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The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy
'This excellent book, both scholarly and readable, gives us a new approach to the eighteenth-century British Navy, which helps to explain its historic achievement and illuminates the society of which it was a characteristic and resounding expression throughout the world.' - A.L. Rowse
422 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1986
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About the author
N.A.M. Rodger
29 books31 followersNicholas Andrew Martin Rodger, FBA, is a historian of the British Royal Navy and Senior Research Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.
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December 7, 2019Ok now that I have my trousers on (no britches for me today ) I can begin.
This book as the title largely explains is a study of the British navy during the Seven Years war, which depending on where you live and your perspective you may know as the French and Indian wars, the Third Silesian war, the First world war or the Second World war. There is no account of the course and conduct of the war, this is a sociology of the navy.
To chop up the book the author's thesis is:
it seems certain that in the middle years of the century the Navy, considered as a society in miniature, was very much a microcosm of British society in general. It was peculiar in almost all its superficial aspects; it had its own customs and traditions, its dress and language, and in the important matter of Parliamentary politics it operated a private system insulated from conventional politics ashore. But in its fundamentals, in the ways in which people dealt with one another and thought of one another, it closely resembled British society ashore. In the last analysis, the wooden world was built of the same materials as the wider world (p346)
The navy then is a kind of seaborne mirror of Britain in the middle of the eighteenth century.
In passing Rodger raises a couple of problem areas - in ship to ship combat British ships tended to outperform French ones, whereas all things being equal one might expect battle honours to be evenly divided. This Rodger suggests was because discipline was better on board British ships, but he doesn't prove this, only doubts that British gunnery or battle tactics were superior.
An intense problem is that of manpower - did the navy have enough men, could it get enough men, it was not, he strains to convince the reader, a floating concentration camp.
Then he flings into the book the view that the Navy had a problem of cowardice among senior officers. This is a very interesting and serious allegation, it is believable in that while the crew and junior officers were too busy in combat to be either cowardly or brave, the officer on the Quarter deck
stood on on the contrary had nothing to do but contemplate the enemy's firepower. While Rodger does have a few examples besides Admiral Byng executed ,as Voltaire said, pour encourager les autres for having not engaged the Spanish at Minorca. Rodger doesn't establish that this a problem worse in the British fleet let alone peculiar to it or indeed a particular issue for this point of time, although the dangers of the service also made it attractive as a career option - in time of war who could be sure of vacancies opening up in the ranks above you - this wasn't so true of the army in which you had to buy your rank, in the navy promotion and patronage was in the the gift of the Admiralty and certain senior designated officers (in charge of foreign stations remote from London).
The problem here I felt was that this book is a revisionist text but it is not always clear what he is kicking against or ever clear whose views he argues against.
The problem with manpower was that the Navy relied on an influx of experienced sailors, and since parts of the merchant marine were protected from recruitment (notably colliers carrying coal from the North-east to London) there were rarely enough skilled men in the economy to meet the Navy's needs - one could recruit Landsmen but they lacked the skills and took time to learn the culture (a particular problem apparently was their using any old dark corner of the ship as a toilet rather than making use of the heads) let alone the purely technical requirements. Partly for this reason large numbers of boys were taken into the service - learning the skills as they grew up, the age profile of a ships crew was rather like a stubby Christmas tree very few men over fifty, for the most junior positions lots of teenagers with middle ranking positions dominated by men in their 20s, and a lot of children from the age of six upwards some of these were the children or relatives of officers who'd get their boys signed on young both to learn the ropes (literally) from a 'sea Daddy' and to build up seniority, others were orphans or waifs and strays picked up through charitable efforts from the London streets. Large ships even had school teachers to provide some elements of schooling to all the youngsters ships also carried large numbers of animals for fresh meat or milk leading Rodgers to comment The eighteenth-century Navy combined the disciplined efficiency of a man-of-war with large elements of the playground, the farmyard, and the travelling circus (p.71)
One has to take a view on the question of manpower, the navy did use press gangs to seize and oblige seamen (sailors were easy to recognise because they wore trousers and short jackets (as people do today) rather than knee britches and long coats) to serve in the navy (uniforms at this time were only standard for officers on dress occasions), they also conscripted people at sea from other ships and bought debtors out of prison, nor were they fussy about taking on slaves either ,this led to de facto emancipation. The problem was partly government made, because in peacetime officers were dismissed from ships on half-pay while non-officers were simply paid off and dismissed, the peacetime strength of the navy was around 10,000 men, in the event of war there was then a struggle to recruit enough experienced men to crew warships.
Desertion was a problem, but generally only in the first year - the navy was a very strong paternalistic, community.
Rodgers is keen to assert that the navy was a dynamic institution one ought not expect that it was the same and unchanging from Pepys to Nelson, and in this age punishment was mild, the most a Captain could dole out was twelve lashes without calling a court marital - many austere Goodreaders I know, will give themselves twelve lashes of a morning as a substitute for coffee. Churchill's Rum, Sodomy and the Lash if not simply the product of his imagination was not true of the navy at this period (although there was plenty of alcohol). Water wasn't held to be suitable for drinking while urine was used for washing clothes, despite this expeditionary forces were on occasion able to surprise the enemy (presumably only if the wind didn't carry the smell of the approaching British to the sentries noses).
So what held it all together? For Rodger since the fleet was built up of the same social material as the shoreside world, the glue was also the same - patronage networks. The Captain needed good men and would promote or recommend for promotion those he felt to be capable, competent and loyal, while the Admiralty would promote Captains to commodore or Admiral rank on the same basis but explicitly taking into account the Captain's choice of subordinates as evidence of capability and judgement, sailors even petitioned the Admiralty to serve under officers they were familiar with, the Admiralty tended to approve such transfers on the basis that a happy ship was an effective ship. Patronage was the basis of political life so Navy officials would put pressure on Freeholders working in the Docks to vote for Navy candidates in elections this meant the navy controlled around a dozen seats in Parliament ( shockingly all port towns). The career minded officer would hoard good men and petition the Admiralty to promote or transfer them to his command. The politically minded might promote the sons of Freeholders in parliamentary seats to win votes (the electorate was fairly small, it was a feasible project to win enough votes through promises and favours to gain a seat in Parliament). So that was the navy during the seven years war a tight knit paternalistic community bonded not through fear of beating but by the lure of reward, promotions and prize money.
This book as the title largely explains is a study of the British navy during the Seven Years war, which depending on where you live and your perspective you may know as the French and Indian wars, the Third Silesian war, the First world war or the Second World war. There is no account of the course and conduct of the war, this is a sociology of the navy.
To chop up the book the author's thesis is:
it seems certain that in the middle years of the century the Navy, considered as a society in miniature, was very much a microcosm of British society in general. It was peculiar in almost all its superficial aspects; it had its own customs and traditions, its dress and language, and in the important matter of Parliamentary politics it operated a private system insulated from conventional politics ashore. But in its fundamentals, in the ways in which people dealt with one another and thought of one another, it closely resembled British society ashore. In the last analysis, the wooden world was built of the same materials as the wider world (p346)
The navy then is a kind of seaborne mirror of Britain in the middle of the eighteenth century.
In passing Rodger raises a couple of problem areas - in ship to ship combat British ships tended to outperform French ones, whereas all things being equal one might expect battle honours to be evenly divided. This Rodger suggests was because discipline was better on board British ships, but he doesn't prove this, only doubts that British gunnery or battle tactics were superior.
An intense problem is that of manpower - did the navy have enough men, could it get enough men, it was not, he strains to convince the reader, a floating concentration camp.
Then he flings into the book the view that the Navy had a problem of cowardice among senior officers. This is a very interesting and serious allegation, it is believable in that while the crew and junior officers were too busy in combat to be either cowardly or brave, the officer on the Quarter deck
stood on on the contrary had nothing to do but contemplate the enemy's firepower. While Rodger does have a few examples besides Admiral Byng executed ,as Voltaire said, pour encourager les autres for having not engaged the Spanish at Minorca. Rodger doesn't establish that this a problem worse in the British fleet let alone peculiar to it or indeed a particular issue for this point of time, although the dangers of the service also made it attractive as a career option - in time of war who could be sure of vacancies opening up in the ranks above you - this wasn't so true of the army in which you had to buy your rank, in the navy promotion and patronage was in the the gift of the Admiralty and certain senior designated officers (in charge of foreign stations remote from London).
The problem here I felt was that this book is a revisionist text but it is not always clear what he is kicking against or ever clear whose views he argues against.
The problem with manpower was that the Navy relied on an influx of experienced sailors, and since parts of the merchant marine were protected from recruitment (notably colliers carrying coal from the North-east to London) there were rarely enough skilled men in the economy to meet the Navy's needs - one could recruit Landsmen but they lacked the skills and took time to learn the culture (a particular problem apparently was their using any old dark corner of the ship as a toilet rather than making use of the heads) let alone the purely technical requirements. Partly for this reason large numbers of boys were taken into the service - learning the skills as they grew up, the age profile of a ships crew was rather like a stubby Christmas tree very few men over fifty, for the most junior positions lots of teenagers with middle ranking positions dominated by men in their 20s, and a lot of children from the age of six upwards some of these were the children or relatives of officers who'd get their boys signed on young both to learn the ropes (literally) from a 'sea Daddy' and to build up seniority, others were orphans or waifs and strays picked up through charitable efforts from the London streets. Large ships even had school teachers to provide some elements of schooling to all the youngsters ships also carried large numbers of animals for fresh meat or milk leading Rodgers to comment The eighteenth-century Navy combined the disciplined efficiency of a man-of-war with large elements of the playground, the farmyard, and the travelling circus (p.71)
One has to take a view on the question of manpower, the navy did use press gangs to seize and oblige seamen (sailors were easy to recognise because they wore trousers and short jackets (as people do today) rather than knee britches and long coats) to serve in the navy (uniforms at this time were only standard for officers on dress occasions), they also conscripted people at sea from other ships and bought debtors out of prison, nor were they fussy about taking on slaves either ,this led to de facto emancipation. The problem was partly government made, because in peacetime officers were dismissed from ships on half-pay while non-officers were simply paid off and dismissed, the peacetime strength of the navy was around 10,000 men, in the event of war there was then a struggle to recruit enough experienced men to crew warships.
Desertion was a problem, but generally only in the first year - the navy was a very strong paternalistic, community.
Rodgers is keen to assert that the navy was a dynamic institution one ought not expect that it was the same and unchanging from Pepys to Nelson, and in this age punishment was mild, the most a Captain could dole out was twelve lashes without calling a court marital - many austere Goodreaders I know, will give themselves twelve lashes of a morning as a substitute for coffee. Churchill's Rum, Sodomy and the Lash if not simply the product of his imagination was not true of the navy at this period (although there was plenty of alcohol). Water wasn't held to be suitable for drinking while urine was used for washing clothes, despite this expeditionary forces were on occasion able to surprise the enemy (presumably only if the wind didn't carry the smell of the approaching British to the sentries noses).
So what held it all together? For Rodger since the fleet was built up of the same social material as the shoreside world, the glue was also the same - patronage networks. The Captain needed good men and would promote or recommend for promotion those he felt to be capable, competent and loyal, while the Admiralty would promote Captains to commodore or Admiral rank on the same basis but explicitly taking into account the Captain's choice of subordinates as evidence of capability and judgement, sailors even petitioned the Admiralty to serve under officers they were familiar with, the Admiralty tended to approve such transfers on the basis that a happy ship was an effective ship. Patronage was the basis of political life so Navy officials would put pressure on Freeholders working in the Docks to vote for Navy candidates in elections this meant the navy controlled around a dozen seats in Parliament ( shockingly all port towns). The career minded officer would hoard good men and petition the Admiralty to promote or transfer them to his command. The politically minded might promote the sons of Freeholders in parliamentary seats to win votes (the electorate was fairly small, it was a feasible project to win enough votes through promises and favours to gain a seat in Parliament). So that was the navy during the seven years war a tight knit paternalistic community bonded not through fear of beating but by the lure of reward, promotions and prize money.
Read
June 17, 2015I picked this up expecting it to form a useful complement to Patrick O'Brian's books; more fool me, 'Georgian' though the Napoleonic period technically was. Rodger's focus is generations earlier, most particularly on the Seven Years' War of 1755-63*. But any disappointment I felt was short-lived, for it soon became apparent this was just the sort of non-fiction I love, or one of them anyway - fluent without being flashy, opinionated without being aggressive, always happy to admit opposing examples while still making a clear case, and above all very obviously the work of an absolute expert in the field.
Rodger's case, one which presumably through his efforts is now less controversial than it was, is that the Navy of the time was not "a sort of floating concentration camp", but a largely happy and in many ways surprisingly chaotic organisation, one in which (for instance) even mutiny tended largely to be overlooked so long as the men were civil about it. Moreover, he maps out the imprecise but important boundaries between patronage and corruption, making overall for a spirited defence of the service. If one can sometimes suspect that Rodgers veers too far against the prevailing opinion of his day, painting a picture of the Navy which is a little too democratic and cheerful...well, he has the facts at his fingertips, and he makes a compelling case. At the very least it's an essential counterbalance to easy stereotypes of brutality, which seem to rest more on modern prejudices and misreadings than the real details of an earlier age.
The book is explicitly an 'anatomy' rather than a history, let alone a group biography, but certain characters do stand out, not least the dominant Sea Lord of the period, Anson. Some seem fascinating, and while I'm not sure I could stand to read much more about the self-sabotaging Admiral Rodney, I was intrigued by the two very different Herveys who make significant appearances - relatives to the enemy and better of Pope whom that ghastly little wretch immortalised as 'Sporus'. Alas, so far as I can find, the only book covering the whole dynasty is a rather unappealing-looking affair, and not at all the Gibbon-meets-Waugh chronicle they surely merit.
There is also one absolutely delightful aside, regarding naval officers who (like O'Brian's Aubrey), ended up as perhaps not the most assiduous Members of Parliament:
"It was quite possible for an officer like Captain Edmund Affleck, chosen for Colchester in 1782, to enter Parliament without even being aware he was a candidate, and in 1747 Commodore Edward Legge achieved the still more unusual distinction of being elected posthumously."
And I bet they were both more inspiring parliamentarians than many of the current crop.
*If nothing else, the name is at least closer to being right than the Hundred Years' War's.
Rodger's case, one which presumably through his efforts is now less controversial than it was, is that the Navy of the time was not "a sort of floating concentration camp", but a largely happy and in many ways surprisingly chaotic organisation, one in which (for instance) even mutiny tended largely to be overlooked so long as the men were civil about it. Moreover, he maps out the imprecise but important boundaries between patronage and corruption, making overall for a spirited defence of the service. If one can sometimes suspect that Rodgers veers too far against the prevailing opinion of his day, painting a picture of the Navy which is a little too democratic and cheerful...well, he has the facts at his fingertips, and he makes a compelling case. At the very least it's an essential counterbalance to easy stereotypes of brutality, which seem to rest more on modern prejudices and misreadings than the real details of an earlier age.
The book is explicitly an 'anatomy' rather than a history, let alone a group biography, but certain characters do stand out, not least the dominant Sea Lord of the period, Anson. Some seem fascinating, and while I'm not sure I could stand to read much more about the self-sabotaging Admiral Rodney, I was intrigued by the two very different Herveys who make significant appearances - relatives to the enemy and better of Pope whom that ghastly little wretch immortalised as 'Sporus'. Alas, so far as I can find, the only book covering the whole dynasty is a rather unappealing-looking affair, and not at all the Gibbon-meets-Waugh chronicle they surely merit.
There is also one absolutely delightful aside, regarding naval officers who (like O'Brian's Aubrey), ended up as perhaps not the most assiduous Members of Parliament:
"It was quite possible for an officer like Captain Edmund Affleck, chosen for Colchester in 1782, to enter Parliament without even being aware he was a candidate, and in 1747 Commodore Edward Legge achieved the still more unusual distinction of being elected posthumously."
And I bet they were both more inspiring parliamentarians than many of the current crop.
*If nothing else, the name is at least closer to being right than the Hundred Years' War's.
August 7, 2012
I thought this might be interesting. Instead I came away from it vastly impressed, and having learned a great deal.
I particularly remember how, after years of studying patronage in the ancient world, I finally understood how it really works after Rodger's explanation in this very different context.
I particularly remember how, after years of studying patronage in the ancient world, I finally understood how it really works after Rodger's explanation in this very different context.
January 31, 2024
In-depth study of a period of the British Navy just before the war in the American colonies. If you love O’Brien’s stories you will find this interesting. If you like British history or naval history, this is for you. If you are curious about the British Empire as it was forming, this is informative. Rather than a chronological approach, the author breaks down the study into descriptive categories, such as recruiting, discipline and authority, in order to address some (apparently) common misconceptions about what the British navy was like at that time.
What was eye opening was the way in which the British navy resembled the current culture at investment banks, hedge funds and private equity funds.
*****ARGH!—THERE BE SPOILERS***********
The British navy was a far cry from meritocratic in this era, and probably imitated the rest of British society. Poorer classes could rise through the ranks, but the officers were by and large chosen and trained from among the landed gentry, via acquaintances and recommendations. That the navy yet managed to perform well indicates that within the navy ability mattered most; commanding officers needed to promote and recommend men of ability in order to preserve their respect and standing among their fellow officers and commanders. So they generally chose those of ability or promise from among the sons of upper class gentlemen whom they knew personally. In other words, it was a big patronage club, but where ability of the candidate of course mattered.
Why would the sons of the gentry leave the family estate or business to go to sea? Because eldest sons generally inherited the estate, and younger sons needed to make their own plans. But, you may well ask, how could the risks of going to sea possibly be balanced by the rewards?
Because as an officer in the British navy … you could make a boatload of money. In times of war (and there were quite a few wars) the navy was authorized to disrupt enemy trade. They did this by capturing enemy naval and merchant ships, and taking whatever was aboard. These were called “prizes” and the officers split the money generated from the prizes among themselves and their men. The British navy encouraged this because, using some modern nomenclature, “base” pay was not particularly rewarding, and they wanted to keep their men properly “incentivized.” There are quotes from commanders going after enemy ships in order to “buy an estate.” Presumably, the fighting men were also getting a small cut, much like the Yankee whalers of a later era, but the commanders got the largest percentage. Fair? Well, these officers were up on the deck, exposed to enemy fire, and frequently were targeted by the enemy. So (you may well ask) what is the justification for similar rewards splits in corporations today? What are you, some kind of godless commie pinko?
In addition to the substantial rewards of prize money, there was also a regular trade in war and peace time of moving money. The British navy were regularly hired to move gold, silver and other precious metals, to and from Britain (including, of course, the navy payroll), and for this, captains and commanders were permitted to take a percentage of the value of the cargo (including the payroll) being so transported, of one, two or three percent. Since they were going that direction anyway, it was good work if you could get it.
What was eye opening was the way in which the British navy resembled the current culture at investment banks, hedge funds and private equity funds.
*****ARGH!—THERE BE SPOILERS***********
The British navy was a far cry from meritocratic in this era, and probably imitated the rest of British society. Poorer classes could rise through the ranks, but the officers were by and large chosen and trained from among the landed gentry, via acquaintances and recommendations. That the navy yet managed to perform well indicates that within the navy ability mattered most; commanding officers needed to promote and recommend men of ability in order to preserve their respect and standing among their fellow officers and commanders. So they generally chose those of ability or promise from among the sons of upper class gentlemen whom they knew personally. In other words, it was a big patronage club, but where ability of the candidate of course mattered.
Why would the sons of the gentry leave the family estate or business to go to sea? Because eldest sons generally inherited the estate, and younger sons needed to make their own plans. But, you may well ask, how could the risks of going to sea possibly be balanced by the rewards?
Because as an officer in the British navy … you could make a boatload of money. In times of war (and there were quite a few wars) the navy was authorized to disrupt enemy trade. They did this by capturing enemy naval and merchant ships, and taking whatever was aboard. These were called “prizes” and the officers split the money generated from the prizes among themselves and their men. The British navy encouraged this because, using some modern nomenclature, “base” pay was not particularly rewarding, and they wanted to keep their men properly “incentivized.” There are quotes from commanders going after enemy ships in order to “buy an estate.” Presumably, the fighting men were also getting a small cut, much like the Yankee whalers of a later era, but the commanders got the largest percentage. Fair? Well, these officers were up on the deck, exposed to enemy fire, and frequently were targeted by the enemy. So (you may well ask) what is the justification for similar rewards splits in corporations today? What are you, some kind of godless commie pinko?
In addition to the substantial rewards of prize money, there was also a regular trade in war and peace time of moving money. The British navy were regularly hired to move gold, silver and other precious metals, to and from Britain (including, of course, the navy payroll), and for this, captains and commanders were permitted to take a percentage of the value of the cargo (including the payroll) being so transported, of one, two or three percent. Since they were going that direction anyway, it was good work if you could get it.
January 19, 2024
This takes a broad view of the navy and the politics, culture, and systems it worked upon. I sometimes wished it gave a bit more detail into the smaller elements of sea life, but I suppose other books can be allowed to tackle that. If you are into this piece of history this book is well worth a read, but it's probably too dense with information to make a less interested party enjoy it.
January 1, 2014
I'm just half way into it, but gonna finish this initial review now. This is not some swashbuckling beach read, it's a deep historical dive with lots of detail. Here's an interesting excerpt:
"..the Navy was by far the largest and most complex of all government services, and indeed by a large margin the largest industrial organization in the western world. It faced problems of management and control then quite unknown... favored continuity of service... for there was no pool of talent or relevant experience outside the naval service from which [staff] could be drawn, and they had to be bred up within the service."
Where can we go now, where there is no manual, no fat book of procedures to guide us? In what great enterprise is humanity now engaged, where new leadership must be forged from raw stuff, into which we could throw ourselves and be in the van of something entirely novel?
Some fun facts:
* "Chamber lye" is how you wash clothes. (just imagine what that is!)
* Seamen were paid on the lunar month.
* The French "bury" their dead in the bilge (yuck!)
* Typical rations were 1# bread, 1#beef, & a gallon of beer per day.
"..the Navy was by far the largest and most complex of all government services, and indeed by a large margin the largest industrial organization in the western world. It faced problems of management and control then quite unknown... favored continuity of service... for there was no pool of talent or relevant experience outside the naval service from which [staff] could be drawn, and they had to be bred up within the service."
Where can we go now, where there is no manual, no fat book of procedures to guide us? In what great enterprise is humanity now engaged, where new leadership must be forged from raw stuff, into which we could throw ourselves and be in the van of something entirely novel?
Some fun facts:
* "Chamber lye" is how you wash clothes. (just imagine what that is!)
* Seamen were paid on the lunar month.
* The French "bury" their dead in the bilge (yuck!)
* Typical rations were 1# bread, 1#beef, & a gallon of beer per day.
January 1, 2023
I struggle a bit while writing this review. I think I would give the book a 3.5. The author at times does excellent analysis and takes a firm position as revisionist. On the surface many of the author's claims seem well supported but it's difficult to know because of one of the author's primary failings. He is terrible at using sources. He relies on end notes to support otherwise completely unsupported statements far too frequently. This wouldn't be a problem if the foot notes include explanatory notes but they don't. They are exclusively references to other sources. To properly analyze the author's arguments you would need to have to hand hundreds of sources he cites but does not deal with at length of at all. In my opinion that is a serious weakness in a historian and leads me to not rely on his conclusion.
That said I do think the book is worth reading for someone who is conversant with the period and it's historiography. They would be best placed to evaluate the value of the author's conclusions.
That said I do think the book is worth reading for someone who is conversant with the period and it's historiography. They would be best placed to evaluate the value of the author's conclusions.
January 9, 2013
An absolutely fascinating book on several levels. As a social history of an important but little researched 18th century institution it contains a wealth of insight and detail. It also serves as a useful example of how organisations can function outside the commonly assumed parameters of command and control - as dynamic organisms working on the basis of mutual interest, it offers an alternative view of how organisations can function effectively.
January 11, 2009
the classic book on understanding the British Navy in the Eighteenth Century
July 12, 2017
Well researched, detailed and explained. Covers everything from pox ridden seamen to the promotion and patronage system. Nelson and co may be the glory element but is an able work for a researcher to use to see how the nuts and bolts of the machine worked.
A few more illustrations and copies of primary letters would have been nice, but the only real flaw to note is belabouring a few points - eg Rodney's corruption (character) but it is a minor matter.
If you like illustrations and coffee table books of this kind of history, then I'd recommend this as a companion read.
A few more illustrations and copies of primary letters would have been nice, but the only real flaw to note is belabouring a few points - eg Rodney's corruption (character) but it is a minor matter.
If you like illustrations and coffee table books of this kind of history, then I'd recommend this as a companion read.
January 4, 2019
A fantastic description of the Royal Navy during the times of King George II to King George III. If you a history buff, a fan of Patrick O`Brian's Aubrey-Maturin series or of C.S. Forester's Hornblower novels, this book will give you a great look at the workings of shipboard life, careers (both seamen and officers), and even the food in the Royal Navy. While it focuses mainly on the Seven Years War (1754-63) period, much of the information is useful for the period following as well.
Lots of illustrations and historical information including appendices and a glossary of nautical terms.
Lots of illustrations and historical information including appendices and a glossary of nautical terms.
October 14, 2021
Although I was looking for more of a day-to-day description of what it was to be a sailor in the RN, I was very pleased with this book.
What was amazing to me is that this era of the Royal Navy was NOT Nelson's Navy of the Napoleonic Wars Era. Class distinctions were non-existent or in their infancy, the Press Gangs, though hated, were not responsible for nearly the amount of personnel I thought, and the whole Navy really was a microcosm of British Society in general as the book claims.
So, if you want to read a naval social history about a VERY specific time (the Seven Years War), this is your book. If you want to read something about Nelson's navy...it's not here.
What was amazing to me is that this era of the Royal Navy was NOT Nelson's Navy of the Napoleonic Wars Era. Class distinctions were non-existent or in their infancy, the Press Gangs, though hated, were not responsible for nearly the amount of personnel I thought, and the whole Navy really was a microcosm of British Society in general as the book claims.
So, if you want to read a naval social history about a VERY specific time (the Seven Years War), this is your book. If you want to read something about Nelson's navy...it's not here.
April 15, 2025
A well researched and interesting but somewhat dry examination of the 18th Century Royal Navy. It suffers like many history books from a lack of wit and descriptive power in the writing, but it gets the job done well enough.
July 17, 2017
What else can I say. Brilliant text book.
October 6, 2019
Such a fascinating account - if you have any interest in the Georgian Navy, you need to read this.
April 11, 2020
Excellent for what it does, explores the workings of the Georgian navy. Not a narrative book. A fine read
July 7, 2021
Good account of the Georgian Navy. it wasn't all press gangs!
August 31, 2021
I really liked it. It was engaging and very enlightening.
November 22, 2022
A great analysis of naval life.
September 19, 2011
A topnotch examination of the British navy during the middle of the 18th century. Provides prodigious documentation drawn from actual records on everything from food to venereal disease, and disputes some of the popular myths regarding the navy at this time.
February 9, 2015
I have been reading this the same time as I have been reading the books of Patrick O'Brian. Although neither author had read the other before publishing their own, they complement each other delightfully.
August 16, 2007
A most interesting book that explores everything from ship design to daily grub to pay scales. Quite readable and full of trivial but somehow intriging facts.
March 20, 2008
Rich historical account of the social, economic, political, and military world of the Royal Navy at the time of American independence, Napoleon, and of course Horatio Hornblower and Jack Aubrey.
December 12, 2012
An excellent and readable introduction to life in the Navy somewhat before the age of Nelson, and hence all the more welcome for it.
July 24, 2014
If I could give it 6 stars I would. Naval Bible!
February 11, 2015
Fantastic account of the Georgian navy. A brilliantly compiled and written account of sea faring during this important stage of the navies history. Very readable.
Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews