State Building and Late Development

by David Waldner

Why does state building sometimes promote economic growth and in other cases impede it? Through an analysis of political and economic development in four countries―Turkey, Syria, Korea, and Taiwan―this book explores the origins of political-economic institutions and the mechanisms connecting them to economic outcomes. David Waldner extends our understanding of the political underpinnings of economic development by examining the origins of political coalitions on which states and their institutions depend. He first provides a political model of institutional change to analyze how elites build either cross-class or narrow coalitions, and he examines how these arrangements shape specific state-society relations, the nature of bureaucracy, fiscal structures, and patterns of economic intervention. He then links these institutions to economic outcomes through a bargaining model to explain why countries such as Korea and Taiwan have more effectively overcome the collective dilemmas that plague economic development than have others such as Turkey and Syria. The latter countries, he shows, lack institutional solutions to the problems that surround productivity growth. The first book to compare political and economic development in these two regions, State Building and Late Development draws on, and contributes to, arguments from political sociology and political economy. Based on a rigorous research design, the work offers both a finely drawn comparison of development and a compellingly argued analysis of the character and consequences of "precocious Keynesianism," the implementation of Keynesian demand-stimulus policies in largely pre-industrial economies.

Paperback

First published January 1, 1999

Reviews

[Kara Sıçan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Waldner's "State Building and Late Development" is a brilliant exploration of the linkages between critical variables in political economy via the comparative economic histories of Korea, Turkey and Syria.

Why does state building sometimes promote economic growth and in other cases impede it? The transformation from a mediated state that governs through social notables to an unmediated state that rules the mass of its subjects directly is a critical juncture in state-building. If inter-elite conflict is high at this juncture, elite elements will seek to mobilize mass support since the winning group will have to forge a cross-class coalition to defeat its rivals, which creates a wholly different political economy and institutional profile than elite unity in shaping state-society-business relations, macroeconomic structure, nature of bureaucracy and how economic interventions are done.

Although it is not what the author aimed for, Waldner kinda wrote the best Turkish EH book ever.
Its Korea and Syria parts are really good too but the depth he reached in Turkey is unprecedented, could say Korea and Syria are the bread to the delicious "Turkey" sandwich between them...
Waldner incorporates a vast amount of literature, basically everything good available at the time of his study, from structuralists to neoliberals. I consider myself well-versed in Turkish EH but still found many referential gems I haven't come across before.

Waldner's work also has special importance for the domestic debates in Turkey for lifting the veil over the political economy of ISI and providing the only book-length direct comparison between Turkey and Korea (which is an unhinged and frequently popped discourse in Turkey, the whole political spectrum blames the rest for blocking Turkey to match the economic successes of Korea)

[Peter Goggins · Rating 5 out of 5]

To start with, this was not an easy read - the author suffers from many of the worst vices of academic writing. That being said, the ideas presented are interesting enough to warrant a favorable review, particularly his challenge towards neoliberal ideas of development and his overall thesis regarding elite conflict, side payments, and rent seeking behavior in developing countries. This enmeshed well and compliments other literature contrasting extractive vs inclusive societies. In particular, this provides much of the underlying rationale behind why ossifying and oligarchic societies fall being.