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The Unseen War: Allied Air Power and the Takedown of Saddam Hussein
America's second war against Iraq differed notably from its first. Operation Desert Storm was a limited effort by coalition forces to drive out those Iraqi troops who had seized Kuwait six months before. In contrast, the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was a more ambitious undertaking aimed at decisively ending Saddam Hussein's rule.
After several days of intense air strikes against fixed enemy targets, allied air operations began concentrating on Iraqi ground troops. The intended effect was to destroy Iraqi resistance and allow coalition land forces to maneuver without pausing in response to enemy actions. Iraqi tank concentrations were struck with consistently lethal effect, paving the way for an allied entrance into Baghdad that was largely unopposed. Hussein's regime finally collapsed on April 9. Viewed in hindsight, it was the combination of allied air power as an indispensable enabler and the unexpected rapidity of the allied ground advance that allowed coalition forces to overrun Baghdad before Iraq could mount a coherent defense.
In achieving this unprecedented level of performance, allied air power was indispensable in setting the conditions for the campaign's end. Freedom from attack and freedom to attack prevailed for allied ground forces. The intended effect of allied air operations was to facilitate the quickest capture of Baghdad without the occurrence of any major head-to-head battles on the ground.
This impressive short-term achievement, however, was soon overshadowed by the ensuing insurgency that continued for four years thereafter in Iraq. The mounting costs of that turmoil tended, for a time, to render the campaign's initial successes all but forgotten. Only more recently did the war begin showing signs of reaching an agreeable end when the coalition's commander put into effect a new counterinsurgency strategy in 2007 aimed at providing genuine security for Iraqi citizens.
The toppling of Hussein's regime ended the iron rule of an odious dictator who had brutalized his people for more than 30 years. Yet the inadequate resourcing with which that goal was pursued showed that any effective plan for a regime takedown must include due hedging against the campaign's likely aftermath in addition to simply seeing to the needs of major combat. That said, despite the failure of the campaign's planners to underwrite the first need adequately, those who conducted the three-week offensive in pursuit of regime change performed all but flawlessly, thanks in considerable part to the mostly unobserved but crucial enabling contributions of allied air power.
After several days of intense air strikes against fixed enemy targets, allied air operations began concentrating on Iraqi ground troops. The intended effect was to destroy Iraqi resistance and allow coalition land forces to maneuver without pausing in response to enemy actions. Iraqi tank concentrations were struck with consistently lethal effect, paving the way for an allied entrance into Baghdad that was largely unopposed. Hussein's regime finally collapsed on April 9. Viewed in hindsight, it was the combination of allied air power as an indispensable enabler and the unexpected rapidity of the allied ground advance that allowed coalition forces to overrun Baghdad before Iraq could mount a coherent defense.
In achieving this unprecedented level of performance, allied air power was indispensable in setting the conditions for the campaign's end. Freedom from attack and freedom to attack prevailed for allied ground forces. The intended effect of allied air operations was to facilitate the quickest capture of Baghdad without the occurrence of any major head-to-head battles on the ground.
This impressive short-term achievement, however, was soon overshadowed by the ensuing insurgency that continued for four years thereafter in Iraq. The mounting costs of that turmoil tended, for a time, to render the campaign's initial successes all but forgotten. Only more recently did the war begin showing signs of reaching an agreeable end when the coalition's commander put into effect a new counterinsurgency strategy in 2007 aimed at providing genuine security for Iraqi citizens.
The toppling of Hussein's regime ended the iron rule of an odious dictator who had brutalized his people for more than 30 years. Yet the inadequate resourcing with which that goal was pursued showed that any effective plan for a regime takedown must include due hedging against the campaign's likely aftermath in addition to simply seeing to the needs of major combat. That said, despite the failure of the campaign's planners to underwrite the first need adequately, those who conducted the three-week offensive in pursuit of regime change performed all but flawlessly, thanks in considerable part to the mostly unobserved but crucial enabling contributions of allied air power.
480 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 2013
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
December 1, 2015
Sorry, just awful.
January 24, 2014
Lambeth's review of the air aspects of OIF is timely given the relatively recent Coalition withdrawal from Iraq. Aimed at addressing Lambeth's identified gap in the examination of the air contribution to the three week period of major combat operations, the book does offer a number of insights into the way OIF changed air power. More importantly, however, Unseen War describes an evolution of concepts and application of military air since both Desert Storm and, the more recent, OEF.
The book is logically structured. The first three chapters deal with the path to war, the actual air offensive, and the contribution made by allies, laying the factual foundation for the following two chapters that deal with the accomplishments and the lessons learned. Lambeth closes by a well written summary, and an assertion that, as the chapter's title suggests, we are moving to a new era of warfare.
But what I found interesting is that despite the praise for the movement into a new epoch of near seamless joint integration of military force, many of the lessons of the past century of air power continue to be present. Air-land integration remains a problem, but has evolved since debacles such as Anaconda. Coalition operations remain challenging, as they always have been. And there is never as much BDA or tankers. The question that I am left with asking is, does the success of OIF mark the move towards a new era, or simply a logical progression along the pathway of doing the same things slightly better? After reading this book, I am leaning firmly towards the latter.
That said, this is a very worthwhile read. It is easy to forget the success of the opening three weeks of OIF when presented with the following decade of relatively unsuccessful counter-insurgency operations. There are lessons there that must be learned by airmen as the spectre of major theatre war continues to loom as a distinct possibility. However, there is one glaring gap that must be overcome if the lessons of OIF are to be truly understood and appreicated, and that is the fact that OIF, as Lambeth clearly and directly states, was progression of more than 10 years of continuous military operations against Iraq. Operations NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH, among others, enabled the shaping of Iraqi defenses to a significant degree prior to the launch of major combat operations in March 2003. What is missing is a study that examines the 12 year air campaign that laid the foundation of the success of OIF.
The book is logically structured. The first three chapters deal with the path to war, the actual air offensive, and the contribution made by allies, laying the factual foundation for the following two chapters that deal with the accomplishments and the lessons learned. Lambeth closes by a well written summary, and an assertion that, as the chapter's title suggests, we are moving to a new era of warfare.
But what I found interesting is that despite the praise for the movement into a new epoch of near seamless joint integration of military force, many of the lessons of the past century of air power continue to be present. Air-land integration remains a problem, but has evolved since debacles such as Anaconda. Coalition operations remain challenging, as they always have been. And there is never as much BDA or tankers. The question that I am left with asking is, does the success of OIF mark the move towards a new era, or simply a logical progression along the pathway of doing the same things slightly better? After reading this book, I am leaning firmly towards the latter.
That said, this is a very worthwhile read. It is easy to forget the success of the opening three weeks of OIF when presented with the following decade of relatively unsuccessful counter-insurgency operations. There are lessons there that must be learned by airmen as the spectre of major theatre war continues to loom as a distinct possibility. However, there is one glaring gap that must be overcome if the lessons of OIF are to be truly understood and appreicated, and that is the fact that OIF, as Lambeth clearly and directly states, was progression of more than 10 years of continuous military operations against Iraq. Operations NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH, among others, enabled the shaping of Iraqi defenses to a significant degree prior to the launch of major combat operations in March 2003. What is missing is a study that examines the 12 year air campaign that laid the foundation of the success of OIF.
September 3, 2015
This was a well written account of the air war over Iraq in 2003. I appreciated the detail and that explanations of each major concept that he covered. There were only two detractions from an otherwise exquisite book: he seemed to depend too often on the quotes and opinions of the commander of all air forces, and there was too often a cheerleading vibe, talking up the unmitigated successes of air power, which is common in academic treatments of air warfare. Even though there was a chapter on some of the failures, once walks away with an idea that there is almost nothing to be improved upon, which was far from true at the time and continues to be true. Regarding the over-dependence on discussions with too few participants, often at the senior level, the danger is that there is a process of filtering the truth from the front lines through the mid-level actors up to the generals. Generals get a series of sound bites that may be an oversimplification or, often, a rosy appraisal of an event or problem.
Still, the military and technical explanations nicely filled the gap on this topic.
Still, the military and technical explanations nicely filled the gap on this topic.
December 17, 2013
Excellent account of the US air component side of operations in OIF, with some good insight into the interaction between air-land ops, the integration of the UK and Australian air forces, and how politics played a role in execution.
Although this is largely a one-sided view of the war, it was personally rewarding to see how people I've actually worked with in the story of OIF. Additionally, this story is a testament to the Air Force's efforts to address lessons learned through the Vietnam War and more recent limited operations via the School of Advanced Air & Space Studies and USAF Weapons School.
Enjoyable book, but we must be careful to not give ourselves too much credit. This was mostly an unrestricted war against a much lesser power. We should not fool ourselves into believing we will win so easily against a power closer to our own capability.
Although this is largely a one-sided view of the war, it was personally rewarding to see how people I've actually worked with in the story of OIF. Additionally, this story is a testament to the Air Force's efforts to address lessons learned through the Vietnam War and more recent limited operations via the School of Advanced Air & Space Studies and USAF Weapons School.
Enjoyable book, but we must be careful to not give ourselves too much credit. This was mostly an unrestricted war against a much lesser power. We should not fool ourselves into believing we will win so easily against a power closer to our own capability.
December 19, 2014
Good book on a history that no one cares about anymore, because like Daniel Kahneman says, people either remember the first or worst. No one cares about how well the air-to-ground coordination worked out in this war because of how the insurgency occurred later, which is a damned shame because we haven't likely seen the end of big wars. Thus it is aptly named "The Unseen War."
See also, David Johnson's excellent "Learning Large Lessons," as Lambeth cites it quite regularly in the chapter about where things didn't work out as well. To be honest, in the problems of air-to-ground coordination Johnson's work is probably better. But both are very much worth considering for future joint thinkers.
See also, David Johnson's excellent "Learning Large Lessons," as Lambeth cites it quite regularly in the chapter about where things didn't work out as well. To be honest, in the problems of air-to-ground coordination Johnson's work is probably better. But both are very much worth considering for future joint thinkers.
December 24, 2014
Interesting, but certainly not compelling.
This is a very academic study of the air war in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). It's written from a studious slant. Lots of footnotes and almost excessively dry. In fact, while I've read similar books before, I couldn't finish this one. There's a lot of great data here, but it's so slow and uncompelling, it's too hard to read. If I was writing a report on the air war in OIF, this would be invaluable; otherwise, I just couldn't bring myself back to it. I feel bad, since it's on the CSAF 2014 Reading List, but even I have my limits. So, read at your own risk.
This is a very academic study of the air war in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). It's written from a studious slant. Lots of footnotes and almost excessively dry. In fact, while I've read similar books before, I couldn't finish this one. There's a lot of great data here, but it's so slow and uncompelling, it's too hard to read. If I was writing a report on the air war in OIF, this would be invaluable; otherwise, I just couldn't bring myself back to it. I feel bad, since it's on the CSAF 2014 Reading List, but even I have my limits. So, read at your own risk.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews