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Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla
When Americans think of modern warfare, what comes to mind is the US army skirmishing with terrorists and insurgents in the mountains of Afghanistan. But the face of global conflict is ever-changing. In Out of the Mountains , David Kilcullen, one of the world's leading experts on current and future conflict, offers a groundbreaking look at what may happen after today's wars end. This is a book about future conflicts and future cities, and about the challenges and opportunities that four powerful megatrends--population, urbanization, coastal settlement, and connectedness--are creating across the planet. And it is about what cities, communities and businesses can do to prepare for a future in which all aspects of human society--including, but not limited to, conflict, crime and violence--are changing at an unprecedented pace.
Kilcullen argues that conflict is increasingly likely to occur in sprawling coastal cities, in peri-urban slum settlements that are enveloping many regions of the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia, and in highly connected, electronically networked settings. He suggests that cities, rather than countries, are the critical unit of analysis for future conflict and that resiliency, not stability, will be the key objective. Ranging across the globe--from Kingston to Mogadishu to Lagos to Benghazi to Mumbai--he offers a unified theory of "competitive control" that explains how non-state armed groups such as drug cartels, street gangs, and warlords draw their strength from local populations, providing useful ideas for dealing with these groups and with diffuse social conflicts in general. His extensive fieldwork on the ground in a series of urban conflicts suggests that there will be no military solution for many of the struggles we will face in the future. We will need to involve
local people deeply to address problems that neither outsiders nor locals alone can solve, drawing on the insight only locals can bring, together with outsider knowledge from fields like urban planning, systems engineering, renewable energy, conflict resolution and mediation.
This deeply researched and compellingly argued book provides an invaluable roadmap to a future that will increasingly be crowded, urban, coastal, connected--and dangerous.
Kilcullen argues that conflict is increasingly likely to occur in sprawling coastal cities, in peri-urban slum settlements that are enveloping many regions of the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia, and in highly connected, electronically networked settings. He suggests that cities, rather than countries, are the critical unit of analysis for future conflict and that resiliency, not stability, will be the key objective. Ranging across the globe--from Kingston to Mogadishu to Lagos to Benghazi to Mumbai--he offers a unified theory of "competitive control" that explains how non-state armed groups such as drug cartels, street gangs, and warlords draw their strength from local populations, providing useful ideas for dealing with these groups and with diffuse social conflicts in general. His extensive fieldwork on the ground in a series of urban conflicts suggests that there will be no military solution for many of the struggles we will face in the future. We will need to involve
local people deeply to address problems that neither outsiders nor locals alone can solve, drawing on the insight only locals can bring, together with outsider knowledge from fields like urban planning, systems engineering, renewable energy, conflict resolution and mediation.
This deeply researched and compellingly argued book provides an invaluable roadmap to a future that will increasingly be crowded, urban, coastal, connected--and dangerous.
352 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2013
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2807 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 85 reviews
December 5, 2014
This is far more than a book on tactics in the chaotic world we're in: it's an analysis of strife and the social, urban and environmental trends that feed it and shape it. The world is increasingly urbanized, and those urban areas are often -- usually -- coastal ("littoral", a word he uses often), dysfunctional, complex, connected electronically and filled with internal rivalries and flashpoints. It's the kind of dystopia that authors like Martin van Creveld (The Transformation of War) and Robert Kaplan (The Coming Anarchy) warned of, 20 years ago. David Kilcullen now shows us how it acts.
The title is slightly misleading, as it's not simply about guerilla warfare but about modern conflict, which will be, as he shows, mostly urban, but involving populations, accessible technology and social organization like nothing before, and far removed from what Mao or Che Guevara knew.
Kilcullen shows how urban society can produce combatants and govern neighborhoods: gangs and groups like Shabab in Somalia are the most obvious, as he shows, but football fan clubs ("Ultras") are also candidates, as are hacker groups and social networks. Indeed, his concept of competitive control is clever, as governments, local gangs and social networks might have organization, a normative system of rewards and punishments, and communications that overlap in urban neighborhoods and even personnel. These groups may claim turf and adherents but might have tenuous legitimacy or power, something an outside force -- say, a US Marine expeditionary force -- might not understand.
His tactical examples from recent history are apt. He shows how, for instance, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) established dominion in Sunni neighborhoods, enforced its will, waged war on government and Shiite entities, but was eclipsed after 2006 due to a combination of a foreign troop surge and its own unpopularity among its hosts. He shows how the Taliban in Afghanistan has adapted its control systems and governance to maintain a presence even during the occupation. He shows how Shabab militias can adapt light vehicles and crew-served weapons to a simple, but effective, form of mounted warfare. He shows the interaction and conflict of competing power centers, as in the battle between the Shower Posse gang of Kingston and the Jamaican government: two hostile authorities with definite (and shifting) areas of control in the country's own capital. He even mentions an episode in San Francisco, where the Bay Area Rapid Transit authority sought to turn off wireless to forestall a demonstration, and learned that people, once connected, will resent any attempt to cut it off.
He shows us how modern connectivity -- the Web, cell phones, social networks, satellite technology, and phenomena like Skype or Google Earth -- now reaches every part of this new environment. It can mobilize demonstrators as in the Arab Spring and get help from relatives abroad, he shows, but it can also train unskilled soldiers and armorers in tactics and fabrication, as in Libya, or utilize iPhone, Skype and mapping software to direct its new firepower, and get their message out to domestic and world audiences. He does, in short, explain the Arab Spring's events and functionality.
He does show successful cases where local people overcame this chaos, but little of it involved military force or outsider control, but, rather, down-to-earth social interaction and a concerted, collective effort.
This is a book that Western defense ministries and service academies had better read.
Indispensible for anybody seeking to understand conflict, and not just military, in this time. Anybody in urban planning, military science, economics, sociology, technology applications, and, just maybe, regional or national politics, would do well to study it.
The title is slightly misleading, as it's not simply about guerilla warfare but about modern conflict, which will be, as he shows, mostly urban, but involving populations, accessible technology and social organization like nothing before, and far removed from what Mao or Che Guevara knew.
Kilcullen shows how urban society can produce combatants and govern neighborhoods: gangs and groups like Shabab in Somalia are the most obvious, as he shows, but football fan clubs ("Ultras") are also candidates, as are hacker groups and social networks. Indeed, his concept of competitive control is clever, as governments, local gangs and social networks might have organization, a normative system of rewards and punishments, and communications that overlap in urban neighborhoods and even personnel. These groups may claim turf and adherents but might have tenuous legitimacy or power, something an outside force -- say, a US Marine expeditionary force -- might not understand.
His tactical examples from recent history are apt. He shows how, for instance, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) established dominion in Sunni neighborhoods, enforced its will, waged war on government and Shiite entities, but was eclipsed after 2006 due to a combination of a foreign troop surge and its own unpopularity among its hosts. He shows how the Taliban in Afghanistan has adapted its control systems and governance to maintain a presence even during the occupation. He shows how Shabab militias can adapt light vehicles and crew-served weapons to a simple, but effective, form of mounted warfare. He shows the interaction and conflict of competing power centers, as in the battle between the Shower Posse gang of Kingston and the Jamaican government: two hostile authorities with definite (and shifting) areas of control in the country's own capital. He even mentions an episode in San Francisco, where the Bay Area Rapid Transit authority sought to turn off wireless to forestall a demonstration, and learned that people, once connected, will resent any attempt to cut it off.
He shows us how modern connectivity -- the Web, cell phones, social networks, satellite technology, and phenomena like Skype or Google Earth -- now reaches every part of this new environment. It can mobilize demonstrators as in the Arab Spring and get help from relatives abroad, he shows, but it can also train unskilled soldiers and armorers in tactics and fabrication, as in Libya, or utilize iPhone, Skype and mapping software to direct its new firepower, and get their message out to domestic and world audiences. He does, in short, explain the Arab Spring's events and functionality.
He does show successful cases where local people overcame this chaos, but little of it involved military force or outsider control, but, rather, down-to-earth social interaction and a concerted, collective effort.
This is a book that Western defense ministries and service academies had better read.
Indispensible for anybody seeking to understand conflict, and not just military, in this time. Anybody in urban planning, military science, economics, sociology, technology applications, and, just maybe, regional or national politics, would do well to study it.
December 9, 2021
Kilcullen is one of my favorite contemporary writers on war and strategy, and although I didn't like this quite as much as Dragons and the Snakes or Accidental Guerrilla, it was still interesting. The basic argument is that current and future warfare is increasingly defined by connectivity and communication in the "urban littoral." That somewhat awkward term refers to the vastly expanding coastal cities of the developed world that haven't "metabolized" massive population transfers of people effectively, creating large, poor, poorly governed urban spaces where people are nonetheless highly connected to global information flows by the internet and cell phones. He explores how much conflict takes place in that space, from the Mumbai terrorist attack of the 2008 to gang warfare in Jamaica to the Arab spring in North Africa. One of the big points here is that as more and more of the world's population lives in coastal cities, more of the world's conflict will occur there, so we need to start shifting our attention from mountain warfare like Afghanistan to the urban guerrilla. Moreover, other states are likely to avoid challenging us in the conventional realm, where we dominate, and will push warfare into this space and use networked, asymmetrical forms of warfare against us (this, of course, is his main argument in Dragons/Snakes, which is a more interesting book).
Probably the most useful concept in this book is the theory of competitive control as an alternative to COIN theory. The CC theory posits that COIN focuses too much on what people think, believe, and choose in terms of the sides of a civil war or insurgency. Instead, much of guerrilla warfare and even things like gang struggles (or struggles btw gangs and governments like in Jamaica) are way more about who provides a basic level of security to the population than whom they are loyal to. I'm not sure if COIN theory necessarily differs all that much from this, but you could apply the theory of CC more to a variety of fluid situations were competing political groups are vying to control a population even when they aren't necessarily at war.
However, for a book about the urban guerrilla, there wasn't a ton in this book on actual urban guerrillas, like the insurgencies in Algeria in the 50s or Iraq in the 2000s. The book therefore might be a little misleading. Furthermore, while the overall argument of the book is interesting and worthwhile, it's a little bit loaded down with social science terms and concepts. Social scientists often love to talk concepts over narrative, and that makes a good deal of the book abstract and a little dull to read at times. Still, Kilcullen is clearly one of the best modern strategic thinkers out there, and his body of work is worth checking out.
Probably the most useful concept in this book is the theory of competitive control as an alternative to COIN theory. The CC theory posits that COIN focuses too much on what people think, believe, and choose in terms of the sides of a civil war or insurgency. Instead, much of guerrilla warfare and even things like gang struggles (or struggles btw gangs and governments like in Jamaica) are way more about who provides a basic level of security to the population than whom they are loyal to. I'm not sure if COIN theory necessarily differs all that much from this, but you could apply the theory of CC more to a variety of fluid situations were competing political groups are vying to control a population even when they aren't necessarily at war.
However, for a book about the urban guerrilla, there wasn't a ton in this book on actual urban guerrillas, like the insurgencies in Algeria in the 50s or Iraq in the 2000s. The book therefore might be a little misleading. Furthermore, while the overall argument of the book is interesting and worthwhile, it's a little bit loaded down with social science terms and concepts. Social scientists often love to talk concepts over narrative, and that makes a good deal of the book abstract and a little dull to read at times. Still, Kilcullen is clearly one of the best modern strategic thinkers out there, and his body of work is worth checking out.
January 19, 2022
Kilcullen argues that conflict follows where the populations are. And that within the next couple of decades a large percentage of the world's populations will live in stressed urban centers on the coast. Cities that have grown from 50,000 to 15 million in 50 years are going to be the new normal, especially in Africa and Southeast Asia. "Competitive control" means that non state armed groups such as drug cartels, street gangs, and warlords draw their strength from local populations and will be competing with police and city officials for control of the peri-urban slums. He suggests that cities, rather than countries, are the critical unit of analysis for future conflict and that resiliency, not stability, will be the key objective.
Why I started this book: I love listening to my Professional Reading titles, so I jumped when I found another one.
Why I finished it: Fascinating and a reminder that we won't be prepared for tomorrow if we only focus on today. This book made me want to start a book club with my cousins, one who serves in the National Guard, one who is an urban planner and one who is trying out for the police force. I just want everyone in the same room, so we can talk about what their disciplines have taught them and what these groups consider their biggest future challenges.
Why I started this book: I love listening to my Professional Reading titles, so I jumped when I found another one.
Why I finished it: Fascinating and a reminder that we won't be prepared for tomorrow if we only focus on today. This book made me want to start a book club with my cousins, one who serves in the National Guard, one who is an urban planner and one who is trying out for the police force. I just want everyone in the same room, so we can talk about what their disciplines have taught them and what these groups consider their biggest future challenges.
April 12, 2020
Did this book take me over two years to read? YES! Am I annoyed at that? YES! But it is also a fantastic read that not only explains counterinsurgency tactics but explains the PoV of militant, terrorist, and guerrilla warriors. Do you know how essential that is? It doesn't talk down or belittle their arguments while also noting every time that either side (insurgency or counterinsurgency) committed war crimes or human rights violations. He pulls in subaltern studies, organizational theory, and his military background. Examples come from Belgrade, East Timor, Mumbai, Lagos, San Salvador, and San Francisco, to name a few. Although I am dismayed by how Kilcullen didn't interlink climate issues into more of these topics, given its destabilizing nature and such, he did really write an intersectional and helpful guide to understanding guerrilla warfare and how to plan with it. I'll be coming back to this book for reference in a ton of cases: it has inspired some military fiction, for sure.
October 15, 2021
Jeg vil ikke bruke ord som «groundbreaking», med mindre man har vært helt isolert fra nyheter og sikkerhetspolitikk siste drøye 10 år. Byer har gjennom alle tider vært senter for makt, handel, og der hvor flest mennesker bor (…), at byer heller enn land blir gjenstand for analyse og militære kampanjer synes å være litt overdrevet - iallfall for USA og allierte.
Kilcullen gir uansett en god oppsummering av ulike konflikter og enkelthendelser, hvor beskrivelsen av Mumbai-angrepene er den mest informative etter mitt syn.
Kilcullen gir uansett en god oppsummering av ulike konflikter og enkelthendelser, hvor beskrivelsen av Mumbai-angrepene er den mest informative etter mitt syn.
December 16, 2013
Out of the Mountains is a serious work of scholarship written by David Kilcullen a serious scholar of modern warfare. It's not a topic that I would want to study in depth, but I'm glad there are people out there who make it their lives' work. A full disclosure, I received this book through Goodreads' First Reads program.
Kilcullen points out that we are becoming more clustered in our coastal cities. We use our technology to connect us in ways that our ancestors couldn't even dream. Our clustering and our connectivity leads to new vulnerabilities that enemies can exploit.
Kilcullen identifies these problems and vulnerabilities. He is not long on solutions, but that may be because there are few ways to solve these problems. At least solutions that do not involve tossing away our smart phones, and moving away from the coasts. I recommend this book heartily.
Kilcullen points out that we are becoming more clustered in our coastal cities. We use our technology to connect us in ways that our ancestors couldn't even dream. Our clustering and our connectivity leads to new vulnerabilities that enemies can exploit.
Kilcullen identifies these problems and vulnerabilities. He is not long on solutions, but that may be because there are few ways to solve these problems. At least solutions that do not involve tossing away our smart phones, and moving away from the coasts. I recommend this book heartily.
July 1, 2019
Kilcullen is both a soldier and a scholar, with experience ranging from small combat unit leadership to the staff of a theater-level commander (Gen. Petraeus), and perspective drawing on service in a variety of places and types of situations. Like John Nagl (who also worked for Petraeus), this author is more able than even most effective leaders to analyze and project based on developing and likely trends in economics and geopolitics.
This book looks at the accelerating growth of megacities, especially coastal ones, and the percentage of the world's population that lives in those megacities, especially the poor, and how those changes will affect the future of warfare. Any political or military policy-maker who wants to avoid the common mistake of planning to refight the last war would do well to read LtCol. Kilcullen's books.
This book looks at the accelerating growth of megacities, especially coastal ones, and the percentage of the world's population that lives in those megacities, especially the poor, and how those changes will affect the future of warfare. Any political or military policy-maker who wants to avoid the common mistake of planning to refight the last war would do well to read LtCol. Kilcullen's books.
August 29, 2016
Very good overview of urban counterinsurgency to come, almost more by way of an anthropological/sociological view of urbanization, rather than a purely military focus. The appendix is where the technical meat is, and it's quite fascinating. The idea that Iraq/Afghanistan are a collective mistake best forgotten is reinforced by Kilcullen's reference to innovative studies on urban operations, which really peaked between 1997 and 2002, and were then stopped and/or forgotten after the invasion of Iraq.
But, really, quite a good synopsis of why urban operations in the future are inevitable.
But, really, quite a good synopsis of why urban operations in the future are inevitable.
March 13, 2014
I may be biased but, as a journal editor and one who does not specialize in conflict studies, I found this book extremely interesting but one that is much better suited for a journal article. The thesis is powerful and compelling in part because of its simplicity and, ultimately, while I enjoyed it and respect Kilcullen's work immensely, I just didn't find I needed to invest the time or delve into the detail a book requires for this argument.
January 31, 2016
Very interesting book which reads more like a guide to modern urban warfare two days after the Paris attacks. I would strongly recommend all urban dwellers to check it as they may one day face the same situation as the Mumbai and Paris inhabitants.
September 6, 2019
Thesis: Irregular warfare -- conflicts involving non-state actors -- is the future whether politicians like it or not; four megatrends are affecting how these conflicts will be fought: population growth, accelerating urbanization, littoralization, and increased connectedness -- which together mean that the connected urban littoral is where future irregular warfare will mostly take place.
Kilkullen combined sophisticated theoretical account of the politics of these conflicts, rooted in close readings of key episodes in irregular conflicts from Somalia to Iraq to Afghanistan to Rio to Kingston to Mumbai to San Pedro Sula, to generate a subtle prognostication of how the future of littoralized irregular warfare will unfold. His key metaphor is to understand the (mega)city itself as kind of metabolic system, and that the winners in combat in these settings will be those who best understand and exploit that metabolic system. "Far from being a discrete entity, separate from its environment, an insurgency is in fact a system state within that environment, a dissipative structure within a complex flow system, and thus inseparable from the ecosystem in which it occurs." (43) "Future threat networks will be embedded in a complex urban littoral environment, illicit activities will nest within licit systems and processes, and local threats will nest within networks at the regional and global level." (112)
Several of the set pieces in the book are among the best things of their kind I have ever read, notably the detailed account of the 2008 L-e-T assault on Mumbai (52-65) and the account of Somali swarm tactics (80-84), in which a consistent set of complex, emergent effects result from the application of five simple rules of engagement: Maintain an extended line abreast; Keep your neighbors in sight, but no closer; Move to the sound of the guns; Dismount when you see the enemy; When you come under fire, stop and fire back. The application of these five simple rules of "autonomous, rules-based maneuver is the essence of a self-synchronizing swarm.... The size, shape, and disposition of the tactical swarm are completely emergent properties of the rules-based swarm maneuver system itself, something that happens without conscious direction or formal control from a central commander." (84)
Kilkullen also invokes the concepts of "feral cities" and "criminal insurgency" and explains how "competitive control systems" emerge when the state is weak, basically because everyday people would prefer the certainties of consistent oppression to the uncertainties of arbitrary applications of force and (in)justice. "Society abhors a governance vacuum" (95) and so where the government doesn't provide adequate governance services, "criminal governance" instead inevitably emerges, offering (a) consistency, (b) predictability, and (c) order -- albeit often of a very rough kind. He formalizes his theory this way: "In irregular conflicts (that is, in conflicts where at least one of the combattants is a nonstate armed group), the local armed actor that a given population perceives as best able to establish a predictable, consistent, wide-spectrum normative system of control is most likely to dominate that population and its residential area." (126)
What's new is that now these criminal governors are often globally connected, both electronically and commercially, allowing them to develop their own revenue streams independent of the immediate local environment through the control of smuggling and the exploitation of diaspora networks. (One thing Kilkullen spends very little time asking is WHY some places have less effective governments than others.) And this process will intensify as nonstate armed groups increasingly draw on the technical skills of the globally networked urban populations in which they operate.
Kilkullen also hints at how this sort of model of military engagement may increasingly be the norm not just when states are fighting non-state actors, but even in state-on-state combat engagements, especially as the transition to continuous cyberwarfare and remote-control drones erodes the distinction between civilian and military, between zones of peace and the battlespace, and even between war and peace itself -- he might have added, between human and machine.
Kilkullen combined sophisticated theoretical account of the politics of these conflicts, rooted in close readings of key episodes in irregular conflicts from Somalia to Iraq to Afghanistan to Rio to Kingston to Mumbai to San Pedro Sula, to generate a subtle prognostication of how the future of littoralized irregular warfare will unfold. His key metaphor is to understand the (mega)city itself as kind of metabolic system, and that the winners in combat in these settings will be those who best understand and exploit that metabolic system. "Far from being a discrete entity, separate from its environment, an insurgency is in fact a system state within that environment, a dissipative structure within a complex flow system, and thus inseparable from the ecosystem in which it occurs." (43) "Future threat networks will be embedded in a complex urban littoral environment, illicit activities will nest within licit systems and processes, and local threats will nest within networks at the regional and global level." (112)
Several of the set pieces in the book are among the best things of their kind I have ever read, notably the detailed account of the 2008 L-e-T assault on Mumbai (52-65) and the account of Somali swarm tactics (80-84), in which a consistent set of complex, emergent effects result from the application of five simple rules of engagement: Maintain an extended line abreast; Keep your neighbors in sight, but no closer; Move to the sound of the guns; Dismount when you see the enemy; When you come under fire, stop and fire back. The application of these five simple rules of "autonomous, rules-based maneuver is the essence of a self-synchronizing swarm.... The size, shape, and disposition of the tactical swarm are completely emergent properties of the rules-based swarm maneuver system itself, something that happens without conscious direction or formal control from a central commander." (84)
Kilkullen also invokes the concepts of "feral cities" and "criminal insurgency" and explains how "competitive control systems" emerge when the state is weak, basically because everyday people would prefer the certainties of consistent oppression to the uncertainties of arbitrary applications of force and (in)justice. "Society abhors a governance vacuum" (95) and so where the government doesn't provide adequate governance services, "criminal governance" instead inevitably emerges, offering (a) consistency, (b) predictability, and (c) order -- albeit often of a very rough kind. He formalizes his theory this way: "In irregular conflicts (that is, in conflicts where at least one of the combattants is a nonstate armed group), the local armed actor that a given population perceives as best able to establish a predictable, consistent, wide-spectrum normative system of control is most likely to dominate that population and its residential area." (126)
What's new is that now these criminal governors are often globally connected, both electronically and commercially, allowing them to develop their own revenue streams independent of the immediate local environment through the control of smuggling and the exploitation of diaspora networks. (One thing Kilkullen spends very little time asking is WHY some places have less effective governments than others.) And this process will intensify as nonstate armed groups increasingly draw on the technical skills of the globally networked urban populations in which they operate.
Kilkullen also hints at how this sort of model of military engagement may increasingly be the norm not just when states are fighting non-state actors, but even in state-on-state combat engagements, especially as the transition to continuous cyberwarfare and remote-control drones erodes the distinction between civilian and military, between zones of peace and the battlespace, and even between war and peace itself -- he might have added, between human and machine.
May 26, 2021
I thought it was a great look into future/contemporary urbanized guerilla warfare (retrospectively from my post-2020 viewpoint). I believe Kilcullen does an outstanding job of bringing in contextual examples, which are further exemplified through more recent events (BLM Riots, Antifa Rioting/Mob tactics to Right-Wing extremist mobilization efforts online etc.)
Ultimately, the growth in population centers, hyper-urbanization, and inter-technological dependency of the global community has continued to define the 21st century battlespace. Yet, doctrine has only now started addressing enormous vulnerabilities with applying legacy tactics under this scope of contingency/counter-insurgency operations. That is, "we can't fight an army with a pocket knife", yet we "can't annihilate the state to counter crime" either. We still do both overseas...(and, arguably, here at home more too).
International/National Security aside, warfighters of the future will need to adopt more "systems-based" approaches when analyzing densely urbanized contingency areas (a*k*a* war zones). Kilcullen uses the biological framework to define the littoral cities/zones, periurban, and rural areas in analyzing future operations. However, any systems-based approach may lead examiners to reveal inner-city characteristics. Amending this analysis with local insight, however, is where the examiner truly finds the "flow" of the city. Planners can use this to inflict influence, focus humanitarian aid operations, or deliver public assistance with minimal resources, and less risks to operations. Kilcullen highlights the necessity to incorporate local insight, yet also addresses the limitations quite well.
What I found most interesting, however, was looking back at Twitter and Facebook's influential role, and significant contributive efforts, during the Arab Spring circa 2010 through 2011 (Eygpt, Tunisia, Lybia). Counter that with what we're currently seeing with big tech censorship in the United States today (2021); we have a huge issue in social media influence over democratic events. For better or for worse, at what point do we start to question the level of influence, and the agenda of those weilding it's enormous power? Perhaps, 47 U.S. Code § 230 may provide the answer, yet the U.S. political landscape may remain turbulent and significantly polarized for the foreseeable future to do anything about it.
Ultimately, the growth in population centers, hyper-urbanization, and inter-technological dependency of the global community has continued to define the 21st century battlespace. Yet, doctrine has only now started addressing enormous vulnerabilities with applying legacy tactics under this scope of contingency/counter-insurgency operations. That is, "we can't fight an army with a pocket knife", yet we "can't annihilate the state to counter crime" either. We still do both overseas...(and, arguably, here at home more too).
International/National Security aside, warfighters of the future will need to adopt more "systems-based" approaches when analyzing densely urbanized contingency areas (a*k*a* war zones). Kilcullen uses the biological framework to define the littoral cities/zones, periurban, and rural areas in analyzing future operations. However, any systems-based approach may lead examiners to reveal inner-city characteristics. Amending this analysis with local insight, however, is where the examiner truly finds the "flow" of the city. Planners can use this to inflict influence, focus humanitarian aid operations, or deliver public assistance with minimal resources, and less risks to operations. Kilcullen highlights the necessity to incorporate local insight, yet also addresses the limitations quite well.
What I found most interesting, however, was looking back at Twitter and Facebook's influential role, and significant contributive efforts, during the Arab Spring circa 2010 through 2011 (Eygpt, Tunisia, Lybia). Counter that with what we're currently seeing with big tech censorship in the United States today (2021); we have a huge issue in social media influence over democratic events. For better or for worse, at what point do we start to question the level of influence, and the agenda of those weilding it's enormous power? Perhaps, 47 U.S. Code § 230 may provide the answer, yet the U.S. political landscape may remain turbulent and significantly polarized for the foreseeable future to do anything about it.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 1, 2022
David Kilcullen is an experienced Australian military professional. He is a senior advisor to the US Military. In this book, Kilcullen describes the recent Western conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq as relative anomalies in the progress of future wars and conflict. He focus on the Urban, networked littoral. Giant coastal slum cities will be the most likely theaters for modern warfare. Dramatic population rises in giant coastal urban agglomerations which due to technology such as the internet are fully networked into global systems are where the urban guerrillas will be fighting our armies, navies and airforces. He discusses in depth the theory of competitive control whereby communities and organisations through a variety of coercive and non-coercive means wlll govern areas of nations. A clear example of this could be the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq plus its foreign annexed territories across the globe. In the ISIS run areas, civilian populations may be governed with brute force under strict Sharia Islamic law yet at the same time be the only legitimate government of the inhabitants as they provide cvil services, hospitals and transport infrastructure. The littoral refers to maritime urban areas which provide militaries with difficult logistical problems such as arranging convenient and non dangerous amphibious assaults. The Mumbai attacks by the Islamic militants Lashtar-e-Taiba demonstrated how a successful terrorist attack in a large coastal city can be executed and is so difficult to contain and defeat. Population in the developing world is growing massively and these new coastal supercities provide the most difficult terrains for urban planners, governments and militaries to control and are hotbeds where future potential enemies will congregate.
I found this book to be very well written and detailed and its ideas and theories and future projections are inspiring to the imagination if not shrouded with an element of fear. Providing solutions to the changing global military environment will be the focus of world powers for some time and Kilcullen is undoubtedly and expert in the counter-insurgency tactics that will be needed to fight hostile guerrilla movements that threaten the globe.
I found this book to be very well written and detailed and its ideas and theories and future projections are inspiring to the imagination if not shrouded with an element of fear. Providing solutions to the changing global military environment will be the focus of world powers for some time and Kilcullen is undoubtedly and expert in the counter-insurgency tactics that will be needed to fight hostile guerrilla movements that threaten the globe.
August 10, 2025
"Non-state Armed Groups" are the future of American and worldwide conflict. And initiating such conflict will not be just the now-familiar Islamic factions such as ISIS, the Taliban, or Al Quaida from the Middle East, but from groups rooted in the American hemisphere like the Zetas (Mexican drug cartel), Christopher Coke's Jamaican "Shower Posse", or American prison gang La Emme, (along with their competitors and affiliates).
The rise of densely populated and (digitally) interconnected populations in coastal urban areas, Kilcullen argues, has given rise to the now unavoidable consequence of major military powers like the United States being locked in near-continuous struggles with multiple Non-state Armed Groups instead of fighting against fellow. This strikingly different paradigm will also alter armed conflicts between Westphallian States, as both Russia and Israel implementing the techniques of hybrid warfare in their current warfighting are but the most recent examples.
The most important description of 21st Century armed conflict in print. At least to my knowledge, Kilcullen is second to none.
His keen insights were derived from decades of study as tempered by his unique real-world access to "history as it was occuring" as an advisor to the US President and generals responsible for fighting the US war in Iraq. His placement in the upper echelons of the US war effort in spite of being on loan from his native country of Australia, allowed him to be an eyewitness to the development of modern asymmetrical warfare doctrine, as a result of which he has become among it's most influential living theorists.
The rise of densely populated and (digitally) interconnected populations in coastal urban areas, Kilcullen argues, has given rise to the now unavoidable consequence of major military powers like the United States being locked in near-continuous struggles with multiple Non-state Armed Groups instead of fighting against fellow. This strikingly different paradigm will also alter armed conflicts between Westphallian States, as both Russia and Israel implementing the techniques of hybrid warfare in their current warfighting are but the most recent examples.
The most important description of 21st Century armed conflict in print. At least to my knowledge, Kilcullen is second to none.
His keen insights were derived from decades of study as tempered by his unique real-world access to "history as it was occuring" as an advisor to the US President and generals responsible for fighting the US war in Iraq. His placement in the upper echelons of the US war effort in spite of being on loan from his native country of Australia, allowed him to be an eyewitness to the development of modern asymmetrical warfare doctrine, as a result of which he has become among it's most influential living theorists.
November 28, 2025
Na noite de 26 de novembro de 2008, após treze meses de treinamento, equipes de assalto do grupo terrorista paquistanês Lashkar-e-Taiba desembarcaram em dois locais distintos no sul de Mumbai, na Índia, utilizando botes infláveis de casco rígido. Explorando as vulnerabilidades do ambiente urbano, interconectado e litorâneo, eles instalaram dois dispositivos explosivos de distração enquanto se deslocavam para seus objetivos principais. Após 60 horas de terror, mais de 170 pessoas foram mortas e mais de 300 ficaram feridas. Para aqueles interessados em uma análise tática, operacional e estratégica dos ataques, recomendo fortemente o livro OUT OF THE MOUNTAINS, do Dr. David Kilcullen.
O autor Jack Carr foi citado no capítulo sobre Mumbai.
David é um dos maiores especialistas mundiais em insurgências, terrorismo e guerra de guerrilha. Ele atuou como Conselheiro Especial para Contrainsurgência da Secretária de Estado Condoleezza Rice, Conselheiro Sênior para Contrainsurgência do General David Petraeus no Iraque e Estrategista-Chefe de Contraterrorismo do Departamento de Estado dos EUA. Sem dúvida, Jack Carr se tornou um líder de combate muito mais eficaz graças à sua influência.
Encontre a conversa com o Dr. David Kilcullen no episódio 16 do podcast Danger Close.
O autor Jack Carr foi citado no capítulo sobre Mumbai.
David é um dos maiores especialistas mundiais em insurgências, terrorismo e guerra de guerrilha. Ele atuou como Conselheiro Especial para Contrainsurgência da Secretária de Estado Condoleezza Rice, Conselheiro Sênior para Contrainsurgência do General David Petraeus no Iraque e Estrategista-Chefe de Contraterrorismo do Departamento de Estado dos EUA. Sem dúvida, Jack Carr se tornou um líder de combate muito mais eficaz graças à sua influência.
Encontre a conversa com o Dr. David Kilcullen no episódio 16 do podcast Danger Close.
December 26, 2018
Good book for giving someone another reason to move away from populated coastal areas. Not exceptionally readable due to the industry jargon (many paragraphs read like research thesis statements) but addresses all kinds of interesting issues on the subject, like:
Drone warfare is increasingly waged from military bases near civilian populations, and the pilots typically return to their homes and families at the end of the shift - as the pilots are combatants, are they legitimate targets?
Social media is frequently used to organise protests, insurgencies, and domestic terrorism, but when the government blocks the platform for that reason, it paradoxically increases the righteousness of that cause - enough to turn a peaceful protest violent.
Explains how criminal organisations, extremist religious groups, and warlords maintain control over civilian populations (and are welcomed to do so) when the state government is too weak or corrupt to provide stability.
Drone warfare is increasingly waged from military bases near civilian populations, and the pilots typically return to their homes and families at the end of the shift - as the pilots are combatants, are they legitimate targets?
Social media is frequently used to organise protests, insurgencies, and domestic terrorism, but when the government blocks the platform for that reason, it paradoxically increases the righteousness of that cause - enough to turn a peaceful protest violent.
Explains how criminal organisations, extremist religious groups, and warlords maintain control over civilian populations (and are welcomed to do so) when the state government is too weak or corrupt to provide stability.
September 12, 2018
Penned by one of the preeminent military intelligentsia authors of our time, this 2013 work stands as well today in predicting the future of our world and the conflict it will likely encounter as it did upon publication.
The author structures his work around the 4 mega trends of our time, population growth, urbanization, connectivity and littoralization, in conjunction with recent past and current examples, in support of his view on the future of conflicts and of where, why, by whom and how they will likely generate, occur and transpire.
Informative, highly engaging and thought provoking in a multitude of factors and directions.
A work every global citizen should consider.
The author structures his work around the 4 mega trends of our time, population growth, urbanization, connectivity and littoralization, in conjunction with recent past and current examples, in support of his view on the future of conflicts and of where, why, by whom and how they will likely generate, occur and transpire.
Informative, highly engaging and thought provoking in a multitude of factors and directions.
A work every global citizen should consider.
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November 6, 2019This is mandatory reading for any officer or NCO in military units, for the 21st century. Due to technology, The Fulda Gab is irrelevant while costal, overpopulated cities is where we will engage in joint civil-military interventions against an non-state armed opponent. And if we choose to overreact, buy locally or close their internet connection? The population might turn against us.. all 10million of them. Learn the new norm. Before you ship out.
January 25, 2020
A fascinating deep and technical read, with many case studies about irregular warfare, and how populations crave stability above mostly anything else. You'll certainly learn a new way of thinking, equating the dynamism of a city to something like a cellular system, and better understand the "theory of competitive control". A must read for military buffs or policy wonks, this will reframe your view of war and recent (or upcoming?) conflicts.
February 11, 2021
Kilcullen has written a very interesting book, especially in light of events that unfolded in the United States in 2020. The book was published in 2013 and there are many similarities to incidents he described in foreign cities that took place in Seattle, Portland, St. Louis, and other major U.S. cities last year. This book should serve as a wakeup call to those who refuse to see what is happening in our cities.
September 8, 2024
A mixed bag. The case studies are good. The intro and chapter on the “theory of competitive control” are excellent. The ideas are generally sound, but the writing is clunky, over-reliant on buzzwords, and repetitive. Certain thinkers and theories get name-checked without being discussed in a useful way. But overall decent, and did provide me a list of (potentially more substantive) things to read next.
May 4, 2020
This is truly an well-researched and exceptional book and may deserve more than 4 stars. I read it during the COVID stay-at-home order and looking forward applying some of Kilcullen's theory on the job. This book is a must read for anyone focused on urban planning, security politics or national security.
How these theories play out in a post-COVID world would be another great read...
How these theories play out in a post-COVID world would be another great read...
November 14, 2020
4.75 stars. This is an excellent, scholarly but realistic analysis of current conflicts and some likely paths of future conflicts. All of it is interesting; I was particularly fascinated by his analysis of lessons to be drawn from the Arab Spring rebellions as well as the strengths of Somali small unit tactics. I shelled out my own money for this and am glad I did. Recommended.
October 22, 2023
Written by a counterinsurgency expert, he details his future prediction of future warfare in a littoral urban (meaning-city) environment. The book has great historical examples, and his theory of competitive control is not new but is explained in a much easier form to understand. A must-read for Marine Corps Officers.
May 6, 2017
An excellent work focussed on insurgency from recent global examples, but with an equally interesting basis on urban littoralization - the increasing size and number of cities in coastal areas and the contest for control between state and non-state actors.
August 7, 2017
Anyone interested in the future of COIN operations and warfare in the near future should consider picking up a copy of this book. It is incredibly interesting and highlights trends that will change how we view and practice warfare. Dr. Kilcullen's work never disappoints!
September 17, 2017
I enjoyed Kilcullen's venture into this intriguing field of conflict futurology. The appendix at the end was by far the most interesting and coherent. The book is a valuable source of resources for further reading and research. A useful primer on a complex and difficult subject.
February 5, 2018
A lot of the observations are of the "obvious if you live in a city" sort of thing, but the way Kilcullen takes those observations and constructs an actionable theory of military and police action is pretty damn beautiful.
January 17, 2020
Mandatory reading for anyone looking to understand what makes current, and likely future insurgencies work in the context or organization and technology. One of the most insightful and well informed books I have read. We should be pushing this to all leaders.
September 4, 2025
Passionnant ce livre ! Une pensée claire et bien exposée. Cela en fait un livre à lire absolument pour quiconque s’intéresse à l’art de la guerre de nos jours. Sa lecture devrait être obligatoire pour l’école de guerre…
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