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The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam
Tracing the use of air power in World War II and the Korean War, Mark Clodfelter explains how U. S. Air Force doctrine evolved through the American experience in these conventional wars only to be thwarted in the context of a limited guerrilla struggle in Vietnam. Although a faith in bombing's sheer destructive power led air commanders to believe that extensive air assaults could win the war at any time, the Vietnam experience instead showed how even intense aerial attacks may not achieve military or political objectives in a limited war. Based on findings from previously classified documents in presidential libraries and air force archives as well as on interviews with civilian and military decision makers, The Limits of Air Power argues that reliance on air campaigns as a primary instrument of warfare could not have produced lasting victory in Vietnam. This Bison Books edition includes a new chapter that provides a framework for evaluating air power effectiveness in future conflicts.
312 pages, Paperback
First published May 18, 1989
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
December 19, 2025
A balanced and comprehensive history of the US bombing campaigns over North Vietnam.
Clodfelter looks at Rolling Thunder, Linebacker, and Linebacker II, assessing how the results of these campaigns compared to America’s strategic objectives and how American air power was affected by other factors like political constraints, military doctrine, the weather, and technology.
The conclusions aren’t exactly original, but the author does make the argument that Nixon's bombing campaigns were so effective not because of their intensity but because Nixon’s political objectives (US withdrawal and an intact regime in Saigon) were not as ambitious as the ones that accompanied previous air campaigns, because the Russians and Chinese were less likely to intervene, and because Hanoi’s use of conventional ground forces in the Easter Offensive made them more vulnerable to American air power. These are contrasted with the more ambitious goals of the campaign under Johnson, along with Johnson’s concerns about escalation and the idea that bombing North Vietnam was similar to bombing an industrialized Nazi Germany fielding conventional forces.
The book is readable but can be a bit repetitive at times. There is nothing on the general experience of American airmen, if you’re looking for that. Clodfelter writes that the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos convinced the North Vietnamese that “Vietnamization had bolstered Southern combat capability,” although they reached the opposite conclusion. Another quibble: Clodfelter writes that Curtis LeMay, in his memoirs, advocated bombing North Vietnam into the “Stone Age,” though he doesn’t mention the controversy around this quote’s veracity. This quote was made famous by a newspaper book reviewer, and only at that point took off in the media. LeMay himself denied ever having said it, blamed the ghostwriter, and said he was talking about US capabilities rather than intentions.
A clear, well-written and well-researched work.
Clodfelter looks at Rolling Thunder, Linebacker, and Linebacker II, assessing how the results of these campaigns compared to America’s strategic objectives and how American air power was affected by other factors like political constraints, military doctrine, the weather, and technology.
The conclusions aren’t exactly original, but the author does make the argument that Nixon's bombing campaigns were so effective not because of their intensity but because Nixon’s political objectives (US withdrawal and an intact regime in Saigon) were not as ambitious as the ones that accompanied previous air campaigns, because the Russians and Chinese were less likely to intervene, and because Hanoi’s use of conventional ground forces in the Easter Offensive made them more vulnerable to American air power. These are contrasted with the more ambitious goals of the campaign under Johnson, along with Johnson’s concerns about escalation and the idea that bombing North Vietnam was similar to bombing an industrialized Nazi Germany fielding conventional forces.
The book is readable but can be a bit repetitive at times. There is nothing on the general experience of American airmen, if you’re looking for that. Clodfelter writes that the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos convinced the North Vietnamese that “Vietnamization had bolstered Southern combat capability,” although they reached the opposite conclusion. Another quibble: Clodfelter writes that Curtis LeMay, in his memoirs, advocated bombing North Vietnam into the “Stone Age,” though he doesn’t mention the controversy around this quote’s veracity. This quote was made famous by a newspaper book reviewer, and only at that point took off in the media. LeMay himself denied ever having said it, blamed the ghostwriter, and said he was talking about US capabilities rather than intentions.
A clear, well-written and well-researched work.
September 24, 2012
Clodfelter's Limits of Air Power is an attempt to describe situations where military power, and specifically airpower, can be effective. It is, at the same time, a warning that there are instances where it is ineffective. The primary premise of the book is that there are both positive goals, those that are achieved only through military force, and negative goals which are achievable by limiting military force. Both goals must be met in order to achieve victory and in limited wars, the negative goals become more numerous and significant. This premise is outlined through the examples of air campaigns in the Vietnam War.
President Johnson attempted to achieve large positive goals of an independent, non-communist South Vietnam with Rolling Thunder while then negative goal to prevent wider war with China or the Soviets restricted military options. Nixon’s Linebacker I and II campaigns, on the other hand, sought much more limited positive goals of ‘peace with honor’ to maintain the American withdrawal. Detente with the USSR and China had also allowed more freedom and reduced the risk of larger war. Quickly resolving a peace settlement before Congress ending military funding became the driving negative goal.
From this reasoning, Clodfelter seems to argue that Rolling Thunder could not have been done more effectively without getting into a larger conflict with the USSR. If this is true, then USAF and military leaders must go to the National Security Council with an admission that military force cannot reach their objectives. I believe, however, that civilian senior leaders also need to realize that military force does not act alone and they must utilize all of the nation’s instruments of power – diplomatic, information, and economic in addition to military – to achieve victory. Nixon did a better job of this with diplomatic relations to China and the USSR which allowed him more freedom to strike in Linebacker II.
The extension of the question is whether the United States is using all potential instruments of power effectively in Afghanistan and the larger conflict in with Muslim extremism. The parallels between Operation Enduring Freedom and Vietnam are many, Vietnamization and the transfer to Afghan autonomy being the most recent example. Hopefully we will not have to lose this conflict in a similar way to learn the next lesson of international power.
President Johnson attempted to achieve large positive goals of an independent, non-communist South Vietnam with Rolling Thunder while then negative goal to prevent wider war with China or the Soviets restricted military options. Nixon’s Linebacker I and II campaigns, on the other hand, sought much more limited positive goals of ‘peace with honor’ to maintain the American withdrawal. Detente with the USSR and China had also allowed more freedom and reduced the risk of larger war. Quickly resolving a peace settlement before Congress ending military funding became the driving negative goal.
From this reasoning, Clodfelter seems to argue that Rolling Thunder could not have been done more effectively without getting into a larger conflict with the USSR. If this is true, then USAF and military leaders must go to the National Security Council with an admission that military force cannot reach their objectives. I believe, however, that civilian senior leaders also need to realize that military force does not act alone and they must utilize all of the nation’s instruments of power – diplomatic, information, and economic in addition to military – to achieve victory. Nixon did a better job of this with diplomatic relations to China and the USSR which allowed him more freedom to strike in Linebacker II.
The extension of the question is whether the United States is using all potential instruments of power effectively in Afghanistan and the larger conflict in with Muslim extremism. The parallels between Operation Enduring Freedom and Vietnam are many, Vietnamization and the transfer to Afghan autonomy being the most recent example. Hopefully we will not have to lose this conflict in a similar way to learn the next lesson of international power.
April 14, 2013
This is a very good overview of the uses and limits of airpower, as found in the context of the Vietnam War, and how airpower can be used and misused to achieve positive and negative goals. Clodfelter details the rationale behind Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I, and Linebacker II. The micromanagement and mismanagement of Rolling Thunder was very interesting, as the Johnson administration attempted to keep the Vietnam war a limited conflict, while avoiding any provokation of the PRC or the Soviet Union. Targeting presented a significant challenge, as the administration and the JCS attempted to figure out what the center of gravity was, and how to neutarlize it; a significant challenge with a nation like North Vietnam. Lessons learned from WW II were not applicable, as North Vietnam did not have an industrial heartland. The lessons in this book can be tied to our experience in the Balkans, the Gulf War, and the COE in Iraq and Afghanistan. Air power alone cannot bring about decisive victory.
July 15, 2016
Well written and thought out though certainly one should be cautious to note what is opinion and what is fact. This book has been required reading for some Air Force educational courses.
February 2, 2013
Professor Clodfelter's dissection of America's bombing campaigns during the Vietnam War ought to be required reading at all military academies and institutes the world over, and especially in the United States. The book illustrates the clash between doctrine and political limitations that usually accompany the road to war, Clodfelter making the important point that that while the people who ran the bombing campaigns based their expectations on how bombardment from the air was carried out during the Second World War, that war turned out to be the aberration rather than the rule. And while it is true that many of the gloves came off during the more intense campaign of the Nixon-ordered "Christmas Bombing" ("Linebacker II), the political, diplomatic and tactical circumstances surrounding the war had also changed. In short, a study of the bombing campaigns here are a thorough lesson in the Clausewitz-ian aspects of war. While the book isn't exactly a ripping great read, its lessons are too important to pass up.
July 25, 2011
A very comprehensive history lesson of the Vietnam War. Attempts to give the reader the historical context in which civilian and military leaders made national security decisions leading up to, during, and at the end of the war. An excellent read.
February 21, 2013
A good read about the failure of Air Power in Vietnam
October 18, 2017
A classic. Clodfelter’s analysis of air power’s effectiveness is equally applicable to other forms of military power.
December 8, 2020
This superbly lucid and cogent book explains when the bombing of North Vietnam worked and when it didn't, and why. The Rolling Thunder campaigns of the 1960s failed because the guerilla war being waged in the South at the time had such small need for support from the North that bombing the transportation and supply system there could not have a significant effect. Furthermore, the determination of the North to reunite the country was great enough for them to shrug off any damage the US could do--both sides knew we weren't going to flatten Hanoi like Berlin or Tokyo. The Linebacker campaigns of 1972 succeeded somewhat for three reasons. The Communist Easter Offensive that year was a conventional land invasion with tanks and artillery, and it required massive logistical support that could be interdicted. Furthermore, the US did not demand that the North abandon its plan to take over the South, or even withdraw from the provinces it has conquered, only cease operations for a time. Finally, the overwhelming violence of the Linebacker II raids shocked the Communist leaders into accepting a postponement of their ambitions.
July 27, 2022
Clodfelter does an excellent job clarifying why the air campaigns of Vietnam had such drastically different outcomes. He also outlines an excellent framing device for evaluating and designing future air campaigns.
January 8, 2025
Good job of reviewing Johnson's Rolling Thunder and Nixon's Linebacker air campaigns. All in all, the book shows that air power is not necessarily the way to win a war in the post-WW2 era where wars re more limited.
Written so that military non-experts like me can understand.
Written so that military non-experts like me can understand.
December 18, 2018
His concepts of positive and negative political goals really helped my understanding of how airpower's effectiveness can wax or wane in a given conflict.
December 21, 2019
Too scholarly to finish....
December 2, 2013
Clodfelter uses the Vietnam War as the context for analyzing American airpower’s utility as a political instrument. He demonstrates that the US Air Force organized, trained, and equipped for a worst-case scenario (general) war. Air Force leaders believed that by preparing for general war, it would be inherently prepared to fight limited wars. Clodfelter argues that the Vietnam experience created “a modern vision of air power that focuses on the lethality of its weaponry rather than on that weaponry’s effectiveness as a political instrument” (203).
I found the author’s argument to be well organized and useful as a means to employ airpower in less-than-general war; however, his lesson learned appears to be a bit skewed against the reality of politics. If war is, as Clausewitz offers, an extension of politics, then the application of airpower will naturally be at the changing whim of politicians. Even more importantly, a tactical or operational win does not always equate to a strategic win, and it is the strategic win that has the highest value. More than likely, the strategic battlespace may change dramatically even within the course of an operation. When Clodfelter assigns ���positive” value to the application of airpower, and “negative” value to the restraint of airpower, he joins those leaders who have failed to see that constraints and restraints have always been a part of warfare. Given the US’s experience in WWII, airpower without restraint gave American leaders great hope in airpower’s potential; however, it was this lack of restraint that has tainted American airpower with some of the most horrific slaughters in modern history. I would rather Clodfelter have called these objectives “constraints” and “restraints” versus “positive” and “negative,” if only to show that military leaders do not have the luxury of assigning value to objectives handed down by the principals (see Feaver).
I agree with the author when he paints the distorted vision of airpower, that “the direct, independent application of air power seems to work best for a belligerent with no negative objectives,” as well as his caveat, “– provided a suitable type of enemy wages a suitable type of war in a suitable type of environment free of significant military restrictions” (220). If airpower is only effective without restraint in a permissive environment, then it is not effective at all. Airpower must be shown to have utility as a political instrument, either on its own or in concert with other capabilities/powers. For most of this book, I found myself to be in violent agreement with the author. Despite his categorization of objectives, Clodfelter provides a helpful roadmap to bring airpower to its proper place as a political instrument.
I found the author’s argument to be well organized and useful as a means to employ airpower in less-than-general war; however, his lesson learned appears to be a bit skewed against the reality of politics. If war is, as Clausewitz offers, an extension of politics, then the application of airpower will naturally be at the changing whim of politicians. Even more importantly, a tactical or operational win does not always equate to a strategic win, and it is the strategic win that has the highest value. More than likely, the strategic battlespace may change dramatically even within the course of an operation. When Clodfelter assigns ���positive” value to the application of airpower, and “negative” value to the restraint of airpower, he joins those leaders who have failed to see that constraints and restraints have always been a part of warfare. Given the US’s experience in WWII, airpower without restraint gave American leaders great hope in airpower’s potential; however, it was this lack of restraint that has tainted American airpower with some of the most horrific slaughters in modern history. I would rather Clodfelter have called these objectives “constraints” and “restraints” versus “positive” and “negative,” if only to show that military leaders do not have the luxury of assigning value to objectives handed down by the principals (see Feaver).
I agree with the author when he paints the distorted vision of airpower, that “the direct, independent application of air power seems to work best for a belligerent with no negative objectives,” as well as his caveat, “– provided a suitable type of enemy wages a suitable type of war in a suitable type of environment free of significant military restrictions” (220). If airpower is only effective without restraint in a permissive environment, then it is not effective at all. Airpower must be shown to have utility as a political instrument, either on its own or in concert with other capabilities/powers. For most of this book, I found myself to be in violent agreement with the author. Despite his categorization of objectives, Clodfelter provides a helpful roadmap to bring airpower to its proper place as a political instrument.
December 3, 2016
This was a hard book for me to read. It was not as bad as Into the Quagmire in which VanDeMark described me as he described the protagonists, Johnson, MacNamara, etc., who knew they could not win the Viet Nam War because the government was not a viable government. But I did not know that. Like so many. I was conditioned by WWII, my Hungarian background, anti-Russian, anti-Marxist, etc. But I was smart enough, I think, to realize after my Air Force service that strategic bombers could not be brought to bear with effect on tactical issues.
What I did not fully realize was the political dimension, that limited wars should be kept limited so that we do not have a major war in which strategic weapons could be brought into use without the real desire to use them because opposing sides had lost sight of the need for limited objecties.
This book describes the misuse of air power in Viet Nam by Johnson. The Air Force manuals emphasized strategic bombing to bring a country that was an enemy to its knees, and, indeed, atomic bombs. Strategic bombing worked, sort of, in WWII. But it did not work, or was not used, in Korea, leaving a conundrum for Air Force doctrine, which spoke of tactical doctrine after that war but still emphasized strategic bombing.
Clodfelter brings out the view that the Air Force generals retained the notion of strategic air power as the epitome of national defense. What was forgotten and only occasionally adumbrated was the notion that there could be limited wars, especially guerilla wars, in which strategic bombing could not be used well tactically, and, whose misuse could lead to global disaster.
The author describes Graduated Thunder, a result of the 1964-1965 discussions by Johnson and his defense cabinet. The mission was to raise up an independent South Viet Nam. But this was not possible and air power, even gradually used, did not work. JOhnson wanted contradictory things, the great society and containment, in an area in which containment could not work. He hid his purposes in Viet Nam, leading to his loss of presidential power.
The author suggests that the Linebacker campaign which was strategic bombing worked because the mission was far more limited, to withdraw from South Viet Nam, leaving the south to protect itself. [I think there was some cynicism in this] I have to admit here that I gave up after the first 1/3 of the book and read the epilog and quit. This is not because it was a bad book, but I did not have the patience to read of such sorrow, and, yes, such stupidity.
What I did not fully realize was the political dimension, that limited wars should be kept limited so that we do not have a major war in which strategic weapons could be brought into use without the real desire to use them because opposing sides had lost sight of the need for limited objecties.
This book describes the misuse of air power in Viet Nam by Johnson. The Air Force manuals emphasized strategic bombing to bring a country that was an enemy to its knees, and, indeed, atomic bombs. Strategic bombing worked, sort of, in WWII. But it did not work, or was not used, in Korea, leaving a conundrum for Air Force doctrine, which spoke of tactical doctrine after that war but still emphasized strategic bombing.
Clodfelter brings out the view that the Air Force generals retained the notion of strategic air power as the epitome of national defense. What was forgotten and only occasionally adumbrated was the notion that there could be limited wars, especially guerilla wars, in which strategic bombing could not be used well tactically, and, whose misuse could lead to global disaster.
The author describes Graduated Thunder, a result of the 1964-1965 discussions by Johnson and his defense cabinet. The mission was to raise up an independent South Viet Nam. But this was not possible and air power, even gradually used, did not work. JOhnson wanted contradictory things, the great society and containment, in an area in which containment could not work. He hid his purposes in Viet Nam, leading to his loss of presidential power.
The author suggests that the Linebacker campaign which was strategic bombing worked because the mission was far more limited, to withdraw from South Viet Nam, leaving the south to protect itself. [I think there was some cynicism in this] I have to admit here that I gave up after the first 1/3 of the book and read the epilog and quit. This is not because it was a bad book, but I did not have the patience to read of such sorrow, and, yes, such stupidity.
December 5, 2012
A good overview of the political background to, and conduct of the Rolling Thunder and Linebacker campaigns. Clodfelter's main aim is to use the concepts of negative and positive political objectives to explain, at least in part, why Johnson's air campaign against the North was such a failure when compared with Nixon's. In so doing, Clodfelter seeks to dispel the conventional wisdom that if only the Air Force was given free reign in the 60s, it would have brought the war to an end as it did in 72.
Clodfelter's analysis does not argue against the failures inherent in Johnson's micromanagement, and the inability to form a coherent political aim for the bombing campaign he gradually imposed on the North. There were fundamental flaws in the Johnson administration's approach to the war that directly affected the likelihood of success of any actions taken during the war. However, the external circumstances imposed by the legitimate concerns over Chinese and Soviet involvement did place a real and substantial limitation on the advisability of waging unrestrained air war in the North Vietnamese. Also, Johnson's positive objectives of ensuring a stable non-Communist South Vietnam could not easily be achieved through the conduct of a bombing campaign.
Nixon, however, benefited from the detente. The possibility of Chinese and Soviet intervention was a lesser, though still present concern. This allowed Nixon's air planners a freer hand by reducing the administration's negative objectives. Moreover, Nixon only sought "peace with honor" and the withdrawal of US forces without causing the immediate collapse of the South Vietnamese government. This was an outcome more conducive to the employment of military force.
A well-structured and argued book. Easy to read and useful in providing an insight into both the air war, and the connections between poltiical objectives and the employment of military force.
Clodfelter's analysis does not argue against the failures inherent in Johnson's micromanagement, and the inability to form a coherent political aim for the bombing campaign he gradually imposed on the North. There were fundamental flaws in the Johnson administration's approach to the war that directly affected the likelihood of success of any actions taken during the war. However, the external circumstances imposed by the legitimate concerns over Chinese and Soviet involvement did place a real and substantial limitation on the advisability of waging unrestrained air war in the North Vietnamese. Also, Johnson's positive objectives of ensuring a stable non-Communist South Vietnam could not easily be achieved through the conduct of a bombing campaign.
Nixon, however, benefited from the detente. The possibility of Chinese and Soviet intervention was a lesser, though still present concern. This allowed Nixon's air planners a freer hand by reducing the administration's negative objectives. Moreover, Nixon only sought "peace with honor" and the withdrawal of US forces without causing the immediate collapse of the South Vietnamese government. This was an outcome more conducive to the employment of military force.
A well-structured and argued book. Easy to read and useful in providing an insight into both the air war, and the connections between poltiical objectives and the employment of military force.
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