى "الهم الأقصى" كما أطلق عليه، مقتبسا مصمونه عن العهد القديم الذي يعتبر أن غاية الإنسان القصوى هي الخلاص (الهم) الذي يتطلب إيمانا لا مشروطا (أقصى)، ولا معلّقا على نتيجة مرتبطة به. فقد ورد في سفر التثنية: (ستحب الرب إلهك بكل قلبك، وبكل نفسك، وبكل قوتك). وفي المحصّلة: الإيمان اللامشروط ستكون نتيجته خلاصا لا محدود. آمل أن أكون قد فهمته كما شرحه.
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يتطرق الكاتب كذلك إلى أثر الثورة العلمية في القرون الأخيرة على فكرة الإيمان، وتشويشها في نفوس المؤمنين عموما. حيث صار على المؤمن أن يأتي لعقله ببيّنة (يعني دليل يخضع لأدوات المنطق التجريبية) تجعله يحافظ على إيمانه الذي نشأ عليه ويضمن ثباته وتماشيه مع عجلة العلم أو أدواته. وأشير إلى أن بواعث (ومفردها باعث) تعني دافع، أي الأسباب التي تدفع للإيمان؛ هذا حرفيا. وبالتوسّع، بالنظر لمضمونه نجد أنه الأسباب المجتمعة التي شكلت فكرة الإيمان في النفس الجمعي (الطائفة) وما ارتبط به من سلوكيات أخلاقية انبثقت عن الأوامر بفعل أمر أو النهي عن فعله.
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نلحظ كذلك أن الكاتب فرّق بين مفهومي الاعتقاد والإيمان، وجعل الاعتقاد مرتبطا بسلطة تعطي البينة أو البرهان على ما يؤدي للاعتقاد: كأن تعتقد بأن النظرية العلمية الفلانية صحيحة وذلك لأن سلطة علمية -تثق بها- وتتبع لها بموضوعها أيدت ذلك. أو أن تعتقد بان أمرا غيبيا صحيحا لأن هناك دليلا ولو ضعيفا أكدته المؤسسة الدينية التي تتبع لها. ومن ذلك أعطى مثال بان الإيمان المفترض بالكتاب المقدّس ليس إلا اعتقادا لأنه نابع من ثقة بكتابه، وأقتبس: "وهذا التمييز مهم لكون اللاهوتيين السابقين قد حاولوا البرهنة على السلطة اللامشروطة لكتّاب الكتاب المقدس بإظهار أنهم يستحقون الثقة كشهود عيان. قد يصدّق المسيحي كتّاب الكتاب المقدس، ولكن ليس بصورة لا مشروطة. فهو لا يؤمن بهؤلاء الكتّاب. بل هو لا يؤمن حتى بالكتاب المقدس. لأن الإيمان أكثر من مجرد الثقة في السلطات الأكثر قداسة. بل هو المشاركة في موضوع همّ المرء الأقصى بكل وجوده. ولذلك يجب ألا تستعمل مفردة "الإيمان" فيما يتعلق بالمعرفة النظرية، سواء أكانت معرفة قائمة على أساس بيّنة مباشرة ما قبل علمية أو علمية (يعني سواء كانت شكا لم يخضع لأدوات المنطق والتجريب أو خضع لها) أو قائمة على أساس الثقة بالسلطات التي تعتمد بدورها على بيّنة مباشرة أو غير مباشرة".
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يقول سلافوي جيجيك: "لا تصبح بواعث الإيمان مقنعة في عيوننا إلا عندما نقرر أن نؤمن وليس العكس." ومنه ما أعتقده الهدف الأسمى للكاتب بول تيليتش في كتابه بواعث الإيمان وهو تنزيه الإيمان تماما عن الصراعات والتجاذبات التاريخية الفكرية، بين من هم مع ومن هم ضد، أو حتى بين من هم مع ذات أنفسهم، بتحميل مفردة الإيمان استحقاقات لم تكن أبدا من متطلباتها. والله أعلم.
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بالتأكيد هناك مواضيع عديدة متشعبة تطرق لها الكتاب فهمت بعضها وأعرضت عن أكثرها لقصور فهمي عن إدراكه وما أعلاه سوى لمحة سريعة.
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المحصلة فإنني لا أنصح بقراءة الكتاب لمن هم غير مختصين أو معنيّون بهذا النوع والأسلوب على حد سواء من الكتب الفلسفية اللاهوتية، التي أعتقد بأنها متقدمة قليلا أو كثيرا، وتحتاج إلى قراءات مسبقة في كتب ومواضيع تمهّد لها. إلا أن الخلاصة الفكرية التي يخرج بها القارئ المتمعن لهذا الكتاب هي خلاصة عظيمة وتستحق العناء الذي ذهب عليها.

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___________
• اللاهوت: البحث العقلاني في أسس العقائد، كمصطلحات الإيمان والغيب وطبيعة الإله. وأساس بحثه التطبيقي هو المسيحية.
• سلافوي جيجيك: من أشهر الفلاسفة المعاصرين وربما أغزرهم إنتاجا.

[Ted Hovey · Rating 4 out of 5]

Paul Tillich defined faith as the state of being ultimately concerned. The dynamics of faith, therefore, are the dynamics of being ultimately concerned.

Tillich distinguishes between true faith and idolatrous faith. In true faith, he asserts, "the ultimate concern is a concern about the truly intimate ... an awareness of holiness. The awareness of the holy is awareness of the presence of the divine, namely of the content of our ultimate concern." In contrast, idolatrous faith involves lifting finite realities to the rank of ultimacy. Examples Tillich provides include success and nationalism.

According to Tillich's argument, we cannot hope to find certainty in our faith. "If faith is understood as being ultimately concerned, doubt is a necessary element in it. It is a consequence of the risk of faith."

I do not have the tools to critique this book on the basis of theology, or even logic. As a believer, though, I find comfort in the message Tillich provides. If I focus on the spiritual, the holy, the divine, as my ultimate concern -- then I have faith. I shouldn't beat up on myself for not having strong enough faith. If I want to have faith, then I've got it. Now it's my responsibility to continue to try to understand what that means for daily life and all of its choices. I must also be vigilant -- that I don't let some temporal, human object become my ultimate concern.

[Adam · Rating 5 out of 5]

I don't have time at the moment for a review, but this book did some amazing things for me both intellectually and spiritually. Highly recommended for those who would like some sort of spirituality or faith in their lives, but feel like they don't "fit" due to intellectual or other concerns. Also recommended to committed believers of a religious tradition who want to deepen or strengthen their faith. Also recommended to Richard Dawkins, as Tillich proposes a "God" that even an atheist could "believe" in, yet one that doesn't become some sort of "watered-down deism" and instead becomes even more vibrant and meaningful.

[Grant Lewandowski · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting definition of Faith Mr. Paul! I like his description of faith being more holistic and involving the whole person. Rather than, for example, simplifying faith to only “belief.” According to Tillich it’s much more than that.

I liked what he said what literalism and his push back with approaching God, text, and faith with rigidity. He advocates for critically approaching all of these categories.

Not the easiest read… it requires you to slow down and sometimes re-read some of his wording. Maybe it’s because it was originally in German? Not sure

[Benjamin · Rating 3 out of 5]

I first heard of Tillich in a conversation where he was presented as an example of a reasonable voice in a debate where the loudest voices are anything but reasonable, and I agree with that assessment. Much of the book is thought-provoking; in general, his redefinition of faith certainly seems superior to the popular meaning of the word. Much, however, oscillates between very specific statements about absolute truths that, I feel, really require some justification (for example, that all men of all times and cultures truly want a peaceful world) and generic, meaningless, and often self-contradictory statements (for example, Tillich repeatedly and all but explicitly says that everything is faith, despite having an entire chapter devoted to what faith is not). In the latter situations, there were several times where the book reminded me of the drivel that Eckhart Tolle writes; I am unsure if it would be more embarrassing to accidentally write something similar to Tolle's own views, or to write something that Tolle would be willing to plagiarize. For all that I complain, though, I genuinely enjoyed his discussion of symbolism and the inextricable role it plays in the way man views the world. I found very interesting his idea that, when one is confronted with the limitations of one's symbols (in other words, when one is confronted with a situation where the symbolism and abstraction one uses to understand the universe are shown to not match with some part of reality), one has only two options: to find new symbols or to simply not interact with that part of the world. I am not sure it was the conclusion he meant to draw, but it is hard to see how this does not imply that the universe is inherently unknowable. Finally, unrelated to all else, I almost laughed aloud when Tillich, out of the blue, said that Protestantism was superior to Catholicism; it was such a non sequitur after all of his careful attempts to unify mankind's many religious and spiritual traditions.

my favorite quote: "In those who rest on their unshakable faith, pharisaism and fanaticism are the unmistakable symptoms of doubt which has been repressed."

[J. Alfred · Rating 2 out of 5]

This guy has extremely interesting things to say, but it's not so much theology as psychology-- at least, if you understand 'theology' to mean 'thought about God based on special revelation' rather than, like Tillich himself, put 'revelation' in scare quotes. I also think that Tillich is, in anyone's terms other than his own very specialized ones, an atheist. (Note: I'm fine with atheists morally and personally, but I like them to admit that they are in fact atheists, rather than say things like 'no one can truly be an atheist because everyone has an Ultimate Concern,' which, though perhaps true, muddy the waters considerably-- ie, do you call your Ultimate Concern by the name-- or symbol-- God? Do you believe that this Ultimate Concern has, say, an Only Begotten Son and that Whosoever Believes on Him Shall Not Perish and the like?)
However! There are some very good things. I will quote one at length.

An act of faith is an act of a finite being who is grasped by and turned to the infinite. It is a finite act with the limitations of the finite act... faith is uncertain in so far as the infinite to which it is related is received by a finite being. This element of uncertainty in faith cannot be removed, it must be accepted. And the element in faith which accepts this is courage. "

[Geoff Glenister · Rating 5 out of 5]

Paul Tillich opens this book with quite a reality check - and one that is as relevant today as it was the day it was written:

There is hardly a word in the religious language, both theological and popular, which is subject to more misunderstandings, distortions and questionable definitions than the word “faith.” It belongs to those terms which need healing before they can be used for the healing of men. Today the term “faith” is more productive of disease than of health. It confuses, misleads, creates alternately skepticism and fanaticism, intellectual resistance and emotional surrender, rejection of genuine religion and subjection to substitutes. Indeed, one is tempted to suggest that the word “faith” should be dropped completely; but desirable as that may be it is hardly possible. A powerful tradition protects it. And there is as yet no substitute expressing the reality to which the term “faith” points. So, for the time being, the only way of dealing with the problem is to try to reinterpret the word and remove the confusing and distorting connotations, some of which are the heritage of centuries.

Tillich then proceeds to explore what a healthy concept of faith might be - and his thesis on faith is stated:

Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned: the dynamics of faith are the dynamics of man’s ultimate concern.

If we see faith in this way, every one has faith, no matter how much they would like it. For some, their ultimate concern is in themselves; for others, in the state; for still others, in their children.

How does this relate to what we normally call "religion" - expressed in labels like "Christian", "Jew", "Muslim", "Buddhist", etc.? Tillich writes:

[F]aith, understood as the state of being ultimately concerned, has no language other than symbols. When saying this I always expect the question: Only a symbol? He who asks this question shows that he has not understood the difference between signs and symbols nor the power of symbolic language, which surpasses in quality and strength the power of any nonsymbolic language. One should never say “only a symbol,” but one should say “not less than a symbol.”

Throughout the book, Tillich calls those who consider themselves "religious" to challenge their idolatrous attachment to a literalization of symbology and calls them to re-orient themselves: to point their hearts towards what the symbols are pointing to. That is, the point of religion is not the symbol itself but the way of life it is calling us to.

[Mohammad Mahdi Fallah · Rating 3 out of 5]

کتاب پویای ایمان یکی از کتاب های بسیار خوب و غنی در زمینه دین داری در دنیای امروز است. تیلیش در این کتاب تلاش می کند به مباحث جدید و مستحدثه دینداری جدید جواب های درخور و شایسته بدهد که غالباً هم کامیاب شده است؛
در این میان ذکر چند نکته خالی از لطف نخواهد بود:
1- تجربه فاشیسم و ظهور ملی گرایی های جدیدباعث شده دست تیلیش برای ترسیم ایمان گرایی اومانسیتی جدید پر باشد و بتواند تمیزهای مشخص تری بین گرایش به مطلق در درون دین و مطلق گرایی های موجود در علم گرایی و میهن پرستی را ترسیم کند.
2- نقدهای که خصوصاً تیلیش در بخش های مختلف کتاب به روانکاوی که به نظر میرسد در وضعیت کنونی رقیب جدی دین باشد کارساز و مهم است؛ هرچند شاید خیلی دقیق نباشد ولی منظر دینی را به خوبی توجیه می کند.
3- به نظر می رسد اساساً تلقی عمومی تیلیش نسبت به علم و تلاش برای مرضی الطرفین کردن محل نزاع، قدری از زوایای دین را سایش می دهد و در نهایت تصاویر تحریف شده ای خصوصاً از علم ارائه دهد؛ یعنی علم و عقل آشتی پذیر با دین و ایمان به نظر چهره های واقعی این مقولات نیستند.
4- ترجمه آقای دکتر ثقفی واقعاً فرسایش و مستهلک کننده است!

[Mohamed Kanjaa · Rating 5 out of 5]

من أروع الكتب التي قد يقرأها الواحد
أظن أن كثيراً من قناعاتي استطاع هذا الكتاب تغييرها
هل أستطيع أن أشك في وجود الله وأنا مرتاح؟
هل نستطيع التسامح مع المؤمنين بأديان أخرى؟ كيفما كانت هذه الأديان حتى ولو كانت غير دينية؟
ما هو الايمان؟ وكيف نزيل عنه المعاني المشوهة؟
كل هذه الأسئلة وغيرها
أعد قراء هذا الكتاب بأن يجدوا لها الجواب

[Hussain آل سِنان · Rating 5 out of 5]

بواعث الايمان
هذا الكتاب الرائع الذي ألف لاهوتي بروتستانتي متشبع بالفلسفة الوجودية وهو بول تيليش.

الكتاب يدخل في معاني الايمان من ماهيته إلى دخوله و رؤيته في جمع الحقول الوجودية من العلوم و التاريخ و الأساطير. ويناقش في هذا الكتاب فكرة اساسية لدى الإنسان وهي الغاية القصوى وهي موجودة لدى البشر حصراً و ما اجمل رؤيته في كيفية الأمور التي يختص بها البشر مثل البناء رؤية بالشك (بمعارف) كي يوصل لمراحل بقينة و إيمانية اعلى و اعلى بل ويرى الكاتب ان الرؤية الوجودية في كشف الصفات الجميلة ونسبتها إلى الله.
وطبيعة الكتاب تتمركز في كثير من القضايا على المسيحية و ثم الديانات الأخرى.

وما اجمل حين دخل في الرموز وذكر ان الكل يعبد اله واحد لكن تختلف المسميات في اللغات و الثقافات.
وكان الكاتب حاد النقد على الرؤية الشعبوية او الدوغماتية و الرؤية العلمانية في ان واحد وكان يرى ان الايمان شيء وسطي.

ويرى ان الوحي وفهمه المغلوط لدى الناس وان الحكم العقلي حتمي واقوى من الرؤية النصية(يقول ان العقل يصحح النص).

ويرى اساس النسب الاربعة في الايمان:
التساوي، والتباين، والعموم والخصوص مطلقاً، والعموم والخصوص من وجه.

وما اجمل حين يرى ان الايمان شجاعة ولابد على الفرد ان يواجه الكثير في اثبات إيمانه معرفياً و فلسفياً.



من الكتاب :

الإيمان واقعي في كل حقب التاريخ. وهذه الواقعية لا تبرهن على أنه إمكانية أو ضرورة جوهرية . إذ قد يكون - مثل أية خرافة - تشويهاً فعلياً لطبيعة الإنسان الحقيقية. وهذا ما يعتقده كثير من الناس الذي يرفضون الإيمان. لقد كان السؤال الذي أثاره هذا الكتاب هو هل أن مثل هذا الاعتقاد يقوم على تبصر أو سوء فهم، وكان الجواب بلا ريب ان رفض الإيمان يتجذر في سوء فهم كامل لطبيعة الإيمان. وقد ناقشنا أشكالاً كثيرة من سوء الفهم، والتأويلات المغلوطة، وتشويهات الإيمان. فالإيمان مفهوم، وواقع، يصعب الإلمام به ووصفه. وتكاد تكون كل كلمة يوصف بها الإيمان - حتى في الصفحات السابقة - عرضة لتأويلات سيئة جديدة. ولا يمكن تفادي هذا الأمر، ما دام الإيمان ليس ظاهرة إلى جوار الظواهر الأخرى، بل هو الظاهرة المركزية في حياة الإنسان الشخصية، الجلية والخفية في الوقت نفسه. فهو ديني ويتعالى عن الدين، وهو كلي وعيني، وهو متنوع بلا نهاية، وهو نفسه دائماً.
الإيمان إمكانية وهرية للإنسان، ولذلك فوجوده ضروري وكلي.
هو ممكن وضروري أيضاً في حقبتنا هذه. وإذا فُهم الإيمان في جوهره على أنه هم أقصى، فلا يمكن أن يثلمه العلم الحديث أو أي نوع من الفلسفة. ولن تكذبه خرافاته وتشويهاته السلطوية داخل الكنائس والطوائف والحركات وخارجها . يقف الإيمان على ذاته وهو يسوغ ذاته ضد من يهاجمونه، لأنهم لا يستطيعون أن يهاجموه إلا باسم إيمان آخر. وإن انتصار بواعث الإيمان يتمثل في أن رفض الإيمان هو نفسه تعبير عن إيمان، وتعبير عن هم أقصى.

[Jake Owen · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was great. Hate that this is “liberal” so people won’t read it. Would recommend if you are curious about a term that is used a lot by many, but defined by few.

[Avery · Rating 4 out of 5]

A really wonderful existentialist exploration of the meaning of faith, works well as an addition to Kierkegaard. It's a bit 'theoreticist' at times and I think a little too hand-wavy towards more literalist interpretations of religious doctrine, but interesting and compelling nonetheless. He makes a good point about how there's no way to guarantee in advance that faith won't devolve into idolatry.

[Santiago Iturbide · Rating 5 out of 5]

An intelligent and elegant flow of ideas in intimate connection. That is the book's basic structure. The analysis of man's existentialist concern acts as the one connector. We all participate of it. This "ultimate concern" is Tillich's definition of what faith is, however conscious or unconscious it is. He conducts a concise incursion on what faith is not, and could not be, that is; an idolatrous concern.

He will approach doubt as an essential component of faith. Sincere doubt is a necessary element of being ultimately concerned. This is not the skeptical doubt, but the doubt that accompanies every risk. "One could call it the existential doubt". "It does question whether a special preposition is true or false. It does not reject every concrete truth, but is aware of the element of insecurity in every existential truth. At the same time, the doubt which is implied in faith accepts this insecurity and takes it into itself as an act of courage. Faith includes courage"
"Serious doubt is the confirmation of faith. It indicates the seriousness of the concern, its unconditional character"

He will stress the contrasting humanism implied in protestant faith. The reason for this is the existentialist character of the protestant faith. Existentialist philosophy has man as its center of reflection. In Tillich an existentialist philosophy is converted into the synonym of faith. A constant tension in man's soul. The tension of being separated from the ultimate and the possibility of participating on it.

He gives a comprising and original explanation of the relationship between faith and reason. For him, in contrast to other thinkers, is not a strained relationship nor a complementary one. Instead, it is a relationship of dependance. Faith depending on reason. "For only one who has the structure of reason in able to be ultimately concerned" "Faith, is fulfilled, not denied, rationality" "Reason can be fulfilled only if it is driven beyond the limits of its finitude, and experiences the presence of the ultimate, the holy"

Among many authors, I would place Tillich as one of the most refined in the art of laying ideas. Apart from the content itself, he is magnificent in allocating great substance in clear and cared-of paragraphs and sentences. He will barely repeat himself in order not stop the pleasant flow of ideas. Thence the brevity of the text. Because of its grasping power, this doesn't mean that you will go through the book rapidly. Careful reading and re-reading if necessary, is here demanded.

[Megan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Faith is what pushes a person passionately forward, seeking to be joined with what is just beyond. More than a simple "belief in the impossible" or "unseen" Paul Tillich's idea of faith is that it is a part of all people. In this way faith underlies all action, thought, and decision. Using this thesis the author looks at several aspects of faith. After building up his arguments he lays out some provoking ideas about how faith and one's life are interwoven. I particularly enjoyed his thoughts on the distinction between scientific truth and faith, how neither can truly satisfy the questions of the other. It can be summed up thus:"The famous struggle between the theory of evolution and the theology of some Christian groups was not a struggle between science and faith, but between a science whose faith deprived man of his humanity and a faith whose expression was distorted by Bibilical literalism." He makes similar comments about the spheres of faith colliding with history, philosophy and psychology. Each time he comes to the conclusion that they operate in distinct and equally important spheres. Above all I enjoyed the emphasis he places on faith in life. I like the idea that faith is not belief, but a quality of being human.

[stormhawk · Rating 2 out of 5]

I decided recently that I wanted to understand more about Faith, and what it is beyond dictionary and personal definitions.

A couple of searches and review-readings later, I was directed to this book, which is apparently a classic in the understanding of Faith.

I'm not sure what I've learned, really. I grasp Tillich's definition of Faith as "ultimate concern," but he is less explicit about what constitutes either ultimacy or concern.

The language of the book is academic and stilted, not surprising given the author's German origins. I found it very heavy going, even with rereadings and referring back a page here, a chapter there.

[Ali Reda · Rating 4 out of 5]

Faith transcends both the drives of the nonrational unconscious and the structures of the rational conscious. It transcends them, but it does not destroy them. The ecstatic character of faith does not exclude its rational character although it is not identical with it, and it includes nonrational strivings without being identical with them. In the ecstasy of faith there is an awareness of truth and of ethical value; there are also past loves and hates, conflicts and reunions, individual and collective influences.

[Kareem Brakat]

الحقيقة مش هحط تقييم لاني مفهمتش الكتاب كله
ربما لانه بيتكلم عن الايمان من وجهة نظر مسيحية
لان اعجبتني فكرة تعريف الايمان بانه الهم الاقصى الذي يتم التضحية بكل القيم التي تتعارض معه
كان صعب بالنسبة لي شوية وربما احتاج للعودة اليه مرة اخرى

[Kamel]

كتاب رائع

[Phil Deschler · Rating 4 out of 5]

Existential, deep. A different definition of faith . Difficult to read & u derstand.

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGIAN EXPLAINS HIS THOUGHTS ABOUT FAITH

Paul Tillich (1886-1965) was a German-American theologian and Christian philosopher, who was dismissed from his teaching position in Germany after Hitler came to power in 1933. He came to America, where he taught at Union Theological Seminary and the Harvard Divinity School.

He wrote in the “Introductory Remarks” section of this 1957 book, “There is hardly a word in the religious language, both theological and popular, which is subject to more misunderstandings, distortions and questionable definitions than the word ‘faith.’ … Today the term ‘faith’ … confuses, misleads, creates alternately skepticism and fanaticism, intellectual resistance and emotional surrender, rejection of genuine religion and subjection to substitutes… And yet there is as yet no substitute expressing the reality to which the term ‘faith’ points. So, for the time being, the only way of dealing with the problem is to try to reinterpret the word and remove the confusing and distorting connotations, some of which are the heritage of centuries.”

He begins the book with the statement, “Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned: the dynamics of faith are the dynamics of man’s ultimate concern… man, in contrast to other living beings, has spiritual concerns… and each of them as well as the vital concerns can claim ultimacy for a human life … If it claims ultimacy it demands the total surrender of him who accepts this claim…” (Pg. 1) He adds, “The content matters infinitely for the life of the believer, but it does not matter for the formal definition of faith.” (Pg. 4)

He goes on, “The question now arises: what is the source of this all-embracing and all-transcending concern?... The reality of man’s ultimate concern reveals… that he is able to transcend the flux of relative and transitory experiences of his ordinary life… But this… presupposes the element of infinity in man. Man is able to understand in an immediate personal and central act the meaning of the ultimate, the unconditional, the absolute, the infinite. This alone makes faith a human potentiality.” (Pg. 8-9)

He explains, “We have distinguished between true and idolatrous faith. The holy which is demonic, or ultimately destructive, is identical with the continent of idolatrous faith. Idolatrous faith is still faith. The holy which is demonic is still holy. This is the point where the ambiguous character of religion is most visible and the dangers of faith are most obvious: the danger of faith is idolatry and the ambiguity of the holy is its demonic possibility. Our ultimate concern can destroy us as it can heal us. But we can never be without it.” (Pg. 15-16)

He observes, “If faith is understood as belief that something is true, doubt is incompatible with the act of faith. If faith is understood as being ultimately concerned, doubt is a necessary element in it. It is a consequence of the risk of faith. The doubt which is implicit in faith is not a doubt about facts or conclusions. It is not the same doubt which is the lifeblood of scientific research.” (Pg. 18-19) Later, he adds, “The Church excludes from its community those who are thought to have denied the foundations of the Church. This is the meaning of the concept of ‘heresy.’ The heretic is not one who has erroneous beliefs… but the heretic is one who has turned away from the true to a false, idolatrous concern.” (Pg. 25-26)

He points out, “The most ordinary misinterpretation of faith is to consider it an act of knowledge that has a low degree of evidence. Something more or less probable or impossible is affirmed in spite of the insufficiency of its theoretical substantiation… If this is meant, one is speaking of BELIEF rather than of faith. One believes that one’s information is correct… It is rational to trust in authorities which enlarge our consciousness without forcing us into submission. If we use the word ‘faith’ for this kind of trust we can say that most of our knowledge is based on faith. But it is not appropriate to do so… Faith is more than trust in authorities… some earlier theologians tried to prove the unconditional authority of the Biblical writers by showing their trustworthiness as witnesses. The Christian may believe the Biblical writers, but not unconditionally. He does not have faith in them. He should not even have faith in the Bible. For faith is more than trust in even the most sacred authority. It is participation in the subject of one’s ultimate concern with one’s whole being.” (Pg. 31-32)

He asserts, “The fundamental symbol of our ultimate concern is God. It is always present in any act of faith, even if the act of faith includes the denial of God. Where there is ultimate concern, God can be denied only in the name of God. One God can deny the other one. Ultimate concern cannot deny its own character as ultimate. Therefore, it affirms what is meant by the word ‘God.’ Atheism, consequently, can only mean the attempt to remove any ultimate concern---to remain unconcerned about the meaning of one’s existence. Indifference toward the ultimate question is the only imaginable form of atheism. Whether it is possible is a problem which must remain unsolved at this point.” (Pg. 45-46)

He continues, “such an understanding of the meaning of God makes the discussions about the existence or non-existence of God meaningless. It is meaningless to question the ultimacy of an ultimate concern… If ‘existence’ refers to something which can be found within the whole of reality, no divine being exists. The question is… which of the innumerable symbols of faith is most adequate to the meaning of faith? In other words, which symbol of ultimacy expresses the ultimate without idolatrous elements? This is the problem, and not the so-called ‘existence of God’---which is in itself an impossible combination of words. God as the ultimate in man’s ultimate concern is more certain than any other certainty, even that of oneself.” (Pg. 46-47)

He argues, “the primitive religious consciousness resists the attempt to interpret the myth of myth. It is afraid of every act of demythologization… They resist, often fanatically, any attempt to introduce an element of uncertainty by ‘breaking the myth,’ namely, by making conscious its symbolic character… The resistance against demythologization expresses itself in ‘literalism.’ The symbols and myths are understood in their immediate meaning… Creation is taken as a magic act which happened once upon a time. The fall of Adam is … attributed to a human individual… Literalism deprives God of his ultimacy and, religiously speaking, of his majesty. It draws him down to the level of that which is not ultimate, the finite and conditional. In the last analysis it is not rational criticism of the myth which is decisive but the inner religious criticism. Faith, if it takes its symbols literally, becomes idolatrous!” (Pg. 51-52) He adds, “Christianity is superior to those religions which are bound to a natural myth. But Christianity speaks the mythological language like every other language.” (Pg. 54)

He suggests, “The faith of the fighters for enlightenment since the eighteenth century is humanist faith of the moral type…. It was faith and not rational calculation, although they believed in the superior power of a reason united with justice and truth. The dynamics of their humanist faith changed the faith of the earth… Its dynamic is visible every day in our present period. As for every faith, the utopian form of the humanist faith is a state of ultimate concern…. It has a secular faith, and this has pushed the different forms of religion into a defensive position; but it is faith and not ‘unbelief.’ It is a state of ultimate concern and total devotion to this concern.” (Pg. 69)

He states, “A faith which destroys reason destroys itself and the humanity of man. For only a being who has the structure of reason is able to be ultimately concerned, to distinguish ultimate and preliminary concerns, to understand the unconditional commands of the ethical imperative, and to be aware of the presence of the holy.” (Pg. 75-76)

He says, “Science can only conflict with science, and faith only with faith; science which remains science cannot conflict with faith which remains faith… The famous struggle between the theory of evolution and the theology of some Christian groups was not a struggle between science and faith, but between a science whose faith deprived man of his humanity and a faith whose expression was distorted by biblical literalism… The same consideration must be given to present and future conflicts between faith and contemporary psychology.” (Pg. 82-83) He adds, “The truth of faith cannot be confirmed by latest physical or biological discoveries---as it cannot be denied by them.” (Pg. 85) Later, he notes, “faith does not determine the movement of the philosophical thought, just as philosophy does not determine the character of one’s ultimate concern.” (Pg. 95)

He continues, “Faith cannot guarantee factual truth. But faith can and must interpret the meaning of facts from the point of view of man’s ultimate concern. In doing so it transfers historical truth into the dimension of the truth of faith.” (Pg. 86) He goes on, “Therefore, faith cannot be shaken by historical research even if the results are critical of the traditions in which the event is reported. This independence of historical truth is one of the most important consequences of the understanding of faith as the state of ultimate concern. It liberates the faithful from a burden they cannot carry after the demands of scholarly honesty have shaped their conscience. If such honesty were in a necessary conflict … God would be seen as split in himself… Such faith, in the last analysis, is idolatrous.” (Pg. 89)

He argues, “Doctrinal formulations did not divide the churches in the Reformation period; it was the rediscovery of the principle that no church has the right to put itself in the place of the ultimate. Its truth is judged by the ultimate. In the same way, Biblical research in Protestantism has shown the many levels of Biblical literature and the impossibility of considering the Bible as containing the infallible truth of faith. The same criterion is valid with respect to the whole history of religion and culture… The fact that this criterion is identical with the Protestant principle… constitutes the superiority of Protestant Christianity.” (Pg. 98)

He contends, “ultimate concern is the integrating center of the personal life. Being without it is being without a center. Such a state, however, can only be approached but never fully reached, because a human being deprived completely of a center would cease to be a human being. For this reason one cannot admit that there is any man without an ultimate concern or without faith.” (Pg. 106)

This is one of Tillich’s most interesting and significant books, and will be “must reading” for anyone seriously studying contemporary Christian theology.

[Steve Irby · Rating 4 out of 5]

I just finished "Dynamics of Faith," by Paul Tillich.

Tillich's purpose of this work [1956] is to remove the wrong definitions and assumptions surrounding the word "faith."

What faith is:

The first understanding of faith is as ultimate concern. While we have many immediate and less than immediate concerns--economically, (a)politically, relational, etc.--none is greater than ultimate concern as best stated by the Shema: love the Lord your God.

Faith as a centered act: [insert comments about analytical psychology, Freud, ego/super-ego, etc]

"Faith is not an emotional outburst: this is not the meaning of ecstacy. Certainly emotion is in it, as in every act of mans spiritual life. But emotion does not produce faith. Faith has a cognitive content and is an act of the will."

"[S]erious doubt is confirmation of faith. It indicates the seriousness of the concern, its unconditional character."

This first part was good. Tillich said that creeds, books etc. should fall under the realm of something which should be free to receive doubt. It is when we are free to doubt that we express our seriousness of our faith.

What faith is not:

Modern theology has made faith to be more along the psychological as emotive. This has unfortunately allowed the secular and religous to split and for the religious to be only ones independent, emotional affair. Faith is not purely emotional. While emotion rightly plays a part it is not the totality of faith.

Symbols of faith:

I have been wanting to read Tillich on symbology for quite some time.

Symbols and signs correspond in that they both point beyond themselves. A stop sign points beyond itself to the authority which authorizes one to stop. A symbol participates in the reality to which it points. His unfortunate example is a flag participates in the reality of the country it points to until that reality (a coup, perhaps) changes. A symbol opens up new levels of realities which are otherwise closed without the symbol. A symbol opens up dimensions and elements in our soul which correspond to the dimensions and elements of reality. Symbols can not be produced on demand; they grow organically out of individual or collective unconsciousness. Finally, symbols (based on the previous) cant be invented. They grow and die but arent birthed on demand. They die when they dont produce the response from the group in which they grew.

Types of Faith:

"Faith, in the sacramental type of religion, is not the belief that something is holy and other things are not. It is the state of being grasped by the holy through a special medium. The assertion that something has a sacred character is meaningful only for the asserting of faith."

"Nothing is sacred except the correlation of faith."

He spoke about two types of faith: ontological and ethical. The Roman church had sacramental and the Protestant the ethical. His closing sounded like their should be a modern synthesis of the two, which I would think Azusa would be, somewhat, the equivalent of. While the Pentecostal movement isnt sacramental in the Roman way, per the above quote I believe they have it: "it is a state of being grasped by the holy through a special medium." While for them that will not be in the same sacramental (transubstantiation) way, I believe it is still present, while at the same time they observe the aforementioned ethical side of faith.

The truth of Faith:

"A faith which destroys reason destroys itself and the humanity of man."

"Revelation is first of all the experience in which an ultimate concern grasps the human mind and creates a community in which this concern expresses itself in symbols of action, imagination and thought. Wherever such a revelatory experience occurs, both faith and reason are renewed. Their internal and mutual conflicts are conquered, and estrangement is replaced by reconciliation."

The life of Faith:

"Without the manifestation of God in man the question of God and faith in God are not possible. There is no faith without participation!"

"Sometimes doubt conquers faith, but it still contains faith. Otherwise it would be indifference."

"[B]ody, soul, spirit are not three parts of man. They are dimensions of mans being, always within each other; for man is a unity and not composed of parts." That is the best way I have heard the dichotomy/trichotamy discussion put.

"Faith as a state of ultimate concern implies love and demands action.... [S]ince faith leads to action and action presupposes community, the state of ultimate concern is actual only within a community of action."

[عدنان العبار · Rating 4 out of 5]

Paul Tillich's Dynamics of Faith is the best book I've read on the problems of dogmatic religion. When we say Faith we might mean any number of things: (a) Trust, (b) belief without evidence, (c) a way of life (as when we say the Christian faith), and (d) a commitment (e.g. a faithful wife). But Tillich recognizes that there is something to a religious faith that is higher than, and in some effort of him to elucidate, combines all of the things we tend to associate with simply being 'called' religious persons. Faith, as he describes it, is the state of being ultimately concerned. What does that mean? It means exactly what it says, but it also means more. Faith means ultimate concern; i.e., if you were concerned that a lion is coming towards you, that is a concern, and a big concern at that, as you really might not want to be eaten. But it is not an ultimate concern. There's something that drives you initially to live and avoid being the lion's feast. An ultimate concern is the final thing you will reach when you do any action. And Tillich is an existentialist in his formulation of this brilliant idea: We do have the choice over what we consider to be an ultimate concern, by rational thought and action. And the element action is extremely important here, since the concern is only apparent through action, and not just for others, but for ourselves as well.

The dynamics of faith, in the end, talk about how concern changes with time, with action, with knowledge, and with meditation and prayer and contemplative thought. Faith guides our actions, and it is a universal phenomenon occurring for both theists, atheists, and all the people around. And misconstruing faith as simply to believe anything of your choosing is not only inconsistent with human abilities, as it is impossible to will our beliefs, but also a clash with our skeptic souls. Any conception of faith of this sort is necessarily idolatry since it veils true concern by an act-play of ritual.

The book goes on to talk about symbols of faith, types of faith, and faith in our lives as well as the epistemology of faith, which he does not share with John Henry Newman's. All of these are very interesting subjects which he talks about in detail, but in a lot of instances, he is very cryptic about them and that is the thing preventing me from giving this book 5 stars. There is good aphoristic writing, which resembles that of Emerson's Nature which make poets of us so that we may understand his thesis and come to appreciate the notion of conscious and active and selective perception; and then there is post-modernist blabber like the case of Fromm's The Art of Loving. Although Tillich does not reach Fromm's stage, he is bordering on it, which could be fixed by better writing.

I hope to write a blog post on the symbols, types, and life of faith in the future, and once that is done, I will share the link here. But for the time being, please enjoy this excellent existentialist book on faith and intellectually healthy spirituality.

[James Magrini · Rating 5 out of 5]

Tillich’s Dynamics of Faith could be read as a companion piece to his “existential theological” study, The Courage to Be. There is the undeniable influence of both Heidegger and Jaspers guiding Tillich’s interpretation, or better, his “Destruktion” of both the understanding and living reality of faith.

Finitude-infinity, subject-object divide, ek-stasis, courage, anxiety, doubt, love (agapē), conscious intentionality, attunement (befindlichkeit), and “ultimate concern” (Sorge) are all issues that Tillich approaches with care and presents with a pristine sense of scholarly clarity.

The accessibility of the reading makes it a perfect introduction to Tillich’s theology, yet despite the approachability of his writing, readers will encounter a depth to his interpretation that is transformative.

Here, the idea and practice (immersion in!) faith situate a person within the “back-and-forth” of certainty of task (concern) and the perpetual questioning and doubting of that task, demonstrating that “faith” is a radically dynamic way of Being-in-the-world.

For me, the most interesting chapter (Three) focuses on “faith and symbols,” and Tillich’s re-reading of the symbols and function of mythology was highly enlightening, indeed, had I read this book when teaching, it would have changed my approach to the ancient philosophical issue of the historical, cultural, intellectual, and spiritual transformation in Greece from “mythos-and-Logos.”

To say, as he does, that Christianity is a “broken myth,” simply indicates that it embraces the power of myth as myth and its accompanying symbols as holding the power to move us and direct us in ways that outstrip other forms of “communication.”

I also note that Chapter Five, “Truth and Faith” provides an excellent analysis of the “criteria” for establishing the so-called truth or validity of faith and sets its “criteria for correctness” (verificatipon principle) apart from other modes and grades of “knowledge,” or the ways in which we can be said to know and experience the world.

I highly recommend this book for all interested in theology and Continental (phenomenology) philosophy – Tillich, although a Protestant philosopher and theologian, might be read as contributing in unique ways the growing contemporary tradition of what is now known as “progressive” Christianity.

Dr. James M. Magrini
Former: Philosophy/College of DuPage

[Danielle Kim · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a challenging and fulfilling read. Rather dense, with several references that passed over my head. The first section I found to be most thought provoking and accessible. I read this alongside a couple other books with musings on similar themes, and Tillich makes pop philosophers out of the authors of those books. I will have to read this one again, perhaps even next year. A rare feeling.

Notes:
Doubt as proof of faith -- "Doubt is overcome not by repression but by courage. Courage does not deny that there is doubt, but it takes the doubt into itself as an expression of its own finitude and affirms the content of an ultimate concern. Courage does not need the safety of an unquestionable conviction. It includes the risk without which no creative life is possible."

Faith as a state of ultimate concern rather than of belief without/despite knowledge.

"Only in a community of language can man actualize his faith."

"A god disappears, Divinity remains." (Seeking the infinite and ultimate is innate to our condition.)

The first time I've interrogated whether it's will to believe or faith that comes first. A refutation of "where there's a will, there's a way."

Myth vs literalism: "The presupposition of such literalism is that God is a being, acting in time and space, dwelling in a special place, affecting the course of events and being affected by them like any other being in the universe. Literalism deprives God of his ultimacy and, religiously speaking, of his majesty. It draws him down to the level of that which is not ultimate, the finite and conditional. In the last analysis it is not rational criticism of the myth which is decisive but the inner religious criticism. Faith, if it takes its symbols literally, becomes idolatrous! It calls something ultimate which is less than ultimate. Faith, conscious of the symbolic character of its symbols, gives God the honor which is due him."

[Spencer · Rating 4 out of 5]

Tillich's modern classic, which I read as research for a contemporary theology class I teach. I disagree with Tillich on his understanding of the historical and myth. I think the life of Christ, particularly his resurrection, is demonstrably historical. Thus, Tillich is much more liberal than I am (I was schooled in what is often called "post-liberal" theology). Nevertheless, it is easy to see why Niebuhr referred to him as a giant. His thinking is deep yet easy to understand, clear but eloquent, academic but also inspiring. Thus, as I try to instil in some of my students, usually unsuccessfully, it is important to read and learn from people that are theologically different from you. In that regard, there are many parts of this book I really enjoyed. His understanding of faith and doubt was really well stated. His challenge that we so often form idols with our theology is all too true. However, to push back, I think his parsing of existential (religious) truth from historical and scientific truth is too neat. Yes, it does ensure that no science or historical insights harm faith, but that is only because faith has no stake at all in these, which feels almost docetic. I think a more authentic faith will not settle for a neat separation as science, history, and religion dialogue and debate in a travail of discovery and refinement, both challenged rather than religion always correlated to the others.