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New Cold War History
Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991
During the final fifteen years of the Cold War, southern Africa underwent a period of upheaval, with dramatic twists and turns in relations between the superpowers. Americans, Cubans, Soviets, and Africans fought over the future of Angola, where tens of thousands of Cuban soldiers were stationed, and over the decolonization of Namibia, Africa's last colony. Beyond lay the great South Africa. Piero Gleijeses uses archival sources, particularly from the United States, South Africa, and the closed Cuban archives, to provide an unprecedented international history of this important theater of the late Cold War.
These sources all point to one by humiliating the United States and defying the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro changed the course of history in southern Africa. It was Cuba's victory in Angola in 1988 that forced Pretoria to set Namibia free and helped break the back of apartheid South Africa. In the words of Nelson Mandela, the Cubans "destroyed the myth of the invincibility of the white oppressor . . . [and] inspired the fighting masses of South Africa."
These sources all point to one by humiliating the United States and defying the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro changed the course of history in southern Africa. It was Cuba's victory in Angola in 1988 that forced Pretoria to set Namibia free and helped break the back of apartheid South Africa. In the words of Nelson Mandela, the Cubans "destroyed the myth of the invincibility of the white oppressor . . . [and] inspired the fighting masses of South Africa."
655 pages, Hardcover
First published November 1, 2003
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December 4, 2020
The historian Nancy Mitchell once observed, regarding US relations to Cuba that “Our selective recall not only serves a purpose, it has repercussions. It creates a chasm between us and the Cubans we share a past, but we have no shared memories.” Mitchell is quoted in Piero Gleijeses’s masterpiece Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa 1976-1991. Her observation is quite accurate: for many Americans Cuba and its role in the world has been defined by the anti-Castro community in Miami, Florida, leaving little room or consideration for events or policies that did not fit squarely with this perception. The US and Cuba, although only 90 miles away from each other remain estranged in our historical and cultural memory. Two tenets drive most Americans’ view of Cuba: 1) the government is Communist and is hostile to the world and its own people (this perception is driven by the Miami Cuban exile community and Cold War historical inertia; 2) Cuba invades other countries (such as Angola)—this assessment is informed by the lack of information many Americans have regarding Cuba’s internationalist activities. This book offers a thorough review of the events that began in the 1970s and ended in 1991 and provides a very clear view of how southern Africa became another stage for Cold War politics.
With any scholarly book that is of significant length (this book is over 650 pages long) I had some concern that the central thesis might be lost in the jumble of names, policies, concepts, battles, etc. This was not the case here. Gleijeses did a superb job researching this book (over 10 years), sifting through materials in archives, conducting interviews with participants and examining other primary sources in over 20 different countries. You could not be more thorough. Gleijeses deftly funnels the vast reams of information into a very easy-to-read narrative that is not overwhelming with names, dates, etc. Too often, historians fall into the trap of name-dropping, that is, peppering their text with so many names that the reader loses track of who is who, who did what, etc. Gleijeses has an excellent command of his information and expertly controls the pacing of the appearances of so many individuals in this text. With other books, I have often had to go to the index frequently to remember a name, title or some other important attribute of someone who appears in the text because of the plethora of names that emerge as the narrative continues. This did not happen here. Only a few times, did I have to go to the index to remember who someone was. This is a testament to Gleijeses’s skill as a historian and a writer. Years ago, someone disdainfully said to me that “all historians do is remember dates.” I wish I could show him this book so that he could see that what historians do, especially one at the top of his game like Gleijeses, really do.
My knowledge of Cuba’s role in southern Africa was minimal. I only knew about its involvement in Angola because I have lived in Cuba for the last four years. This book was extremely educational for me. The narrative is excellent, and the information is presented in a very simple yet informative style. I love how history repeats itself and I enjoyed this quote from George Ball, former under secretary of state: “Myths are made to solace those who find reality distasteful and, if some find such fantasy comforting, so be it.” (p. 29). This reminds me of a certain individual in Washington, D.C...
What did I take from this book? One, that for all the talk about how President Jimmy Carter truly wanted to normalize relations with Cubans, his actions spoke otherwise. Gleijeses explains that “Carter then called both Castro and Rodríguez liars, telling members of Congress that the evidence of Cuban complicity had been collected over a “long time” and came from “many…top-sensitive sources.” Gleijeses adds that the then Policy Planning Director Anthony Lake observed afterwards, regarding Carter’s efforts to unfairly discredit Cuba, that “I thought we were hyping a crisis that should not have been hyped—unless you had reliable intelligence.”
Second, South Africa’s efforts to manufacture and control consensus in South Africa as part of its plan for a Constellation of Southern African States, led it to become very aggressive in its approach to Angola, the MPLA and the FAPLA (if you want to know the meaning of these acronyms, read the book!).
Third, that despite its role in successfully defending Angola from insurgent (UNITA) and South African aggression, Cuba finds itself having to deflect unfair criticism. One moment in particular stayed in my mind. Defending the presence of Cuban troops in Angola in the 1970s, Fidel Castro exclaimed, “Our soldiers are internationalists; they are not mercenaries.” (p. 79). He reiterated this point later by saying that “Internationalism is the duty to help others.” (p. 82). Of course, this depends on how a country is “helping” another country. For the US, which was supporting the UNITA insurgents in Angola and South Africa, which regularly ordered military incursions into that country, Cuban internationalism was viewed as a form of “imperialism.” But this was a convenient interpretation since it was really the US and South Africa that had less than noble intentions in their approach to Angola.
Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, played a pivotal role in negotiations with the Soviet Union, Cuba, Angola and South Africa. I am glad that Gleijeses portrayed his role in such an important light. As I write this review, I noticed that a Ryan C. Crocker, co-wrote an op Op-Ed piece in the New York Times today titled “Dismantling the Foreign Service”. I could not determine if he is related to Chester Crocker, but his warning against the current administration’s approach to the State Department is timely and important.
Gleijeses’s book is magisterial in its breadth and attention to detail. But more importantly, it provides valuable information on an area of Cold War history that many people are unfamiliar with.
With any scholarly book that is of significant length (this book is over 650 pages long) I had some concern that the central thesis might be lost in the jumble of names, policies, concepts, battles, etc. This was not the case here. Gleijeses did a superb job researching this book (over 10 years), sifting through materials in archives, conducting interviews with participants and examining other primary sources in over 20 different countries. You could not be more thorough. Gleijeses deftly funnels the vast reams of information into a very easy-to-read narrative that is not overwhelming with names, dates, etc. Too often, historians fall into the trap of name-dropping, that is, peppering their text with so many names that the reader loses track of who is who, who did what, etc. Gleijeses has an excellent command of his information and expertly controls the pacing of the appearances of so many individuals in this text. With other books, I have often had to go to the index frequently to remember a name, title or some other important attribute of someone who appears in the text because of the plethora of names that emerge as the narrative continues. This did not happen here. Only a few times, did I have to go to the index to remember who someone was. This is a testament to Gleijeses’s skill as a historian and a writer. Years ago, someone disdainfully said to me that “all historians do is remember dates.” I wish I could show him this book so that he could see that what historians do, especially one at the top of his game like Gleijeses, really do.
My knowledge of Cuba’s role in southern Africa was minimal. I only knew about its involvement in Angola because I have lived in Cuba for the last four years. This book was extremely educational for me. The narrative is excellent, and the information is presented in a very simple yet informative style. I love how history repeats itself and I enjoyed this quote from George Ball, former under secretary of state: “Myths are made to solace those who find reality distasteful and, if some find such fantasy comforting, so be it.” (p. 29). This reminds me of a certain individual in Washington, D.C...
What did I take from this book? One, that for all the talk about how President Jimmy Carter truly wanted to normalize relations with Cubans, his actions spoke otherwise. Gleijeses explains that “Carter then called both Castro and Rodríguez liars, telling members of Congress that the evidence of Cuban complicity had been collected over a “long time” and came from “many…top-sensitive sources.” Gleijeses adds that the then Policy Planning Director Anthony Lake observed afterwards, regarding Carter’s efforts to unfairly discredit Cuba, that “I thought we were hyping a crisis that should not have been hyped—unless you had reliable intelligence.”
Second, South Africa’s efforts to manufacture and control consensus in South Africa as part of its plan for a Constellation of Southern African States, led it to become very aggressive in its approach to Angola, the MPLA and the FAPLA (if you want to know the meaning of these acronyms, read the book!).
Third, that despite its role in successfully defending Angola from insurgent (UNITA) and South African aggression, Cuba finds itself having to deflect unfair criticism. One moment in particular stayed in my mind. Defending the presence of Cuban troops in Angola in the 1970s, Fidel Castro exclaimed, “Our soldiers are internationalists; they are not mercenaries.” (p. 79). He reiterated this point later by saying that “Internationalism is the duty to help others.” (p. 82). Of course, this depends on how a country is “helping” another country. For the US, which was supporting the UNITA insurgents in Angola and South Africa, which regularly ordered military incursions into that country, Cuban internationalism was viewed as a form of “imperialism.” But this was a convenient interpretation since it was really the US and South Africa that had less than noble intentions in their approach to Angola.
Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, played a pivotal role in negotiations with the Soviet Union, Cuba, Angola and South Africa. I am glad that Gleijeses portrayed his role in such an important light. As I write this review, I noticed that a Ryan C. Crocker, co-wrote an op Op-Ed piece in the New York Times today titled “Dismantling the Foreign Service”. I could not determine if he is related to Chester Crocker, but his warning against the current administration’s approach to the State Department is timely and important.
Gleijeses’s book is magisterial in its breadth and attention to detail. But more importantly, it provides valuable information on an area of Cold War history that many people are unfamiliar with.
February 11, 2025
This is the second volume of Gleijeses' history of Cuban involvement in African liberation movements. Based on Cuban archives that only a handful of researchers have access to Gleijeses tells a very well researched and highly readable account on the liberation of Angola and how it helped bring down the Apartheid regime in South Africa. It is also important in that it avoids classical US-USSR-centric narratives of the end of the Cold War.
I found the following anecdote funny and hearthening: In 1979, US Secretary of State Brzezinski's advisor Pastor wrote a report on Cuba and said: "(1) Cuba causes us terrible problems; (2) Cuba is a little country, and we are a super power; and (3) we have almost no leverage or influence over the Cubans." The book shows how little influence the USSR had on Cubans too. Cuban foreign policy in 1970s and 1980s is the proof that even a small country with a population of 10 million could play a global role in countering imperialism and inspiring revolutionary fervour among millions, provided that it bases its policy of alliances on Marxist-Leninist principles.
I found the following anecdote funny and hearthening: In 1979, US Secretary of State Brzezinski's advisor Pastor wrote a report on Cuba and said: "(1) Cuba causes us terrible problems; (2) Cuba is a little country, and we are a super power; and (3) we have almost no leverage or influence over the Cubans." The book shows how little influence the USSR had on Cubans too. Cuban foreign policy in 1970s and 1980s is the proof that even a small country with a population of 10 million could play a global role in countering imperialism and inspiring revolutionary fervour among millions, provided that it bases its policy of alliances on Marxist-Leninist principles.
July 31, 2021
Impeccably researched and very well-written, this, the first international history of the conflict in Southern Africa based on archival sources, reveals much about Cuba’s commitment to the fight against Apartheid South Africa.
It also reveals much about the Soviet Union’s timidity, although because they supplied weapons, they had a greater influence on Angolan military strategy than the Cubans who provided troops, military advisors, and medical personnel all at great cost to Cuba. The USSR’s weakening military capacity is made clear in a December 1982 meeting between Raul Castro and Yuri Andropov where Andropov confirmed that the USSR would not come to Cuba’s aid if it were attacked by the USA.
Raul comments: “Even though we had known for a long time that the Soviet Union would not go to war for Cuba and we could count only on ourselves for our own defense, it was precisely at this moment of greatest danger that the Soviet leaders told us we would be dramatically alone” (218).
There are a lot of LOL moments over the impossible size of American bureaucracy; my favorite example being the discovery, in the 1960s, by US intelligence of a USSR combat brigade operating in Cuba. This information was somehow forgotten until US intelligence rediscovered the brigade in 1979.
An aspect of the book I found interesting was the ways in which the Reagan Administration took different approaches to interpreting the Reagan Doctrine:
1)True Reaganites believed that the US should support any insurgent movement that fought against a communist regime;
2) pragmatists within the State Department, however, believed that the US could tolerate a self-styled Marxist-Leninist regime in Africa (281), i.e., Mozambique — the carrot being a more effective weapon than the stick. George Schultz, whose close relationship with Reagan made him a formidable figure, led the opposition to the true Reaganites. The mainstream GOP was in this camp.
This infighting allowed the vile South African apartheid regime limited freedom of action but the commitment of the Cuban forces to defend Angola from foreign invasion was a barrier to their dominance of Southern Africa that could not be overcome:
“It was not Gorbachev’s new policy or the presidential elections in the United States, it was not constructive engagement nor linkage, that overcame South Africa’s resistance. It was, rather, forces that [Charlie] Crocker and the Reagan administration abhorred: black militants in South Africa waving the flag of the ANC, the threat of sanctions, and Fidel Castro” (508).
I came away from the book very impressed by the Castros’ commitment to the anti-apartheid struggle and Cuban solidarity with the liberation movements in Southern Africa. The significance of this is made clear throughout the book:
“[Africa] is in debt to Cuba. When I say Africa I don’t mean just Angola but Africa as a whole. Had it not been for Cuba’s timely help in 1975, Angola would have been occupied by South Africa, and Savimbi would have come to power, and this would have changed the course of the liberation struggle in our continent.” — President Nyerere of Tanzania (189).
Highly recommended reading for anyone wanting to learn more about Cold War battlefronts in the last quarter of the 20th century, and about the liberation struggles of post colonial Southern Africa and Cuba’s solidarity with this struggle.
It also reveals much about the Soviet Union’s timidity, although because they supplied weapons, they had a greater influence on Angolan military strategy than the Cubans who provided troops, military advisors, and medical personnel all at great cost to Cuba. The USSR’s weakening military capacity is made clear in a December 1982 meeting between Raul Castro and Yuri Andropov where Andropov confirmed that the USSR would not come to Cuba’s aid if it were attacked by the USA.
Raul comments: “Even though we had known for a long time that the Soviet Union would not go to war for Cuba and we could count only on ourselves for our own defense, it was precisely at this moment of greatest danger that the Soviet leaders told us we would be dramatically alone” (218).
There are a lot of LOL moments over the impossible size of American bureaucracy; my favorite example being the discovery, in the 1960s, by US intelligence of a USSR combat brigade operating in Cuba. This information was somehow forgotten until US intelligence rediscovered the brigade in 1979.
An aspect of the book I found interesting was the ways in which the Reagan Administration took different approaches to interpreting the Reagan Doctrine:
1)True Reaganites believed that the US should support any insurgent movement that fought against a communist regime;
2) pragmatists within the State Department, however, believed that the US could tolerate a self-styled Marxist-Leninist regime in Africa (281), i.e., Mozambique — the carrot being a more effective weapon than the stick. George Schultz, whose close relationship with Reagan made him a formidable figure, led the opposition to the true Reaganites. The mainstream GOP was in this camp.
This infighting allowed the vile South African apartheid regime limited freedom of action but the commitment of the Cuban forces to defend Angola from foreign invasion was a barrier to their dominance of Southern Africa that could not be overcome:
“It was not Gorbachev’s new policy or the presidential elections in the United States, it was not constructive engagement nor linkage, that overcame South Africa’s resistance. It was, rather, forces that [Charlie] Crocker and the Reagan administration abhorred: black militants in South Africa waving the flag of the ANC, the threat of sanctions, and Fidel Castro” (508).
I came away from the book very impressed by the Castros’ commitment to the anti-apartheid struggle and Cuban solidarity with the liberation movements in Southern Africa. The significance of this is made clear throughout the book:
“[Africa] is in debt to Cuba. When I say Africa I don’t mean just Angola but Africa as a whole. Had it not been for Cuba’s timely help in 1975, Angola would have been occupied by South Africa, and Savimbi would have come to power, and this would have changed the course of the liberation struggle in our continent.” — President Nyerere of Tanzania (189).
Highly recommended reading for anyone wanting to learn more about Cold War battlefronts in the last quarter of the 20th century, and about the liberation struggles of post colonial Southern Africa and Cuba’s solidarity with this struggle.
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March 20, 2023Angola didn't deserve Cuba, Cuba didn't deserve the Soviet Union, and we didn't deserve the Soviet Union.
April 17, 2023
At the beginning of 1974, just before the Carnation Revolution toppled Portugal’s dictatorship and opened the way for the independence of its African colonies, the southern end of the African continent was dominated by the apartheid regime in Pretoria, its clients, and its foreign benefactors. On South Africa’s frontiers were a friendly—if unrecognized—white-ruled Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe); a de facto colony in South West Africa (now Namibia), which it originally governed under a League of Nations mandate but continued to occupy after the International Court of Justice declared the occupation illegal in 1971 and a UN Security Council resolution called for its withdrawal; and congenial Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique. Though minority rule was unstable by nature and Pretoria faced serious challenges from popular resistance movements—the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, and the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)—South Africa was the dominant military power in the region, and it effectively projected an aura of invincibility.
Furthermore, it could secure American compliance—if not direct patronage—and protect itself from serious international censure by positioning itself as a bulwark against the spread of communism, stemming the tide of the Cuban and Soviet-backed liberation movements. When Angola descended into civil war upon the end of Portuguese rule in 1975, and it became clear that the left-wing and avowedly anti-apartheid MPLA had the upper hand over the ideologically-ambiguous National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), it was with the approval of the Ford administration that the South African army invaded the country from Namibia in support of UNITA and its leader, the savvy and charismatic Jonas Savimbi. The MPLA was little match for the SADF, and the latter might have advanced all the way to Luanda and imposed its will on Angola had it not been for one of the most astonishing geopolitical events of the century: the rapid influx, just after the South African invasion, of 35,000 Cuban soldiers in defense of the MPLA and Angolan sovereignty.
Never before or since has such a comparatively small and impoverished nation taken on such a bold foreign initiative, nor achieved such success in reshaping the international order. A Caribbean island under the nose of a hostile superpower, the Cubans endured a U.S. embargo and faced perpetual threats of blockade and invasion. Indeed, Reagan spoke openly about the possibility of a total naval blockade of the island during his presidential campaign, and the administration seriously considered military action against Cuba as a response to a prospective Soviet intervention in Poland to suppress the Solidarity movement. Though formally aligned with Moscow, the Cubans understood that they could not rely on foreign assistance and would likely be left to fend for themselves in the event of direct hostilities with the United States. Cuban adventurism not only enraged Washington; it also confounded the Soviet Union, which feared that the United States would view the Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia (1977-78) as Soviet proxies, and that their presence would undermine détente. They were correct on both counts.
The intervention becomes even more remarkable when one considers that Cuba had practically nothing material to gain from it, and everything to lose. It received no real compensation from the MPLA; the Cubans even paid most of the expenses of stationing thousands of troops and tens of thousands of aid workers in Angola for fifteen years. The decision to intervene was made at a time when Cuban-U.S. relations were improving, and Washington was enticing Havana with the prospect of an eventual end to the embargo. The Angolan and Ethiopian expeditions were motivated exclusively by a genuine spirit of socialist and anti-colonialist solidarity. Fidel Castro spoke truthfully when he said, “Our soldiers are internationalists; they are not mercenaries.” As a communist country with a mixture of Latin American and African influences, Cuba believed that it had a unique vocation to assist the global south in its quest for liberation: a cause for which it was far more naturally suited than the European socialist states. The United States claimed that the Cubans were unwilling proxies pressed into the service of Soviet imperialism, but in reality Cuba’s actions were taken unilaterally and in the service of popular sovereignty and national self-determination, while the South Africans and their American supporters had far more “imperialistic” designs.
The Cuban troops managed to beat back the SADF, forcing it completely out of Angola by 1976. It was South Africa’s first major military defeat, demoralizing the apartheid government, emboldening the liberation movements, and turning Angola into a base of operations for SWAPO and the ANC. From 1975 to 1988, southern Africa became an increasingly active theater of the Cold War, with Cuban and Soviet support for the MPLA, accelerating South African and American aid for UNITA, and periodic South African assaults on SWAPO bases in southern Angola.
The Carter administration came into office denouncing apartheid and pledging to make human rights advocacy a central component of its foreign policy, but was constrained in southern Africa by its inability to separate regional conflicts from the demise of détente and the growing public perception that the West was sitting on its hands while international communism was on the march. The administration provided indirect aid to UNITA (skirting the Clark Amendment by working through third parties in a manner analogous to the Reagan administration’s conduct in the Iran-Contra Affair), and facilitated interventions of Moroccan, French, and Belgian troops in Zaire (DRC) during tribal conflicts over the latter’s Shaba region. It was in large part the presence of Cuban troops in Angola (as well as a false belief that the Cubans were behind the Shaba conflicts) that precluded Carter from granting recognition to the MPLA.
The Reagan administration continued and increased U.S. support for UNITA while abandoning Carter’s rhetoric against apartheid. It pursued a policy of “constructive engagement,” which entailed a more conciliatory attitude towards Pretoria, and introduced to the Angolan-Namibian question a policy of “linkage,” whereby South Africa’s implementation of UNSC Resolution 435—UN-supervised elections in Namibia, spelling the end of minority rule and South African control of the country (all parties knew that SWAPO would win a free election)—would be conditioned upon the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The policy effectively allowed the U.S. to use the Cuban forces in Angola as an excuse for not supporting sanctions and divestment measures against South Africa, even though the Cubans were there exclusively to defend Angola from the SADF. The South Africans, for their part, had no intention of accepting Resolution 435—instead favoring an internal settlement for Namibia that would grant it merely titular independence—but were happy to take advantage of Reagan’s conciliatory approach by raiding southern Angola.
Yet in the end, it was the African liberation movements and their Cuban allies who had their way. With the New York Accords of 1988, South Africa agreed to withdraw permanently from Angola and accept Resolution 435 for Namibia. The accords were touted as a success story for the American linkage policy, but in fact South Africa only accepted the settlement because, after a period of particularly intense fighting in southern Angola in 1987-88 (including the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, the second-largest battle ever fought on the African continent), the Cuban troops surged, pushed the SADF back to the Namibian border, and threatened an invasion of Namibia. The Cubans had effectively turned the linkage policy on its head.
A Caribbean island nation had defied both Cold War superpowers, secured independence for Angola and Namibia, and set the stage for the end of South African apartheid.
Pretty wild.
Furthermore, it could secure American compliance—if not direct patronage—and protect itself from serious international censure by positioning itself as a bulwark against the spread of communism, stemming the tide of the Cuban and Soviet-backed liberation movements. When Angola descended into civil war upon the end of Portuguese rule in 1975, and it became clear that the left-wing and avowedly anti-apartheid MPLA had the upper hand over the ideologically-ambiguous National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), it was with the approval of the Ford administration that the South African army invaded the country from Namibia in support of UNITA and its leader, the savvy and charismatic Jonas Savimbi. The MPLA was little match for the SADF, and the latter might have advanced all the way to Luanda and imposed its will on Angola had it not been for one of the most astonishing geopolitical events of the century: the rapid influx, just after the South African invasion, of 35,000 Cuban soldiers in defense of the MPLA and Angolan sovereignty.
Never before or since has such a comparatively small and impoverished nation taken on such a bold foreign initiative, nor achieved such success in reshaping the international order. A Caribbean island under the nose of a hostile superpower, the Cubans endured a U.S. embargo and faced perpetual threats of blockade and invasion. Indeed, Reagan spoke openly about the possibility of a total naval blockade of the island during his presidential campaign, and the administration seriously considered military action against Cuba as a response to a prospective Soviet intervention in Poland to suppress the Solidarity movement. Though formally aligned with Moscow, the Cubans understood that they could not rely on foreign assistance and would likely be left to fend for themselves in the event of direct hostilities with the United States. Cuban adventurism not only enraged Washington; it also confounded the Soviet Union, which feared that the United States would view the Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia (1977-78) as Soviet proxies, and that their presence would undermine détente. They were correct on both counts.
The intervention becomes even more remarkable when one considers that Cuba had practically nothing material to gain from it, and everything to lose. It received no real compensation from the MPLA; the Cubans even paid most of the expenses of stationing thousands of troops and tens of thousands of aid workers in Angola for fifteen years. The decision to intervene was made at a time when Cuban-U.S. relations were improving, and Washington was enticing Havana with the prospect of an eventual end to the embargo. The Angolan and Ethiopian expeditions were motivated exclusively by a genuine spirit of socialist and anti-colonialist solidarity. Fidel Castro spoke truthfully when he said, “Our soldiers are internationalists; they are not mercenaries.” As a communist country with a mixture of Latin American and African influences, Cuba believed that it had a unique vocation to assist the global south in its quest for liberation: a cause for which it was far more naturally suited than the European socialist states. The United States claimed that the Cubans were unwilling proxies pressed into the service of Soviet imperialism, but in reality Cuba’s actions were taken unilaterally and in the service of popular sovereignty and national self-determination, while the South Africans and their American supporters had far more “imperialistic” designs.
The Cuban troops managed to beat back the SADF, forcing it completely out of Angola by 1976. It was South Africa’s first major military defeat, demoralizing the apartheid government, emboldening the liberation movements, and turning Angola into a base of operations for SWAPO and the ANC. From 1975 to 1988, southern Africa became an increasingly active theater of the Cold War, with Cuban and Soviet support for the MPLA, accelerating South African and American aid for UNITA, and periodic South African assaults on SWAPO bases in southern Angola.
The Carter administration came into office denouncing apartheid and pledging to make human rights advocacy a central component of its foreign policy, but was constrained in southern Africa by its inability to separate regional conflicts from the demise of détente and the growing public perception that the West was sitting on its hands while international communism was on the march. The administration provided indirect aid to UNITA (skirting the Clark Amendment by working through third parties in a manner analogous to the Reagan administration’s conduct in the Iran-Contra Affair), and facilitated interventions of Moroccan, French, and Belgian troops in Zaire (DRC) during tribal conflicts over the latter’s Shaba region. It was in large part the presence of Cuban troops in Angola (as well as a false belief that the Cubans were behind the Shaba conflicts) that precluded Carter from granting recognition to the MPLA.
The Reagan administration continued and increased U.S. support for UNITA while abandoning Carter’s rhetoric against apartheid. It pursued a policy of “constructive engagement,” which entailed a more conciliatory attitude towards Pretoria, and introduced to the Angolan-Namibian question a policy of “linkage,” whereby South Africa’s implementation of UNSC Resolution 435—UN-supervised elections in Namibia, spelling the end of minority rule and South African control of the country (all parties knew that SWAPO would win a free election)—would be conditioned upon the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The policy effectively allowed the U.S. to use the Cuban forces in Angola as an excuse for not supporting sanctions and divestment measures against South Africa, even though the Cubans were there exclusively to defend Angola from the SADF. The South Africans, for their part, had no intention of accepting Resolution 435—instead favoring an internal settlement for Namibia that would grant it merely titular independence—but were happy to take advantage of Reagan’s conciliatory approach by raiding southern Angola.
Yet in the end, it was the African liberation movements and their Cuban allies who had their way. With the New York Accords of 1988, South Africa agreed to withdraw permanently from Angola and accept Resolution 435 for Namibia. The accords were touted as a success story for the American linkage policy, but in fact South Africa only accepted the settlement because, after a period of particularly intense fighting in southern Angola in 1987-88 (including the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, the second-largest battle ever fought on the African continent), the Cuban troops surged, pushed the SADF back to the Namibian border, and threatened an invasion of Namibia. The Cubans had effectively turned the linkage policy on its head.
A Caribbean island nation had defied both Cold War superpowers, secured independence for Angola and Namibia, and set the stage for the end of South African apartheid.
Pretty wild.
August 2, 2016
If you think yourself as a foreign policy wonk this is the book for you. It is basically a diplomatic and foreign policy history (rather than a military one) of the border war between South Africa, Angola, Cuba, and the other players including the US, and Soviet Union, along with the intertwining stories of SWAPO, UNITA, and the ANC.
The book has a strongly Cuban slant and mainly focuses on the groups and governments that opposed South Africa’s apartheid era government.
This is not the most enthralling book, but Gleijeses’s comprehensive picture of the inner politics of South Africa’s opponents is an essential contribution to the overall history of southern Africa.
The book has a strongly Cuban slant and mainly focuses on the groups and governments that opposed South Africa’s apartheid era government.
This is not the most enthralling book, but Gleijeses’s comprehensive picture of the inner politics of South Africa’s opponents is an essential contribution to the overall history of southern Africa.
December 23, 2016
An impressive work of forensic history. Gleijeses digs deep into the available records of Cuba, the former USSR, South Africa, the U.S. and elsewhere to provide an unprecedented analysis of Cuba's defense of Angola and Namibia.
The U.S. reluctance to impose sanctions on South Africa for its illegal wars against its neighbors -- first Carter, then Reagan, the latter who tossed aside the plight of black Africans to support the apartheid state -- is fully exposed in these pages.
The U.S. reluctance to impose sanctions on South Africa for its illegal wars against its neighbors -- first Carter, then Reagan, the latter who tossed aside the plight of black Africans to support the apartheid state -- is fully exposed in these pages.
July 8, 2023
A masterpiece! Maybe this 500+ page history is not for everyone but I found it hard to put down all the way through, especially actually when you get to the second half. This book is worth it alone for the insight you get into Cuba and the leadership of Fidel Castro and the people around him: precise, strategic, thoughtful, respectful, and full of revolutionary chutzpah.
January 6, 2021
A terrific book that shows the positive role of the Cuban Revolution in world history and international relations.
December 15, 2023
One of the best written and researched cold war studies out there, and demonstrates how vital it is to resist America-centric research and archive work.
February 13, 2024
One of the most impressive works of diplomatic history
April 24, 2024
Incredibly well researched, this book provides an in-depth look at the politics of Cuba, the United States, and South Africa regarding the Angolan Civil War.
July 26, 2024
An incredibly complete and informative book.
August 18, 2023
An excellent, excellent book. Factual and historical elements on American, Cuban, South African, Angolan and Namibian international policy between 1976 and 1991, when the Cold War was in full swing in Southern Africa. Solid sources: American, South African, Cuban, Russian and some British, West and East German and French archives. The book deconstructs myths about all the diplomatic policy of every country involved in the region, but mostly the US, Cuba and South Africa. The author's interpretations are also interesting, though should be treated with caution. In any case, this book gives us an excellent overview of the history of this part of the continent, to often reduced to South Africa and apartheid. Special mention to the work done to explicate Cuban political and military diplomacy and the role they played in saving Africa from a prolongation of apartheid. Very, very interesting. And very easy to read!
November 1, 2025
Piero Gleijeses started telling the story of Cuba's support to African liberation movements in his earlier book Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976. Because of the length of time between the two books, he summarizes that one in the first few chapters of this.
This is the key book because it takes the story to the end, when there are no more colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, and also no more white-minority-ruled states there. If you believe US mythology, you might assume that the US was against Portugal and other colonial powers, and against white-minority-rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa. Even if you know some of the truth about that, you might still be certain that Cuba's role in Africa was that of supporting the Soviet Union's policy.
But nothing could be further from the truth. Gleijeses doesn't simply assert but proves absolutely that Cuba took the initiative to intervene with approval from liberation movements, and that the Soviet Union intervened later, feeling pressure because of Cuba. And furthermore, much of the Soviet intervention was counterproductive.
This is written with extensive access to Cuban sources. (The Cuban government doesn't keep many secrets, but they weren't prepared to share them, so Gleijeses had to show them what "redacting" was). He also did extensive research on US foreign policy and many interviews with the players involved. Many US diplomats disagreed with the US support to apartheid South Africa, but they felt they had to continue in order to advance their careers.... Gleijeses also did research and interviews in the former Soviet Union.
I personally was able to convince Encyclopedia Britannica to change their entry on Fidel Castro, which originally claimed that Cuba was following in the Soviet Union's footsteps in Africa. If you look online at their site, they even give me credit as an author, although Piero Gleijeses and Mary-Alice Waters, the editor of [book:Cuba and Angola: Fighting for Africa’s Freedom and Our Own|17281918' (and many other titles about Cuba published by Pathfinder Press), are really the ones who deserve the credit.
This is the key book because it takes the story to the end, when there are no more colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, and also no more white-minority-ruled states there. If you believe US mythology, you might assume that the US was against Portugal and other colonial powers, and against white-minority-rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa. Even if you know some of the truth about that, you might still be certain that Cuba's role in Africa was that of supporting the Soviet Union's policy.
But nothing could be further from the truth. Gleijeses doesn't simply assert but proves absolutely that Cuba took the initiative to intervene with approval from liberation movements, and that the Soviet Union intervened later, feeling pressure because of Cuba. And furthermore, much of the Soviet intervention was counterproductive.
This is written with extensive access to Cuban sources. (The Cuban government doesn't keep many secrets, but they weren't prepared to share them, so Gleijeses had to show them what "redacting" was). He also did extensive research on US foreign policy and many interviews with the players involved. Many US diplomats disagreed with the US support to apartheid South Africa, but they felt they had to continue in order to advance their careers.... Gleijeses also did research and interviews in the former Soviet Union.
I personally was able to convince Encyclopedia Britannica to change their entry on Fidel Castro, which originally claimed that Cuba was following in the Soviet Union's footsteps in Africa. If you look online at their site, they even give me credit as an author, although Piero Gleijeses and Mary-Alice Waters, the editor of [book:Cuba and Angola: Fighting for Africa’s Freedom and Our Own|17281918' (and many other titles about Cuba published by Pathfinder Press), are really the ones who deserve the credit.
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