[Disclaimer: This is a snapshot of my thoughts on this book after just reading it. This is not meant to serve as a summary of main/supporting points or a critique – only as some words on how I engaged with this book for the purposes of building a theoretical framework on strategy.]
-- Assigned chapters 3, 4, and 6 for School of Advanced Air & Space Studies curriculum --
Keohane presents an alternative to the requirement for a hegemon as the foundation for cooperation between states – international regime(s). While he recognizes that a hegemon may be required as part of the initial construction of an international regime, he does not believe a hegemon is required once the regime is in place and has established parameters for cooperation between states. Throughout the three assigned chapters, the author builds an argument for what a hegemon ought to be, how self-interest can actually fuel cooperation, and how an international regime (or set of regimes) can maximize gains for all states who subordinate themselves to the established regime(s).
The author offers that a hegemon must have the permission of other states to remain such. While military power is an essential requirement of a hegemon, it also needs the tacit acceptance by other states to maintain its status. Having a hegemon may “contribute to order in world politics…but it is not a sufficient condition and there is little reason to believe that it is necessary” (46). While the author looks at the two examples of the US and the UK, he does not adequately defend his proposition. This defense is crucial to the rest of his argument; otherwise, his argument would have been solely focused on the benefits of international regimes. This would have been a great contribution on its own without trying to discount the need for a hegemon at the foundation of the international structure.
Chapter 4 presents the idea of cooperation, where “intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination” (51-52). States can still operate within the concept of realism, with self-interest as its primary motivator, within the context of cooperation. Cooperation may in fact help a state gain more from the international system than trying to acquire gain on its own. Perhaps cooperation is a more positive term for what otherwise might fall into coercion – the latent power of the hegemon acting as a shadow over diplomacy. There is no way to test this theory without first removing the hegemon from the equation. Structure may very well require a supporting authority, as realists might argue.
Regimes are made up of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, defined by the author on pages 57-59. The implementation of a regime requires the acceptance of states, and will maximize gains through its use. The errors in this idea lie in the assumption of valuation – all states do not see the world equally, nor do they see loss/gain equally. What may be gain for one state may be valued as a loss by another – unless gain is purely material. The author explains asymmetric information away by suggesting that diplomacy and the intermediary effects of the regime would build trust between self-interested states. I tend to be pessimistic about this proposal. Nevertheless, I am willing to accept that regimes may make transactions more trustworthy than they otherwise might be, build a history of predictability between states, and allow for the mitigation of corruption and deceit. However, this would be with a hegemon at the foundation of such an order.