Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe

by John Buckley

Historian John Buckley offers a radical reappraisal of Great Britain’s fighting forces during World War Two, challenging the common belief that the British Army was no match for the forces of Hitler’s Germany. Following Britain’s military commanders and troops across the battlefields of Europe, from D-Day to VE-Day, from the Normandy beaches to Arnhem and the Rhine, and, ultimately, to the Baltic, Buckley’s provocative history demonstrates that the British Army was more than a match for the vaunted Nazi war machine. This fascinating revisionist study of the campaign to liberate Northern Europe in the war’s final years features a large cast of colorful unknowns and grand historical personages alike, including Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery and the prime minister, Sir Winston Churchill. By integrating detailed military history with personal accounts, it evokes the vivid reality of men at war while putting long-held misconceptions finally to rest.

Genres: World War II, History, Nonfiction, Military History, Military Fiction

384 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2013

About the author

John Buckley is Professor of Military History at the University of Wolverhampton, where he has taught and researched since 1992. He is the author and editor of a range of books on aspects of twentieth-century military history, air power, and conflict studies, including The RAF and Trade Defence, 1919-1945 (1995) Air Power in the Age of Total War (1999) and Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe 1944-5 (2013) which won the 2014 Templer Medal (awarded annually to the author of the book deemed to have made the most significant contribution to the history of the British Army).

Reviews

[Jonny · Rating 4 out of 5]

This one's an interesting reappraisal of the British Army's performance in North Western Europe from June 1944 to the end of the war.
Not offering anything startlingly revisionist, author John Buckley instead argues that the British 'plodding' progress from the Normandy beachheads was playing to the strengths of the national army and exploiting the weaknesses of their German adversaries - both in terms of lack of resources and in predictability of action (having just watched a re-run of Peter Barton's excellent Battle of the Somme From Both Sides of the Wire it appears that German defensive tactics hasn't fundamentally changed since 1916).
Where it's good - it puts new context on the British efforts in Europe in terms of British capabilities of the time, and political acceptance of risk for the post war world. The argument that the British Army's performance compared favourably is well made - consider for example that while Michael Wittman may have decimated units of 7th Armoured Division in Villers-Bocage, but he still ended up walking home - and, horror of horrors, when he does meet his end it's down to the (much maligned) Sherman... There's also a distinct lack of favouritism - Montgomery's character defects are not glossed over (does not play well with others) and the failures to secure the approaches to Antwerp and the overall failure of Operation Market Garden (even had US Airborne forces captured the bridge at Nijmegen, allowing a seamless advance to Arnhem, no exploitation would have been possible due to supply shortages) are pointed out with even handedness.
And the less good - its Anglo centric (the sharp eyed among you may have noted the subtitle) so the Canadians don't get a look in, and I've liked a little contrast with American activities, but the book stands well on it's merits. Recommended, unless you're likely to take offence at the suggestion that the Germans were less than military supermen.

[Jill H. · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book covers the years 1944-45 from D Day to VE Day when Northern Europe was liberated from Nazi control by the Allies. The author's subject is the British Army, which has been given short shrift by historians as inefficient and outclassed by the German troops. He presents a second look at the reputation of the British forces and how they were much more superior than history has treated them.

Even though limited by a lack of troops and morale issues, the British had the advantage of resources to conduct a machine-based and technologically driven approach to battle. "Let metal do it rather than flesh. Waste all the ammunition you want but not lives" was the credo of command.

The author follows the battles across France, the Low Countries, and Germany and listens in to Montgomery and other commanders as they plan the tactics and execution of those plans. It is this level of detail which may lose some readers as the narrative can becomes dull and rather tedious. Regardless, it is a fascinating look at an army that didn't get much credit and a reassessment that succeeds in refuting earlier interpretations of Britain's efforts and successes. Recommended.

[Heinz Reinhardt · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent, analytical/operational look at the Anglo-Canadian portion of the war in Northwest Europe in 1944-45.
The author, John Buckley, goes to some length to repair the maligned reputation of the British and Canadian forces that battled against the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS, and to showcase the quality both of Monty's Men, but also of the British command hierarchy, and it's doctrine, as well.
In this the author, quite honestly, only does a middling job.
It is simply inescapable when studying the Second World War, that one cannot help but notice that the more remarkable story, in terms of doing more with far, far less, still remains that of the Germans. As such, it is my opinion at least, that Buckley fails to overturn Sir Max Hastings' analysis of the various combatants.
That said, he does a very good job of highlighting that, far from a bumbling, ponderous, hidebound force, the 21st Army Group was an innovative, efficient, powerful, and damned lethal organization.
The majority of the text, just over half really, focuses on the long, drawn out Battle for Normandy. Here the British, Canadians, and the Poles (free Polish formations who were seconded to Monty's Army Group) faced the cream of the German formations in the Western Theater.
The bulk of the Panzer, Panzergrenadier, and Waffen-SS formations were arrayed against Monty, and the focus of the fierce, and bloody, fighting was the city of Caen. Meant to be taken on D+2, it would take the British and Canadians over a month to seize the city, and they would receive numerous bloody noses, setbacks, and downright thrashings along the way. As the author points out (though it is rather common knowledge), German armor and gunnery was superior to those of the Allies, and so the Brits and Canadians had to develope combined arms tactics to overcome the qualitative superiority of German armor.
In part a legacy of the awful casualties of the Great War, the Brits focused their doctrine on a material/technological/logistical factor, favoring machinery and firepower over the flesh and blood of the poor infantry.
The Germans' strategy of fighting a close in, head to head battle of attrition against the British actually played to British strengths, while fatally exposing German weaknesses. The German desire to pin the Allies as close to the invasion beaches as was possible, negated the element of maneuver (the German specialty being mobility and speed despite their lack of total mechanization), something the British and Canadians were never very good at anyway, and allowed the Brits to bring to bear in the most direct way their awesome array of artillery.
In short, the German desire to pin the Allies into a killing zone close to the coast, allowed the Allies to blow them to shreds with their own superior firepower, whereas, possibly, fighting along the Seine or deeper inside France would have allowed the Germans the space to maneuver, which could have exposed the Allies weaknesses in their ability to react rapidly enough, and with enough flexibility to counter an enemy who was the embodiment of said virtues.
Normandy, while terribly costly in Allied lives and horrifically so in equipment (I did say German armor was superior), it all but destroyed the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS, and caused a collapse in late August that saw the Allies stream to the German border and into the Low Countries.
It took the Allies months to break through this line, as much to their surprise (though the Russians could have told them this), the Germans managed to reform and rebuild at a startling rate and capacity.
In fact the Germans would wage a brilliant defensive campaign on their border and in the Netherlands that would often stymie, and in more than one case outright defeat, Allied attempts to blast their way across the Rhine and into Germany.
However, the Germans massive, and quite unexpected, counteroffensive aimed at the Americans in the Ardennes served to erode most of their remaining strength in the West (they retained enough mechanized strength to launch an equally massive, and equally ill advised, Panzer offensive against the Soviets in Hungary in the spring of 45), making the ensuing campaign to battle towards, and then across the Rhine significantly easier.
All throughout, Buckley showcases the British in their finest moment in their history, and while, as I said earlier, I believe he fails to overturn Hastings' analysis, he does repair the reputation of the British Army in WW2, and as a man who is a Yank but half English with relatives having served in Monty's Army Group, this pleases me greatly.
If there is a genuine failing in this work, it is that the Canadian contribution does get glossed over. While this is perhaps unavoidable considering the author is himself a Brit, it is a tad unfair to a major portion of the 21st Army Group, and a damned hard fighting portion at that. The Canadian battles for the Scheldt Estuary are the bloodiest in Canadian military history, and it was slightly disappointing to see them somewhat glossed over.
Regardless, this is an excellent book, one that is a necessary addition to any student of military history's bookshelf, or of British history in general. This one will remain in my collection for many years to come.
Highly recommended.

[abby ❤ · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'M FREEEEEE good fucking riddance

more objective rtc maybe

[Steve Switzer · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent book which challenges the existing reputation of the british army of northwest Europe in 1944-45 as slow lumbering and ponderous and generally less effective than the much vaunted Wehrmacht
Demonstrates that when it played to its strengths , set-piece attacks,
firepower ,control and sound planning, then it could and did defeat the best the Wehrmacht could offer.
As it indeed did on the east flank of the Normandy beach head when it
and the Canadian forces ground the ss panzer divisions to dust to enable the breakout to succeed when it did

[Jack · Rating 4 out of 5]

John Buckley’s refreshing review of the British Army’s performance in the liberation of Europe is long overdue and a welcome addition to the historical debate.

Buckley’s central argument centres on the fact that 21st Army Group, led by the controversial yet iconic Field Marshall Montgomery, fought the liberation campaign much more effectively and with much more determination than has been previously supposed. Often, ‘Monty’s Men’ have been described as sluggish, unimaginative and lacking the sheer skill of their enemy. Buckley unpicks this Hastings-esq argument piece by piece, describing how it was effectively British army doctrine, certainly Montgomery’s, to methodically and meticulously plan for set-piece battles whereby Britain’s powerful artillery formations and superior logistics could grind down their more agile and aggressive German foe. What is so persuasive about this argument is that it explains and accounts for many different factors. The political and social reality that the British would not accept the high casualties inherent in a more aggressive strategy combines with the military reality to justify a precise military strategy.

Buckley backs this key point up by methodically combing through the actions of 21st Army Group throughout 1944-45. British action in Normandy and through Market Garden are described in detail, constantly linking back to Buckley’s central argument. One criticism I did have was that the section dealing with 1945 felt rushed, and I would’ve liked to have seen more detail and more information detailing this often overlooked part of the war- especially considering the author himself acknowledges that it has been overlooked in the past.

Alongside the persuasive argument, Buckley provides a comprehensive and balanced overview of the commanders. Montgomery finds no worshipper here- Buckley is often critical and points out Monty’s mistakes and mishaps but stops short of unjustly lambasting him in the way many have done since 1945. Richard O’Connor and Miles Dempsey are finally restored to their rightful place in the historical record in this book with Buckley highlighting their key contribution to the campaign. Whilst this is centred on the 21st Army, there are frequent references to both the Canadians and the Americans, though in some places (particularly in the latter stages of the books/war) I would’ve liked more on the cooperation between armies.

My biggest gripe, AS ALWAYS with WWII British military history books, is the absence of the RASC! They get one mention in this book, one. Buckley makes such an effort to explain Britain’s logistic network yet fails to refer to the very people that manned that logistical network. It is an oversight that needs to be rectified.


Overall, I enjoyed the book immensely. This is ‘serious’ military history and could certainly be overwhelming for those unfamiliar with the topic however Buckley writes clearly and I found myself certainly able to keep up with the cast of characters and their movements across Europe. This is a good operational, strategic and tactical explanation of the British army in Europe and certainly is well worth a read for those interested.

Whilst I largely agree with Buckley’s assessment, I regret that it does not appear to have moved the dial within the historical community. Old opinions die hard and it still seems as though the view of the 21st Army as unimaginative and slow persists. This is regrettable and perhaps we shall have to wait even longer for Buckley’s reassessment to take hold within the historical community. Nevertheless, the author makes a worthwhile and enjoyable contribution.

4/5*

[Martin Samuels · Rating 3 out of 5]

With the exception of the initial landings on 6 June, the campaign in North West Europe in 1944/45 is not generally remembered as a high point in British military performance. Montgomery's army tends to be characterised as slow and plodding, securing victory through methodical planning of the application of vast amounts of firepower, securing objectives through weight of material rather than any tactical skill or spark of inspired generalship. By contrast, the German Army is lauded for its dynamism and flexibility, maintaining a fierce resistance against hopeless odds almost until the end. John Buckley comes across as offended and irritated by this orthodoxy and has written Monty's Men as a means to set the record straight.

Buckley's argument is fairly straightforward. By mid-1944, Britain was nearing the end of its manpower reserves, both in absolute terms and in its willingness to accept casualties. Victory, however, was almost certain, given the ever greater superiority in material terms enjoyed by the Allies. It was therefore sensible and appropriate for Montgomery to adopt an approach that maximised the use of artillery and bombers, with ground thrusts led by massed armour, and sought to protect the infantry through excellent logistics and medical support - metal not men. Further, Buckley argues that the German Army was far less effective than is often portrayed, with even that performance based on the organisation's inherent brutalism, which renders it unfit for admiration or emulation.

In presenting his case, Buckley largely focuses on the experiences of British Second Army, with generally only passing reference to First Canadian Army. That in itself is a reminder of how limited Montgomery's manpower was - a single army of between three and four corps may be compared to the force of five armies in eighteen corps commanded by Haig 25 years earlier.

While the narrative is clear and engaging, with regular pauses for analysis and reflection, Buckley's arguments are ultimately unconvincing. While he is absolutely right to emphasise the major constraints that surrounded Montgomery, in terms of the political balance between Britain and America and the need to maximise Britain's perceived contribution to the campaign while minimising losses, Buckley's points about battle performance feel weak. He himself notes that the formations that landed in June often struggled with tank/infantry coordination and that the methodical approach demanded by Montgomery often led to a slow tempo of action, with opportunities lost. There must be serious questions raised whether these characteristics in fact had the effect of increasing casualties, as they forced the British into a slow battle of attrition, whereas a more dynamic approach might have secured victory sooner through more decisive manoeuvre.

Buckley's hostility to the German Army and its tactics also comes across as insufficiently grounded. There can be no question that the Nazi regime was vile and that the behaviour of many army commanders and units was criminal, but that does not feel enough basis on which to argue that the performance of the army was primarily due to these characteristics - indeed, there is much evidence that they hindered its performance. In addition, Buckley represents the German tendency to launch immediate counterattacks as a major flaw. While it does appear that this could lead to predictable tactics, which could be punished through massive use of artillery, Buckley gives little hint of what else the Germans could have done in the face of the enormous material superiority enjoyed by the Allies. And, indeed, there were many instances where such counterattacks did much to disrupt British plans. The reader is left with a strong sense of deja vue, as Buckley's narrative and analysis reads remarkably similarly to that of John Terraine regarding the First World War. Yet the dynamic nature of the German defensive doctrine in that war too also frequently served to blunt massed British attacks, forcing them into attritional battles where the balance of casualties was far less favourable to the British than was believed at the time, or might have been expected through simple numerical comparison of forces and artillery.

In summary, Buckley has written a vivid and engaging account that provides much insight into Montgomery and the army he led to final victory, but which ultimately fails to overturn the sense that the British won through the careful application of overwhelming force, while the Germans, through reliance on a far more flexible doctrine, managed to resist far longer than the balance of forces would have suggested possible.

[Wulf · Rating 5 out of 5]

A superb book. Details the british 2nd army operations from D day to the ending of the war in europe, and it does so with an account based on facts and giving a firm grip of what was expect of the army, its objectives and how it faired. Indeed, it faired greatly, but history has been unkind to it, and this book helps a lot to solve the issue on what was the actual capacity of the british army and if its criticisms were well founded. As such, they were not, and most of them came later on from simply being directed into Montgomery because of his personality, and it ricochet into the troops under him.

All in all, this book shows how the british managed to defeat the germans over and over again, with a firepower based army, and giving a superb effort to try to aliviate the dangers to the riflemen, which still received some 70% of all casualties. Indeed, for all the british operations, the only which was a failure was Market Garden, and yet it did not prove so damaging to the british efforts as a whole, because of the reality of the germans stopping their rout a week before it. Time and time again the german counter attacks were completely destroyed, be the numerous of those made in Normandy in a tactical level, which the british completely exploitaded the predictabilty of german strategy, or those in a larger level, such as those trying to dislodge the british from the corridor in Nijmegen, or those after Operation Constellation. All of these failed and showed how much of the criticism against the british is unfounded.

For the 130.000 casualties the british suffered, being 30.000 killed, they achieved a victory in another level completely, and much more cost effective than the soviet advances, or even the americans. Only on Veritable and Grenade the germans lost 100.000 men, while the british (and US Ninth army) less than 20.000. In Operation Plunder, an outstanding 30.000 germans were made casualties, for a ridiculous small number of british casualties, 3000. And yet even that operation itself suffers criticism from others. At the ending of the hardest point of the whole campaign, after Falaise, the british and americans had lost 200.000 since D day and the germans more or less 400.000. And yet many still have the idea that the western allies, specially the british, should have played the campaign differently than they have, that they should have incorporated german tactics such as "blitzkrieg", and that most of their setbacks in terms of the armoured divisions were because of their tanks.

John Buckley, in both this book AND 'British Armour in the Normandy Campaign' shows how unfouded that view is. In fact, the british army did play the EXACT campaign it should have, one focusing on its strenghts, one which minimized casualties by a overwhelming amount, and one that ultimately did deliver the british the many victories they need, and the germans, despite being seen as the "best" army, was defeated over and over again. The british army reputation has been slowly destroyed as the time goes on, but John Buckley goes on to salvage it from the shackles of the bias of the historiography of the last half of the 20th century, much based on unfounded statements by those that had no knowledge of the exact facts and reasons of what was happening, or had other motives to criticize the british army (because of Monty) such as Bedell Smith, Lindell Hart, Bradley and Patton, while much of their views continued to being repeated by historians such as Max Hastings, Ambrose and Cornelius Ryan.

All in all, a great book that is a necessity for someone to try to grasp all that is related to the 2nd british army (and in a lesser focus the 21st Army group overall), from all its operations, to its doctrine, strategies and tactics, how it supported their soldiers, and even how it treated the civilians while entering germany. Summing up, a few mistakes were made, most notably the ONE operation which for other reasons was made without taking in account all that the british army and indeed Monty thought to be required, but overall the criticism against the british army is shown as unfouded. As a matter of fact, if anything the british made a superb use of its resouces, advancing in such a cost effective level that it completely shadows the soviet and american advances.

As a side note. For a great view of the british armour, one which contrasts much of the tendencies of those historians named above, i suggest John Buckley's other book, which i already named here, 'British Armour in the Normandy Campaign' .

[Christopher L. · Rating 5 out of 5]

I found this to be an outstanding history book - it is crisply written, challenges orthodoxy, it is not biased and, above all, it educates. Prof. Buckley has written a first class addition to the WW2 Canon.

Prior to reading this book, I have to say that it always troubled me how often and how intensely the German army continued to receive the sobriquet of "being the best army" in the war yet lost, while the British army, by contrast, has been denigrated quite viciously, yet won where required.

In this book, Prof. Buckley tries, and in my opinion succeeds, in objectively assessing the British Army's performance in Western Europe, post D-Day. His conclusions are that Britain in fact ended the war with a well honed, highly professional army equipped with excellent and innovative tactical skills and an operational doctrine which brought victories, large and small, in varied conditions and terrain against, in many cases, highly organized and motivated opposition.

Prof. Buckley fluently addresses the basic criticisms leveled at the British Army - First, German interpretations of various battles were best served by focusing on the preponderance of resources, air superiority etc of the allies rather than their own tactical and operational weaknesses.... so to state the obvious point, not to have used those resources and the advantages they conferred would have been negligent indeed, and this holds true for all the allies. But what is clear though is that, in most instances, the British managed those resources very effectively.

Second, the British adapted well and fast to tactical situations, Prof. Buckley gives many examples of this as well as examples of the dire consequences if lessons were ignored. As a result the British Army wasn't the hidebound institution that some maintain, and in becoming more "professional" as combat wore on the British replicated the same learning experience as the Americans, a process which was been well addressed in Rick Atkinson's trilogy.

Third, operationally the British, and in reality the allies as a whole, were constrained by what was considered to be acceptable losses, yet for political reasons the Army had to be shown to be doing its bit, especially as the US commitment grew.... the operational doctrine which Montgomery developed was very well suited to this conundrum. It wasn't perfect, and opportunities were lost as a result of either the wrong strategic decisions as with regard to Market Garden / Scheldt Estuary or an overly conservative approach such as that of crossing the Rhine, yet the goal of beating the Germans in fraught and aggressive engagements without the blood letting of the first would war was ultimately very successfully achieved.

Fourth, the British were no slouches in a number of areas - artillery, engineering, medicine, logistics, intelligence to name some, and as Prof Buckley shows this institutional excellence greatly helped the fighting man achieve his goals without the slaughter seen on the Eastern Front.

Prof. Buckley goes into other aspects of the Army's performance in this excellent book, but rarely if ever does he show anything but appropriate critical analysis - I was surprised for example about his rather scathing assessment of Market Garden - I had always considered it to be a glorious failure rather than the end result of operational incompetence. Similarly, he expresses trenchant and cogent views on other operations as well as on specific generals. As a result one never feels like one is reading a eulogy or an apologia.

Which perhaps brings us on to the most interesting underlying question - exactly why had the British Army's reputation slipped so much with revisionist historians? Although perhaps not Prof Buckley's direct conclusion, my own view was that Montgomery, simply by being Montgomery, was largely responsible. There is a strong argument to suggest that he was the foremost Allied Army commander in the Western European Theatre and certainly the most successful and experienced, but he seems to have been a deeply flawed personality in many ways. It is evident he created a highly effective and efficient army, yet at the same time managed to upset and alienate vast swathes of the US and British High commands. As a result, it would appear that the criticism of Montgomery which erupted post war appears to have wrongly flowed through to criticism of the actual army he led, until such point as we were left with the received, but incorrect, wisdoms which Prof. Buckley so ably corrects.

To conclude, whether or not you agree with Prof. Buckley's positions, this really is a must read. Excellent scholarship, a plethora of new ideas to explore and a challenge to conventional thinking all make this a wonderful, stimulating history.

[Justin · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was excellent! Packed full of first-hand accounts, the book examined the premise that the British Army of 1944-1945 in Northwest Europe was risk averse, lacking in imagination and less effective than its allies and adversary. Buckley does an excellent job of giving an overview of the campaign and showed that the British Army played to its strengths: firepower, logistics, engineering and intelligence, all of which it excelled at, arguably more so than its allies, and which the Germans struggled to counter or match. Risk aversion was a consequence of a citizen army with a limited supply of soldiers, which meant that casualties had to be kept to a minimum. The British Army would have to finish the campaign with no more personnel than it started with in June 1944 - there were no more reserves (and potentially a whole further campaign to fight in the Far East). So Montgomery adopted the template he developed in 1942: massive artillery bombardments supported by lavish logistics, including excellent medical care, and enabled by Royal Engineers clearing obstacles, rebuilding roads, and constructing bridges. I was surprised at how much the tactics in Normandy resembled that of the First World War, with creeping artillery barrages and infantry advancing just behind, and most casualties caused on the enemy by artillery when they counterattacked.

Half the book covers Normandy, and the slog of that campaign really comes through. Then there is a chapter covering the few weeks of rapid charge from the Seine to Brussels and Antwerp. We then go through the criminal debacle of Arnhem, born of arrogance and overconfidence that the Germans were defeated. We then go through the winter of 1944-45, and I hadn’t appreciated how much fighting took place in those months and where the by-now battle-hardened British Army excelled tactically, before crossing the Rhine and final victory.

Montgomery comes across broadly positively, at least initially. He appears to have been the right person at the right time, developing a way that won battles for the army he had (it’s remarkable that he survived the First World War to get to this point). He cast this approach aside for the catastrophe of Arnhem, which overshadows his legacy, alongside his caution (arguably well-founded) and abrasiveness.

[Tony · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent overview of the British Army's war from Normandy to the Surrender. He covers all the major issues of controversy to give a much more nuanced - and positive - view of the British and Commonwealth Armies in the final year of the War.

He also, thankfully, helps puncture this weird worship of the German Army that some historians seem to have been infected by pointing out not just the simple fact that they lost, but that they were an army whose leadership was based on an almost ruthless disregard for casualties, a terrible lack of care for the injured and broken and led - at the highest level - by a cruel, vain and foolish man.

This isn't a hagiography though. Mistakes and errors are identified, but with the more strategic ones Buckley does a fine job of explaining what the British Army (and politicians) were keen to avoid - casualties like those of World War One. Why throw men into a meatgrinder when you have the power of engineering and equipment to help you?

That doesn't mean there wasn't a meatgrinder. What this book, and James Holland's 'Sicily '43' do is emphasize that an infantry soldier's life was a perilous and frightening one. Infantry soldiers made up 15% of the forces deployed by the British Empire but suffered 70% of the casualties. The courage required to keep pushing on, particularly towards the war's end when the Allied soliders must have been thinking that they could make it to the end, is something I will never understand.

It's also nice and fair about Montgomery, who seems to bring out the worst in some historians. Particularly American ones.

Highly recommended.

[Mike · Rating 4 out of 5]

Buckley's goal is to set the record straight and convince us that the British Army of the Second World War was not as leaden and lumpen as historians would have us believe.

I think he does so, while still highlighting the deficiencies. Basically, Montgomery fought a war that played to the Commonwealth's strengths in organisation, planning, engineering etc. while minimizing casualties.

The only flaw, and what prevents that fifth star, is that Buckley doesn't explain why Britain had to minimize losses when the Germans didn't - the Germans had been through a worse Great War than the UK had - or why the Germans at the front-end of the battle, the infantry, were 'better' than the Brits at tactical warfare. I'm assuming it's because the Germans focused on the tactical while the Brits focused on the campaign as a series of operations. But I'd have liked a bit more of a comparison to help cement the author's argument.

[Brian Page · Rating 4 out of 5]

Monty’s Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe by John Buckley is a feat of immense scholarship. Buckley lays out his challenge in the introduction: “How has the passage of history since 1945 turned the perception of a triumphant and successful army into one that is now of an unimaginative and plodding force….” (p. 7) The answer, of course, is that the army has with time been tarred with the same brush as "Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K. G." Buckley ably counters the common perception with an extraordinarily detailed account of British Army combat operations in Northwestern Europe beginning with D-Day. He concedes that aggressiveness was constrained by political considerations imposed from Churchill who insisted that the army never become so emasculated as to be of no account at the post-war bargaining table (Churchill looking for preservation of their empire, of course). Yet, in a contradictory imperative, the army had to show sufficient chutzpah to warrant a seat at that table. Monty’s strategy was, therefore, to carry out set piece campaigns of overwhelming strength (particularly armor) with minimal casualties.

I admit that I was well into the book before I fully realized that Buckley’s tome was not simply an addition to the Monty’s reappraisal industry – and the title of the book suddenly made sense. Buckley doesn’t spare Montgomery. Neither does he skewer him. The book documents the combat operations and provides a level-headed assessment of Monty’s (many & great) failings as well as providing an understanding of the constraints under which the Viscount was working. All-in-all, this is a welcome addition to WW II literature. And then there’s my favorite quote: “Brigadier Bill Williams, 21st Army Group’s chief intelligence officer, though noting that a German offensive [in the Ardennes] was possible, regarded it as unlikely, perhaps attributing an air of rational thinking to German strategy….” (p. 258)

[Sharad · Rating 4 out of 5]

As the cover says, a revisionist view of the role of the British army during the Normandy campaign and all the way to Berlin. Overall, a great book but the descriptions of army units was very detailed and at times dull.

[Tom · Rating 5 out of 5]

An enlightening view of the British army from 1944-45 dispelling many tired and outdated mainly politically driven opinions of its performances hitherto.

[Shrike58 · Rating 5 out of 5]

A really excellent synthesis of the New Operational Military History as it relates to the way of war in 21st Army Group, in which Buckley concludes that this field force "...matched resources with objectives, developed proficient fighting power sufficient to overcome the enemy, and delivered a victory to the British state that has for too long been downplayed by the passage of time."

If Buckley has a particular mission it is to place the undeniable errors and systemic problems of the British Army into proper context and call out a wide range of critics (Liddell Hart, Cornelius Ryan, Max Hastings, etc.) who had political and professional agendas to pursue, and in doing so misrepresented the real achievements that were accomplished in victory. If nothing else it's another sign that the legacy of Cold War military historiography, where it was politically convenient to exaggerate the performance of the German military (thus overlooking its professional and moral failings), is being rapidly left behind.

Still, Buckley also leaves one with the sense that much of the animus that has been directed at the British Army, and its way of war, is due to the resentment and anger that Bernard Montgomery's incompetence (there is no other appropriate word) at social engineering left in its wake, and which has fed into a "black legend" of arrogant poseurs leading unwilling donkeys.

Originally written: July 18, 2014.

[Nick Monfries · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not a bad read at all, and a surprisingly balanced look at the British (and Canadian) Armies that slogged through NW Europe in 44-45.

Buckley isn't afraid to call a spade a spade, and does a pretty good job of defending the British from the usual declarations of being poor throughout the campaign. He rightfully calls Market Garden a disaster but also defends (compellingly I might) a lot of the usual talking points.

About the only thing I would have liked to see included in this book was a bit more of a discussion of the technology involved. What we tend to get is a brief discussion of the armour both sides used and it's comparative strengths and weaknesses. Personally, I would have liked a little more discussion of the relative merits of equipment on both sides, but hey, can't win them all.

Overall, a fine book that I learnt a lot from and enjoyed very much.

[Omar Ali · Rating 3 out of 5]

An attempt to rescue the British Army's sorry reputation in world war 2. Some of it is persuasive, but not persuasive enough to completely overturn that perception. Still, a good read that will be interesting to world war two history fans. History needs rewriting several times, so there IS a need for this sort of thing, even if it does not turn black into white...

[Thomas Weston · Rating 4 out of 5]

An enjoyable book looking at the performance of the British Army in Europe from D-Day to VE Day, and offering some counter points to commonly held criticism of the way the British campaign was conducted. I may not agree with all of the authors conclusions, but he certainly offers some convincing arguments in favour of British doctrine and strategy.

[Brent]

Found in catalog, Yale University Press Fall/Winter 2013

[Nishant Pappireddi · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book convincingly refutes the conventional wisdom, showing that the British Army was effective and achieved its goals in its campaign from Normandy to the Baltic.