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Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War
Surge is an insider’s view of the most decisive phase of the Iraq War. After exploring the dynamics of the war during its first three years, the book takes the reader on a journey to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where the controversial new U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine was developed; to Washington, D.C., and the halls of the Pentagon, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff struggled to understand the conflict; to the streets of Baghdad, where soldiers worked to implement the surge and reenergize the flagging war effort before the Iraqi state splintered; and to the halls of Congress, where Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus testified in some of the most contentious hearings in recent memory. Using newly declassified documents, unpublished manuscripts, interviews, author notes, and published sources, Surge explains how President George W. Bush, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Ambassador Crocker, General Petraeus, and other U.S. and Iraqi political and military leaders shaped the surge from the center of the maelstrom in Baghdad and Washington.
384 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 2013
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November 11, 2023
First and foremost, this book was incredibly informative. I understand that “informative” is a quality that is relatively inherent to non-fiction literature, but here we are. I don’t often put down a book and go, “holy shit I just learned a lot.” With this book, I did.
Prior to reading this book my understanding of the Surge in Iraq (2007-2008) was that Petraeus came in and essentially shifted the entire mindset of American military strategy in the country. Instead of consolidating forces in large built-up bases outside of populated Iraqi areas (it’s easy to see how this could make you the big bad guy), American forces needed to walk and live alongside the Iraqi people to counter the efforts of the insurgencies.
Importantly, before reading, I didn’t understand the extent to which American actions catalyzed an Iraqi civil war. I also failed to understand the extent to which this civil war allowed for outside meddling: Iran fanned the flames of the civil war far more than I thought, including the direct use of Qods forces against Americans.
This book confirmed my understanding of the Surge, but expounded upon my rudimentary description more extensively than I could have imagined. The “Surge” was not just an increase in troops. It was an increase in efforts across all fronts by US forces and Iraqi counterparts to institute lasting change, in the face of extreme violence, before Congress turned the faucet off.
It was very refreshing to hear about a commander that pushed a comprehensive plan (a ‘Surge’-like strategy is relatively common for American military commanders to popularize without any follow-up) actually follow through and ensure subordinate units found success in their own ways. Petraeus and his staff updated the doctrine on counterinsurgency stateside in 2006 (FM 3-24) and then implemented it in Iraq one year later, updating as they went. (I checked, although a much better read than most doctrine, the 300-page FM 3-24.2 was last updated APR2009, so it seems that they are the last people to have revised the document). Still, all of this gave me a significant amount of hope about the capabilities of the military even with the understanding that it took 4 full years of military and diplomatic floundering in Iraq, and American politicians negating perceived gains, to find the right people for the job.
Second, I do think that this book is incredibly important in the historiography of the war in Iraq (most books I’ve perused have been entirely too positive or too negative, and written too close to 2008 to be published in a “relevant” window). Mansoor himself says that this book should be considered “the second draft of history, one that follows the journalistic accounts” that I just referred to. Petraeus appointed Mansoor to found the Counterinsurgency Center (where they wrote and revised FM 3-24) and hired him as his XO during the Surge. Mansoor is a legitimate historian separate from his military career, which lended quite a bit of legitimacy to this book as a history of the Surge rather than just a “good ol boy’s war story.” Mansoor does have some rose-tinted memories of what was a very physically comfortable deployment for him, which was a bit tone deaf considering the content of the rest of the book, and is a symptom of some classic staff officer behavior. In general, Mansoor was a bit too positive and self-congratulatory for my taste, but I appreciated the huge amount of good information.
Last, I do think that the American military members that participated in this conflict (for better or for worse) have not been given a fair shake. The question of agreeing with the 2003 American invasion and subsequent De-Ba’athification and occupation of Iraq is very different from how US Forces conducted themselves 5, 10, or 20 years after. It is clear that the American government/political establishment and American military had conflicting aims, goals, and resulting strategies in the country 2003-2008. It seems that due to their lack of historical knowledge, they were also bad at interpreting what was happening in Iraq and what those happenings meant for the future of the country. All of that to say, what American forces did under David Petraeus 2007-2008 was nothing short of unbelievable. I was in awe reading this book.
Favorite quotes:
“The Bush administration would have done well to study more history before engaging in such wars of choice.”
“Bremer… had little experience in the Middle East, did not speak Arabic, and lacked a thorough knowledge of the history, politics, social composition, and psyche of the Iraqi people.” (My Goodreads account is a dedicated Paul Bremer hate account)
On the CPA 2003-2004: “The astonishing reality is that the largest foreign assistance effort ever undertaken by the United States government was managed by an ad hoc organization created as an improvised solution to a crisis of America’s own creation.”
“In the end, the solution to Islamic radicalism had to come from within the Islamic tradition.”
“Wringing our hands about the flawed decision to invade Iraq was an interesting academic exercise… but it had zero utility in the real world… Surging U.S. forces to Iraq… was the right decision, even if it was merely the best of a lot of bad options.”
“The history of the surge argues for more civilian involvement in the development of strategy, not less.”
“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish… the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” - von Clausewitz
Prior to reading this book my understanding of the Surge in Iraq (2007-2008) was that Petraeus came in and essentially shifted the entire mindset of American military strategy in the country. Instead of consolidating forces in large built-up bases outside of populated Iraqi areas (it’s easy to see how this could make you the big bad guy), American forces needed to walk and live alongside the Iraqi people to counter the efforts of the insurgencies.
Importantly, before reading, I didn’t understand the extent to which American actions catalyzed an Iraqi civil war. I also failed to understand the extent to which this civil war allowed for outside meddling: Iran fanned the flames of the civil war far more than I thought, including the direct use of Qods forces against Americans.
This book confirmed my understanding of the Surge, but expounded upon my rudimentary description more extensively than I could have imagined. The “Surge” was not just an increase in troops. It was an increase in efforts across all fronts by US forces and Iraqi counterparts to institute lasting change, in the face of extreme violence, before Congress turned the faucet off.
It was very refreshing to hear about a commander that pushed a comprehensive plan (a ‘Surge’-like strategy is relatively common for American military commanders to popularize without any follow-up) actually follow through and ensure subordinate units found success in their own ways. Petraeus and his staff updated the doctrine on counterinsurgency stateside in 2006 (FM 3-24) and then implemented it in Iraq one year later, updating as they went. (I checked, although a much better read than most doctrine, the 300-page FM 3-24.2 was last updated APR2009, so it seems that they are the last people to have revised the document). Still, all of this gave me a significant amount of hope about the capabilities of the military even with the understanding that it took 4 full years of military and diplomatic floundering in Iraq, and American politicians negating perceived gains, to find the right people for the job.
Second, I do think that this book is incredibly important in the historiography of the war in Iraq (most books I’ve perused have been entirely too positive or too negative, and written too close to 2008 to be published in a “relevant” window). Mansoor himself says that this book should be considered “the second draft of history, one that follows the journalistic accounts” that I just referred to. Petraeus appointed Mansoor to found the Counterinsurgency Center (where they wrote and revised FM 3-24) and hired him as his XO during the Surge. Mansoor is a legitimate historian separate from his military career, which lended quite a bit of legitimacy to this book as a history of the Surge rather than just a “good ol boy’s war story.” Mansoor does have some rose-tinted memories of what was a very physically comfortable deployment for him, which was a bit tone deaf considering the content of the rest of the book, and is a symptom of some classic staff officer behavior. In general, Mansoor was a bit too positive and self-congratulatory for my taste, but I appreciated the huge amount of good information.
Last, I do think that the American military members that participated in this conflict (for better or for worse) have not been given a fair shake. The question of agreeing with the 2003 American invasion and subsequent De-Ba’athification and occupation of Iraq is very different from how US Forces conducted themselves 5, 10, or 20 years after. It is clear that the American government/political establishment and American military had conflicting aims, goals, and resulting strategies in the country 2003-2008. It seems that due to their lack of historical knowledge, they were also bad at interpreting what was happening in Iraq and what those happenings meant for the future of the country. All of that to say, what American forces did under David Petraeus 2007-2008 was nothing short of unbelievable. I was in awe reading this book.
Favorite quotes:
“The Bush administration would have done well to study more history before engaging in such wars of choice.”
“Bremer… had little experience in the Middle East, did not speak Arabic, and lacked a thorough knowledge of the history, politics, social composition, and psyche of the Iraqi people.” (My Goodreads account is a dedicated Paul Bremer hate account)
On the CPA 2003-2004: “The astonishing reality is that the largest foreign assistance effort ever undertaken by the United States government was managed by an ad hoc organization created as an improvised solution to a crisis of America’s own creation.”
“In the end, the solution to Islamic radicalism had to come from within the Islamic tradition.”
“Wringing our hands about the flawed decision to invade Iraq was an interesting academic exercise… but it had zero utility in the real world… Surging U.S. forces to Iraq… was the right decision, even if it was merely the best of a lot of bad options.”
“The history of the surge argues for more civilian involvement in the development of strategy, not less.”
“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish… the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” - von Clausewitz
January 6, 2024
I read this book after hearing Tarpey talk about it, wanting to read more books outside my norm. I also know embarrassingly little about the conflict that occurred during my childhood and this was one step toward learning more.
First and foremost, I have the utmost admiration for Petraeus and his staff. His ability to build a strong team, stand up for his plan, and to develop a thoughtful strategy that took into account the historical and cultural context was remarkable. And his commitment to his soldiers and the Iraqi people.
The book leaves me thinking about the necessary and complex relationship between the military and civilians/government - a topic Tarpey and I often noodle. The surge would not have worked if not paired with diplomacy, on the ground aid to Iraqis, and working with Iraqi leaders on local and national politics. Misunderstanding that context was much of the problem with the conflict altogether.
At the same time, Mansoor’s frustration with the congressional oversight and the political scene back at home is indicative of a larger challenge between the civilian government and the military. Very rarely are they speaking the same language or have the same time horizon in mind. It creates frustration on all sides - frustration that is palpable from Mansoor.
Favorite quotes:
“Just because you invade a place stupidly does not mean you have to leave it stupidly”
“The emphasis on technology over an understanding of the realities of war and conflict reflect the historicism not only of the US military officer corps but of the American educational system as well. Our mistakes…. Were a result of a pervasive failure to understand the historical framework…, to appreciate the cultural and political favors of other nations and other people…, and to encourage the learning of foreign language”
“The history of the surge argues for more civilian involvement in the development of strategy, not less”
“Just because US armed forces are the most capable in the world does not mean they should be the first choice for policy makers looking for solutions to difficult problems”
First and foremost, I have the utmost admiration for Petraeus and his staff. His ability to build a strong team, stand up for his plan, and to develop a thoughtful strategy that took into account the historical and cultural context was remarkable. And his commitment to his soldiers and the Iraqi people.
The book leaves me thinking about the necessary and complex relationship between the military and civilians/government - a topic Tarpey and I often noodle. The surge would not have worked if not paired with diplomacy, on the ground aid to Iraqis, and working with Iraqi leaders on local and national politics. Misunderstanding that context was much of the problem with the conflict altogether.
At the same time, Mansoor’s frustration with the congressional oversight and the political scene back at home is indicative of a larger challenge between the civilian government and the military. Very rarely are they speaking the same language or have the same time horizon in mind. It creates frustration on all sides - frustration that is palpable from Mansoor.
Favorite quotes:
“Just because you invade a place stupidly does not mean you have to leave it stupidly”
“The emphasis on technology over an understanding of the realities of war and conflict reflect the historicism not only of the US military officer corps but of the American educational system as well. Our mistakes…. Were a result of a pervasive failure to understand the historical framework…, to appreciate the cultural and political favors of other nations and other people…, and to encourage the learning of foreign language”
“The history of the surge argues for more civilian involvement in the development of strategy, not less”
“Just because US armed forces are the most capable in the world does not mean they should be the first choice for policy makers looking for solutions to difficult problems”
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 16, 2013
Very informative and very detailed book that is a combination of an academic military history work and a apologetic for the surge in Iraq. It shows where military policy failed and then was rescued giving credit to not only GEN Petreas but also the Iraq Prime Minister (esp. In Basra) and President Bush who in his opinion made a courageous decision to order the surge. It also reads with the tone of an academic history book so the reader needs to be prepared for big words and long sentences as well (i.e. this is NOT written by a reporter!)
March 18, 2018
AWC. The book includes a fair amount of apologetics for President Bush and his administration, and it taught me a lot about the background and implementation of our 2007-2008 surge in Iraq from the viewpoint of an officer who was right there during it all.
April 7, 2014
Using his experience as Executive officer to General David Petraeus, recently declassified documents, interviews, and unpublished manuscripts, Peter Mansoor has written a powerful and insightful book on the "Surge" in the Iraqi War. In the forward of the book, General Petraeus writes that author Pete Mansoor "is uniquely qualified to write a history of the surge" and that "he possesses an unequaled combination of impressive scholarly achievement, military service, experience in the early days in Iraq, and participation in key events during the surge." That says it all. This is an enjoyable, well written book about a complex and much discussed event. I recommend it highly.
April 9, 2022
Pete Mansoor was Petraeus' XO during the Surge in Iraq, and he played a major role in developing and executing this strategy. In this balanced and thorough book, Mansoor traces the history of the surge and analyzes how it succeeded in tamping down violence in Iraq and creating space for Iraq politicians to reconcile and come to power-sharing agreements (a task they largely failed at).
Mansoor's history is nuanced, so he doesn't treat the surge as a totally new strategy. Some commanders were employing COIN type strategies throughout Iraq before 2007, but at the national level the focus was on transition to Iraqi forces. Donald Rumsfeld was a huge barrier here: at first he denied that an insurgency was happening, supported decisions that worsened the insurgency like disbanding the army, and then stuck to a "light footprint" strategy that failed to provide security to the IRaqi people. The core problem was ethno-sectarian competition over power, particularly Shia domination of the state and the Sunni loss of power/fear of oppression/disbelief in the legitimacy and efficacy of the political process. Sunni tribes made alliances with AQ and other radicals to wage war against the Shia and the US. This alliance soured over time as AQ became more brutal and radical, but the Sunni tribes could not throw off AQ on their own. 2006 became the horrible year for Iraq, with full on sectarian civil war and endless car and suicide bombings.
The Surge was America's last ditch effort to reverse these trends. Far from just being a hearts and minds strategy, the surge was a complex strategy that did a number of things 1. Securing the Iraqi population by clearing out insurgents and then remaining in neighborhoods to maintain security, make it possible for Iraqis to aid the coalition forces without fear of reprisal, and build services, governance, and legitimacy. 2. Training Iraqi forces in real time by bringing them on these missions and, when appropriate, handing things off to them gradually. 3. Special ops and other kinetic ops against the radical "belt" around Baghdad to clear out insurgent staging points and facilities used to project force into the capital. 4. a prison surge to weed out the most extreme prisoners and isolate them from the population, all while facilitating a rehabilitation and release program for other prisoners. 5. An alliance with Sunni tribes to help them take on and eject the extremists from their communities 6. Building militias called the Sons of Iraq to integrate armed groups and even former insurgents into anti-AQ forces and eventually legitimate state institutions like the police.
This strategy was remarkably successful in 2007-8 at tamping down violence, providing more security and stability to the average Iraqi, marginalizing and weakening AQ and other extremists, and creating space for Iraqi politicians to reconcile their differences. The last point is really the ultimate point of strategic success, and it was achieved only partially (at best). Mansoor is fully cognizant of this limitation, but because the book was published in 2013, he obviously didn't know that ISIS was going to come roaring back in Iraq as a manifestation in part of Sunni anger and alienation from the political process. A lot of this failure came from Maliki himself, who often performed admirably during the surge but turned out to be more partisan and authoritarian than we had hoped. He made some power-sharing deals with the Sunni but didn't follow through, he increasingly infiltrated the Iraqi state with partisans who were corrupt and anti-Sunni, he more or less stole an election in 2010-2011, and ultimately he oppressed his political rivals and transformed Iraq into a partial democracy at best. The failure of the political process in Iraq helped set the stage for AQI's metamorphosis into ISIS, a development which to me reflects the ultimate failure of the IRaq War. This doesn't make the Surge the wrong thing to do, but it shows that it didn't fundamentally change the political scene in Iraq.
Mansoor is a judicious and fair-minded narrator who mixes in analysis with entertaining memoir. He is more defensive of Bush than many writers on Iraq, but I agree with him that Bush deserves immense credit for the Surge even though he botched the war's first 4 years (and made the original mistake of invading IRaq in the first place). If I had a criticism of this book, it would be that there is too much repetition of the basic strategy of the surge; eventually, as a reader, you say "ok I get it." But the book is nonetheless clearly written, persuasive, and of reasonable length. Strongly recommended for anyone lookin for a better understanding of the course of the IRaq War from a scholar and insider.
Mansoor's history is nuanced, so he doesn't treat the surge as a totally new strategy. Some commanders were employing COIN type strategies throughout Iraq before 2007, but at the national level the focus was on transition to Iraqi forces. Donald Rumsfeld was a huge barrier here: at first he denied that an insurgency was happening, supported decisions that worsened the insurgency like disbanding the army, and then stuck to a "light footprint" strategy that failed to provide security to the IRaqi people. The core problem was ethno-sectarian competition over power, particularly Shia domination of the state and the Sunni loss of power/fear of oppression/disbelief in the legitimacy and efficacy of the political process. Sunni tribes made alliances with AQ and other radicals to wage war against the Shia and the US. This alliance soured over time as AQ became more brutal and radical, but the Sunni tribes could not throw off AQ on their own. 2006 became the horrible year for Iraq, with full on sectarian civil war and endless car and suicide bombings.
The Surge was America's last ditch effort to reverse these trends. Far from just being a hearts and minds strategy, the surge was a complex strategy that did a number of things 1. Securing the Iraqi population by clearing out insurgents and then remaining in neighborhoods to maintain security, make it possible for Iraqis to aid the coalition forces without fear of reprisal, and build services, governance, and legitimacy. 2. Training Iraqi forces in real time by bringing them on these missions and, when appropriate, handing things off to them gradually. 3. Special ops and other kinetic ops against the radical "belt" around Baghdad to clear out insurgent staging points and facilities used to project force into the capital. 4. a prison surge to weed out the most extreme prisoners and isolate them from the population, all while facilitating a rehabilitation and release program for other prisoners. 5. An alliance with Sunni tribes to help them take on and eject the extremists from their communities 6. Building militias called the Sons of Iraq to integrate armed groups and even former insurgents into anti-AQ forces and eventually legitimate state institutions like the police.
This strategy was remarkably successful in 2007-8 at tamping down violence, providing more security and stability to the average Iraqi, marginalizing and weakening AQ and other extremists, and creating space for Iraqi politicians to reconcile their differences. The last point is really the ultimate point of strategic success, and it was achieved only partially (at best). Mansoor is fully cognizant of this limitation, but because the book was published in 2013, he obviously didn't know that ISIS was going to come roaring back in Iraq as a manifestation in part of Sunni anger and alienation from the political process. A lot of this failure came from Maliki himself, who often performed admirably during the surge but turned out to be more partisan and authoritarian than we had hoped. He made some power-sharing deals with the Sunni but didn't follow through, he increasingly infiltrated the Iraqi state with partisans who were corrupt and anti-Sunni, he more or less stole an election in 2010-2011, and ultimately he oppressed his political rivals and transformed Iraq into a partial democracy at best. The failure of the political process in Iraq helped set the stage for AQI's metamorphosis into ISIS, a development which to me reflects the ultimate failure of the IRaq War. This doesn't make the Surge the wrong thing to do, but it shows that it didn't fundamentally change the political scene in Iraq.
Mansoor is a judicious and fair-minded narrator who mixes in analysis with entertaining memoir. He is more defensive of Bush than many writers on Iraq, but I agree with him that Bush deserves immense credit for the Surge even though he botched the war's first 4 years (and made the original mistake of invading IRaq in the first place). If I had a criticism of this book, it would be that there is too much repetition of the basic strategy of the surge; eventually, as a reader, you say "ok I get it." But the book is nonetheless clearly written, persuasive, and of reasonable length. Strongly recommended for anyone lookin for a better understanding of the course of the IRaq War from a scholar and insider.
December 24, 2017
An insider's account of American counterinsurgency fighting in Iraq. Describes deliberations behind the Surge strategy and its implementation. Includes both the historical narrative with events of the campaign and personal impressions, opinions of other people, encounters with friends and some good humor.
The main point is - solution to counterinsurgency is mostly political, and armed forces operations are only means, although very important, to achieve that end, and not the end themselves. The author reiterates that main points of surge strategy perhaps too many times, by the end of the book you already know what he is going to say in the next few paragraphs once he brings up the topic, but I find it a minor drawback.
Two very important points were:
1. The key to success was winning the loyalties of population, not by "hearts and minds" PR campaign, but by solving their pressing needs: security, electricity, water, then political representation.
2. They could not kill all the enemies, they had to make peace somehow with armed enemies, guys who had blood on their hands. Instead of retaliation, they chose to reconcile and remove an obstacle to the long-term goal.
The story ends in summer 2008, would be interesting to read a follow-up about later events, the reasons behind failure in Iraq in the long run and rise of ISIL.
The main point is - solution to counterinsurgency is mostly political, and armed forces operations are only means, although very important, to achieve that end, and not the end themselves. The author reiterates that main points of surge strategy perhaps too many times, by the end of the book you already know what he is going to say in the next few paragraphs once he brings up the topic, but I find it a minor drawback.
Two very important points were:
1. The key to success was winning the loyalties of population, not by "hearts and minds" PR campaign, but by solving their pressing needs: security, electricity, water, then political representation.
2. They could not kill all the enemies, they had to make peace somehow with armed enemies, guys who had blood on their hands. Instead of retaliation, they chose to reconcile and remove an obstacle to the long-term goal.
The story ends in summer 2008, would be interesting to read a follow-up about later events, the reasons behind failure in Iraq in the long run and rise of ISIL.
May 24, 2017
I though a long time about writing a review for this book. It is masterly researched and gives an excellent picture of the surge in the Iraq War. However, I served as an Army Officer retiree recall in a Provincial Reconstruction Team during this period and experienced a completely different existence than Colonel Mansoor. At the ground level the State Department and military constantly were at each other's throats. We got little done due to the constant fighting and the poor leadership of many of the State Department leaders. Their complete disdain for the military and their goal of enhancing their careers was the sole reason for being in Iraq. They looked upon as Neanderthals who could barely read and write, even though I have a PhD.
I have the highest respect and admiration for Colonel Mansoor, General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker and especially the young men and women who constantly put their lives on the line daily to protect me and my associates but the Surge was in many ways a disaster due to incompetent State Department management.
Maybe I ought to quit playing golf and walking the dog and write my own version of the Surge.
I have the highest respect and admiration for Colonel Mansoor, General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker and especially the young men and women who constantly put their lives on the line daily to protect me and my associates but the Surge was in many ways a disaster due to incompetent State Department management.
Maybe I ought to quit playing golf and walking the dog and write my own version of the Surge.
November 7, 2016
The semi-official history of the surge, written by Gen. Petraeus' executive officer, Peter Mansoor. But don't let that fool you: Mansoor has a PhD in History and knows how to write a balanced account. He argues (correctly) that the surge was successful and helped stabilize Iraq, but he also (correctly) credits the Anbar Awakening and other factors as crucial in helping bring about the turnaround in 2007-8. No history of the Iraq war is complete without some accounting of Mansoor's record, which should be considered a vital first draft of history.
February 18, 2019
Extremely insightful take on what made up the surge and the author’s thoughts on why it worked. I enjoyed the detail relating to the Civilian-Military relationships and interactions. Personally i felt the intro was a bit long and could have done with less, “I did this, I did that...” but overall I’m thankful for the author’s work and am very interested to revisit “The surge” in 10 years to get a perspective on how time has changed on the view of the surge.
April 30, 2014
Here we have an ultimate insider’s view of the American military strategy in Iraq, post 2007. According to the author, the ‘Surge’ strategy turned the war around, from potential disastrous military and even geopolitical defeat in the region for the U.S. into the somewhat stable and potentially viable state that Iraq is today.
Then Colonel Peter R. Mansoor was a ground commander in Iraq prior to 2007. He acted as General David Petraeus’s executive officer in Iraq during the surge strategy, thus witness to the conflict from both angles, pre and post surge. Mansoor traces Iraq from the end of 2006 when the war was ‘all but lost,’ to ‘hard is not hopeless,’ to stability by such metrics as reduced car bombings, civilian murders and trooper casualties after the surge. There’s an underlying supposition in the book, that the war itself is a grand adventure, a test of America’s resolve to cement a democracy in the middle east by securing a population and rendering safety to the Iraqi people. To his credit, Mansoor for the most part avoids the roiling U.S. politics of the war—that Iraq was a war of choice—to focus his writing on the surge itself and its military and thus political effects inside Iraq. The author hints at the pushback from Democrats and others on Capitol Hill, but restrains his writing, mostly.
Mansoor’s narrative takes off from Fort Leavenworth, where, with his efforts and prodding from General Petraeus, Army TRADOC produces FM 3-24, the counterinsurgency (COIN) manual. Together with the Surge of troops, that Field Manual will hopefully turn the tide in Iraq. And the strategy does work, for the most part.
Mansoor is a military historian, and as such he lives with a somewhat broader view than most. The book cites such obscure but perhaps relevant factors as the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 after the Magdeburg massacre. That treaty is the first document which alludes to the separation of church and state. Mansoor cites the deep, divisive history of the Shi’a Vs Sunni Muslim population in Iraq, and the chasm between those two religious groups that drives much of the conflict. Indeed, the event that seems to mark the nexus of change in Iraq is the so called Awakening, when Sunni members of the new Iraq turned against their own Sunni militia counterparts. According to Mansoor, the sea change would not have happened without the surge. Likewise, Shi’a groups turned against Muqtada al Sadr’s Shi’a militia in similar fashion during the so called Charge of the Knights, demonstrating loyalty to Nouri al Maliki’s government and a secular Iraq.
Surge outlines and unpacks a specific military strategy in America’s war of choice in Iraq. It has its faults. For one, the author idolizes General David Petraeus, his commander in war and writer of his book’s foreword. The rendering of Petraeus borders on hagiography. The book, rightly I believe, takes certain Democratic politicians to task for overt campaigning at the expense of the troops. Mansoor cites Von Clausewitz and Beyerchen on the non-linear aspect of war, then he draws straight lines from surge strategy to success. Likewise, he refers again and again to the necessity of personal interaction with Iraqis, and the resultant Humint that such counterinsurgency offers, but seems enamored of tech tools such as powerpoint, drones, social media and the hard power common to any war, such as Stryker vehicles, M1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. To his credit, Mansoor avoids any mention of his own military activity, writing almost as a witness to the history he’s immersed in, and not as a soldier. That, too, may be a shortcoming. The book makes little mention of the troops on the ground, the Eleven Bravos wearing their battle rattle who made the Surge work.
In the book’s final section, The Surge in Retrospect, Mansoor delves into some of the political aspects of the Iraq war, and here, in this reviewer’s opinion, as an objective writer he stumbles a bit. Those who ‘wring their hands’ over the Bush administration’s ‘surge’ to invade Iraq in 2003, ‘for vague strategic reasons,’ are engaged in ‘an interesting academic exercise.’ Mr. Bush invaded Iraq to find non-existent WMD. Nothing vague about it. Our elected leaders have a sacred obligation to debate the use of America’s military. This is no ‘interesting academic exercise.’ The author mentions the failure of the Obama administration to secure an agreement to keep U.S. troops in Iraq post 2011, using Korea and Vietnam as examples. This is a false choice; Koreans begged us to stay; we lost the war in Vietnam and had to leave; the American people demanded that we leave Iraq. In a democracy, which is what we’d hoped to install in Iraq, after all, that’s simply the way it works.
All in all a definitive book about a select, specific military strategy that seems to have done the job it was designed to do. The writing is crisp, authoritative and jammed with facts. For those who study military history it offers an important addition to their shelves, along with Tom Holland’s In The Shadow of the Sword, and Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie.
Byron Edgington, author of The Sky Behind Me: A Memoir of Flying & Life
Then Colonel Peter R. Mansoor was a ground commander in Iraq prior to 2007. He acted as General David Petraeus’s executive officer in Iraq during the surge strategy, thus witness to the conflict from both angles, pre and post surge. Mansoor traces Iraq from the end of 2006 when the war was ‘all but lost,’ to ‘hard is not hopeless,’ to stability by such metrics as reduced car bombings, civilian murders and trooper casualties after the surge. There’s an underlying supposition in the book, that the war itself is a grand adventure, a test of America’s resolve to cement a democracy in the middle east by securing a population and rendering safety to the Iraqi people. To his credit, Mansoor for the most part avoids the roiling U.S. politics of the war—that Iraq was a war of choice—to focus his writing on the surge itself and its military and thus political effects inside Iraq. The author hints at the pushback from Democrats and others on Capitol Hill, but restrains his writing, mostly.
Mansoor’s narrative takes off from Fort Leavenworth, where, with his efforts and prodding from General Petraeus, Army TRADOC produces FM 3-24, the counterinsurgency (COIN) manual. Together with the Surge of troops, that Field Manual will hopefully turn the tide in Iraq. And the strategy does work, for the most part.
Mansoor is a military historian, and as such he lives with a somewhat broader view than most. The book cites such obscure but perhaps relevant factors as the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 after the Magdeburg massacre. That treaty is the first document which alludes to the separation of church and state. Mansoor cites the deep, divisive history of the Shi’a Vs Sunni Muslim population in Iraq, and the chasm between those two religious groups that drives much of the conflict. Indeed, the event that seems to mark the nexus of change in Iraq is the so called Awakening, when Sunni members of the new Iraq turned against their own Sunni militia counterparts. According to Mansoor, the sea change would not have happened without the surge. Likewise, Shi’a groups turned against Muqtada al Sadr’s Shi’a militia in similar fashion during the so called Charge of the Knights, demonstrating loyalty to Nouri al Maliki’s government and a secular Iraq.
Surge outlines and unpacks a specific military strategy in America’s war of choice in Iraq. It has its faults. For one, the author idolizes General David Petraeus, his commander in war and writer of his book’s foreword. The rendering of Petraeus borders on hagiography. The book, rightly I believe, takes certain Democratic politicians to task for overt campaigning at the expense of the troops. Mansoor cites Von Clausewitz and Beyerchen on the non-linear aspect of war, then he draws straight lines from surge strategy to success. Likewise, he refers again and again to the necessity of personal interaction with Iraqis, and the resultant Humint that such counterinsurgency offers, but seems enamored of tech tools such as powerpoint, drones, social media and the hard power common to any war, such as Stryker vehicles, M1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. To his credit, Mansoor avoids any mention of his own military activity, writing almost as a witness to the history he’s immersed in, and not as a soldier. That, too, may be a shortcoming. The book makes little mention of the troops on the ground, the Eleven Bravos wearing their battle rattle who made the Surge work.
In the book’s final section, The Surge in Retrospect, Mansoor delves into some of the political aspects of the Iraq war, and here, in this reviewer’s opinion, as an objective writer he stumbles a bit. Those who ‘wring their hands’ over the Bush administration’s ‘surge’ to invade Iraq in 2003, ‘for vague strategic reasons,’ are engaged in ‘an interesting academic exercise.’ Mr. Bush invaded Iraq to find non-existent WMD. Nothing vague about it. Our elected leaders have a sacred obligation to debate the use of America’s military. This is no ‘interesting academic exercise.’ The author mentions the failure of the Obama administration to secure an agreement to keep U.S. troops in Iraq post 2011, using Korea and Vietnam as examples. This is a false choice; Koreans begged us to stay; we lost the war in Vietnam and had to leave; the American people demanded that we leave Iraq. In a democracy, which is what we’d hoped to install in Iraq, after all, that’s simply the way it works.
All in all a definitive book about a select, specific military strategy that seems to have done the job it was designed to do. The writing is crisp, authoritative and jammed with facts. For those who study military history it offers an important addition to their shelves, along with Tom Holland’s In The Shadow of the Sword, and Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie.
Byron Edgington, author of The Sky Behind Me: A Memoir of Flying & Life
June 2, 2019
Very informative. Well written. If you are interested in this type of history, both military and political, you will enjoy the book and appreciate the inside view of the overall war in Iraq and particularly the Surge. The author does not give his opinion as to the decision to invade Iraq, but offers plenty of insight on the strategic and tactical decisions made.
July 11, 2025
While the book is rich in details and very informative, it also feels a little repetitive. At times, it seems like the author struggled to reach the assigned number of pages.
Some thoughts and ideas are repeated throughout the book without any clear reason. This issue becomes more noticeable in the final chapter, the retrospect, which feels like a condensed version of what came before.
Content-wise, the book feels somewhat self-congratulatory and biased, especially for something written by a historian. Some bias might be expected, as Mansoor is sharing his experience as part of the surge. However, the book often resembles an '80s or '90s movie. There's a stark divide between characters: the "good guys" (the MNF-I under Petraeus and the Republicans) doing everything right, and the "bad guys" (the MNF-I under Petraeus' predecessor, the Democrats, the rest of the U.S. military not under Petraeus, and, of course, the insurgents).
This simplistic divide and lack of nuance suggest cherry-picking, which is unfortunate, given the overall quality of the book.
Some thoughts and ideas are repeated throughout the book without any clear reason. This issue becomes more noticeable in the final chapter, the retrospect, which feels like a condensed version of what came before.
Content-wise, the book feels somewhat self-congratulatory and biased, especially for something written by a historian. Some bias might be expected, as Mansoor is sharing his experience as part of the surge. However, the book often resembles an '80s or '90s movie. There's a stark divide between characters: the "good guys" (the MNF-I under Petraeus and the Republicans) doing everything right, and the "bad guys" (the MNF-I under Petraeus' predecessor, the Democrats, the rest of the U.S. military not under Petraeus, and, of course, the insurgents).
This simplistic divide and lack of nuance suggest cherry-picking, which is unfortunate, given the overall quality of the book.
November 16, 2014
Indispensable analysis
Mansoor has contributed an indispensable analysis of surge strategy from his front row seat behind General Petraeus. Looking back on my years as an advisor to senior Iraqi military and police officers in Baghdad, the chronology provides valuable context to decisions and events we experienced in real time. In the final analysis a spotlight shines on the necessity of getting the strategy right early by understanding the nature of the war, then finding the right General to implement it. It is easy to read between the lines and see how easily defeat can be snatched from victory. A well-written combination of analysis and memoir.
Mansoor has contributed an indispensable analysis of surge strategy from his front row seat behind General Petraeus. Looking back on my years as an advisor to senior Iraqi military and police officers in Baghdad, the chronology provides valuable context to decisions and events we experienced in real time. In the final analysis a spotlight shines on the necessity of getting the strategy right early by understanding the nature of the war, then finding the right General to implement it. It is easy to read between the lines and see how easily defeat can be snatched from victory. A well-written combination of analysis and memoir.
March 22, 2014
Interesting account of the period from Feb 2007 to May 2008. This is a memoir, not a history book. Provides insight about the inner workings of Gen Petreaus during "The Surge."
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