Humour: A Very Short Introduction

Very Short Introductions #378

by Noël Carroll

Humour is a universal feature of human life. It has been discovered in every known human culture, and thinkers have discussed it for over two thousand years. In this Very Short Introduction Noel Carroll considers the nature and value of humour: from its leading theories and its relation to emotion and cognition, to ethical questions of its morality and its significance in shaping society.

About the Series:
Oxford's Very Short Introductions series offers concise and original introductions to a wide range of subjects--from Islam to Sociology, Politics to Classics, Literary Theory to History, and Archaeology to the Bible. Not simply a textbook of definitions, each volume in this series provides trenchant and provocative--yet always balanced and complete--discussions of the central issues in a given discipline or field. Every Very Short Introduction gives a readable evolution of the subject in question, demonstrating how the subject has developed and how it has influenced society. Eventually, the series will encompass every major academic discipline, offering all students an accessible and abundant reference library. Whatever the area of study that one deems important or appealing, whatever the topic that fascinates the general reader, the Very Short Introductions series has a handy and affordable guide that will likely prove indispensable.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Psychology, Humor, Comedy, Cultural, Literature

126 pages, Paperback

First published January 8, 2014

About the author

Noël Carroll (born 1947) is an American philosopher considered to be one of the leading figures in contemporary philosophy of art. Although Carroll is best known for his work in the philosophy of film, he has also published journalism, works on philosophy of art generally, theory of media, and also philosophy of history.

As of 2012, he is a distinguished professor of philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center. He holds PhDs in both cinema studies and philosophy. As a journalist, earlier in his career he published a number of articles in the Chicago Reader, Artforum, In These Times, Dance Magazine, Soho Weekly News and The Village Voice. He is also the author of five documentaries.

Perhaps his most popular and influential book is The Philosophy of Horror, or Paradoxes of the Heart (1990), an examination of the aesthetics of horror fiction (in novels, stories, radio and film). As noted in the book's introduction, Carroll wrote Paradoxes of the Heart in part to convince his parents that his lifelong fascination with horror fiction was not a waste of time. Another important book by Carroll is Mystifying Movies (1988), a critique of the ideas of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser and the semiotics of Roland Barthes, which has been credited with inspiring a shift away from what Carroll describes as the "Psycho-Semiotic Marxism" that had dominated film studies and film theory in American universities since the 1970s.

Reviews

[Michael Emond · Rating 2 out of 5]

I like the fact this book was brief, I like it tried to tackle the very hard to tackle subject/question of "What is Humour?" "Is Humour an Emotion?" and "What is the Purpose of Humour?".
I think out of the three sections it presented the theories of humour the best. However all three sections suffered from the fact this was written by a philosopher and not a psychologist - in other words it was written by a non-scientist and without any research to back his claims up it just becomes opinions not supported by facts but by cherry picked examples and sometimes not even that. I am a scientist so while I might find his opinion interesting it doesn't really further my KNOWLEDGE on the subject because one man's opinion is as good as the next person's opinion. And, oftentimes, I flat out disagreed with his opinions and found them ill founded.
A slightly interesting view on this topic that (let's be honest) can't really be dissected. I don't necessarily agree with E.B. White "Analyzing humor is like dissecting a frog. Few people are interested and the frog dies of it." But I do concede by analyzing humour into bits and pieces we can never capture the whole of it. That is to say, one theory of what is funny, or why we need humour won't ever be satisfying.

[Steve · Rating 1 out of 5]

Has to be the dryest, most unfunny book on humor ever written. Reminded me of the Bruno Kirby character in GOOD MORNING, VIETNAM ("I know comedy!"). And his defense of questionable humor, esp. his insistence that thinking a particular sexist joke is funny does not make him sexist, is offense and reveals his crude, boorish side. If I hadn't had to narrate this for work, I would have stopped 1/2 way through the first chapter.

[Christopher Gontar · Rating 1 out of 5]

Some scholars refer to the stimulus in humor as the "holy grail of humor studies." Though this is appropriate, it gives the impression that the stimulus question is the only important one. It would be equally if not more useful if "holy grail" referred to both stimulus and response, the two being inherently linked by the way they are defined.

There is a theory that establishes such a link. It is better than any of the ones Carroll mentions, and was introduced in 2011 after 5 years of work. On this view, the stimuli of humor are allusions to or direct images of a self-deceived superiority in a relatively small character, while the response is a mental copy of this disposition. The response is dispositional, the inner feeling of amusement. The one essence of humor is not "illusory superiority" (or Dunning-Krueger Effect) because that allows for an imposed deception, whereas deceptions are funny because they allude to self-deception. Diminutive self-deception is a central, personal image, while all other images of humor are merely objects or other signs that must allude to this. A serious hero is no less self-deceived, but he or she is not humorous unless seriousness itself is seen as pretentious.

Through producing or experiencing humor we express adjustment to reality, rather than attaining it if we are deficient. Mainly the disposition is the copy, yet outward laughter, too, is part of this imitation of a deluded attitude.

When self-deception is reproachable, it hides something that dissatisfies someone rather than something that truly hurts them. Consequently, an informed reader might say, "if the ridiculous is the inferior, that supports the superiority theory of Hobbes or of Charles R. Gruner." But that view does not define humor at all, only identifying an accompanying condition. The new theory is no "superiority theory."

The incongruity theory is false because it claims that contrasts create humor either directly or by their resolution, always unthematically. And in other cases, it is simply misapplied. The theory fails to indicate that the humor in great and small, high and low, derives from the relation of delusion versus reality. The response to humor is not a pleasure in the sense of a satisfaction in a contrast, or in its resolution, as the incongruity theory claims. Instead, the contrasts always are funny by representing delusion, so that the pleasure is first an imitation of an irrational and blithe attitude. Secondary pleasures of course follow. Therefore the incongruity theory of humor is false, and displaced by the new theory. Neurological studies would probably support these claims.

Among cases where the incongruity would apply, it is trivial. A pratfall could be described as high becoming low, but this is uninformative. A theory of humor must explain humor, not describe it superficially. Incongruity only describes humor superficially while pretending to explain it; therefore it is false. A pratfall represents shallow concern, not just being thwarted but raised in importance by death. The fall disrupts the pretentious character, but it is also a kind of hyperbole. In other words, falls illustrate both sides of the theory of Paul Reboux, that "humor is taking the light seriously and the serious lightly."

The incongruity theory also misuses incongruity by applying it to all sharp contrasts in general, treating them as inert. It is possible for many of those contrasts, for example, irregular language and ambiguity, to be treated meaningfully. But only the theory here proposed in this review does that. Ambiguity by itself, seen in isolation, signifies generally the embarrassing misuse of language, in particular the local or "host" language. There are tangible things that signify foibles and indecencies, while all such foibles are funny only because they represent self-deception. Ambiguity is a sign of those ideas by association, but also a device for their revelation.

Incongruity should be used only to refer to a difference in humor of great and small. Instead, every possible sense of the irregular or variant is equated, so that the concept not only loses the original meaning, but even has no meaning at all. For these reasons, the incongruity theory is discredited and there is no reason to use the name. Though it has been debunked before by both Alexander Bain and George Santayana, a more thorough refutation takes those writers into account.

Noël Carroll endorses mostly the earlier form of incongruity theory. But the newer version is that puns, while having other humorous effects, can create an appropriate incongruity. In other words, a foible or complaint is mentioned, linked to another idea by the double meaning. (If one needs an example, note the entire joke about the piano player and containing the line "do you know your monkey just dipped his balls in my martini?").

In the first place, the paradigm just mentioned has two possible senses in jokes. The standard "appropriate incongruity" theory interprets this idea to mean the way we understand jokes, the way we "get" them, resolving an incongruity. It cannot be entirely refuted, because it is a permanent part of the humor. But what proponents of the "getting the joke" approach fail to realize, is that this idea is a repetition of the central theme of jokes, and it is extraneous to the main part of their meaning. The true theory of humor, then, assimilates the old "incongruity resolution" theory. Everything falls under the theme of "selfish self-deception."

Thus the appropriate incongruity should also be seen as sarcasm, directed at a deluded stereotype who is not present in the most ideal form, though there is an actual addressee. Something painful or foolish is exposed obliquely using double meaning as a screen, in the same manner in which we whisper to someone sarcastically. The only sensible option for humor theory is to discard incongruity and replace it with the one thematic concept that it implies.

Noël Carroll's view of caricatures displays the triviality of the incongruity theory. The humor does not consist in the deviation from the person's specific, that is, individual appearance, because caricature is not a mere disguise. The important incongruity in caricature further disproves the theory. Caricature turns the human shape away from the human or adult so that the element of mind ceases to belong to it. But that is anthropomorphism and an image of self-delusion, and it explains why animal comparison is a type of caricature.

Noël Carroll misses some double meanings and he does not have a convincing theory of that kind of humor, or of other kinds of jokes. He claims that incongruity explains the humor in double meaning and in violations other than jokes. Violation, either as something so general as to be meaningless, or else as the rule-breaking sense of folly, is not the essence of humor despite philosophers trying to force it to be so. It is useful to have a theory of nonsense humor if jokes exhibit it in the way that Carroll claims. Yet they do not. But success in humor theory should be a question of breadth. If a theory shows that a single idea applies well to everything, informatively, then it should be the leading and authoritative position.

Carroll argues (like Freud) that some jokes come to nonsensical conclusions as a form of tension and release. This is based on the correct idea that tensions, releases, or in this case even false releases are funny. Carroll and many other writers on humor are right that this element adds to the power of a joke. But they are wrong to invest much of the humor in it. Tension and release, appearing even in the riddle of the Sphinx, are part of the cumulative structure of a joke, but as the more basic aspect. Humor in such tension and release can only be explained by the "selfish self-deception theory" of humor, that is, because the disappearance of tension alludes to the putting down of unjustified emotions; and when humor shows the increase of tension, the allusion is to complacency. But it is ambiguity that creates most of the humor in jokes. One might say that Carroll's idea of prolonged nonsense is meant as a sort of false release. But jokes can gain very little from any kind of tension except if they finally make sense. Only then can they refer to the only idea that is humorous on its face: delusion.

Freud too overlooks several double meanings in examples of humor. But he does not know their significance even when he does perceive them. And since he seeks to emphasize tension, nonsense, and puzzlement, he, like Carroll, selects a joke as nonsensical when actually he does not understand it. Freud then thinks laughter follows as a response by resembling a dissipation of purpose. One way to refute this view, then, is to explain all the jokes that are thus misinterpreted. This has already been accomplished in several examples of Freud's.

Carroll introduces the Incongruity Theory before the others (Release/relief and Superiority), and then returns to defend it more closely. This is where he introduces the problem that jokes are so puzzling as to be nonsensical. He then enlists an empty answer to address this pseudo-problem, which might be more easily solved by dropping incongruity as a theory altogether.

Jokes actually don't work by means of nonsense. First, note the one about the plane crash survivor.

The lone survivor of an airplane crash is marooned on a deserted island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. After many years, he is rescued by a passing ocean liner. The doctor who examines him says, 'You're in great health, but tell me one thing. Why did you build two synagogues on the island?' The survivor answers: 'The one on the north side of the island is my synagogue. The other one I wouldn't step into.'
Of this joke, Carroll says, "the punchline explains the puzzle of why there are two synagogues on an island with one inhabitant, but it does so at the cost of compounding the absurdity. For the joke invites us to imagine...a man [who] would build a structure for the sole purpose of not entering it. [Thus] the answer itself is an absurdity..." (Carroll 36).

Carroll's reading is similar to that of Freud, in that both thinkers are preoccupied with the surface of what it feels like to hear a joke for the first time -- not an unimportant idea. There is a bit of humor in this, so Carroll is right that the man's answer compounds the absurdity, creating a minor part of the humor. But it is a superficial description of the joke as it is to be explained. It is not the explanation itself.

The main meaning of this joke is hyperbole. It is a joke of exaggeration, which is understood by the "diminutive illusory superiority" theory as an example of extreme emotion or exaggerated concern. There is abundant evidence. The man is on a deserted island, where there are no people to care about differences of Jewish faith. That is the point of the joke being about a deserted island. Thus the humor consists almost solely in the idea that the religious divisions familiar to the survivor and to all Jews persist when he is alone. There is perhaps another level, wherein the man's beliefs have resulted in the construction of an extra building, as though he were beside himself or had generated without thinking this division within a community that is not there. Thus there is an extra allusion to absence of mind, or to a community that lacks actual bodies.

Try this example - what does "I never met a man I didn't like" mean? Is it nonsense, or double meaning? Is the double meaning a mere "violation," and is that what makes it funny? It's far more likely that we respond to an archetype, or image, of one who evades context, for when we see such double meanings we are affected by that image. Similarly, Groucho Marx says, "These are my principles, and if you don't like them, well, I have others." This might be an often misunderstood joke. Most people hearing this line probably feel that it only expresses the sudden reneging on the initial offering, of irreplaceable principles. But although it's there, that's not the main meaning. Groucho really means that the emphasis changes from the word "These" to the word "my."

Although it is a "violation" not to pay attention to context or others' intentions, it is more important to note that it is an ethical sort of violation, a kind of "self-centeredness." And according to what I think is the best theory (the one that I claim as intellectual property) every example of humor is, or alludes to, an image of such delusion, and our "dispositional" response to this stimulus is merely an echo of that image. Thus the "dispositional theory" that Carroll attributes to Jerrold Levinson, for example, only becomes truly important in this sense. It is only an obvious fact that there is such a disposition. And we have probably evolved or developed this response in a psychological sense, as an expression of our adjustment to ethical and social norms.

Carroll admits that he is not completely satisfied with what he finds the least problematic view, the Incongruity Theory. And yet he defends it, in scores of examples. It is difficult to conclude from this picture what sort of improvement is actually desired. "The incongruity theory still seems the most promising, because it offers the most informative approach to locating the structure of the intentional object of comic amusement" (48). Carroll also mentions that the banishment of fear is a factor that is "added to perceived incongruity in order for the incongruity theory to approach adequacy" (29).

The problem here is not just that incongruity is too general, as Carroll himself notes. But he seems unaware of an alternative, already known, that much better explains all that it explains. Success in "locating the structure," is in noticeable tension with incongruity as an "imprecise notion" (37) and "no more than a necessary condition for comic amusement" (28). How does incongruity explain informatively, if it's only a necessary condition? Carroll also criticizes incongruity directly on p. 34 and 37. On 34, he grants that incongruity is similar to puzzles (a problem that he then tries to solve), and shortly thereafter on p. 37, it is admitted that incongruity is too general, or does not describe its object informatively. But there is a basic reason for doubts. It is explained here and in a book. Incongruity is only a description of humor, rather than an actual explanation, something that's been said enough times. For Carroll, it is hoped that eventually a supplemental theory will arrive to patch up the problem, "isolate the pertinent recurring variables" and actually vindicate and preserve Incongruity, an implausible prognosis (53). I predict that it will never happen.

One problem with incongruity is that it does not produce a "response side" theory. It has not in 300 years presented a contentful view of what the response to humor is, only the stimulus. The fact is that incongruity by itself is incapable of eliciting in us something like the response to humor. John Morreall suggests "pleasure," but there are pleasures in incongruity that are not humorous. Matthew Hurley has pointed out that relatively "benign" violations are often not funny at all.

All of the qualities of benign violation which would make it appear to be intrinsically humorous, point away from it to a more perfect theme in self-deception. The moral or emotional uncertainty of a situation alludes very effectively to this idea of delusion -- by the pretentiousness or exaggeration of some serious concerns, the deception or self-deception required in order to hide moral or social error, and finally the mockery implicit in competitions or battles which use feigned violence or mental weapons instead of physical ones. Benign violation is funny because it indicates a better theory; that other does not support benign violation as a theory.

When I assert that "the essence of humor not pleasure," I don't mean that it does not include pleasure, but that this does not fully capture it, for several reasons. It is too general because pleasurable feeling is too general, and there is no other way to make the notion of satisfaction native or essential to humor except as the escape from reality, and thus delusion or diminutive ambition. A larger scale flawed ambition will pertain to tragedy.

As Victor Raskin once noted in a conference, the response to humor resembles intoxication. But Raskin did not assert, and did not know, why the response to humor is related to intoxication. The relation is plainly that both phenomena evoke not only delusion but a willful, appetitive delusional state. Tickling tends to evoke this state, not merely because it is sensual or sexual, but by the sense of its impropriety. By rapidly and repeatedly approaching sensitive areas, it violates the form of intimacy. This is the best account, though others have been attempted. We don't find tickling funny as merely a "mock attack," but because it is an allusion to a defective means of seduction. Therefore laughter does not follow as a reflex in this case.

A cold beverage or a cool shower on a very hot day might be congruous with desires. But they are incongruous with the surrounding heat, while even in that very sense they are pleasant in both the objects and their effects (the hot-cold contrast is desired), but neither, in that sense, is funny. Thus it is not, as Alexander Bain once suggested, that non-humorous incongruity is so easily found to be unpleasant. (In fact, Bain's "snow in May" example even eerily resembles the kind of pleasure just mentioned). A man in a wheelchair winning a track race is quite incongruous as well as inspiring and pleasing in an ethically sound way, and this even answers with the positive version of Bain's "decrepit man under a heavy burden." If the "special Olympics" does not violate actual defunct norms, it follows new norms that would been considered strange long ago. But it has no humor, unless we twist things by an insensitive interpretation.

Humor is not in essence, as Carroll claims, a "deviation from some presupposed norm" (17). Evidently, however, every humorous incongruity violates some norm. Erotic advances are a major paradigm. We will overlook some modern social changes (and even looks to some extent) and here treat efforts in love as a question of skill and charms.

How bizarre it would be, if we really thought that breaking rules, per se, was what the humor in romantic intrepidity, or unlikely love were all about. Who would we resemble, but the romantic fool himself, for whom rules are so all-important? That would make no sense.

In fact, our sense of humor is a mirroring of folly, but not in our theory -- not in the way we use and understand humor. The sense in which we mirror folly is in our response to humor. That is the response disposition that the other theorists have been seeking.

[Daniel Wright · Rating 4 out of 5]

Chapter 1: The nature of humour
Chapter 2: Humour, emotion, and cognition
Chapter 3: Humour and value

[Erica Eller · Rating 2 out of 5]

I had expected something more like a literary and historical analysis of the subject that would have taken us on a journey to ancient forms of humour to styles coming out on tik tok, etc. I’ve enjoyed better descriptions of humour by reading literary analyses of Shakespeare or Bakhtin’s theories about Rabelais. Instead, this author applied analytic philosophy (one of the driest disciplines) and through a repetitive and overly didactic approach theorizes the nature of humour. I felt the text was redundant and not well edited for concision (even in such a short book) in many sections. The author explores various theories about humour and its relationship to the emotions and morality to attempt to settle on a flawless definition of humour, which continues to evade us by the end of the book. I read the whole thing, but it wasn’t the book I was hoping for. In some ways, it presupposes humour is a static affect or phenomenon, rather than a literary genre or art form, has not evolved over time, and functions similarly across cultures, all of which I tend to disagree with. I would have preferred not to read about what universally defines humour, but enjoy the myriad forms it takes. I’m especially interested in comparisons between mediums: written humor, filmed comedy, stand up comedy, etc. I would love to read the same book by someone from a comparative literature department...

[Bernie Gourley · Rating 4 out of 5]

As both Mark Twain and E.B. White made abundantly clear, humor is like a frog; dissection kills it and few are interested in watching that happen. Which isn’t to say that dissection isn’t useful. But it does mean that readers who are looking for a book that’s a laugh-riot are looking in the wrong place. Most of the example jokes were ancient when the book was first published eight years ago. (They’re good jokes. Bad jokes don’t become old jokes, they die ignominiously.) All that aside, this book provides an intriguing look into such questions as: 1.) why do we find things humorous in the first place? (We take humor for granted, but – think about it – there’s no rationale for things being funny that automatically springs to mind;) 2.) how, if at all, does humor relate to our broader emotional experience; and 3.) when, if ever, is humor unethical?

This concise guide has three parts. In the first part, we learn the various theories of humor, and learn that the author favors Incongruity Theory (i.e. humor is - first and foremost - a recognition of and response to incongruities.) In the second, the author discusses the debate over whether humor is an emotional experience, or something else. Finally, we learn about the value of humor and, in particular, the ethics of humor. There’s a continuum from those who believe that humor – in and of itself – is always ethical to those who think that it’s virtually always unethical (unless one can find a joke without a butt,) with many nuanced variations, in between.

I found this to be an intriguing guide to the philosophy and psychology of humor, and – if that’s what you’re in search of – you should check it out.

[Richard · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a philosophical introduction to humour that works by argument. Carroll takes three areas - theories of humour, models of how humour works in terms of emotion and cognition, and ethical considerations relating to humour and its moral value - and adopts a position on each. For example, on theories, he summarises the superiority and release theories, and deals more briefly with two more theories (the play theory and the dispositional theory), but argues heavily for the incongruity theory, putting forward a number of counter-arguments, and dismissing each in their turn. Similarly, in the third chapter, he argues for "moderate comic moralism" and against other ethical models of humour. Each argument is pretty well structured and illustrated, and mostly well-paced, only getting bogged down a couple of times. I didn't always agree with him but I found the book largely convincing and informative, although it presents a different take on the release theory than what I thought I knew about it. For me, this was useful and readable book; although a glance at other reviews on this site shows that Carroll's personal and partial approach to the topic certainly does not work for everyone. One minor nit-pick: despite his appearance, SpongeBob SquarePants is not "a talking soap pad" (p. 20)!

[Σωτήρης Κατσιμίχας · Rating 2 out of 5]

Είχα μεγάλες προσδοκίες από αυτό το βιβλίο, αλλά δεν εκπληρώθηκαν. Δεν με δίδαξε τι είναι το χιούμορ, ούτε επιβεβαίωσε ή κατέρριψε τη θεωρία μου.

Το χιούμορ, για εμένα, η κωμική διάθεση και αντιμετώπιση της πραγματικότητας, δεν είναι καθόλου αστεία υπόθεση. Φανταστείτε τη ζωή σας χωρίς αστεία. Δεν γίνεται καν να ζήσουμε χωρίς αυτά. Μόνο τις στιγμές της μεγάλης λύπης και του πένθους, μπορεί να μας λείψει το χιούμορ, αλλά σύντομα ανακτάμε, χωρίς καθόλου προσπάθεια, την κωμική μας διάθεση. Μια ζωή χωρίς χιούμορ θα ήταν ένα συνεχές πένθος.

Γιατί το χιούμορ είναι το μόνο μας όπλο απέναντι στη ματαιότητα και τον θάνατο. Πιστεύω ότι το χιούμορ μας το χάρισε η εξέλιξη, μαζί με τη λογική, ακριβώς για να μπορούμε να την αντέχουμε.

Δυστυχώς, τίποτα από τα παραπάνω δεν διερευνάται στο βιβλίο. Γίνεται μια βαρετή και επαναλαμβανόμενη διερεύνηση για τη φύση του χιούμορ, υιοθετείται η θεωρία της ασυμβατότητας, μια ταυτολογία, στην ουσία, και, στο δεύτερο μέρος, ο συγγραφέας καταπιάνεται με την ηθική του χιούμορ, τον ρατσισμό, σεξισμό, ομοφοβία, κλπ, χωρίς να προσφέρει κάτι ενδιαφέρον ή σημαντικό.

Είναι το δεύτερο βιβλίο για το χιούμορ, που με απογοητεύει (το πρώτο ήταν το ομώνυμο του Terry Eagleton) και δεν το συστήνω.

[Dwight Penny · Rating 4 out of 5]

Needless to say, a book that provides a philosophical introduction to the nature of humor will contain an element of humor. In this case, it's the degree of dead-seriousness applied to the topic. The philosophy of humor is, of course, no laughing matter, which is what makes this book an example of its own thesis, specifically, the theory that the root of humor is incongruity, and a deadpan discussion of humor as a subject worthy of philosophical examination is, by the time you get well into this deceivingly long (tiny type-faced) book, is a joke in itself.

The incongruity of the formal, academic language used (a specific telling of a joke is a "humor token," humorous incongruity can be "initially described as a problematization of sense") builds up to a sort of in-joke. You can sort of imagine the author sitting with his grad students in a seminar and feeling rather pleased with himself that this course is written up in the school's catalog, and he's getting paid to discuss this.

If there appears to be some jealousy in my words, there probably is. The book is clearly written, as he wrestles not only with the question of What is humor?, also with important related points, such as, What is the evolutionary purpose of humor? Does humor have a moral duty? What happens to us when we appreciate humor?

I felt a sort of perverse sense of accomplishment in finishing the book. It was an exercise in how we can think about things philosophically, although it didn't reach any grand or earth-shattering conclusions. I will admit that some of the examples, which range from Cervantes to Krazy Kat are classic, and at times even laugh-out-loud (although when I retold one to someone who enquired, my humor token totally bombed), so by my own criteria, I have to nudge it up from three-stars to four.

[Jason · Rating 5 out of 5]

Carroll’s Humour: A Very Short Introduction was the book I used in my Greek and Roman comedy class to learn about the three main theories of humor (superiority, relief, and incongruity) as well as the ethics of it. Our reading lasted a week, comprising most of Chapters 1 and 3. Overall, I found Carroll’s formal analyses of humor convincing, and I was particularly persuaded by his thoughts on whether people have the right to be offended at certain jokes. In Chapter 3, he distinguishes “humor tokens” (the contexts in which a joke is told) from “humor types” (the jokes themselves), and claims that the morality of someone’s comedy is determined by the former rather than the latter. The only issue I have with the book is that it can feel repetitive, as if the exact same sentences are being written over and over again. Perhaps that is useful for inculcating the ideas into the reader, however. Other than that, the book achieves what it sets out to do, and I would recommend it to anyone seeking to engage more deeply with what philosopher Susanne K. Langer calls “the manifestation of life itself”.

[mavromou · Rating 4 out of 5]

si bien no me leí todo lo que está escrito sobre el humor, luego de leer 3 ó 4 referentes o libros clásicos que tratan las teorías más conocidas comenzar la lectura de un libro que pretende ser una introducción no me pareció atractivo.

Sin embargo el tema es tan vasto e interesante que no dejas de aprender nuevos enfoques de estudio, teorías y autores, por lo que este libro fue muy interesante en este sentido.

Si bien recorre las teorías principales, como muchos otros libros se centra en la teoría de la incongruencia la cual señala, tal como otros autores, que es la mas acertada.

También se centra, en el último capítulo, en un abordaje ético del humor .

[Kavitha Tandale]

The book discusses five fundamental theories that engender comic amusement: 1. Superiority theory; 2. Incongruity theory; 3. Release theory; 4. Play theory; 5. Dispositional theory, amongst which the second type of theory seems the most prevalent in the different comic situations. Although neither of them is relevant at all times and in all cases, other conditions also need to be considered, such as a joke's offensiveness, repetitiveness, morality, amorality, and ethicality.

[Matthew Sobolik · Rating 5 out of 5]

I thoroughly enjoyed this short book on the philosophical nature of humor. This is a branch of philosophy I have not given much thought to so a brief introduction like this was excellent. Carroll discusses several different theories of humor ultimately settling on the incongruity theory which holds that humor is derived from some perceived incongruity. I found this theory to be very persuasive, but missing something, namely the communal aspect of humor.

[Adam O'Boyle · Rating 4 out of 5]

She Favors the incongruity theory while also acknowledging the superiority theory has some useful applications. Humour- a social event that disrupts norms and and creates social bonding through culture and subculture mutual understanding and merit responsive laughter. Humour lies in a region beyond good and evil. No topic or taboo is off limits.

[Dessy Pingelova · Rating 3 out of 5]

Грабваща в началото, но неспособна да задържи интереса. Това е мнението ми за тази книга.
В началото бях въодушевена от теориите, защото разкриваха идеи за хумора, за които не съм се замисляла, но разчитайки повече на теория отколкото на нагледни примери, книгата не можа да задържи интереса ми по същия начин докрая, когато вече се усещаше като просто задължение да я завърша.

[Neul · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book intends to explain “What is humor?” while trying to prove incongruity is the reason for comic amusement, hence the humor. This is the reason it is not a suitable book for the “A Very Short Introduction” series. The writer jumps really fast to trying to prove why other theories are not true before explaining what theories really are.

[Aletta Simpson · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a wonderful book for anyone that would like a good overview of humour theory. I really enjoyed reading it as part of my master's research and would recommend it to humour and/or philosophy lovers. Carroll gives a condensed and clear summary of the major trends in the field.

[María Frutilla · Rating 2 out of 5]

Fome as hell.

[Naga Teja · Rating 2 out of 5]

A very terse read.

[Carman Chew · Rating 5 out of 5]

It is what it claims to be, a simple introduction to humour theories.

[William Bryant · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book is not funny.

[Guaire Mckenna · Rating 4 out of 5]

Discussions of humour kill humour but there's something interesting about playing with humours dead body

[Alberta · Rating 4 out of 5]

Giving me a different aspect when watching comedy. Kind of interesting and useful.

[Isabella · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was coo. Sometimes it feels like people explain things in such a roundabout way that could've been more efficient but it was still cool.

[Julie Rosenberg · Rating 5 out of 5]

Translation: Dark humour exists to remind us that people are not perfect. (In a fun way thehehehehe).

[Gega Phridonishvili · Rating 3 out of 5]

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[Ross McLean]

I have mixed feelings about this one. Oxford's A Very Short Introduction series presents itself as a collection of broad overviews on a variety of topics. "A thinking man's wikipedia" according to the inside cover. However this volume argues very strongly in favour of the Incongruity Yheory to the point that it seems outright dismissive of other approaches to the study of humour. Some theories that I find interesting, such as the Benign Violation Theory, aren't even mentioned. While it is a (very) short book and can't mention every single idea on the topic, far too much of the volume is taken up by arguments defending The Incongruity Theoery. Some of the arguments are convincing, some are not at all.

Still, it is a perfectly enjoyable introduction to the topic that almost anyone can enjoy, provided that they are aware that it is coming from a specific point of view. If the book was part of a different series and titled 'In Defense Incongruity: The Noel Carrol Approach to Humour" it might have garnered an additional star. However it is purporting to be something that it is not.

[Vikas Datta · Rating 4 out of 5]

A succinct but illustrative account of the concept..

[Tri Le · Rating 2 out of 5]

Short and informative but incredibly dry and not very engaging book about the very concept of humor. Very intellectual but not an easy read.

[Mary Wachs ☼]

From the excerpts I read of this book for my seminar class, I enjoyed the philosophical examinations of the concepts of comic amusement/funniness. That being said, this is a topic I can only debate/discuss for so long before I find myself disinterested. Well written, well argued, but not my cup of tea.