Preemptive warfare is the practice of attempting to avoid an enemy s seemingly imminent attack by taking military action against them first. It is undertaken in self-defense. Preemptive war is often confused with preventive war, which is an attack launched to defeat a potential opponent and is an act of aggression. Preemptive war is thought to be justified and honorable, while preventive war violates international law. In the real world, the distinction between the two is highly contested.
In First Strike, Matthew J. Flynn examines case studies of preemptive war throughout history, from Napoleonic France to the American Civil War, and from Hitler s Germany to the recent U.S. invasion of Iraq. Flynn takes an analytical look at the international use of military and political preemption throughout the last two hundred years of western history, to show how George W. Bush s recent use of this dubiously "honorable" way of making war is really just the latest of a long line of previously failed attempts.
Balanced and historically grounded, First Strike provides a comprehensive history of one of the most controversial military strategies in the history of international foreign policy.
Initially I thought this was a pretty reasonable work, that held together for the most part. I could see that each conflict was going to be abbreviated, and that's reasonable if you are trying to do a tight chapter focused on the preemptive aspect of it.
However, I realized he understands each of these conflicts poorly and so he relentlessly gives a misleading picture. Despite lengthy discussions about the Confederate leadership and their misguided beliefs about how the war could not have been a complete disaster for them, he neglected to mention the hopes of bringing the UK into the war, which seems highly relevant to the subject at hand.
The Russo-Japanese war ended because "the international community took an interest" and not at all because of the Russian Revolution of 1905. He misunderstand the Japanese war aims, claiming Japan sought to put the peninsula under Japanese control. That was not true in 1905, it only became true later. In 1895, Japan had ejected China from Korea to make Korea independent, and in 1905, the goal was to eject Russia. Annexation was not yet in the cards and efforts after 1905 were made to avoid annexation. He alleged strangely that Chinese suzerainty ended with the treaty of 1876, which if it had been true then the war of 1895 would not have happened.
Stranger still is to say that China felt intimidated by Japan from 1876 onward, directly contradicting the historical record. China remained disdainful of Japan and considered them a quantité negligable under 1895.
The book is deeply flawed, untrustworthy Americentric and poorly researched.