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The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812
In the summer of 1812 Britain stood alone, fighting for her very survival against a vast European Empire. Only the Royal Navy stood between Napoleon's legions and ultimate victory. In that dark hour America saw its chance to challenge British dominance: her troops invaded Canada and American frigates attacked British merchant shipping, the lifeblood of British defence.
War polarised America. The south and west wanted land, the north wanted peace and trade. But America had to choose between the oceans and the continent. Within weeks the land invasion had stalled, but American warships and privateers did rather better, and astonished the world by besting the Royal Navy in a series of battles.
Then in three titanic single ship actions the challenge was decisively met. British frigates closed with the Chesapeake, the Essex and the President, flagship of American naval ambition. Both sides found new heroes but none could equal Captain Philip Broke, champion of history's greatest frigate battle, when HMS Shannon captured the USS Chesapeake in thirteen blood-soaked minutes. Broke's victory secured British control of the Atlantic, and within a year Washington, D.C. had been taken and burnt by British troops.
War polarised America. The south and west wanted land, the north wanted peace and trade. But America had to choose between the oceans and the continent. Within weeks the land invasion had stalled, but American warships and privateers did rather better, and astonished the world by besting the Royal Navy in a series of battles.
Then in three titanic single ship actions the challenge was decisively met. British frigates closed with the Chesapeake, the Essex and the President, flagship of American naval ambition. Both sides found new heroes but none could equal Captain Philip Broke, champion of history's greatest frigate battle, when HMS Shannon captured the USS Chesapeake in thirteen blood-soaked minutes. Broke's victory secured British control of the Atlantic, and within a year Washington, D.C. had been taken and burnt by British troops.
560 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2012
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158 people want to read
About the author
Andrew D. Lambert
62 books38 followersAndrew Lambert, FRHistS, is a British naval historian, who since 2001 has been the Laughton Professor of Naval History in the Department of War Studies, King's College London
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Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews
February 2, 2022
Prof Lambert has written a very detailed account of how, because of errors of judgement and in spite of attempts to defuse the causes of conflict, this regrettable war began. This book is concerned primarily with the naval aspects of the war. As other reviewers have noted, Lambert is writing from the British viewpoint and at times his viewpoint might be considered too partisan. Nevertheless the book is a very good account, in considerable detail, and deals with many of the personalities of the principal players. As a history of the war, I give the book four stars; maybe I should have given it five?
The way the personalities of the two captains in the famous frigate-to-frigate action, that ended with HMS Shannon capturing the American Chesapeake, shocks my sense of morality so much that I cannot read beyond Chapter four. Philip Broke, who commanded the Shannon, was evidently an officer of the old school: 'gentlemen' would fight duels over matters of honour. After his victory he received honours that included a baronetcy and two British warships were later named after him. He was an effective fighting captain and his primary aim at the start of his command was to find and destroy the American commerce raider President, commanded by the equally effective Commodore Rodgers. However, while blockading Boston, Broke so taunted James Lawrence, who commanded the Chesapeake, that he finally accepted what was effectively a challenge to a duel. In my opinion, it might have been acceptable at the time for 'gentlemen' to try to satisfy some honour by duelling, but it was totally unforgiveable for Broke to involve the lives of both crews when neither ship was an active threat to the other. Prof. Lambert wrote: "It was as if Achilles and Hector were once again before the walls of Troy". I cannot agree with this view. Broke and Lawrence were not fighting on a man-versus-man basis. The challenge resulted in the maiming or killing of many members of both crews. For this ethical reason I cannot finish reading this otherwise very good history of the naval war of 1812.
The way the personalities of the two captains in the famous frigate-to-frigate action, that ended with HMS Shannon capturing the American Chesapeake, shocks my sense of morality so much that I cannot read beyond Chapter four. Philip Broke, who commanded the Shannon, was evidently an officer of the old school: 'gentlemen' would fight duels over matters of honour. After his victory he received honours that included a baronetcy and two British warships were later named after him. He was an effective fighting captain and his primary aim at the start of his command was to find and destroy the American commerce raider President, commanded by the equally effective Commodore Rodgers. However, while blockading Boston, Broke so taunted James Lawrence, who commanded the Chesapeake, that he finally accepted what was effectively a challenge to a duel. In my opinion, it might have been acceptable at the time for 'gentlemen' to try to satisfy some honour by duelling, but it was totally unforgiveable for Broke to involve the lives of both crews when neither ship was an active threat to the other. Prof. Lambert wrote: "It was as if Achilles and Hector were once again before the walls of Troy". I cannot agree with this view. Broke and Lawrence were not fighting on a man-versus-man basis. The challenge resulted in the maiming or killing of many members of both crews. For this ethical reason I cannot finish reading this otherwise very good history of the naval war of 1812.
October 4, 2015
This book starts well: with a good introduction, interesting overview of the Napoleonic maritime era & robustly opinionated. However about half way through the book becomes laboured and repetitive and what was robustly opinionated becomes jarringly partisan. Understanding aside its about the naval war - Lamber pays very little notice to the battle of New Orleans whilst covering the burning of the Whitehouse. Some of the later chapters feel like historical papers that have been expanded upon and grafted onto the narrative. Book could have been trimmed down by 80+ pages for a tighter more compelling read. Final chapter on artistic developments post war felt tedious and forced.
March 19, 2020
OK, but the author seems to have a definite agenda and so spends a great deal of time creating straw man arguments to knock down. I like the naval and British perspectives, but there are better alternatives on both.
August 3, 2015
Overall this is a strong corrective against the many books that try portray the War of 1812 as some sort of success instead of the colossal blunder that it was. A naked land grab has been dressed up as some kind of principled stand and the handful of American naval victories has to be considered in the light of the British seizing command of the seas. Lambert is a bit over the top (comparing the use of innovations like the torpedo to IEDs and a connotation of unfair play) but is mostly fair.
Star reduced because the book drags quite a bit in sections.
Star reduced because the book drags quite a bit in sections.
September 29, 2013
An exciting and little known piece of British history and American propaganda. This book tries too hard to debunk the propaganda at the expense of creating a more exciting narrative. The chronology can be confusing and there is a bit too much repetition. There is a Hollywood blockbuster in this story except for the conclusion because not everybody will accept it! " this is my truth now you tell me yours"..
November 14, 2023
A straightforward and dramatic history of the naval War of 1812 from the British perspective.
The author does a great job putting the war into its international context. Lambert devotes a good deal of ink to the war’s causes, most of which can be traced to Jefferson’s presidency. Jefferson’s hostility towards New England and Britain as well as his considerable contribution to American military unpreparedness would all come back to haunt his successor during the war. Jefferson also comes off as vindictive, petty, easily manipulated by Napoleon, and poorly schooled in economic matters. He also notes American naïveté in taking an apparently principled stance on their freedom to profit off the epic war between Britain and Napoleon’s France, and their willingness to deliberately pick a fight with a global superpower over the issue, without bothering to raise the taxes, army, and navy to do so.
From Lambert’s narrative it seems like the US never really had a clear grasp of the situation in Europe. Lambert also describes the challenges of the British blockade, and how the Admiralty frequently disregarded John Warren’s concerns. While the early naval victories of the US have long been celebrated by historians, Lambert downplays these, arguing that ultimately they did not contribute to much except for US morale.
Lambert often writes that one of the US war aims was the acquisition of Canada: it wasn’t; the US was under the impression that seizing Canada would serve as a bargaining chip to force British concessions on maritime issues. However, throughout the book he attributes the war to American territorial ambitions rather than genuine concern over maritime issues, and even asserts that the Madison administration desired to annex Canada after a successful war. He insists that Britain’s Orders in Council or impressment practices weren’t genuine causes of the war. To support this assertion, Lambert cites the fact that the American supporters of the war “were entirely unconnected with the supposed ‘causes.’ ” So, because many War Hawks came from the West, that means they didn’t genuinely care about British maritime practices? That’s an interesting argument, but Lambert never develops this further. Also, he asserts that the USS Essex challenging the HMS Phoebe was “petty tomfoolery.” However, when HMS Shannon issues the same challenge to the USS Chesapeake he calls it “a masterpiece of psychological warfare.” In the conclusion Lambert writes of Jefferson’s “willingness to wage war on New England once the invasion of Canada became a fiasco.” I don’t know what he means by that; Jefferson wasn’t even president at the time. Some better maps would have helped, and the footnotes seem inadequate.
There’s a few errors. Lambert writes that the 1806 Fox blockade alienated Americans (even though it lifted restrictions on American re-exports) and that Napoleon’s Berlin Decree violated treaties between France and the US (the treaties were actually suspended as a result of the Quasi-War). He also writes that British impressment during the Chesapeake-Leopard affair was “unprecedented and illegal,” even though a similar incident took place in 1798 and Jefferson’s cabinet was divided over the legal question. The Royal Navy deserters on the Chesapeake are described as “Britons,” though some were impressed Americans. Elsewhere Lambert claims that “slavery won the War of 1812.” Elsewhere Lambert writes that Madison knew about Napoleon’s Russian invasion when he addressed Congress on declaring war (even though the news only reached the US weeks later) When describing the capture of Washington, Lambert writes that the British “enjoyed the meal prepared at the Presidential Mansion to celebrate Madison's anticipated victory.” I’ve read many books on the British capture of Washington, but I’ve never read of Madison being confident in an American victory there. After all, he and his wife had made plans ahead of time to escape if the British attacked, and he had asked her to be prepared to abandon the mansion at any moment. Lambert also writes that the Treaty of Ghent resulted in US concessions on impressment and “upheld British maritime rights,” even though the treaty famously made no mention of these issues. When covering the duel between Decatur and James Barron, Lambert writes that “Rodgers and Porter knew all about the duel, but did nothing to stop it.” However, both of them had refused to be Decatur’s second, and insisted to him that there wasn’t sufficient cause for a duel.
A mostly well-researched and mostly well-argued history.
The author does a great job putting the war into its international context. Lambert devotes a good deal of ink to the war’s causes, most of which can be traced to Jefferson’s presidency. Jefferson’s hostility towards New England and Britain as well as his considerable contribution to American military unpreparedness would all come back to haunt his successor during the war. Jefferson also comes off as vindictive, petty, easily manipulated by Napoleon, and poorly schooled in economic matters. He also notes American naïveté in taking an apparently principled stance on their freedom to profit off the epic war between Britain and Napoleon’s France, and their willingness to deliberately pick a fight with a global superpower over the issue, without bothering to raise the taxes, army, and navy to do so.
From Lambert’s narrative it seems like the US never really had a clear grasp of the situation in Europe. Lambert also describes the challenges of the British blockade, and how the Admiralty frequently disregarded John Warren’s concerns. While the early naval victories of the US have long been celebrated by historians, Lambert downplays these, arguing that ultimately they did not contribute to much except for US morale.
Lambert often writes that one of the US war aims was the acquisition of Canada: it wasn’t; the US was under the impression that seizing Canada would serve as a bargaining chip to force British concessions on maritime issues. However, throughout the book he attributes the war to American territorial ambitions rather than genuine concern over maritime issues, and even asserts that the Madison administration desired to annex Canada after a successful war. He insists that Britain’s Orders in Council or impressment practices weren’t genuine causes of the war. To support this assertion, Lambert cites the fact that the American supporters of the war “were entirely unconnected with the supposed ‘causes.’ ” So, because many War Hawks came from the West, that means they didn’t genuinely care about British maritime practices? That’s an interesting argument, but Lambert never develops this further. Also, he asserts that the USS Essex challenging the HMS Phoebe was “petty tomfoolery.” However, when HMS Shannon issues the same challenge to the USS Chesapeake he calls it “a masterpiece of psychological warfare.” In the conclusion Lambert writes of Jefferson’s “willingness to wage war on New England once the invasion of Canada became a fiasco.” I don’t know what he means by that; Jefferson wasn’t even president at the time. Some better maps would have helped, and the footnotes seem inadequate.
There’s a few errors. Lambert writes that the 1806 Fox blockade alienated Americans (even though it lifted restrictions on American re-exports) and that Napoleon’s Berlin Decree violated treaties between France and the US (the treaties were actually suspended as a result of the Quasi-War). He also writes that British impressment during the Chesapeake-Leopard affair was “unprecedented and illegal,” even though a similar incident took place in 1798 and Jefferson’s cabinet was divided over the legal question. The Royal Navy deserters on the Chesapeake are described as “Britons,” though some were impressed Americans. Elsewhere Lambert claims that “slavery won the War of 1812.” Elsewhere Lambert writes that Madison knew about Napoleon’s Russian invasion when he addressed Congress on declaring war (even though the news only reached the US weeks later) When describing the capture of Washington, Lambert writes that the British “enjoyed the meal prepared at the Presidential Mansion to celebrate Madison's anticipated victory.” I’ve read many books on the British capture of Washington, but I’ve never read of Madison being confident in an American victory there. After all, he and his wife had made plans ahead of time to escape if the British attacked, and he had asked her to be prepared to abandon the mansion at any moment. Lambert also writes that the Treaty of Ghent resulted in US concessions on impressment and “upheld British maritime rights,” even though the treaty famously made no mention of these issues. When covering the duel between Decatur and James Barron, Lambert writes that “Rodgers and Porter knew all about the duel, but did nothing to stop it.” However, both of them had refused to be Decatur’s second, and insisted to him that there wasn’t sufficient cause for a duel.
A mostly well-researched and mostly well-argued history.
November 3, 2024
Andrew Lambert’s retelling of the naval war of 1812 is comprehensive and incredibly detailed, making it a great reference book for not just a naval buff but also the other war of 1812. It is not always enthralling and beware, he is an unapologetic Anglophile with a huge bias (not surprising as he is a Professor of Naval History at King’s College, London) to describing the war as an overwhelming British victory, when perhaps it may have been a timorous draw at best.
He has interspersed this comprehensibility with one of the most thrilling and brutal descriptions of a naval one-on-one battel between the USS Chesapeake and the H.B.M ship Shannon that I have ever read. I almost suspect he had a ghost writer in the wings as it is so different in style to the rest of the book. The battle took place after the bizarre habit of the day of captains challenging each other to one-on-one (ships, not pistols) duels. I am sure the hundreds of sailors and marines that got dragged into these duals of honour were not excited about being bit-player in senior officers’ egotistical games. Especially the dead and maimed.
The last couple of chapters provide an excellent examination of the cultural and political consequences of the war and could be read in isolation without have to digest the sometimes-over-detailed naval descriptions that precede. For the navy history aficionado, please enjoy the comprehensiveness of preceding chapters. A solid reference book to keep on the shelf when information on the naval war of 1812 is required.
He has interspersed this comprehensibility with one of the most thrilling and brutal descriptions of a naval one-on-one battel between the USS Chesapeake and the H.B.M ship Shannon that I have ever read. I almost suspect he had a ghost writer in the wings as it is so different in style to the rest of the book. The battle took place after the bizarre habit of the day of captains challenging each other to one-on-one (ships, not pistols) duels. I am sure the hundreds of sailors and marines that got dragged into these duals of honour were not excited about being bit-player in senior officers’ egotistical games. Especially the dead and maimed.
The last couple of chapters provide an excellent examination of the cultural and political consequences of the war and could be read in isolation without have to digest the sometimes-over-detailed naval descriptions that precede. For the navy history aficionado, please enjoy the comprehensiveness of preceding chapters. A solid reference book to keep on the shelf when information on the naval war of 1812 is required.
October 6, 2020
Now I know.
I have always wanted to know more detail about the 1812 - 15 war between America and the UK. This book filled in the details. At times a bit turgid and verbose and yet it kept me wanting to know more. Although this book tells the story from the British point of view I believe the author has based the story on the available facts. If, like me, your a fan of Patrick O'Brien or just simply want to know the history relating to a war fought when Britain was already fighting Napoleon... you might enjoy this book.
I have always wanted to know more detail about the 1812 - 15 war between America and the UK. This book filled in the details. At times a bit turgid and verbose and yet it kept me wanting to know more. Although this book tells the story from the British point of view I believe the author has based the story on the available facts. If, like me, your a fan of Patrick O'Brien or just simply want to know the history relating to a war fought when Britain was already fighting Napoleon... you might enjoy this book.
June 9, 2024
An excellent and well-evidenced diatribe - setting itself out to the task of dismantling what the author sees as an ahistorical fictional War of 1812 which dominates public memory in the United States. With wry observations and the odd acid witticism scattered amidst an excellently argued review of the naval aspects of the War of 1812 this is one of those history books which is both an informative read and an entertaining read.
January 7, 2021
A very well written book about the War of 1812, focusing mainly on the naval side, but it does also include the burning of Washington and battle of New Orleans. I did not know much about this war and found myself reading page after page just to find out what happened next. I'm going to have to read more by this author.
December 22, 2022
Captivating exploration of the American second war of independence. Whilst I was occasionally overwhelmed by the nautical terms I never lost interest and was frequently on the edge of my seat as the homeric nature of the ship to ship battles was brought to life.
June 26, 2019
Captain’s Log, Day 43:
Just about finished it and rapidly running out of steam / wind. But what else can one expect in the Doldrums? Became becalmed midstream when all that seemed to be going on was talk of one naval engagement after another and once you've read one / been in one, you've just about read them / been in them all... no that's unfair, but it is the realm of the naval history zealot.
Lambert has some good things to say and good ideas to try to get across. The problem is that this is really not that well written (or MAYBE - and I am quite prepared to concede this - not that well read.) This is a really good case for a better editor. Some of the things that are annoying is the constant use of naval / seafaring / yachtie speak when those of us not in the know don't have a scoobie what he's on about. And wtf IS 'SPECIE'? The maps included are pretty useless at the size and quality they are reproduced in this paperback version and I can't imagine them being much better in a hard back version. This is a regular bugbear on books that need illustration to give greater depth and knowledge to what is in the text. Maps need to be clear.
But the main thing that I found confusing is the arguments where Lambert can't seem to come down on one side or the other. The 1812 - 1815 war UNITED the US or the war DIVIDED the US in to democrats and republican, North and South, merchants and muppets. He makes both cases and sometimes plumps for one and sometimes for the other. Slavery WAS important / slavery WASN'T important. It really goes on like this wanting cake and eating and its difficult to work out what Lambert's position is let along what the actuality was.
This is a great pity because there is lots of food for thought here not the least of which is the propagandising of the outcome. The Brits were really more interested in the outcome of a European war that they had been facing for a much longer period and this was a bit of a sideshow. The Yanks wanted a slice (or more) of Canada and thought it would be a good time to march in when the homies’ eye was off the ball elsewhere. Wrong move. And as they declared war but took no measures to raise an army, navy or taxes to fund that war the Brits didn't take it seriously. Then when they realised that the mouthy ones over there really were up for a scrap, they promptly blockaded the coast and all American trade and the profits to the coffers of the American treasury ceased. They basically went about commercial warfare to bankrupt the states. Didn't stop the States claiming victory afterwards, though.
It does point the way to the schisms that happened later and led to the American Civil War but that's much greater speculation on Lambert's part and full of the well-they-did-but-then-they-didn't attitude.
This book really did need a better editor. Great Pity.
Just about finished it and rapidly running out of steam / wind. But what else can one expect in the Doldrums? Became becalmed midstream when all that seemed to be going on was talk of one naval engagement after another and once you've read one / been in one, you've just about read them / been in them all... no that's unfair, but it is the realm of the naval history zealot.
Lambert has some good things to say and good ideas to try to get across. The problem is that this is really not that well written (or MAYBE - and I am quite prepared to concede this - not that well read.) This is a really good case for a better editor. Some of the things that are annoying is the constant use of naval / seafaring / yachtie speak when those of us not in the know don't have a scoobie what he's on about. And wtf IS 'SPECIE'? The maps included are pretty useless at the size and quality they are reproduced in this paperback version and I can't imagine them being much better in a hard back version. This is a regular bugbear on books that need illustration to give greater depth and knowledge to what is in the text. Maps need to be clear.
But the main thing that I found confusing is the arguments where Lambert can't seem to come down on one side or the other. The 1812 - 1815 war UNITED the US or the war DIVIDED the US in to democrats and republican, North and South, merchants and muppets. He makes both cases and sometimes plumps for one and sometimes for the other. Slavery WAS important / slavery WASN'T important. It really goes on like this wanting cake and eating and its difficult to work out what Lambert's position is let along what the actuality was.
This is a great pity because there is lots of food for thought here not the least of which is the propagandising of the outcome. The Brits were really more interested in the outcome of a European war that they had been facing for a much longer period and this was a bit of a sideshow. The Yanks wanted a slice (or more) of Canada and thought it would be a good time to march in when the homies’ eye was off the ball elsewhere. Wrong move. And as they declared war but took no measures to raise an army, navy or taxes to fund that war the Brits didn't take it seriously. Then when they realised that the mouthy ones over there really were up for a scrap, they promptly blockaded the coast and all American trade and the profits to the coffers of the American treasury ceased. They basically went about commercial warfare to bankrupt the states. Didn't stop the States claiming victory afterwards, though.
It does point the way to the schisms that happened later and led to the American Civil War but that's much greater speculation on Lambert's part and full of the well-they-did-but-then-they-didn't attitude.
This book really did need a better editor. Great Pity.
June 25, 2012
Avoids the blatant jingoism that mars other accounts. Good analysis of the economic consequences of war on the beligerents.
June 22, 2013
I find that the author was slightly too repetitive in something that could have been a more fast paced overview of the book.
May 10, 2014
British POV. Wonderfully acerbic at times.
Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews