A perennial topic in philosophy is whether we are morally responsible for our actions if we and our behavior are fully determined by environmental, genetic, and situational factors. Should determinism be true, it would appear that there is no role for a person's free will in deciding what course of action to pursue. This raises the basic question whether a person deserves praise or blame for their behavior if they could not have avoided doing what they did. Thus, there appears to be a fundamental conflict between determinism and free choice that undermines holding people responsible for their behavior. In a senior thesis completed in May 1963 at Reed College ("The Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism") the author carefully examines the conditions under which a person could have acted otherwise, demonstrating that determinism does not rule out responsibility for one's actions. Key among these conditions are that the person had the ability and the opportunity to perform the action that they in fact did not do, and that they were not subject to duress in making the decision they did. As a cogent analysis of major positions on the possible conflict of free will and determinism, the thesis merits attention sixty years after it was written. The foreword by Thomas W. Clark provides a lucid assessment of its main arguments, showing how the author anticipated the conclusions of some well-known modern-day philosophers, thus giving the reader insight into much of what is still central to the free will debate.