Reckoning: Vietnam and America's Cold War Experience, 1945-1991

by Neal F. Thompson

Cold War orthodoxy provides Americans with every reason to be proud of their “long twilight struggle” against Communism. It begins, of course, with Harry Truman, his heroic resistance to Soviet aggression in Europe, his defense of democracy in Korea and his opposition to the disastrous influence of McCarthyism, a malevolent force injected into “the bloodstream of the society” by the right in 1948. Moving on, orthodoxy teaches us of John Kennedy’s doomed if honorable attempts to save an unsustainable ally in Southeast Asia, Lyndon Johnson’s disastrous attempt to follow Kennedy’s path and the courage and insight of those who saw the folly before them and led America out of this singularly unjust, ill-advised campaign. Orthodoxy ends with the West’s final, brilliantly engineered triumph over Soviet Communism, which represents a splendid, bi-partisan accomplishment in which all Americans, left and right can take pride. This is all very nice if only it were true. Vietnam and America’s Cold War Experience, 1945-1991, is a compelling exercise in saying things that, in George Orwell’s words, it is “just not done to say” and identifying facts that have been hiding in plain sight—“elephants in the living room” as they are commonly known. Starting with the “Communist movement of the 1930s” and all that came with it, Reckoning chronicles the Soviets’ massive North American espionage network, Truman’s feckless response, his relentless obstruction of Congressional attempts to investigate these matters and his ruthless purge of leftists from the federal civil service, all of which combined to poison political discourse in this country for decades. Reckoning examines Truman’s slaughterous, senseless campaign in Korea in all its folly and brutality—a campaign that led the United States directly into Southeast Asia—which, orthodoxy aside, was a war winnable within a reasonable definition of victory but fought ineffectively and lost by politicians like John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, whose every move was dictated by an obsessive fear of, in Johnson’s words, “another Korea,” which, although listed today in America’s “win” column, had driven Truman from office with 22% poll ratings.Finally, Reckoning examines the campaign in Southeast Asia in full Cold War context, focusing on history rather than ideology and applying a single, reasonably objective set of standards to judge the conduct of enemies, allies and Americans from 1939 to the fall of the Soviet Union, demonstrating thereby that there is no intellectually honest way to condemn this country’s war in Southeast Asia that does not serve to delegitimize the Truman Doctrine in its entirety. In short, if the Cold War, with the Truman Doctrine at its core, represents a just cause successfully concluded, as orthodoxy would have us believe, embracing America’s ultimate victory over Communism while condemning the campaign in Southeast Asia is like accepting World War II as this country’s finest hour while denouncing MacArthur’s defense of and eventual return to the Philippines because the United States, having stepped into Spanish shoes as colonial occupier at the turn of the century, had no rightful presence or interests there.You might be surprised much of what you read here, but a paradigm shift in worldview awaits anyone willing to read Reckoning with an intellectually honest, open mind.

577 pages, Paperback

First published March 1, 2013

Reviews

[Henry Berry · Rating 4 out of 5]

One-time Vietnam helicopter pilot and now retired former prosecutor, Thompson reviews the historical and political paths leading up to America's involvement in Vietnam culminating in the latter 1960s and early 1970s and ending with the ignominious flight symbolized by the helicopter on the roof of the US embassy in Saigon taking on passengers before the city was completely overrun by the North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong allies.

For ones not familiar with this history, "Reckoning" relates it with considerable dimension and detail and with a distinct, somewhat personal perspective which nonetheless does not skewer the history stretching over decades nor interfere so it becomes simply a screed. Thompson's narrative resembles Barbara Tuchman's in her classic "The March of Folly" except that as the subtitle "From Troy to Vietnam" of her book denotes, she focuses on poor decision-making, catastrophic war-mongering, deluded expectations, and in some cases, duplicitous rationalizations and justifications throughout history whereas Thompson limits himself to a deeper and broader analysis of the Vietnam War.

Unlike Tuchman who surveys history, Thompson's motivation for his book was the Bush Administration's invasion of Saddam Hussein"s Iraq supposedly to attack a major source and support of terrorism and take out weapons of mass destruction, but which as we now see, turned out to be calamitous. This motivation on Thompson comes out in the title of his last chapter, "History, Ideology, and the Tyranny of Bad Ideas." It is here where the theme running through his informative record of events and decisions leading up to military involvement in Vietnam and its escalation is imparted plainly and directly.

Though more compressed than US involvement in Vietnam, US invasion of Iraq demonstrates the same hubris bordering on arrogance, indifference to local cultural and political conditions, overconfidence in military effectiveness, and out-of-place aims as in Viet Nam. For Thompson, the US learned nothing from its abortive Viet Nam adventure—not a thing. He is not the first to come to this realization, this point of view, this reckoning. But he brings to it an uncommon range of material involving historical scholarship, journalistic reporting, and pattern of events with a particular intelligence, sense of critique, and desire to refresh the paradigmatic cautionary tale of American history peremptorily dismissed by Bush and his bellicose cronies.

[John · Rating 5 out of 5]

Anyone with an interest in the history of the Cold War, Communism in America, the war in Vietnam and a look behind the accepted official history will find this book thought provoking. It is, in a word, controversial. Mr. Thompson slays, no, he murders more than one sacred cow as he strives to arrive at the truth regarding the events leading up to the Vietnam war, the war itself and its aftermath. I believe that almost everyone reading this book will do so with a growing sense of anger—some more than others depending on their political inclinations.

[Thomas Reilly · Rating 5 out of 5]

Neal Thompson has written an incredibly deep analysis of one of the most turbulent periods in US history. This well-researched and highly readable book should be part of any serious discussion of the Vietnam War. I recommend reading and studying this book for anyone who desires a deeper understanding of this war and the political environment surrounding it. It is especially relevant for what we are experiencing in the US today. Well done.

[Jim Gallen · Rating 3 out of 5]

“Reckoning: Vietnam and America’s Cold War Experience, 1945-1991” is a blend of history with political and social criticism. It consists of in-depth examinations of the many Cold War clashes between the United States and Communism. Readers are challenged to rethink their impressions of the Communists in government controversies of the 1930s, 40s and 50s and the legacies that they left. Author Neal Thompson shines the spotlight on the actions, moral and otherwise, of administrations from Truman through George W. Bush. The means of waging war during World War II as well as in Korea, Vietnam Grenada, Kosovo and the Middle East are compared and contrasted to identify their distinguishing characteristics and the consistent themes woven through them. From start to finish he follows the effects of the legacy of the 1930s, that being a general acceptance of anti-communism, and the application of the Truman Doctrine of assisting free people resting subjugation by minorities or outside forces. I learned facts of which I had not been aware, such as that Truman invited Stalin to Fulton to give his side of the story and Eisenhower’s conditions for assistance to the French in Indochina.

Thompson advances his agenda throughout this work. He believes that much, even most, of the decisions of peace and war have been driven more by domestic politics than international affairs. He accuses political leaders of lying and misleading the American public to achieve their ends while at the same time questioning whether victory in the Cold War would have been possible under any other terms and pondering what benefit America really got from that victory? A Vietnam veteran himself, Thompson assembles facts and figures to support his assertions that the Vietnam War could have been won, that its warriors were well motivated and as, or more successful during their service and in later life than the general population of their era. He also proposes the proposition that their service, rather than having been in vain, did advance the cause of freedom by limiting the spread of Communism and consuming Communist resources that otherwise would have been used elsewhere.

I am going to stop here with the facts to maintain suspense. The genius of this book is its ability to keep the reader guessing where he is being led. My solid advice is that if you start this book do not stop until the last page. Whenever I thought that I had figured out its point it would take a turn and leave me rethinking. I like the way that Thompson holds political myths accountable to the historical record and appreciate the new perspectives through which it views America’s Cold War Experience. On the other hand, I suspect that some of the “facts” are shaded by the author’s historical and political orientation. There is much criticism of the handling of the Korean War without, I believe, raising the legitimate criticism that the Truman administration, and General MacArthur, gave every indication that Korea was outside of the American defensive perimeter before immediately responding to the attack that they may have inadvertently encouraged. I also think that he is overly cynical in attributing virtually every American Cold World governmental initiative to political motivations. I have to believe that, political animals though they be, our presidents and other political leaders are driven by some sense of obligation to the country they serve and, on occasions at least, act accordingly.

Its strengths and weaknesses being weighed, I am glad that I read “Reckoning”. I would not recommend it as an initial or definitive history of the Cold War. I do value it as a critical check on main stream histories and conventional wisdom of the Cold War. I am sure that, as I read other histories I will measure them against “Reckoning” and it against them.

I did receive a free copy of this book without the obligation to post a review.