Unger offers an evaluation of how the United States largely created its own dilemmas in foreign policy. He claims that over the past century these mistakes have, consequently, forced America into a perpetual and unnecessary mentality of alarm, which requires defense and protection at any cost. The entire premise of Unger’s book is based on the notion that in hindsight every decision and outcome takes on more clarity about how and why certain events in history transpired, and that certain events could have been carried out differently and, therefore, prevented world catastrophes and the predicament American finds itself with policing the world. For example, he assesses how Wilson initiated the groundwork for abuses of power during his presidency. He then proceeds to assess how FDR followed suit and overstepped his executive authority by shortcutting constitutional laws in order to aid and abet Great Britain during the early years of the war. These arguments are true in a vacuum, but in the sweeping, tumultuous context of history and the world twice at war, did not Wilson and FDR try to keep America out of the conflicts? Did they not want peace?
By the next chapter, Unger works ahead to Truman. He claims that the Cold War and the emergency state began at the precise moment when Truman failed to reconcile with Stalin over postwar control of Germany and Europe. He criticizes Wilson and FDR’s undermining of power as essentially preparing the stage for Truman to proceed with misguided doctrines in the postwar world. And yet a few pages later he argues that had FDR lived he would not have allowed the emergency state to continue. This type of reinvented evaluation of history comprises the book up to the modern day. It is a curious argument, which can be interesting, and Unger can be praised for providing a nuanced exploration of historical events and circumstances. His ideas, however, become less convincing due to the glaring fact that his chief device is to argue against what happened in history and in favor of pointing out choices and circumstances that he predicts would have prevented future turmoil and entanglements had other decisions been undertaken. The unfortunate result of what happened is a mindset in America that nurtures a formulated, perpetual “emergency state.” Unger’s ideas are valuable for their obvious concern about American’s need to do better. That is an assessment that few, including myself, are in disagreement. In his last chapter, Unger outlines a course of actions and practices that can help America for the future. This may be his strongest contribution. At heart, even with its intent to magnify what went wrong, this is an optimistic book about how we can think of making things right.