The Right and the Good

by William David Ross, Philip Stratton-Lake (Editor)

The Right and the Good , a classic of twentieth-century philosophy by the eminent scholar Sir David Ross, is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton-Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and Stratton-Lake provides the context for a proper understanding of Ross's great work today.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Classics

256 pages, Paperback

First published December 1, 1930

About the author

Sir William David Ross KBE, frequently published as W.D. Ross, was a philosopher, principally of ethics. He was White's Professor of Moral Philosophy (1923–1928), Provost of Oriel College, Oxford (1929–1947), Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford (1941–1944) and Pro-Vice-Chancellor (1944–1947). He was president of the Aristotelian Society (1939–1940), and was elected a Fellow of the British Academy and was its President (1940-1944).

Reviews

[Tucker · Rating 3 out of 5]

Super abstract. Talking "in the air," as I once heard someone put the complaint in a business meeting, meaning not anchored to anything in the real world that anyone really cares about (odd, since the topic of The Right and the Good is why we care, or ought to care, about stuff). Should have had some great, colorful examples. Instead is made of sentences like "We have simply to add that the ultimately good as distinct from the merely intrinsically good contains no element that is not intrinsically good" (p. 74) and "For if we could correctly define 'yellow' as, say, 'x which is y', we should not be saying that 'yellow' means anything other than 'yellow', for 'x which is y'would be just what yellow is" (p. 92) If your brain is already traveling these circles, this may be a good summation of the debate — at least, as it stood in Western philosophy in 1930 — but I could not recommend this as anyone's first introduction to moral philosophy.

[Caleb · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th Century analytic moral philosophy. Ross defends a version of intuitionism, whereby, he claims, certain duties are self-evident. For example, the duty to be benevolent or the duty to keep promises, etc., are self-evidently prima facie duties. In a particular context the agent must use judgment to determine which prima facie duties are most relevant in order to determine which act is appropriate.

Without addressing the distinction between the right and the good, the arguments for which are not entirely compelling, it is worth briefly commenting on the notion of self-evidence operative in Ross's theory.

He recognizes that the self-evidence of a prima facie duty may not be apparent to some or even many persons and may take time and effort to be grasped. In this sense, one might say, following Aristotle (who is clearly a source for Ross) that these duties are self-evident to the wise. In this sense, Ross's intuitionism is far from absurd. Given the appropriate conditions, appropriately socialized persons will find a range of duties to be obvious, without further need of elaboration or defence. Bernard Williams noted that rationalist ethical theories often required 'one thought too many,' such that they posited a need for a reason when the ethical person would not need a reason, for instance a reason to save a drowning spouse. In such a case of urgent need, appeals to the greatest good, or the categorical imperative are out of place and the ethical person ought to recognize the needed action without need for further argument.

What is missing from the intuitionism of Ross is an account of (a) the virtues needed to recognize these duties, (b) the social conditions needed to acquire these virtues, and (c) an explanation of why the combination of social conditions and duties that are self-evident to the wise in those social conditions are rationally justified and superior to alternative sets of duties and social conditions. Hegel and MacIntyre offer some insight into how this last issue might be addressed.

[Adam Ehlert · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was happy to see that Ross' classic book had been translated to Swedish by Anders Hansson, whose publishing house I hold to a very high standard. This one is a good one - the book is a classic and Hansson's translation is very readable. Would recommend for any Swedish speaker interested in reading Ross.

[jacob · Rating 4 out of 5]

Honestly this was a really good piece of philosophy all things considered and highly compelling but for some reason I have so few feelings and thoughts about it. British analytic/moral philosophers sap the fucking life out of my soul regardless of how valuable their philosophy is someone needs to teach these Men(TM) how to experience emotion.

While the concept of prima facie duties and his discussion of the Good and what things are a part of it were all good (love myself a virtue-pilled king), I have to wonder how original his prima facie idea actually was. He really did just go "whoa whoa WHOA, guys, what if there were actual RULES about stuff, but, hear me out, the rules aren't absolute, and sometimes if it'd be REALLY BAD to follow a rule, we could just not follow it. And the rule would still be fine the rest of the time." To be as fair as possible I'm sure that other similar ideas had been proposed before Ross, and his prima facie list of duties is a lot more interesting than I'm making it sound here or else this book wouldn't be getting 4 stars, but it does just make me chuckle to think about deontologists between Kant and Ross banging their heads against the wall after failing to invent the concept of conditionally valid rules for like 150 years or something.

The biggest weakness of Ross' philosophy generally for me is his ethical intuitionism, which makes me wanna cry piss and vomit everytime I think about it and almost made me give him a 3 just for that. At least in terms of justifying, like, axiomatic moral judgements themselves I can see how intuitionism would be defensible - pretty hard to argue that "murdering people is bad" is seriously lacking justification. But the absolute amount of Ross' philosophy that simply rests on "idk man I just thought of like, 5 rules you guys gotta just figure out every other moral judgement for yourselves" is a little unsatisfying, althought he does get bonus points for bullying utilitarians and at least recognizing the inherently unique moral value of special social relationships.

TL;DR - British guy writes a kinda boring book in which he invents rules that are sometimes overruled by other rules, literally breaks moral philosophy, and people don't even really realize he did until like 80 years later.

[Richard]

Thanks for Philospohy Bro for recommending this. I’d like to dive into it after I finally finish Hannah Arendt and then Baumeister’s Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty , although I’d already committed that next spot to David Livingstone Smith’s Less Than Human: Solving the Puzzle of Dehumanization .

Unfortunately, the only edition of this at my local library is the original, without the introduction by Philip Stratton-Lake.

[Ross · Rating 4 out of 5]

[The human mind] has in fact an a priori insight into certain broad principles of morality, and it can distinguish between a more and a less adequate recognition of these principles. [...] There is a system of moral truth, as objective as all truth must be, which, and whose implications, we are interested in discovering.

I would give five stars to the first two chapters on "the right," and three stars to the remaining chapters on "the good." Ross's insights into the nature of right action via prima facie duties is compelling and well-argued, but his complicated parsing of Moorean goodness left me as unconvinced and confused as reading Principia Ethica.

[Andrew Jampol-Petzinger · Rating 4 out of 5]

A wonderful companion piece to any other readings on deontology, Ross gives a closer-to-intuitive account of moral obligation and makes an effort to frame it against contemporaneous attempts within Anglophone philosophy to present arguments about both what the good is and what right actions are. Some of the chosen debates may seem overly dry or besides the concerns of the reader, but there is much to be gained from Ross’ careful approach to moral questions. Stratton-Lake’s introduction is both helpful and academically rigorous.

[Kevin Howery · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ross and his moral intuitionism are iconic in the history of moral philosophy. This work on deontology being a school of morals that is naturally contained in the human intellect is a clever testimony to thinking that far proceeds Ross himself. I recommend reading some of the works that Ross is in conversation with alongside this book. Although we are given brief summaries of these works, a larger picture is sometimes necessary to understand the full scope of Ross’ arguments. I am glad that this piece of literature has been gaining attention recently and hope that others are interested in what is right and what is good.

[Emin Orhan · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's a crime that this book (and WD Ross's work in general) isn't more widely known. In my mind, he basically solved all the major issues in moral philosophy as satisfactorily as one can hope to solve or resolve such issues.

[Sean Ryan · Rating 5 out of 5]

I'm usually not one for duty ethics of any sort, but W. D. Ross's has a certain undeniable appeal for me. Regardless of my precise agreement with Ross's arguments, I think he does a good job in his presentation.

[Shaira Allyne]

We

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 5 out of 5]

one of the top books of the 30s for Ethics

Oxford University Press 1931

[Francisco Barrios · Rating 5 out of 5]

Si lo "correcto" no equivale a lo "moralmente bueno", ni significa "lo que produce el mayor placer posible para el agente que lo efectúa o para la humanidad" (como afirman los utilitaristas hedonistas) o si cambiamos "placer" por "bien", como afirmó G. E. Moore, veremos que la única manera posible en que podemos aclarar lo mentado por "correcto" es la de (nuestro) "deber" o "lo moralmente obligatorio".

(Claro, esto devela otras interrogantes entre las que se destacan tres: ¿qué hace "correctos" a los actos "correctos"?, ¿cuál es la relación entre lo "correcto" y lo "bueno"?, y ¿cuál es la naturaleza de la "bondad"?)

Entre los subproductos que ofrece este ensayo (maravillosamente escrito por su autor y bellamente editado por Sígueme) están una refutación de la teoría utilitarista del "deber", el rechazo del subjetivismo axiológico y la reivindicación del intuicionismo (tan cercano a Bergson) como teoría del conocimiento.

Para mí un texto valioso y una imperdible de la creación filosófica del s. XX.

(Otros aspectos, más técnicos, de esta obra podrán encontrarse y discutirse próximamente en https://solosuicidadesprofesionales.w... .)

[Elisa · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.5/5
(Only had to read a chapter for uni)
I don't agree with everything he said but it was written in a good way so that I could understand it relative easily most ot the time.