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Biblioteca de la Historia #5
Falange: historia del fascismo español
A study of Spanish politics, General Franco, and the Spanish Fascist Party from 1933 to 1959.
264 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1961
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About the author
Stanley G. Payne
81 books105 followersStanley G. Payne is a historian of modern Spain and European Fascism at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He retired from full time teaching in 2004 and is currently Professor Emeritus at its Department of History.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
July 12, 2011
1/26/2007
Franco vs. Fascism
Primo de Rivera is the great fascist leader of the Spanish Civil War. Captured, judged and sentenced to death by the Republicans in 1936, Franco shrewdly turned him into a martyr for his rebellion. Franco, however, was really only a pragmatic arch-traditionalist. In fact, many thought (or hoped) that, at the conclusion of the Second World War, Spain would fall into another civil war, this time between fascists and traditionalists. Of course, this never happened. But why? Brilliantly, during WWII, Franco sent traditionalist students to the seminary and young fascists to die with the Germans on the eastern front fighting the Soviet Union. Speaking of the Spanish troops fighting in the USSR Payne says, "Here disappointed Falangists could once more shoulder arms against atheistic Bolshevism [...] By no means all members of the Blue Division were enthusiastic Falangists, but a great many of them were [...] and scores of promising young Falange leaders never returned to Spain." (p. 233-234) Thus at the end of WWII there weren't enough Spanish fascists (or, at any rate, fascist leaders) left alive to oppose Franco!
The neutrality of Franco during WWII can also, I think, be nicely explained by his traditionalism. All the contending ideologies (i.e., communism, fascism, nazism, and, to a lesser extent, liberalism) in the Europe of the thirties (and WWII) were self-consciously trying to create a new world. Even in America one had the New Deal. But Franco I think fundamentally wanted to go back; it was of the Reconquista and the Church that he dreamed. Thus the refusal of the alliance with Hitler wasn't merely the result of some shrewd Machiavellian balance of power assessment. (Though it was, of course, in part that.) It was a genuine reflection of Franco's world view. All the contending powers in Europe wanted to go forward - Franco wanted to go back! See the first paragraph of chapter XVII (p. 239) where the author speaks of the change in 1943 and the Spanish insistence on peace with the Anglo-Saxon powers and war on Japan based on Christian principles(!) if there was to be a Spanish-Nazi alliance. Note that Franco also refuses to hand over Jewish refugees on Spanish territory to the Gestapo saying repatriation of refugees could wait until the end of the war. In effect, this of course meant that in order to get his hands on Jews in Spanish territory all Hitler had to do was conquer the world!
Now, were the Nazis, on their part, aware of this disconnect between their Ideology and Franco's traditionalism? This passage in a book by David Irving nicely catches the ideological distance between the Nazis and Franco in the pre-WWII period: "Early in November 1937 Hitler told his staff that an outright Franco victory in Spain was not desirable: `Our interest is in maintaining existing tensions in the Mediterranean.' That Franco was fighting the Communist-backed Republicans was of only secondary importance. In April 1938 Hitler would muse out loud to Reinhard Spitzy, Ribbentrop's private secretary: `We have backed the wrong horse in Spain. We would have done better to back the Republicans. They represent the people. We could always have converted these socialists into good National Socialists later. The people around Franco are all reactionary clerics, aristocrats, and moneybags - they've nothing in common with us Nazis at all!'" (Irving, "Hitler's War", p. 60-61) Of course, Hitler was only kidding himself if he actually thought the Spanish Republicans could be converted to Nazism. From a much later period, Goebbels, in his diaries, writes, "Tokyo is denying most energetically that atrocities have been committed against Spanish citizens in the Philippines as the Spaniards maintain." ("Final Entries", p. 220, March 24, 1945.) "The Spaniards have made a further sharp protest in Japan. The British maintain that the Spaniards intend to sever diplomatic relations with Japan." (March 25, 1945). The state of the war at this time (1945) I think speaks loudly for Franco's shrewdness, although his 'Machiavellianism' can be overdone if it is thought to be the overwhelming character of his regime.
From beginning to end there was a gulf between Franco's Spain and Nazi Germany that has been all too often papered over. Franco was a sincere traditionalist who understood the grave limitations to Spanish power. The mausoleum that Franco built to honor Primo de Rivera was a stone rolled over his grave to prevent fascism from rising again. This shrewdness allowed his rule to outlast those of Hitler and Mussolini by thirty years.
Franco vs. Fascism
Primo de Rivera is the great fascist leader of the Spanish Civil War. Captured, judged and sentenced to death by the Republicans in 1936, Franco shrewdly turned him into a martyr for his rebellion. Franco, however, was really only a pragmatic arch-traditionalist. In fact, many thought (or hoped) that, at the conclusion of the Second World War, Spain would fall into another civil war, this time between fascists and traditionalists. Of course, this never happened. But why? Brilliantly, during WWII, Franco sent traditionalist students to the seminary and young fascists to die with the Germans on the eastern front fighting the Soviet Union. Speaking of the Spanish troops fighting in the USSR Payne says, "Here disappointed Falangists could once more shoulder arms against atheistic Bolshevism [...] By no means all members of the Blue Division were enthusiastic Falangists, but a great many of them were [...] and scores of promising young Falange leaders never returned to Spain." (p. 233-234) Thus at the end of WWII there weren't enough Spanish fascists (or, at any rate, fascist leaders) left alive to oppose Franco!
The neutrality of Franco during WWII can also, I think, be nicely explained by his traditionalism. All the contending ideologies (i.e., communism, fascism, nazism, and, to a lesser extent, liberalism) in the Europe of the thirties (and WWII) were self-consciously trying to create a new world. Even in America one had the New Deal. But Franco I think fundamentally wanted to go back; it was of the Reconquista and the Church that he dreamed. Thus the refusal of the alliance with Hitler wasn't merely the result of some shrewd Machiavellian balance of power assessment. (Though it was, of course, in part that.) It was a genuine reflection of Franco's world view. All the contending powers in Europe wanted to go forward - Franco wanted to go back! See the first paragraph of chapter XVII (p. 239) where the author speaks of the change in 1943 and the Spanish insistence on peace with the Anglo-Saxon powers and war on Japan based on Christian principles(!) if there was to be a Spanish-Nazi alliance. Note that Franco also refuses to hand over Jewish refugees on Spanish territory to the Gestapo saying repatriation of refugees could wait until the end of the war. In effect, this of course meant that in order to get his hands on Jews in Spanish territory all Hitler had to do was conquer the world!
Now, were the Nazis, on their part, aware of this disconnect between their Ideology and Franco's traditionalism? This passage in a book by David Irving nicely catches the ideological distance between the Nazis and Franco in the pre-WWII period: "Early in November 1937 Hitler told his staff that an outright Franco victory in Spain was not desirable: `Our interest is in maintaining existing tensions in the Mediterranean.' That Franco was fighting the Communist-backed Republicans was of only secondary importance. In April 1938 Hitler would muse out loud to Reinhard Spitzy, Ribbentrop's private secretary: `We have backed the wrong horse in Spain. We would have done better to back the Republicans. They represent the people. We could always have converted these socialists into good National Socialists later. The people around Franco are all reactionary clerics, aristocrats, and moneybags - they've nothing in common with us Nazis at all!'" (Irving, "Hitler's War", p. 60-61) Of course, Hitler was only kidding himself if he actually thought the Spanish Republicans could be converted to Nazism. From a much later period, Goebbels, in his diaries, writes, "Tokyo is denying most energetically that atrocities have been committed against Spanish citizens in the Philippines as the Spaniards maintain." ("Final Entries", p. 220, March 24, 1945.) "The Spaniards have made a further sharp protest in Japan. The British maintain that the Spaniards intend to sever diplomatic relations with Japan." (March 25, 1945). The state of the war at this time (1945) I think speaks loudly for Franco's shrewdness, although his 'Machiavellianism' can be overdone if it is thought to be the overwhelming character of his regime.
From beginning to end there was a gulf between Franco's Spain and Nazi Germany that has been all too often papered over. Franco was a sincere traditionalist who understood the grave limitations to Spanish power. The mausoleum that Franco built to honor Primo de Rivera was a stone rolled over his grave to prevent fascism from rising again. This shrewdness allowed his rule to outlast those of Hitler and Mussolini by thirty years.
July 5, 2019
Stanley Payne is one of the big figures in the historiography of fascism, and he built his career by studying the Spanish example. Spanish fascism is tricky, and gets right into the differences between academic and popular uses of the word “fascism.” In the popular sense, the Franco regime was fascist- violent, authoritarian, right-wing. In the academic sense, most definitions of fascism don’t include Franco or his Portuguese neighbor Salazar, instead defining them as authoritarians. There’s a number of reasons for this, starting with both dictators lack of interest in remaking society or fighting aggressive wars (both of which are more iffy than the model implies- just ask the Angolans). There’s also the differentiation between the Franco regime and the Spanish Falange party, the country’s premier fascist movement. For a brief period during the civil war the Falange played a prominent role in Franco’s coalition, but Payne shows that the general always worked to sideline the noisy and anti-clerical followers of Primo de Rivera, son of a former authoritarian leader. Once Franco consolidated power, he ruled through traditional institutions like the army and the church, and the Falange became something more like a club than a ruling party.
Marxists have done themselves few favors in defining the history of fascism by sticking with a few talking points defined by Trotsky, Gramsci, and a few other canonical figures and not going very far past them. Scholars like Enzo Traverso, Arno Mayer, and Domenico Losurdo have done more in that vein lately, but more liberal writers have a substantial head start in the historiography, Payne being one of the major figures writing since the early sixties. So I think we’re in a situation where real and necessary historical nuance comes with a politicization defined by Cold War liberalism. Fascists need to be destroyed; authoritarians can be negotiated with; the former are rare and the latter are easy to be found, including with America’s Cold War allies. What I wonder is if we can keep the nuanced taxonomy of far-right regimes but keep the urgency of anti-fascism. It’s not like right-wing authoritarianism (any authoritarianism) is some picnic we should tolerate. I think calling Franco “fascist” as in “intolerably right-wing” makes sense even if he’s not “fascist” in the academic sense.
Anyway- this is a fine book for what it is but I read it a little while ago and most of the thoughts it provoked were about the historiography. But hey, I don’t see anyone else reviewing the books around here! ****
Marxists have done themselves few favors in defining the history of fascism by sticking with a few talking points defined by Trotsky, Gramsci, and a few other canonical figures and not going very far past them. Scholars like Enzo Traverso, Arno Mayer, and Domenico Losurdo have done more in that vein lately, but more liberal writers have a substantial head start in the historiography, Payne being one of the major figures writing since the early sixties. So I think we’re in a situation where real and necessary historical nuance comes with a politicization defined by Cold War liberalism. Fascists need to be destroyed; authoritarians can be negotiated with; the former are rare and the latter are easy to be found, including with America’s Cold War allies. What I wonder is if we can keep the nuanced taxonomy of far-right regimes but keep the urgency of anti-fascism. It’s not like right-wing authoritarianism (any authoritarianism) is some picnic we should tolerate. I think calling Franco “fascist” as in “intolerably right-wing” makes sense even if he’s not “fascist” in the academic sense.
Anyway- this is a fine book for what it is but I read it a little while ago and most of the thoughts it provoked were about the historiography. But hey, I don’t see anyone else reviewing the books around here! ****
November 26, 2025
Blanquea la figura de Primo de Rivera... Ya se sabe de qué pie cojea Stanley G. Payne... Pero algo positivo que he aprendido del libro es que la Falange original tenía alguna que otra buena idea, como acabar con el latifundismo, antes de convertirse en una caterva de asesinos descerebrados... Resulta ilustrativo que en mi pueblo el único falangista sea el tonto del pueblo, valga la redundancia...
April 24, 2025
Un interesante libro de Stanley Payne sobre la figura de José Antonio Primo de Rivera, y como después de la Guerra Civil el movimiento fue absorbido por el Régimen y persiguiendo a los disidentes que se opusieron a ello.
August 9, 2021
El principal aprendizaje que saqué en claro de su lectura fue el siguiente:
Toda asimilación banal que se haga entre el fascismo y el comunismo por ser ideologías "totalitarias" queda desvanecida si se hila fino. El fascismo (o cualquiera que fuera el nombre que los falangistas o nacional-sindicalistas quisieran darle a lo que era la variante española del fascismo) tiene que ver más con las facciones reaccionarias, pretorianistas, monárquicas en el caso español, y con la derecha política y sociológica en general, antes que con cualquiera de las corrientes izquierdistas de la época (desde el liberalismo azañista hasta el anarco-sindicalismo, pasando por el socialismo y el comunismo). Muy claro queda en el caso español, cuyo fascismo ni siquiera llegó al poder "a la alemana" o "a la italiana".
Toda asimilación banal que se haga entre el fascismo y el comunismo por ser ideologías "totalitarias" queda desvanecida si se hila fino. El fascismo (o cualquiera que fuera el nombre que los falangistas o nacional-sindicalistas quisieran darle a lo que era la variante española del fascismo) tiene que ver más con las facciones reaccionarias, pretorianistas, monárquicas en el caso español, y con la derecha política y sociológica en general, antes que con cualquiera de las corrientes izquierdistas de la época (desde el liberalismo azañista hasta el anarco-sindicalismo, pasando por el socialismo y el comunismo). Muy claro queda en el caso español, cuyo fascismo ni siquiera llegó al poder "a la alemana" o "a la italiana".
April 11, 2024
De las primeras obras académicas que se fijaron como objetivo estudiar lo que había sido el partido fundado por el hijo del dictador Primo de Rivera, aunque realizada por un autor con escasa ambición intelectual y menos científica.
Sin animo de extenderme en demasía, señalar que la obra se puede dividir en dos grandes bloques, divididos por el evento de la Guerra civil española.
En el primer bloque, luego de esbozarnos un excesivamente sintético contexto histórico previo, se nos cuentan las peripecias hasta la creación de Falange, y paralelamente su relación con las JONS de Ramiro Ledesma Ramos. El autor en esta parte centra sus esfuerzos en dilucidar si se podría denominar fascista al nuevo partido, basándose tan solo en ciertas declaraciones del propio Primo de Rivera, sin entender que estas se daban por la particular situación de España en la Europa del momento (lo que no impide situar a la Falange, al igual que a la SA nazi, dentro del ámbito de las fascismos europeos de entreguerras), ya que si señala que lo más lógico era que el fascismo español fuese encabezado por un Indalecio Prieto o por un Ángel Pestaña, pero es incapaz de entender porqué esto no sucedió como en Italia con Mussolini o el caso alemán con la mitad del SPD apoyando los créditos de guerra y sumándose al carro del chovinismo en bloque. Y es que a lo largo de la obra el liberalismo que profesa el autor lo lleva a ser incapaz de dar una visión de conjunto del fenómeno fascista español, de una forma "estructural" (aunque esta sea una palabra por la cual no siento mucha simpatía). En este sentido el autor pretende exculpar a la Falange y su líder de una imagen negativa, y si bien es cierto que la mayoría de historiografía post-75 ha hecho una análisis quizás demasiado simplista de la Falange como una masa amorfa de pistoleros y asesinos represores sin más, lo cierto es que el partido fue sumamente irrelevante, excepto en la guerra cuando a sus filas acudieron en masa precisamente eso, señoritos que añoraban tener una cohartada política para empuñar la pistola y defender sus intereses amenazados.
En la segunda parte el autor también evidencia sus carencias al interpretar la traición de Franco a la Falange como una simple riña entre líneas discordantes, pero todas amables y bien intencionadas, lo que no quita que incluso la parte más izquierdista del propio movimiento fascista en sí sea incapaz de ser fagocitada por el ala más reaccionaria y conservadora de cualquier movimiento derechista. Por no hablar de su legitimación hacia el oxímoron del franco-falangismo...
A parte de estas carencias, se puede intuir de la obra de Payne un velado elogio a la figura de Franco, además que adolece de la misma visión racista y romántica propia de la sobredimensionada pléyade de hispanistas británicos, inaugurada por Gerald Brenan, que lo lleva a ver la Falange de forma absurda como un "movimiento poético". Además que resulta llamativo como Payne parece solo interesarse por fuentes afines al movimiento y por relatos de primera persona de protagonistas de los hechos, negando asi un principio de la historiografía medianamente seria como es el contraste de las fuentes.
Resumiento, obra recomendable quizás para quien quiera conocer el repertorio de nombres y hechos (narrados a medias) que recorrieron la historia de la Falange desde su fundación hasta finales de los 50, pero que no esperen una explicación mínimamente articulada de la existencia de la misma y de su razón de ser política.
Sin animo de extenderme en demasía, señalar que la obra se puede dividir en dos grandes bloques, divididos por el evento de la Guerra civil española.
En el primer bloque, luego de esbozarnos un excesivamente sintético contexto histórico previo, se nos cuentan las peripecias hasta la creación de Falange, y paralelamente su relación con las JONS de Ramiro Ledesma Ramos. El autor en esta parte centra sus esfuerzos en dilucidar si se podría denominar fascista al nuevo partido, basándose tan solo en ciertas declaraciones del propio Primo de Rivera, sin entender que estas se daban por la particular situación de España en la Europa del momento (lo que no impide situar a la Falange, al igual que a la SA nazi, dentro del ámbito de las fascismos europeos de entreguerras), ya que si señala que lo más lógico era que el fascismo español fuese encabezado por un Indalecio Prieto o por un Ángel Pestaña, pero es incapaz de entender porqué esto no sucedió como en Italia con Mussolini o el caso alemán con la mitad del SPD apoyando los créditos de guerra y sumándose al carro del chovinismo en bloque. Y es que a lo largo de la obra el liberalismo que profesa el autor lo lleva a ser incapaz de dar una visión de conjunto del fenómeno fascista español, de una forma "estructural" (aunque esta sea una palabra por la cual no siento mucha simpatía). En este sentido el autor pretende exculpar a la Falange y su líder de una imagen negativa, y si bien es cierto que la mayoría de historiografía post-75 ha hecho una análisis quizás demasiado simplista de la Falange como una masa amorfa de pistoleros y asesinos represores sin más, lo cierto es que el partido fue sumamente irrelevante, excepto en la guerra cuando a sus filas acudieron en masa precisamente eso, señoritos que añoraban tener una cohartada política para empuñar la pistola y defender sus intereses amenazados.
En la segunda parte el autor también evidencia sus carencias al interpretar la traición de Franco a la Falange como una simple riña entre líneas discordantes, pero todas amables y bien intencionadas, lo que no quita que incluso la parte más izquierdista del propio movimiento fascista en sí sea incapaz de ser fagocitada por el ala más reaccionaria y conservadora de cualquier movimiento derechista. Por no hablar de su legitimación hacia el oxímoron del franco-falangismo...
A parte de estas carencias, se puede intuir de la obra de Payne un velado elogio a la figura de Franco, además que adolece de la misma visión racista y romántica propia de la sobredimensionada pléyade de hispanistas británicos, inaugurada por Gerald Brenan, que lo lleva a ver la Falange de forma absurda como un "movimiento poético". Además que resulta llamativo como Payne parece solo interesarse por fuentes afines al movimiento y por relatos de primera persona de protagonistas de los hechos, negando asi un principio de la historiografía medianamente seria como es el contraste de las fuentes.
Resumiento, obra recomendable quizás para quien quiera conocer el repertorio de nombres y hechos (narrados a medias) que recorrieron la historia de la Falange desde su fundación hasta finales de los 50, pero que no esperen una explicación mínimamente articulada de la existencia de la misma y de su razón de ser política.
November 2, 2025
Una obra fundamental para comprender Falange, las JONS y sus fundadores. Payne describe con rigor e imparcialidad cómo se desarrolla el movimiento desde sus orígenes personales hasta su disolución. Analiza con precisión las complicaciones surgidas tras la sublevación, así como la falta de poder con la que se encuentra después de no seguir en manos de sus fundadores y formar parte de una minoría dentro del bando nacional.
October 5, 2022
Probably out-of-date, but very informative about the evolution of the main fascist faction in Spain. It touches many aspects and criticizes all sides.
Willing to read more books from the author.
More detailed review (in Catalan): https://lobloc.net/2022/10/05/falange...
Willing to read more books from the author.
More detailed review (in Catalan): https://lobloc.net/2022/10/05/falange...
March 5, 2024
Un 3 porque no estoy del todo convencido de las categorías que maneja pero un 5 por el pedazo trabajo de investigación que hizo Payne.
July 26, 2024
Una obra de rigor y erudición extraordinarios, la mejor que se ha escrito sobre la historia de la Falange en los años de la Segunda República y la Guerra Civil.
February 2, 2025
Un ensayo muy interesante sobre José Antonio Primo de Rivera y la creación de su partido.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews