Morality, Autonomy, and God

by Keith Ward

"From Descartes to Dostoevsky, the debate concerning the relationship between religion and morality has raged for centuries. Can there be a solid foundation for ethics without God? Or would we be consigned to a relativist morality, where “the good” is just a product of societal values or natural selection? In this landmark work, acclaimed philosopher and theologian, Keith Ward, presents a revolutionary new contribution to this discussion. Reflecting on the work of philosophers old and new – including Hume, Mill, Murdoch and Moore – he argues that our conception of morality intrinsically depends on our model of reality. And if we want a meaningful, objective ethics, then only God can provide the solid metaphysical foundations.

Carefully structured and written in Ward’s famously clear prose, Morality, Autonomy and God will be an invaluable primer for students of theology or philosophy of religion. But more than that, this strident and controversial book is guaranteed to shape philosophical opinion for years to come."

Genres: Philosophy

256 pages, Paperback

First published November 1, 2013

About the author

Keith Ward was formerly the Regius Professor of Divinity and Head of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Oxford. A priest of the Church of England and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, he holds Doctor of Divinity degrees from Cambridge and Oxford Universities. He has lectured at the universities of Glasgow, St. Andrew's and Cambridge.

Reviews

[Odelia · Rating 3 out of 5]

I think the writing style was too technical for my taste but the flow of the book was excellent and that’s why I could understand some of his arguments. Overall, good read

[Tucker · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ward begins by explaining his view that "Basic values are objective, parts of the fabric of reality, not simply inferences from the existence of actual desires in individuals" and that "there may be some need for a metaphysical underpinning for beliefs about human flourishing."

He proposes that "‘Platonic enchantment’ engenders the idea of an objective focus for moral vision and commitment, which alleviates John Mackie’s fear of ontological ‘queerness,’" and he endorses Kant's view "that, in certain conditions, it is reasonable to make a practical moral and epistemological commitment in face of theoretical uncertainty."

On relativism:

"To be a quasi-realist is to say there are no moral facts, but it is all right to talk as if there were some. Like many people, I have an uneasy feeling about quasi-realism. How can it be all right to talk as if there were moral facts, yet declare there are none? I do not say this is a refutation – I would not be so rash. But I do think that such a view is at least as queer as saying that moral facts actually exist, that we can quantify them, and do so in an intentionally and fully existential sense.

I would be happy with saying that every meta-ethical view is queer, from other perspectives, and that what seems queer is relative to what metaphysical or ontological view one finds appealing. Hilary Putnam does not seem to me to be right when he says that we can have ethics entirely without ontology."

On duty tied to belief in God:

"In addition, if I am a theist, my failure to meet an obligation will be the breaking of a personal relationship with a loving God. It will be a moral failure even if there is no God. But, if there is a God, there will exist an additional level of failure. God, as a being of supreme value and the creator of all for the sake of good, will add love and gratitude to sheer obligation. That is what we will fail to give. Such failure may be in itself, if and when we come to see it clearly, a form of punishment."