Олигархи. Богатство и власть в новой России

by David E. Hoffman, Сергей Шульженко (Translator), Дэвид Э. Хоффман

A brilliant and investigative narrative of "crony capitalism" explores how six average Soviet men rose to the pinnacle of Russia's battered economy.

Genres: History, Russia, Nonfiction, Politics, Economics, Business, Audiobook

624 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2002

About the author

David E. Hoffman covered Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign for the Knight-Ridder newspapers. In 1982, he joined The Washington Post to help cover the Reagan White House. He also covered the first two years of the George H.W. Bush presidency. His White House coverage won three national journalism awards. After reporting on the State Department, he became Jerusalem bureau chief for The Post in 1992, and served as Moscow bureau chief, 1995-2001. He was also foreign editor and Assistant Managing Editor for Foreign News.

Reviews

[Mike · Rating 4 out of 5]

Like Hoffman's book The Dead Hand which concerns the Cold War and the Soviet's efforts at biological and nuclear weapons, The Oligarchs both boasts and suffers from Hoffman's skills and lack thereof in certain areas. There is no question that Hoffman is an astute researcher: in both books, he has dug up information that perhaps no other author writing in English has ever taken into account and there is probably no better, more-detailed, a book on the rise of the core group of oligarchs in Yeltsin's new Russia in any language, Russian included. Hoffman's narrative of these new scions of industry and their rise to power and wealth spares no details and provides nuanced, pithy, descriptions of all the players involved. You feel like you get to know these guys over the course of the book. Hoffman, as he has lived in Moscow for years apparently and also wrote the aforementioned book on the later years of the Cold War and fall of the Soviet Union, is also able to place the decade of the oligarchs becoming some of the world's richest men and the turn towards a relentless free market in Russia in greater context in the scope of Russian/Soviet history.

So what's not to like? Well, where Hoffman suffers in both books is a bad habit of restating things over and again and also in some cases not going into enough detail on something interesting while instead wasting print going into something not so interesting, even if he's already touched on it once or twice already. A good example is how early into the book he explains what Gosplan was about three times in the spane of around 50 pages. Granted, I know a good amount about Russian history myself and read fluent Russian, but still there are places where you have to question what gets great attention and what doesn't. In the case of The Dead Hand Hoffman made some minor factual errors too and my background in Russian economics isn't that great so I can't say I spotted anything in this book, but there could be similar errors. The ones he made on the Cold War were small and fairly unimportant, but still things he could have fact-checked before the book went to press (an example being how he describes Chequers Court as Margaret Thatcher's country estate when in fact it's a retreat for the prime minister and owned by the government, much as is Camp David in the USA). Small things, but in books so deep you have to wonder how many errors of this sort lurk about.

This is, therefore, really more of a three-star book than a four-star one, but I will be kind today: it's the best work in English of its kind and probably overall the least biased, when you factor in Russian works on the same topic. It's necessary reading for anyone interested in how the current Russian economy developed under Putin and why things evolved as they did under Yeltsin. So I have to recommend this book—and I recommend the one on the Cold War, too—but wish Hoffman was just a bit better a writer than he is: he's established himself as the core writer in English on these topics in any depth so it would be nice to have someone of the caliber of, say, Stephen S. Hall (science journalist who wrote A Commotion in the Blood) in that position.

[Maru Kun · Rating 5 out of 5]

This fascinating graph from Thomas Pikkety's blog showing the change in share of wealth for the richest ten percent of the population in Russia, France and the US tells us in one picture the same story outlined in this book.

The graph also has something interesting to say about the US.

One thing common to the rise of each of the Russian Oligarchs discussed in this book is that they exploited a lack of any understood or enforced law or regulations around the ownership of state property post the collapse of communism.

An Oligarch might, for example, set up their own organisations within a state company to buy coal, gas, nickel or whatever at state prices and then export these goods overseas at world market prices and pocket the difference. This would normally require them to have overseas contacts, which might well have come through the KGB.

In this respect the position of a Russian Oligarch, who knows no law, can be contrasted with that of some American businessmen who are bound by law, but who simply pay lobbyists to change it for them, or with others, like Trump and his pals, who simply think they are above the law.

Overall this book is a great guide to stealing anything that isn't nailed down if you are in a position of political influence. We can be sure the Oligarchs in it who haven't yet been imprisoned or murdered will be passing on its lessons to their friends in the GOP.

[Max Berendsen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Review to follow

[Rundown · Rating 5 out of 5]

4.5 out of 5 stars.
book is incredibly well written, a pleasure to read..

A worthy investment, as it exposes a clear explanation of the problems that communism creates, gives an overview of what was intended and the corruption that ensues during the transition to capitalism.

Vividly paints a picture of what it would be like living under broken communism, and the phenomenal opportunities for those born to hustle during the transition.
The importance of being flexible and getting connected, what an amazing book.

It should also be read by entrepreneurs, in order to understand how lucky we are in the west, a how to book about hustling, with a caveat of, no doubt similar corruption has been established in the western world, which has had many years to tone it down, cover it up, make it invisible without digging around.

Those clued up in the west, know our leadership and various sectors are pretty much corrupt, and maybe its time to join them or at least get in the middle.

With all the cronyism in the UK, it is worth thinking about spending a year or two trying to position yourself in the middle of some of this massive action, and retiring real quick.

The communist countries have three real distinct industries, the state handled business, business run outside state control, and business that run outside state control but hustle with the state.
The latter is what made the Oligarchs.

It can be assumed that democracies work on a similar algorithm, and one should aim to get IN ON THIS IMMENSELY REWARDING AFFRAY.
If you cant beat them, join them.
It also shows how poverty and shortages lead to criminal activity.

Most of the oligarchs were jewish, maybe the jewish russians were just incredible entrepreneurs...this was quite interesting for me, as i am descended from austrian jews..maybe i have the magic too.... or maybe they were guided by a hidden hand.

At the very end of the book, Putin appears, and it is a bit hazy about how he got there, who put him there, and what the major driving forces behind him were. He just kind of appears out of nowhere.

The only bad point about the book are,the author seems to feel sorry for the way things eventually turned out for the men who had pillaged the entire russian people, men who had selfishly been totally corrupt and thought of nothing but personal wealth and power, and stepped on and abused the millions of hard working russians to attain their aim. Basically they robbed the people blind and shared the spoils of their massive theft between themselves.

Another point is, the book describes the sheer billions these oligarchs were fleecing from Russians , yet in the next breath, how they couldnt come up with a few tens of millions, or how they laundered tiny amounts like 100k.. It just doesnt add up, if you had billions and billions in offshore companies, surely a couple million dollars you would be able to raise without begging for a loan, or bringing in others to help you put the finance together.

I was amused that George Soros was quite heavily involved with the Oligarchs.

a good follow up would be the proletariat, about how every day soviets dealt with the transition to capitalism, and how they survived it and their mindset, struggles and breakthroughs. and the systems that evolved and hindered and helped throughout the exact same period.

A thoroughly enjoyable read.

[Nick · Rating 4 out of 5]

Watching Vladimir Putin preside over the opening of the Sochi Olympics, a glorious spectacle that pointedly included the hammer-and-sickle era, it was difficult to recall just what kind of chaos had descended on Russia during the nineties, a bare decade-and-a half before. David E. Hoffman's "The Oligarchs" is a pertinent reminder of just what it took for Russia to emerge from the collapse of the Soviet empire. He focuses here on the emergence, seemingly overnight, of immense fortunes in banking, mining (especially oil), and media. Many of these fortunes were created through the privatization of state resources through rigged auctions in which the bidder actually borrowed much of the capital he was pledging. The holders of these fortunes in turn gathered with members of the press and of the Yeltsin to save his Presidency from the man himself. At the moment they organized, he was polling in single digits and the resurgent Communist Party looked like the next regime. If the financial sleight-of-hand that Hoffman details can at times challenge the reader, the account of the campaign to save Yeltsin's presidency is gripping. Yeltsin, with the help of his oligarchs, won the election, and they thought they had won the future. The late Boris Berezovsky crowed that the oligarchs would run the country as a board of directors, a sort of new Politburo, one assumes. And then it all came apart, first when one of the auctions, the privatization of a telephone and communications company, was unexpectedly awarded to the highest bidder rather than the oligarch who felt it was his turn (Vladimir Gusinsky, in alliance with Berezovsky). The young reformers who were trying to transform Russia's economy into a modern ones, Anatoly Chubais and his deputy, Boris Nemstov, were dismissed. Yeltsin overlooked all the regular candidates and elevated a members of the security service, Putin, to Prime Minister. We all know how that turned out. All these years later, those oligarchs who made nice with the new regime or at least kept quiet, were allowed to stay and sometimes prosper. Berezovsky died in exile; it was his security man who was famously poisoned with plutonium. Gusinsky also went into exile. Chubais has been low-key although there was a recent article indicating increasing official interest in his business activity; Nemtsov turned to protest and was assassinated this year. Of the other politicians and businessman treated in detail by Hoffman, Yuri Luzhkov, once thought the successor to Yeltsin, was allowed to remain as Mayor of Moscow for many years after he joined the winning side. Alexander Smolensky's bank folded and his billions melted into mere millions. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former oil magnate, began to move toward organizing an opposition and found himself in jail for a number of years on tax charges while his company was disassembled. He is free now, living in Switzerland. Hoffman's account of the assembling of Kohodrokovsky's company makes clear that among the key components were inventive accounting and sheer gall. From time to time I run into people who went from the West to Russia in the nineties to help it navigate toward capitalism. I do not think that those people thought they would be helping to create a capitalism like the robber baron era of the post-Civil War United States. Or that the result would include things that I think would even have caused Gould and Frick to pause.

[Ilya Inozemtsev · Rating 5 out of 5]

Название не должно пугать — это монументальный труд о периоде ельцинской власти в новейшей России: от падения Союза до прихода к власти Путина. Если, к примеру, «Все свободны» рассказывали о единственном эпизоде правления Ельцина, то «Олигархи» описывают все ситуации. Из-за такого широкого контекста многие вещи о современной России становятся понятны, тем удивительнее, что книга была написана почти двадцать лет назад. У последнего издания есть важное послесловие о Ходорковском и судьбе героев-олигархов, но, опять-таки, не стоит делать акцент на этом термине — книга Хоффмана об олигархии, как о типе правления, а не как о бизнес-магнатах, с которым этот термин стал тождественен.

[Joni Baboci · Rating 5 out of 5]

A thrilling ride on the rollercoaster of Russia's foray into capitalism describing the life, work and professional death of the first six oligarchs under the loose reign of Yeltsin. 

Hoffman's book starts slowly, exploring the lives of the six oligarchs before the ruble-storm - superdriven individuals but fairly unimportant cogs in the enormous soviet machine. 

It then traces their incredible and absurd growth through privatization vouchers, cash for shares agreements, bribery, coercion, ruble devaluation and the tumultuous decade of 90s Moscow. 

A page-turner. Do not miss it.

[Frank Stein · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a fascinating, if overlong, look at the corrupt billionaires that emerged unexpectedly out of the collapse of the Soviet state. Although the sprawling cast of secondary figures in the book summons the inevitable comparison to a Russian novel, David Hoffman focuses on just a handful of major characters, all of whom seemed destined for anonymity when Gorbachev began his "perestroika" campaign in 1985.

Vladimir Gusinsky was a failed theater director driving a taxi when he decided to start a "cooperative" (or private company) to sell copper bracelets, which he then parlayed into a banking and media empire centered around Russia's one independent television station, NTV. Alexander Smolensky was a former soldier and periodic anti-Soviet rebel (he printed his own Bibles for sale, although he was Jewish) who began some construction work for the Moscow government on the side, which he soon transformed into an industrial and especially banking empire. Boris Berezovsky was a hyperkinetic scientist at the Institute for Control Sciences when he began importing some Fiats for a state company and then started assembling an automobile empire. Mikhail Khodorkovsky was a "komosomol" or youth group, leader in the Mendeleev research institute, when he was allowed to create his own bank from which he got the funds to assemble the oil empire of Yukos. Hoffman also describes how Yuri Luzhkov, later Moscow mayor, and Anatoly Chubais, the economist and reformer, helped create the kind of government where these billionaires could flourish, often at the expense of the rest of the country.

The oligarchs themselves had many similarities. Most were Jewish, and thus had been restricted from many careers and honors in the Soviet Union. Most were outraged at state control of their early cooperatives and thus created their own mini-banks to control their earnings, and it was from these banks that most of their profits emerged. Most relied on connections with early Communist leaders to attract government funds to their banks, or to give them control of state assets, and then earned a mint gambling on ruble fluctuations or exchanging underpriced Soviet commodities abroad. Most relied not so much on ownership of vital properties as extracting the profits and sending them to secret accounts. Finally, most of their banks were devastated in the 1998 Russian default, and then most were hounded by one of their own creations, Vladimir Putin, once he assumed power in 2000.

Although Hoffman portrays the oligarchs with an understanding eye, he knows that much of what they did was detrimental to Russia. Tragically, however, they were often the only ones willing to resist the still powerful Communists or, later and too late, Putin. The book ends with Putin stealing NTV and driving Gusinsky from the country, but since it was published in 2002, it does not describe how Khodorkovsky was jailed on flimsy charges for over a decade by Putin, or how Berezovsky was driven from the country and possibly killed by Putin's agents.

Whatever one thinks of the oligarchs, they reshaped one of the most powerful countries on Earth for almost a decade, and then were driven out by one of their own creations. It's a majestic and tragic story, well told here.

[Morgan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A super interesting and thorough overview of how the oligarchs rose to power during the demise of the Soviet Union. How these men were able to manipulate the failing system and be so forward thinking was absolutely incredible and mind boggling.

While the information was fascinating, it was hard to keep track of all the individuals. The first part of the book gives the reader the background story of each of the oligarchs and then brings them together as their rise to power intertwines their stories. By the point they are all brought together it was hard to remember who went with what origin story. I felt like I needed an overview cheat sheet, especially since I read this book over two months.

[Petr Zajac · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book attracted me because I am from a post communistic country influenced by Rusia. David E. Hoffman very well described the transformation from Gorbacov’s perestroika to Yelcin’s privatisation till Putin’s post Oligarchs era. The transformation was driven by corruption and clientelism like in other post communistic countries. Autor mainly focused on six Russia tycoons. How they from nothing took ownership of Russia. How they influenced government. Live of actors in the book mainly ends with exile or death.

[Masha · Rating 5 out of 5]

Incredible compilation of history and firsthand accounts. I cannot stop telling people about all that I've learned.

[Dmitry · Rating 5 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

(По следам фильма ФБК «Предатели»)

Да, открыто автор не предъявляет никаких обвинений в адрес Ельцина, но то что он пишет, не оставляет никаких сомнений о том, что же так называемые либералы и демократы строили в 90-х в России, что они построили в итоге и почему эта шаткая «демократия» 1991-1999 гг., разрушилась так быстро от первого же дуновения Путина. Эта книга предельно точно показывает, что никакого иного итога и быть не могло. Ельцин не строил демократическое государство европейского образца. Ельцин строил олигархическое мафиозное государство, которое бы обогащалось само и помогало бы Ельцину удерживаться у власти. Конечно, в то время они не могли отказаться хотя бы он налёта демократии, и поэтому СМИ были хоть и не свободными, но не полностью подконтрольными Кремлю. Грубо говоря, критиковать власть можно было, но все собственники СМИ понимали, что потеря власти Ельциным привело бы и к потери всей доставшейся олигархам собственности, которую они получили фактически бесплатно. Вот эта книга как раз и показывает, почему олигархия и Ельцин были неразрывно связаны и почему поражение одного, с большой долей вероятности, приводило и к падению второго политического актора. Березовский мог воевать с Гусинским и Потаниным, но все они прекрасно знали, что пока в стране отсутствует сильное гражданское общество, пока нет демократии европейского образца, они и их капиталы в безопасности. Как я думаю, именно поэтому им и необходимо было создать иллюзию демократического правления, иллюзию силы общества, но с тем условием, чтобы при этом нужные им решения принимались бы со 100% гарантией. Книга говорит о том, как кучка людей получила в собственность фактически всю страну, т.е. всё богатство страны, но уже сам читатель может понять, что получив такое богатство, они вынуждены были озаботиться тем, чтобы это богатство у них и у их детей и внуков, следующая власть, не смогла бы отобрать. Так и появился проект «Владимир Путин».

“Все предприятия, открывавшиеся то время, преуспевали только в том случае, если имели высокопоставленных покровителей или поддерживали тесные связи с влиятельными людьми, признался Ходорковский в 1991 году. — Важны были не деньги, а покровители. Политическая поддержка в то время была необходима”
<…>
Щекочихин писал, что реальная власть в городе принадлежит не мелким предпринимателям, появившимся после краха коммунизма, и не “криминальным структурам”, воспользовавшимся “хаосом в стране”, а какой-то загадочной “третьей группе”, близкой к городским властям.

Какое небывалое откровение от Ходорковского, не так ли? Об этом я уже, кстати, слышал. Я слышал, что богатыми людьми в стране стали не самые успешные и умные, а люди с самыми лучшими связями, т.е. бывшие партийные работники. В итоге, страной как руководила партнаменклатура так и руководит. Но что мешало партийным работникам в СССР? Невозможность жить на широкую ногу, невозможно спокойно путешествовать по всему миру и невозможность покупать недвижимость на Западе. И вот тут и появился «хороший» коммунист Ельцин, который сломал эти барьеры, при этом оставив всех бывших коммунистов у горнила власти. Потрясающий по циничности ход, нужно признать.

Алексей Юрчак ... описал “последнее советское поколение”, молодых людей, родившихся в 1960-х и 1970- х, и то, как цинично они приспосабливались к требованиям общественной жизни в советскую эпоху, давая пустые обещания и не выполняя их.

Очень точно замечание. Цинизм российской элиты мы отчётливо увидели не только в финансовых кризисах, которые потрясали России в 90-х, но и на примере войны в Чечне, а потом и в Грузии и Украине. Уже Чечня научила их, что большие деньги важнее жизней, как российских солдат, так и жителей Чечни, Грузии и Украины. Удивительно, как же нужно любить деньги, чтобы не увидеть весь тот ужас, что принесла новая Россия в дом чеченцев, грузин и украинцев. Образно говоря, у меня нет вопросов к Путину, ибо другого ждать от чекиста просто странно, ибо он делает всё то, что делали чекисты на всём протяжении существования СССР – затаптывали в грязь простых людей, но я не понимаю какими же нужно быть моральными уродами чтобы выбрать сотрудника одной из самых страшных и жестоких организаций в мире в «наследники/преемники» России.

“Когда я основывал газету — скажу прямо, как есть, — она была ничем иным, как инструментом влияния, — сказал Гусинский. — На сто процентов инструментом влияния на чиновников и на общество. Я создавал газету именно для этой цели.

Вот такая у нас в 90-х была свобода СМИ. Очень условная свобода и независимость, не таки ли? Так что же теперь удивляться, когда все как один журналисты из 90-х начали поливать дерьмом ФБК. Эти журналисты из 90-х набили руку ещё в 90-х, когда, подобно Доренко, мочили неугодных чиновников, бизнесменов и политиков. Удивительно, что Гусинский даже не понимал, что говоря это, он признавался в том, что не было никакой цели в 90-х в создании независимых СМИ. Нужен был рычаг для влияния. Путин этот урок хорошо запомнил и сделал ровно то, чему учил его Гусинский. Сегодня то же самое делает Ходорковский, который взял под своё крыло всех бывших сотрудников «Эха» и прочих журналистов из 90-х. Он наверно тоже надеется вернуться в политику под дружный гул купленных им журналистов. Вот такая демократия, такая вот «свобода» и «независимость» СМИ по-российски. Выборы 1996 и 2000 гг. научили Ходорковского, что, как писал классик, «люди узнают о том, что они думают, по телевизору», т.е. из СМИ. Не зря они постоянно говорили, что в российской оппозиции существует лишь две сильной фигуры – Ходорковский и Навальный. Навального убили, и теперь они будут продвигать Ходорковского как главного и, что важно, единственного оппозиционера. Вот только не получится. И эта книга как раз и говорит, почему это не получится, даже если Ходорковский скупит и ФБК.

На том этапе не имело значения, кому доставалась собственность. Было совершенно не важно, готов ли человек к этому
<…>
Предстояла не просто продажа огромного количество фабрик, шахт, заводов, а дешевая распродажа по бросовым ценам, если сравнивать с другими странами мира. Чубайсу было все равно, для него был важен сам процесс перераспределения.

Трудно сказать, был ли подлецом Чубайс или просто некомпетентным человеком, который на беду России попал во власть. Но ясно одно - это был урок того как нельзя проводить приватизацию. Они же прекрасно знали, что Россия испокон веков жила за счёт природных ресурсов, так зачем их раздали за бесценок? Хотели не допустить прихода коммунистов к власти? Так можно было запретить коммунистическую партию и признать преступной эту идеологию. Можно было, в конце концов, продать собственность тем группам, кто даст больше всего денег. Можно было продать лишь часть собственности. Но выбрали другой путь, создав приближённых к власти группу олигархов. С какой целью? Связать олигархов с ельцинской властью, чтобы олигархи понимали, что если падёт власть Ельцина, они потеряют всё что получили благодаря приватизации. Именно поэтому и была выбрана именно небольшая группа людей, которые и получили все самые ценные активы. Если бы в приватизации участвовали самые широкие слои общества и если бы были допущены иностранцы, то тогда падение Ельцина и его уход от власти не означал бы потерю собственности бенефициаров приватизации, ибо их было бы очень много. Другими словами, им нужна была круговая порука, т.е. нужно было сделать то же самое, что сделал Путин 24 февраля 2022 года, когда замазал всех кровью. Первым такую стратегию применил Ельцин.

Модель олигархического капитализма с центром в Москве быстро распространилась по всем регионам России, где местные магнаты перенимали опыт олигархов. Они брали под свой контроль промышленные предприятия, устанавливали тесные связи с губернаторами и стремились к богатству с той же дерзостью, которая принесла успех московским магнатам.
<…>
Березовский подразумевал претензию олигархов на решающий голос в определении следующего президента России, хотя и не осмелился сказать об этом прямо.
Избиратели? Они сделают так, как им скажут, а скажут им по телевизионным каналам олигархов. Что еще более важно, магнаты хотели прихода к власти такого лидера, который шел бы тем же путем реформ, что и Ельцин, но с учетом их требований; такого, кому они могли бы доверять и кем могли бы управлять. Им нужен был лидер, готовый играть по правилам олигархического капитализма.

Вот она – вертикаль власти. Олигархи скупают самые прибыльные компании и становятся финансовой властью. Кто контролируют финансовые потоки, тот контролирует людей. Убери финансирование от СМИ, политических партий и пр. и эти организации моментально исчезнут. Это правило поняли очень быстро КГБ, которое делало всё возможное, чтобы контролировать всё и вся. Люди не пойдут на митинг, зная, что их уволят. Журналисты не будут писать нелицеприятные статьи, если знают, что их уволят. Путин это очень хорошо уяснил. А теперь представьте, что олигархи действую в альянсе с чиновниками и силовиками, и вы увидите во всей красе блеск диктатуры в РФ и её силу. Вот только создал это явно не Путин, и появилось это задолго до него.

Yes, the author does not openly make any accusations against Yeltsin, but what he writes leaves no doubt about what the so-called liberals and democrats built in the 90s in Russia and why this shaky “democracy” of 1991-1999 collapsed so quickly in the first whiff of Putin. This book shows that there could not have been any other outcome. Yeltsin was not building a European-style democratic state. Yeltsin was building an oligarchic mafia state that would enrich itself and help Yeltsin stay in power. Of course, at that time, they could not give up at least a hint of democracy, and so the media were, although not free, not completely under the control of the Kremlin. Roughly speaking, it was possible to criticize the government, but all media owners understood that the loss of power by Yeltsin would also lead to the loss of all the oligarchs' property, which they received virtually free of charge. This book shows exactly why the oligarchy and Yeltsin were inextricably linked and why the defeat of one was likely to lead to the downfall of the other. Berezovsky could fight with Gusinsky and Potanin, but they all knew perfectly well that as long as there was no strong civil society in the country and as long as there was no European-style democracy, they and their capitals were safe. I think that's why they needed to create the illusion of democratic government, the illusion of the power of society, but with the condition that the decisions they wanted would be made with a 100% guarantee. The book is about how a bunch of people got ownership of the whole country, i.e., all the wealth of the country, but the reader can realize that having received such wealth, they had to make sure that the next government could not take it away from them and their children and grandchildren. This is how the “Vladimir Putin” project came into being.

“All the ventures that were started at this time succeeded only if they were sponsored by or had strong connections with high-ranking people,” Khodorkovsky acknowledged in 1991. “It wasn’t the money but the patronage. At the time, you had to have political sponsorship.”
<…>
Schekochikhin said the real power in the city was reserved not for small businessmen who got started after Communism collapsed nor the “real criminal businesses” that took advantage of “chaos in the country,” but rather a shadowy “third group” close to the city government.

What an unprecedented revelation from Khodorkovsky, isn't it? I've heard that before, by the way. I have heard that it is not the most successful and intelligent people who have become rich in the country but the people with the best connections, i.e., former party workers. As a result, the country is still run by the Party nomenklatura. But what prevented party workers in the USSR? The inability to live large, the inability to travel around the world, and the inability to buy real estate in the West. And then came the “good” communist Yeltsin, who broke down these barriers, while leaving all former communists at the crucible of power. A shockingly cynical move, I must admit.

Alexei Yurchak... has chronicled the “last Soviet generation,” young people born in the 1960s and 1970s, and how they cynically adapted to the demands of public life in the Soviet era—the empty promises—while privately rejecting them.

This is a very accurate observation. We saw the cynicism of the Russian elite not only in the financial crises that shook Russia in the 90s, but also in the war in Chechnya, and then in Georgia and Ukraine. Already Chechnya has taught them that big money is more important than the lives of Russian soldiers and the people of Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine. It is amazing how much you have to love money not to see all the horror that the new Russia has brought to the homes of Chechens, Georgians, and Ukrainians. Figuratively speaking, I have no questions for Putin because it is strange to expect anything else from a Chekist. After all, he does everything that Chekists did throughout the existence of the USSR - trample ordinary people into the dirt. But I do not understand what kind of moral freaks you have to be to choose an employee of one of the most terrible and cruel organizations in the world to be the “heir/ successor” of Russia.

“When I started the newspaper, I will say it directly as it was: it was nothing but an instrument of influence,” Gusinsky said. “One hundred percent—influence over officials and over society. I was creating the newspaper exactly for this aim.”

That's the kind of media freedom we had in the '90s. Very conditional freedom and independence, isn't it? So why should we be surprised now when all the journalists from the 90s start throwing shit at the FBK. These journalists from the 90s had their hands full back in the 90s when, like Dorenko, they attacked officials, businessmen, and politicians. Surprisingly, Gusinsky didn't even realize that in saying this, he was admitting that there was no goal in the 90s to create independent media. What was needed was leverage. Putin remembered this lesson well and did exactly what Gusinsky taught him. Today, Khodorkovsky is doing the same thing, taking under his wing all the former employees of "Ekho" and other journalists from the 90s. He probably also hopes to return to politics amid the friendly roar of the journalists he bought. This is “democracy,” this is “freedom” and “independence” of the media in the Russian way. The elections of 1996 and 2000 taught Khodorkovsky that, as the classic writer wrote, “people learn what they think from television,” i.e., from the media. It was not for nothing that they kept saying that there were only two strong figures in the Russian opposition - Khodorkovsky and Navalny. Navalny was killed, and now they will promote Khodorkovsky as the main and, importantly, the only opposition figure. Except it won't work. And this book tells us exactly why it won't work, even if Khodorkovsky buys up the FBK.

And at that stage, it didn’t matter at all to whom these enterprises went, who was getting the property. It was absolutely unimportant whether that person was ready for it.”
<…>
Not only was the enormous stock of factories, mines, and smelters about to be sold, but judging by any comparison around the rest of the world, it was to be sold dirt cheap. Chubais didn’t care; to him, the important fact was the process of redistribution.

It is hard to say whether Chubais was a scoundrel or just an incompetent person who got into power to Russia's misfortune. But one thing is clear - it was a lesson in how not to carry out privatization. They knew perfectly well that Russia has lived off natural resources for centuries, so why did they give them away for nothing? Did they want to prevent the Communists from coming to power? So they could have banned the Communist Party and criminalized this ideology. It was possible, after all, to sell the property to the groups that would give the most money. It was possible to sell only part of the property. But they chose another way, creating a group of oligarchs close to the government. For what purpose? To tie the oligarchs to Yeltsin's power, so that the oligarchs would understand that if Yeltsin's power fell, they would lose everything they had gained through privatization. That is why a small group of people were chosen to receive all the most valuable assets. If the broadest strata of society had participated in privatization and if foreigners had been allowed in, then Yeltsin's fall and his departure from power would not have meant the loss of property of the beneficiaries of privatization because there would have been so many of them. In other words, they needed a circular bail, i.e., they needed to do the same thing that Putin did on February 24, 2022, when he covered everyone with blood. Yeltsin was the first to use such a strategy.

The model of oligarchic capitalism, centered in Moscow, spread quickly throughout Russia’s regions, as local barons copied what they learned from the tycoons. They grabbed control of factory complexes, glued themselves to regional governors, and sought fortunes with the same audacity that had rewarded the Moscow tycoons.
<…>
What Berezovsky meant, but didn’t dare say directly, was that they wanted a strong hand in determining Russia’s next president. The voters? They would do what they were told, and they would be told on the oligarchs’ television channels. More importantly, the tycoons wanted to install a leader who would broadly continue the same reform path as Yeltsin but would heed their demands, someone they could trust and manipulate. They needed a leader who would play by the rules of oligarchic capitalism.

This is the vertical of power. Oligarchs buy up the most profitable companies and become the financial power. Those who control financial flows control people. Take away funding from the media, political parties, etc., and these organizations will instantly disappear. This rule was realized very quickly by the KGB, which did its best to control anything and everything. People will not go to a rally knowing that they will be fired. Journalists will not write unflattering articles if they know they will be fired. Putin has learned that very well. Now imagine that the oligarchs are acting in alliance with officials and law enforcers, and you will see in all its glory the brilliance of the dictatorship in Russia and its power. Except Putin did not create it, and it appeared long before him.

[Mubeen Irfan · Rating 3 out of 5]

USSR was all but gone when I was a child and when I was able to decipher the conversations around me, Boris Yeltsin was the name that I heard the most. However, there was a very limited interest in Russian politics in Pakistan because the general population felt we have achieved our purpose of dismantling USSR and thus whatever turmoil is happening now in Russia, we can just sit back and let it slide by.

It also did not affect us because we were a pro-American country and looked up to the US for everything, be it pop-culture or politics. Impact of all this was that I knew next to nothing about this huge country undergoing a massive change from communism to capitalism. The only Russia I knew was through Val Kilmer's amazing movie 'The Saint' where I got my flavor of Russian nationalism through the opening lines of a speech where speaker calls to the crowd in a play of words from a Shakespear's play, 'Friends, Countrymen, Russians!' and a deafening roar of the crowd which followed these lines...

A lot of current interest in Russia is due to Putin and the rise of Russian nationalism through his efforts to bring Russia back to the center stage of world politics. But if you want to understand how Putin got where he is right now, you can find clues here in this book. The age of Russian Oligarchs which is roughly the 9-10 years starting from 1991 onwards, brought back that nationalism in their country which was discarded when USSR broke up. This book is a story of those Oligarchs and their grasp of wealth and power in the new Russia. This is an up close of the shock therapy of Chicago school of economists and how it ruined an entire country. A small group of Russians rigged everything in their favor and accumulated unseen wealth amongst themselves. These oligarchs are interesting characters who are sometimes colluding with each other to maximize their gains and other times at each other's throats, again for the same reason: to maximize their gains.

Russian government affairs of 1990s are clouded in secrecy just like the entire history of USSR governance. This makes it very difficult to understand how actually these Oilgarchs accumulated this much wealth (the modalities) and a lot of sources & information is left desired in this book. The author has also acknowledged this fact too. It is a smooth read but I personally found very hard to keep track of all the Russian characters and their names.

[Grump · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting at the beginning but then sort of drags towards the end. Endless descriptions of obscure financial wrangling. Could definitely use an update given Berezovsky's 'open verdict' death and Khodorkovsky's subsequent release from prison. Basically it's the story of six different guys taking advantage of the huge legal and economic grey areas that were Russia during the Yeltsin years. Huge fortunes were made and lost. Some dudes got away with a lot of the country's wealth just by being aggressively shady. The moral is: You should probably never trust a Russian person.

Yury Luzhkov – The mayor of Moscow, did some financial wrangling to get money spent on fancy shit and approve loans and other financial instruments that would make the other guys rich.
Boris Berezovsky – This dude was super pumped, started a car empire then a TV station (which was a big deal because Russia had like two in 90s.) then tried to muscle in on an oil company. Evidently he pissed people off and eventually he had a hit put out on him and was found dead from a suspicious suicide in London. He was butting heads with Roman Abramovich, the guy that owns Chelsea FC. This guy helped bring Putin to power and founded/funded the Unity party.
Anatoly Chubais – Some sort of political operator that pulled strings to allow for privatization and other shit that let people buy up all of the nation’s wealth for copecks on the ruble. I guess a key figure in the governmental transition to a market economy.
Alexander Smolensky – This guy had one of the biggest banks in Russia. When the economy crashed from all the oligarchic fuckery, this guy’s bank screwed a ton of people.
Vladimir Gusinsky – He had a TV channel that helped influence and trick the Russian people into letting some of this fucked up shit happen.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky – This guy started a bank, bought a big oil company for next to nothing then pissed off Putin and got put in the clink. Was the quintessential shady Russian.

[catinca.ciornei · Rating 5 out of 5]

Riveting detailed story about the main Russian oligarchs, retold by a master journalist storyteller. Captivating in many ways - historically, economically, politically; larger than life figures in an unique historical moment, that of the fall of the Soviet Union. Also a great story about really unbridled capitalism, and power of 'fake' news. Interesting read especially given today's major political (USA) and social topics.

[Alex Snyatkov · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well researched and well written history of six Moscow oligarchs, how they came to exorbitant money, power and eventually fell. It was very interesting to learn about what was happening backstage when I watched events of crazy "Democracy and Capitalism Now!" play staged on the streets of Moscow. However, I think this book will look boring for anybody who wasn't present in Russia during 90s.

[AskHistorians]

A very well-written account of the rise of the current Russian inner-circle in the highest echelons of power under Putin in the years during the downfall of the Soviet Union. Starts with short biographies of the 6 main players in this history, and then gives a fascinating detailed account of their accumulation of and fights for power.

[Anya · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very informative book regarding Russia's richest businessmen in modern Russia. A lot to remember, but revealing of what makes the Russian economy including political webs, Soviet values, and big personalities. Impressive journalism.

[Jort · Rating 5 out of 5]

5/5. Best history book I’ve read. If you’re interested in the transition from the communist USSR to capitalist Russia, with a particular interest in the emergence of its oligarchy, this book is perfect.

The book first describes the six people it follows closely, consisting of four soon-to-be oligarchs and two politicians, whose wealth and policies will intricately intertwine.

All oligarchs are cunning, intelligent, shrewd, and ruthless businessmen. Most of them started accumulating small fortunes on the huge black market that emerged in the USSR as a consequence of the constant shortages of goods and foods. Once Gorbachev’s perestroika and Glasnost policies were implemented, these businessmen possessed starting capital to set up innocent small businesses. However, once Yeltsin came to power and slowly transformed Russia into a market economy, these businessmen exploited every loophole in Yeltsin’s policies, all their political connections, and every cunning scheme or investment they could think of.

The oligarchs amassed billions in the most ruthless ways. Bribery and murder were ubiquitous during the privatisation in the Russian Wild West of the 1990s. A notorious deal the oligarchs made with Yeltsin is known as the loans for shares scheme, where the businessmen could basically buy assets of huge state-owned companies for immensely undervalued prices in rigged auctions. Yeltsin set up this scheme to finance his re-election campaign, which was successful, although his second term was not.

Nearing the end of the book, Putin’s rise is documented, as well as his merciless attitude towards the oligarchs. Whereas before the politicians and oligarchs worked together, and the oligarchs had the president under their thumb, Putin switched these roles around, and made clear that he only allows any teamwork if they agree on all his conditions. This eventually gets Khodorkovsky jailed, the former richest man in Russia, after a trail whose fairness was highly dubious. The book ends with Putin in full power, having taken much away from the oligarchs. Many lost their wealth, were locked behind bars or fled the country.

I would’ve liked the book to have covered more of Roman Abramovich, since he plays a major in a loans for shares deal with Berezovsky, one of the covered oligarchs. Abramovich is known for his secrecy and uttermost ruthlessness, making him one of the most interesting oligarchs.

I would have also liked to have a short coverage about Berezovsky’s death in London in 2013, where he lived in exile after he got in trouble with Putin. His death was initially ruled a suicide, but was later recorded an open verdict. Many prominent Russians who criticised Putin fled to and died in London under mysterious circumstances, including Litvinenko. This part of history is outside of the scope treated by the book, but it could have been included in the epilogue.

If you’re into this part of history, this book tells a highly detailed and juicy story. Beware of the book’s density and details, it’s really not a light read.

[Jak60 · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Oligarchs attracted my attention because the period it covered (essentially the decade which transitioned the old Soviet Union to the contemporary Russia) was something I was very interested in and of which I had only a rather superficial knowledge. So The Oligarchs presented itself as the perfect match...
In many ways, it was so, and if in the end it failed it was for excess: excess of information and details, which make the book unnecessarily too long and heavy reading.
In fact I was shocked when, after a few days of avid reading, I realised I was only one third into the book....I had learnt so much in that third that I asked myself what would come in the remainder of the book. Well, that's the problem, what comes after is mainly a mountain of information, details, anecdotes providing supporting evidence to points put forward earlier on and already sufficiently supported. So I confess I started skimming through the chapters, not jumping completely because you can still find some good complementary facts in that plethora of repetitions.
In the end, the last couple of chapters, the books picks up again its pace when it describes the final transition from the crazy 90's of wild capitalism and oligarchs into Putin's Russia.
All in all, I want to give the book credit for being so incredibly instructive (at least for me), and I will punish the lengthiness and wordiness of the central part only with one star less.

[Macka · Rating 4 out of 5]

The depth of knowledge and research in here is amazing. This book dives head long into the post USSR world where businesses were privatised and divided up.
The detail gives me a new appreciation of what people went through both during the cold war and after it, their lack of understanding regarding free enterprise and capital markets and thus how the oligarchs have become what they are.
I think one of the saddest aspects of all though is the light it shines on the uglier aspects of russia, the corruption, the competitive mindset of 'if i dont take this someone else will', and the notion that if one keeps out of the business of the state the state will leave them alone.
The effects of these can be seen up until this day.
A highly recommended book as long as you have even an inkling of interest in the subject.

[Vėjas Galvoje · Rating 5 out of 5]

Stipri knyga, labai detaliai ir aiškiai aprašoma kokia buvo griūvančios sovietų sąjungos situacija, kaip buvę žmonės pasinaudojo esama situacija ir patapo vieni turtingiausių žmonių Pasaulyje. Kokie buvo naudojami metodai, čia jau visai kitas klausimas. Kai gyvenai tame laikotarpyje, kai atsimeni "perestrojkos" laidas televizijoje, kai pameni nemažai elementų, kuriuos matiai kiekvieną miela dieną, darosi bauginančiai graudu.

Manau labai panašiais metodais buvo turtėjama ir Lietuvoje, tačiau kai mes neturime tokių išteklių, resursų, tai ir mūsiškiai oligarchai ne tokie galingi, kaip buvo/yra Rusijoje.

Tačiau visi pinigai staiga pasidaro labai nuliniai, kai ateina į valdžią KGB pilietis ir pradeda diktatą...

Labai smagiai susiskaitė ir tikrai viena geriausių knygų šia tema.

[Patryk · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very informative look at the economic transformation from communism to a rigged "free market" in 90s Russia under Boris Yeltsin, at least for me who has not read anything about that period. It was however inconsistent in depth at times, glossing over how certain developments took place while getting into the minutes of other ultimately standard meetings. Putin comes in at the end and, although his rise to power of course warrants its own book, he appears essentially as a deus ex machina. Additionally, though appropriately covering the backroom deals of certain then-prominent oligarchs, the book only mentions ordinary Russians' lives near the beginning and once more later, rather than effectively contrasting life "on the ground" with the exorbitance of the oligarchy.

[Albertas Agejevas · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book explains very clearly and vividly the problems of the Soviet economy in the 80's, what whas being done in the late 80's to address them, what consequences it had, and how, decision by decision, the current political-economical system of the Russian Federation was formed. Parts of it read like an engaging thriller. The sequence of events sometimes even feels too logical, I would not expect that much cohesion and so little randomness in the real life.

I've lived through perestroika and the downfall of the Soviet Union, I've witnessed the events described in this book in the Russian media. This book put all that into an overarching story.

[Dana Aldee · Rating 5 out of 5]

After reading the DOJ’s Report on the investigation into Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election, I was baffled with the amount of influence Russian Oligarchs had on American businessmen. I further questioned the direct connections these oligarchs had to the kremlin.

So, naturally, I wanted to understand how the Russian system operated, when business-savvy oligarchs got their start, and how Putin was in charge of calling all the shots. This book gave me the kind of information I needed to better understand the early years of Wealth accumulation in post-soviet Russia.

——————-

[Aliaksei Mukhachou · Rating 5 out of 5]

Loved it. As a post-soviet child myself, I really value the semi-outsider view you get from americans, like Hoffman, describing in neutral, matter-of-fact fashion the events that shaped my life, even if I was just a child back then. It's a very similar experience to Kotkin's Stalin series. Hoffman's writing may not be to the same aesthetic quality as Kotkin's, admittedly. Yet, it's about very recent events and brings together many first-hand accounts from their participants. And it's devoid of the emotional vitriol and bias you find in any book written by Russians, thankfully. It's 'clean' yet captivating. A good guide to how many fortunes are built.. In Russia or anywhere really..

[Brendan James · Rating 4 out of 5]

Rich story of the huge pieces of shit that bought and sold Russia after the Soviet collapse. The author's persistent wish that Russia had instead gotten the "good" version of capitalism is puzzling given how his own story reveals this to have been a total illusion. Still, well-reported and worth reading for a look at how to destroy a country in under ten years, with understated but clear evidence of US meddling in Russia's affairs.

[Nic Rad · Rating 4 out of 5]

A whirlwind of a book that goes through the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union (and touches on the beginning of Putin’s rise) - well researched and written to understand the mentality and foundation of the pseudo-democratic and pseudo-capitalist system that exists today.

It is odd to read this, understanding that nearly all the main characters/figures of the book are now either exiled or dead.

[NCHS Library]

From the Publisher
In this saga of brilliant triumphs and magnificent failures, David E. Hoffman, the former Moscow bureau chief for the Washington Post, sheds light on the hidden lives of Russia's most feared power brokers: the oligarchs. Focusing on six of these ruthless men-- Alexander Smolensky, Yuri Luzhkov, Anatoly Chubais, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Boris Berezovsky, and Vladimir Gusinsky--Hoffman shows how a rapacious, unruly capitalism was born out of the ashes of Soviet communism.

[George Nalbandian · Rating 5 out of 5]

I started this book for a class a while ago and only recently finished it. It's one of the most comprehensive studies of a very unique, complex, and understudied time period in world history. If you are remotely interested in the story of the reprivatization of the Russian economy, this is a great book to read. However, it can be a bit dense.