Mikhail Gorbachev's relations with the West have captured the imagination of contemporaries and historians alike, but his vision of Soviet leadership in Asia has received far less attention. The failure of Gorbachev's Asian initiatives has had dramatic consequences, by the late 1980s, the Soviet Union was in full retreat from Asia, and since the Soviet collapse, Russia has been left on the sidelines of the "Pacific century."
In this exceptionally wide-ranging and deeply researched book, Sergey Radchenko offers an illuminating account of the end of the Cold War in the East, tracing the death of Soviet ambitions in Asia. Radchenko shows that Gorbachev began with big gestures, of which the most important was his initiative in Vladivostok in July 1986, the opening salvo of the Soviet charm offensive in Asia Pacific. The problem, Radchenko points out, was that no one in Asia bought into Gorbachev's vision. If the Soviets had realized earlier that they needed Asia more than Asia needed them, they might have played a much more important role there. Instead, China was largely misunderstood, early gains in India were squandered, Japan was ignored or condescended to, and the Korean scenario played out in ways most unfavorable to Russia. Radchenko captures all of this in his compelling narrative, shedding important new light on many key players, including Gorbachev, Deng Xiaoping, Margaret Thatcher, Boris Yeltsin, and George H. W. Bush, among others.
Based on archival research in Russia, China, Mongolia, India, the United States, Britain, and numerous European countries and on interviews with former policy makers in a dozen countries, Unwanted Visionaries presents a deftly narrated and penetrating portrait of the Soviet failure in the East, with a wealth of valuable insight into Asia today.
3.5 stars [History] (W: 2.75 / U: 3.75 / T: 3.75). Exact: 3.42. A thorough history of Gorbachev's "Sprint to the East," i.e., Soviet relations in Asia in the 1980s. It entails material on China, Japan, India, and Vietnam/Cambodia.
Writing: 2.75 Use of the pluperfect would have aided the prose: using the simple past whilst skipping around in time was often confusing. The chapter on Vietnam bogged down, and subsequent chapters did not evince the cleanness of the book's beginning.
Use: 3.75 Intensive use of primary sources. Covers much diplomacy, but not by merely regurgitating events chronologically: Radchenko demonstrates competence by relating the most important and pivotal exchanges, especially in the first three chapters.
Truth: 3.75 Notable to rare truth comes from extensive use of diary accounts, as well as more than one source when possible. One will minutely understand much of Asian foreign policy in the 1980s after reading this book.
There is no doubt the author has done extensive research, but unfortunately the end result is an astoundingly boring microscopic view of every conceivable aspect of late Era USSR international relations. It ends up as a boring version of Mean Girls, where China says Vietnam looks stupid for hanging out with Cambodia. Unless you need a ridiculous level of depth on the issue, I'd suggest a pass.
This book tries to overcome scholarly neglect of the Far East in Soviet diplomacy at the end of the Cold War. Still, it’s pretty, pretty dry, as Larry David might say.