What do you think?
Rate this book
THE FORERUNNER OF ALL THINGS: Buddhaghosa On Mind, Intention, And Agency
Scholars have long been intrigued by the Buddha's defining action (karma) as intention. This book explores systematically how intention and agency were interpreted in all genres of early Theravada thought. It offers a philosophical exploration of intention and motivation as they are investigated in Buddhist moral psychology. At stake is how we understand karma, the nature of moral experience, and the possibilities for freedom.
In contrast to many studies that assimilate Buddhist moral thinking to Western theories of ethics, the book attends to distinctively Buddhist ways of systematizing and theorizing their own categories. Arguing that meaning is a product of the explanatory systems used to explore it, the book pays particular attention to genre and to the 5th-century commentator Buddhaghosa's guidance on how to read Buddhist texts. The book treats all branches of the Pali canon (the Tipitaka, that is, the Suttas, the Abhidhamma, and the Vinaya), as well as narrative sources (the Dhammapada and the Jataka commentaries). In this sense it offers a comprehensive treatment of intention in the canonical Theravada sources. But the book goes further than this by focusing explicitly on the body of commentarial thought represented by Buddhaghosa. His work is at the center of the book's investigations, both insofar as he offers interpretative strategies for reading canonical texts, but also as he advances
particular understandings of agency and moral psychology. The book offers the first book-length study devoted to Buddhaghosa's thought on ethics
In contrast to many studies that assimilate Buddhist moral thinking to Western theories of ethics, the book attends to distinctively Buddhist ways of systematizing and theorizing their own categories. Arguing that meaning is a product of the explanatory systems used to explore it, the book pays particular attention to genre and to the 5th-century commentator Buddhaghosa's guidance on how to read Buddhist texts. The book treats all branches of the Pali canon (the Tipitaka, that is, the Suttas, the Abhidhamma, and the Vinaya), as well as narrative sources (the Dhammapada and the Jataka commentaries). In this sense it offers a comprehensive treatment of intention in the canonical Theravada sources. But the book goes further than this by focusing explicitly on the body of commentarial thought represented by Buddhaghosa. His work is at the center of the book's investigations, both insofar as he offers interpretative strategies for reading canonical texts, but also as he advances
particular understandings of agency and moral psychology. The book offers the first book-length study devoted to Buddhaghosa's thought on ethics
- GenresBuddhismPhilosophy
272 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2013
3 people are currently reading
44 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
April 27, 2015
Not for beginner, great for practitioners and scholars interested in the mechanism of cetana-karma in shaping our experience.
Cetana (intention) and karma are one entity that always go together according to Theravadin interpretation. Karma is one of the cornerstones of understanding Buddhist teaching, and yet often misunderstood when interpreted through Western philosophical tradition; free will versus determinism. The pair cetana and karma is neither full autonomy nor fatalism. The author uses both Pali Canon and the Commentaries - mostly Buddhagosa - to explain how cetana and karma, intention and action, orchestrate the reality of human experience.
Cetana (intention) and karma are one entity that always go together according to Theravadin interpretation. Karma is one of the cornerstones of understanding Buddhist teaching, and yet often misunderstood when interpreted through Western philosophical tradition; free will versus determinism. The pair cetana and karma is neither full autonomy nor fatalism. The author uses both Pali Canon and the Commentaries - mostly Buddhagosa - to explain how cetana and karma, intention and action, orchestrate the reality of human experience.
June 16, 2019
Our commonsense and philosophical ideas about the nature of action, intentionality, and morality depend on a particular folk psychology: that an individual has an autonomous will; that experience is composed of representations of the world, which relate to the world in a correspondence relation; that reason and emotion are separable; that action is to be explained by beliefs and desires. Each of these folk psychological assumptions, however, has faced major philosophical problems, as well as challenges from empirical sciences of mind. It is a good idea to question these assumptions, and this requires us to rethink the fundamentals of action, intentionality, and morality.
It is very difficult to begin such a revisional project. These assumptions are deeply entrenched in Western cultures and thinking. So it is a delight to read Heim's book. Buddhist philosophical traditions are founded on a radically different set of fundamental metaphysical assumptions (they challenge every assumption I've listed above!). This leads to differences across all philosophical topics, as well as in folk psychology (see this wonder introductory
book for understanding such differences).
Starting from this basis, the Theravada thinker Buddhaghosa provides an account of the nature of intentionality and action that is rigorous, technical, and startlingly unlike that which we find in Western thought. Intentionality (translated from cetanā) is understood as the ways we construct the world that serves as the backdrop to all conscious experience and thought. This construction process is highly constrained by our history and future; by our previous lives and our intersubjective relationships. It is this very construction process that is defined as action; this is very different than the Western conception of action as purposive bodily movement.
Buddhaghosa also provides ways of thinking about morality, which follow from this understanding of intentionality. Because intentionality is governed by such a indecipherable, complex set of past and future conditions, and of intersubjective and distributed conditions -- it is very difficult to draw a moral evaluation of any action. It is impossible to do so if we simply look to the immediately preceding beliefs and desires of the agent, or the discernible consequences of the action.
Rather, we should try to think of the action as situated in network of interrelations between people and things, across a vast time scale. Moral evaluations should be done for the sake of preserving important social institutions or traditions; for enabling the agent's future developmental possibilities; for promoting harmonious social relations. Whenever we ascribe a moral judgment, we should also engage in a sort of hermeneutical evaluation; we should inquire about our biases, social role, and relations to the agent, and perhaps change our judgment accordingly.
Heim presents all of this in an very clear and well-organized manner. I have barely studied Buddhist philosophy before, and this did not hinder my understanding. Although at times I felt that she went into quite a lot of details of the Buddhist texts involved, Heim always contextualizes any seemingly obscure detail under the broader philosophical point made. Heim also draws implications from these broader points for Western thought on the relevant topics; such comparisons are genuinely thought-provoking. The book is also full of useful citations for getting deeper into the topics involved.
I would recommend it to anyone interested in action theory and metaethics, regardless of whether they think they have an interest in non-Western philosophies.
It is very difficult to begin such a revisional project. These assumptions are deeply entrenched in Western cultures and thinking. So it is a delight to read Heim's book. Buddhist philosophical traditions are founded on a radically different set of fundamental metaphysical assumptions (they challenge every assumption I've listed above!). This leads to differences across all philosophical topics, as well as in folk psychology (see this wonder introductory
book for understanding such differences).
Starting from this basis, the Theravada thinker Buddhaghosa provides an account of the nature of intentionality and action that is rigorous, technical, and startlingly unlike that which we find in Western thought. Intentionality (translated from cetanā) is understood as the ways we construct the world that serves as the backdrop to all conscious experience and thought. This construction process is highly constrained by our history and future; by our previous lives and our intersubjective relationships. It is this very construction process that is defined as action; this is very different than the Western conception of action as purposive bodily movement.
Buddhaghosa also provides ways of thinking about morality, which follow from this understanding of intentionality. Because intentionality is governed by such a indecipherable, complex set of past and future conditions, and of intersubjective and distributed conditions -- it is very difficult to draw a moral evaluation of any action. It is impossible to do so if we simply look to the immediately preceding beliefs and desires of the agent, or the discernible consequences of the action.
Rather, we should try to think of the action as situated in network of interrelations between people and things, across a vast time scale. Moral evaluations should be done for the sake of preserving important social institutions or traditions; for enabling the agent's future developmental possibilities; for promoting harmonious social relations. Whenever we ascribe a moral judgment, we should also engage in a sort of hermeneutical evaluation; we should inquire about our biases, social role, and relations to the agent, and perhaps change our judgment accordingly.
Heim presents all of this in an very clear and well-organized manner. I have barely studied Buddhist philosophy before, and this did not hinder my understanding. Although at times I felt that she went into quite a lot of details of the Buddhist texts involved, Heim always contextualizes any seemingly obscure detail under the broader philosophical point made. Heim also draws implications from these broader points for Western thought on the relevant topics; such comparisons are genuinely thought-provoking. The book is also full of useful citations for getting deeper into the topics involved.
I would recommend it to anyone interested in action theory and metaethics, regardless of whether they think they have an interest in non-Western philosophies.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews