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The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power
While the major conflicts in American history have become all too familiar, America’s “small wars” have played an essential but little-appreciated role in the country’s growth as a world power. First published in 2002, The Savage Wars of Peace quickly became a key volume in the case for a new policy of interventionism. Max Boot shows how America’s smaller actions—such as the recent conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—have made up the vast majority of our military engagements, and yet our armed forces do little to prepare for these “low intensity conflicts.”
A compellingly readable history of the forgotten wars that helped promote America’s rise in the last two centuries, The Savage Wars of Peace is now updated with new material on the repercussions of America’s far-flung imperial actions and the impact of these ventures in American international affairs.
A compellingly readable history of the forgotten wars that helped promote America’s rise in the last two centuries, The Savage Wars of Peace is now updated with new material on the repercussions of America’s far-flung imperial actions and the impact of these ventures in American international affairs.
496 pages, Paperback
Published March 11, 2014
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2736 people want to read
About the author
Max Boot
13 books220 followersMax Boot is a historian and biographer, best-selling author, and foreign-policy analyst. He is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a weekly columnist for The Washington Post.
Max Boot’s biography of Ronald Reagan, Reagan: His Life and Legend, is his third New York Times bestseller. It was named one of the Ten Best Books of 2024 by the New York Times, and also made best-of-the-year lists from The New Yorker, The Washington Post and The Economist. It has been acclaimed as a "landmark work" (The New York Times), the "definitive biography" (The New Yorker), “magisterial" (The Washington Post), and “enormously readable and scrupulously honest” (The Sunday Times). Max Boot’s previous biography, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam, was also a New York Times bestseller and a finalist for the 2019 Pulitzer Prize in biography.
Max Boot’s biography of Ronald Reagan, Reagan: His Life and Legend, is his third New York Times bestseller. It was named one of the Ten Best Books of 2024 by the New York Times, and also made best-of-the-year lists from The New Yorker, The Washington Post and The Economist. It has been acclaimed as a "landmark work" (The New York Times), the "definitive biography" (The New Yorker), “magisterial" (The Washington Post), and “enormously readable and scrupulously honest” (The Sunday Times). Max Boot’s previous biography, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam, was also a New York Times bestseller and a finalist for the 2019 Pulitzer Prize in biography.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 101 reviews
January 2, 2020
Savage Wars of Peace is a decent, if unsystematic study of American military interventions prior to 1941, wedded to an ideology that has aged like a burn-pit outside Bagram Air Base.
I'll tackle the first bit. America has a long history of deploying force overseas, in gunboat diplomacy and putative expeditions stretching back to the wars against the Barbary Corsairs: "...to the shores of Tripoli", as the Marine corps hymn goes. As Toll's magisterial Six Frigates discusses, these early wars were at the pivot of a debate about the power of the Federal government and America's role in the world. The 18th century was marked by constant, if limited use of the Navy and Marines to open Japan, Korea, and China to American trade, and to punish various groups in Malaysia and the Caribbean who had decided that plundering American merchants was better than trading with them.
The Spanish-American War marked a distinct change in American policy, with the Philippines and Puerto Rico now directly ruled colonies, Cuba a protectorate, and a newly more assertive posture worldwide. A combination of Teddy Roosevelt's imperialism, and Woodrow Wilson's moralism, summed up in the statement that 'America should teach Latin Americans to elect good men', resulted in repeated interventions in Haiti and Nicaragua, as well as a protracted counter-insurgency in the Philippines, Pershing's putative expedition against Pancho Villa, which nearly resulted in an actual shooting war with Mexico, and the gunboat operations of the China patrol. Generally, small groups of American Marines outfought their local opponents with superior training and armaments. Boot takes a universally uncritical view of the American role in all these operations, arguing that American intervention was broadly popular because Americans provided hygiene and displaced local corrupt strongmen. I'm sure a historian who bothered to read what the locals involved thought would consider otherwise.
The final chapter is a brief skip through the latter half of the 20th century. Boot's take is that Vietnam was lost because Westmoreland's war of attrition destroyed American morale at home, and that the COIN side of the Combined Action Patrol (see Bing West's The Village) and Phoenix Program (Herrington's Stalking The Vietcong) showed that the war could be won. If America had the will to intervene as decisively in 1975 as it did in 1972, there'd still be a South Vietnam. This is a conclusion that I'm skeptical of. I think America would have had to intervene again in 1978, 81, etc. There's a brief skip through Desert Storm and Clinton's operations of the 90s.
This pure history isn't a bad one, per se, as a military history of forgotten American interventions. My problems are twofold, first Boot agrees completely with Kipling's 'white man's burden' thesis of history, without managing to capture any of the actual zeitgest of period, what I consider to be the highest aim of history. Second, this book includes nothing on the US Army and the Indian Wars, certainly the most protracted and decisive of American Small Wars. The relationship between the genocide of American Indians, the Federal government, and historiography is a complex one, but to write an entire book on Small Wars without discussing Custer or Geronimo is a curious choice-perhaps because it's impossible to fit genocide into Boot's theoretical framework that imperialism is both authentically American and generally good for all concerned.
And that theoretical framework is where this book stinks. The book was written in that halcyon 'End of History' prior to 9/11, and published immediately afterwards, before the true nature of the quagmire of Afghanistan and the fiasco of Iraq had sunk in to public perception. Assessing the total cost of the War of Terror and its children is foolhardy, but the total cost cannot be considered anything less than high. Around $45 billion per year, as the Afghanistan War becomes old enough vote, according to the Pentagon's numbers. Perhaps $5.9 TRILLION, according to the Crawford Report.
If these are Small Wars, I shudder to think of what a big one would look like. And that doesn't even include the human costs to American soldiers, and to especially the Afghans, Iraqis, and Yemeni (among many others) on the receiving end of "American liberty".
Since publishing this book, Boot has gone on to a successful career as a chickenhawk Washington Post columnist and perpetually owned twitter figure. He lacks the truly sublime idiocy of a Thomas Friedman or David Brooks, but he's still out there, saying America should bomb some more people, and getting wrecked on Twitter. I picked this book up for a dollar at a used book sale, I almost decided to toss it away unread when I saw Boot's name on. And I persisted in reading just so I could write a very sarcastic review.
I'll tackle the first bit. America has a long history of deploying force overseas, in gunboat diplomacy and putative expeditions stretching back to the wars against the Barbary Corsairs: "...to the shores of Tripoli", as the Marine corps hymn goes. As Toll's magisterial Six Frigates discusses, these early wars were at the pivot of a debate about the power of the Federal government and America's role in the world. The 18th century was marked by constant, if limited use of the Navy and Marines to open Japan, Korea, and China to American trade, and to punish various groups in Malaysia and the Caribbean who had decided that plundering American merchants was better than trading with them.
The Spanish-American War marked a distinct change in American policy, with the Philippines and Puerto Rico now directly ruled colonies, Cuba a protectorate, and a newly more assertive posture worldwide. A combination of Teddy Roosevelt's imperialism, and Woodrow Wilson's moralism, summed up in the statement that 'America should teach Latin Americans to elect good men', resulted in repeated interventions in Haiti and Nicaragua, as well as a protracted counter-insurgency in the Philippines, Pershing's putative expedition against Pancho Villa, which nearly resulted in an actual shooting war with Mexico, and the gunboat operations of the China patrol. Generally, small groups of American Marines outfought their local opponents with superior training and armaments. Boot takes a universally uncritical view of the American role in all these operations, arguing that American intervention was broadly popular because Americans provided hygiene and displaced local corrupt strongmen. I'm sure a historian who bothered to read what the locals involved thought would consider otherwise.
The final chapter is a brief skip through the latter half of the 20th century. Boot's take is that Vietnam was lost because Westmoreland's war of attrition destroyed American morale at home, and that the COIN side of the Combined Action Patrol (see Bing West's The Village) and Phoenix Program (Herrington's Stalking The Vietcong) showed that the war could be won. If America had the will to intervene as decisively in 1975 as it did in 1972, there'd still be a South Vietnam. This is a conclusion that I'm skeptical of. I think America would have had to intervene again in 1978, 81, etc. There's a brief skip through Desert Storm and Clinton's operations of the 90s.
This pure history isn't a bad one, per se, as a military history of forgotten American interventions. My problems are twofold, first Boot agrees completely with Kipling's 'white man's burden' thesis of history, without managing to capture any of the actual zeitgest of period, what I consider to be the highest aim of history. Second, this book includes nothing on the US Army and the Indian Wars, certainly the most protracted and decisive of American Small Wars. The relationship between the genocide of American Indians, the Federal government, and historiography is a complex one, but to write an entire book on Small Wars without discussing Custer or Geronimo is a curious choice-perhaps because it's impossible to fit genocide into Boot's theoretical framework that imperialism is both authentically American and generally good for all concerned.
And that theoretical framework is where this book stinks. The book was written in that halcyon 'End of History' prior to 9/11, and published immediately afterwards, before the true nature of the quagmire of Afghanistan and the fiasco of Iraq had sunk in to public perception. Assessing the total cost of the War of Terror and its children is foolhardy, but the total cost cannot be considered anything less than high. Around $45 billion per year, as the Afghanistan War becomes old enough vote, according to the Pentagon's numbers. Perhaps $5.9 TRILLION, according to the Crawford Report.
If these are Small Wars, I shudder to think of what a big one would look like. And that doesn't even include the human costs to American soldiers, and to especially the Afghans, Iraqis, and Yemeni (among many others) on the receiving end of "American liberty".
Since publishing this book, Boot has gone on to a successful career as a chickenhawk Washington Post columnist and perpetually owned twitter figure. He lacks the truly sublime idiocy of a Thomas Friedman or David Brooks, but he's still out there, saying America should bomb some more people, and getting wrecked on Twitter. I picked this book up for a dollar at a used book sale, I almost decided to toss it away unread when I saw Boot's name on. And I persisted in reading just so I could write a very sarcastic review.
February 21, 2018
A very interesting work. Boot debunks the myth of an American isolationist tradition, focusing on America's many "smaller" military actions, from the Barbary Wars to the hundred years (1840-1941) that American troops were continuously stationed in China to the Phillippine Insurrection (1900-1902) to the many 20th Century American interventions in Latin America.
Surprises abound, the biggest being how Boot convincingly argues that. for the most part, America's interventions happened for idealistic reasons, rather than the usual stereotype that has the U.S. always watching out for big-business interests. Also surprising is Boot's account of how effective America was at fighting anti-guerilla wars, at least up until Vietnam. Boot covers each intervention separately, combining politics with actual battle narratives in a very readable manner. Colorful figures emerge, like Smedley Butler, who for over thirty years was America's foremost (and most successful) soldier, only to become a staunch pacifist upon retirement.
Though it is a historical narrative, it is obvious that the author is trying to send a message to today's military leaders, especially in the wake of such post-Vietnam policies as the "Powell Doctorine." The argument is that America has a duty to continue to fight small wars to make the world a safer place (especially after September 11th), but that it should also not encourage our enemies by cutting and running from such engagements after the first casualties.
At one point Boot implies that Clinton's ineffective 1998 missile strikes in al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Sudan "emboldened" bin Laden to launch the 9/11 attacks. This point seems underdeveloped and unknoweable. Also, Boot's criticism of the Powell Doctrine is not entirely convincing, since his own history reveals that America's attempts at "nation building" have often failed. Thinking Americans should comprehend that most of the world's peoples (including Americans?) are almost definitely unsuited to Western-style democracy. Our government should formulate foreign policy accordingly.
Surprises abound, the biggest being how Boot convincingly argues that. for the most part, America's interventions happened for idealistic reasons, rather than the usual stereotype that has the U.S. always watching out for big-business interests. Also surprising is Boot's account of how effective America was at fighting anti-guerilla wars, at least up until Vietnam. Boot covers each intervention separately, combining politics with actual battle narratives in a very readable manner. Colorful figures emerge, like Smedley Butler, who for over thirty years was America's foremost (and most successful) soldier, only to become a staunch pacifist upon retirement.
Though it is a historical narrative, it is obvious that the author is trying to send a message to today's military leaders, especially in the wake of such post-Vietnam policies as the "Powell Doctorine." The argument is that America has a duty to continue to fight small wars to make the world a safer place (especially after September 11th), but that it should also not encourage our enemies by cutting and running from such engagements after the first casualties.
At one point Boot implies that Clinton's ineffective 1998 missile strikes in al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Sudan "emboldened" bin Laden to launch the 9/11 attacks. This point seems underdeveloped and unknoweable. Also, Boot's criticism of the Powell Doctrine is not entirely convincing, since his own history reveals that America's attempts at "nation building" have often failed. Thinking Americans should comprehend that most of the world's peoples (including Americans?) are almost definitely unsuited to Western-style democracy. Our government should formulate foreign policy accordingly.
June 8, 2010
There's the good and there's the bad.
The conflicts Boot reconstructs in the first half (or 2/3) of his book are important to learn about. Conflicts like Kosovo and Somalia are military history's norm, not its exception. However, Boot treats his history in the most disappointing way. He adds an addendum to the history books that, unfortunately, often comes across like a history book--cold, calculating, and unabashadly pro-American interest. A more measured approach to America's small wars that delineates the war from more points-of-view than the Marines' would be welcomed.
But, of course, that wasn't really Boot's purpose. Again, there's the good and the bad.
The Good: Boot makes a strong case against the prevailing American sentiments he clusters as the "Powell Doctrine": America (should) only fights big wars; casualties in small wars are unacceptable; any war not won quickly and decisively is a "Vietnam" quagmire. For that, and for the interesting analysis of the Vietnam war, I give Boot props.
But then he overstretches. In the final chapter, Boot argues for continual policing by the United States (with a slight nod to the U.N. in the second-to-last paragraph). He says that American hubris will have fewer costs than American caution. I disagree (or more accurately, reserve judgment), especially when Boot's conclusions are based on evidence gleaned from the USMC's archives.
So, while Boot does general history a service, he does the reader a disservice by drawing premature conclusions from less than objective data.
The conflicts Boot reconstructs in the first half (or 2/3) of his book are important to learn about. Conflicts like Kosovo and Somalia are military history's norm, not its exception. However, Boot treats his history in the most disappointing way. He adds an addendum to the history books that, unfortunately, often comes across like a history book--cold, calculating, and unabashadly pro-American interest. A more measured approach to America's small wars that delineates the war from more points-of-view than the Marines' would be welcomed.
But, of course, that wasn't really Boot's purpose. Again, there's the good and the bad.
The Good: Boot makes a strong case against the prevailing American sentiments he clusters as the "Powell Doctrine": America (should) only fights big wars; casualties in small wars are unacceptable; any war not won quickly and decisively is a "Vietnam" quagmire. For that, and for the interesting analysis of the Vietnam war, I give Boot props.
But then he overstretches. In the final chapter, Boot argues for continual policing by the United States (with a slight nod to the U.N. in the second-to-last paragraph). He says that American hubris will have fewer costs than American caution. I disagree (or more accurately, reserve judgment), especially when Boot's conclusions are based on evidence gleaned from the USMC's archives.
So, while Boot does general history a service, he does the reader a disservice by drawing premature conclusions from less than objective data.
November 26, 2008
The short version of this book can be had in Kipling's poem, "White Man's Burden."
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/Ki...
The title of the book comes from the second line of the third stanza:
Take up the White Man's burden--
The savage wars of peace--
Fill full the mouth of Famine
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch sloth and heathen Folly
Bring all your hopes to nought.
This is a version of Joshua Muravchik's Exporting Democracy "democratic idealism" or "idealist internationalism" but is better seen, in my view, as simply the return of colonialism. (Not that it went far -- just to the corner store to pick up some cigarettes, a six pack, and some amo.) It is a defense of small wars as a means to raise the natives up to the standards of civilization.
I would use this book instead of say, something by Howard Zinn or Chomsky, because I feel it is necessary to allow liberals to feel the full weight of their own only slightly hidden, but nevertheless tangible and real, beliefs in the superiority of white people.
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/Ki...
The title of the book comes from the second line of the third stanza:
Take up the White Man's burden--
The savage wars of peace--
Fill full the mouth of Famine
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch sloth and heathen Folly
Bring all your hopes to nought.
This is a version of Joshua Muravchik's Exporting Democracy "democratic idealism" or "idealist internationalism" but is better seen, in my view, as simply the return of colonialism. (Not that it went far -- just to the corner store to pick up some cigarettes, a six pack, and some amo.) It is a defense of small wars as a means to raise the natives up to the standards of civilization.
I would use this book instead of say, something by Howard Zinn or Chomsky, because I feel it is necessary to allow liberals to feel the full weight of their own only slightly hidden, but nevertheless tangible and real, beliefs in the superiority of white people.
February 4, 2017
Quick comments here. Please read this one if you want to truly understand more about American wars/conflicts outside of WWI, WWII, and Vietnam. I truly believe we as military professionals should understand all of our conflicts instead of the ones we were great at and those staring us in the face.
November 5, 2012
I learned a lot about the wars America has fought in the past.
November 20, 2010
I was truly impressed with the book. The amount of history which isn't taught in today's schools is appalling. When I was still in school (awhile ago) the only small wars ever mentioned and very briefly were the Spanish American war and the Boxer Rebellion. This book goes over all the little wars we have fought since the 1800's up until Vietnam which is included in the evaluation. The history about the subjugation of the Philipines after we took it in the Spanish American war is so eerily like Iraq it isn't even funny, right down to the whining about torture. History definitely works in cycles and if lessons previously learned are not applied they are lost, case in point Vietnam which the author makes a great case for. For those who complain we are not into nation building they will be rather taken aback at how many times we did exactly that throughout our history in the region of the Carribean and Central America and in other places as well. Our current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are nothing new under the sun for we have done the same things before it is only that we as a people don't know our own history. This book is a must read in order to get up to speed on our past and give us insight on how our future battles should be looked at.
October 2, 2016
The United States has been involved in hundreds of small scale conflicts and wars [what we Marines used to call banana wars] to protect American economic and political interests. The Savage Wars of Peace takes a historical look at these wars, their causes and results. A good read for anyone with a desire for general American history.
January 8, 2022
Interesting read, definitely some bias but overall a good look into the history of US interventions and military doctrine.
December 31, 2018
This is an illuminating book to read as the nation contemplates the pros and cons of intervening in the Syrian civil war. It covers the history of America's "small wars," from the Barbary Wars to the Yangtze patrol, then shows how all the lessons learned were wiped out by World War II, leading to a wrong-headed "big war" approach to Vietnam and a subsequent impulse to swear off all foreign interventions. It's instructive to note that though the failures loom large in our memory, the interventions were mostly successful. They were sometimes horrifyingly brutal (causing national scandal), but usually benevolent and constructive, certainly by the standards of the time: imposing the rule of law and a more or less honest and competant government, and building roads and schools and so forth.
However, it seems to me that it's not so clear that the long-lasting interventions of the early 20th century were really so successful. It's hard to see any lasting improvement in Haiti, for instance. But perhaps things would have been even worse there without American intervention. Also, we should remember that Vietnam is exceptional for a number of reasons besides the big-war approach to counterinsurgency. Crucially, it was fought by the Americans with draftees, not volunteers. The insurgents had very well-organized and -resourced external support, secure sanctuaries, and support with first-class weapons. The Philippine rebels had none of these. In the end, it was North Vietnamese tanks that rolled into Saigon, not Viet Cong in black pajamas.
Boot says that interventions are the norm, not the exception, and we should expect to undertake them from time to time if we don't want to let brutal kleptocrats take over around the world. The Army prefers to concentrate on large wars with near-peer competitors. Big wars promise a straightforward goal, a clear beginning, middle, and end, and total national commitment. There's also presumably more at stake in a big war. I can see the Army now moving to swear off the counterinsurgency wars like Iraq and Afghanistan. But counterinsurgencies have to be fought by different rules, and we shouldn't forget how it's done. We're at least as likely to fight a counterinsurgency as a regular war.
However, it seems to me that it's not so clear that the long-lasting interventions of the early 20th century were really so successful. It's hard to see any lasting improvement in Haiti, for instance. But perhaps things would have been even worse there without American intervention. Also, we should remember that Vietnam is exceptional for a number of reasons besides the big-war approach to counterinsurgency. Crucially, it was fought by the Americans with draftees, not volunteers. The insurgents had very well-organized and -resourced external support, secure sanctuaries, and support with first-class weapons. The Philippine rebels had none of these. In the end, it was North Vietnamese tanks that rolled into Saigon, not Viet Cong in black pajamas.
Boot says that interventions are the norm, not the exception, and we should expect to undertake them from time to time if we don't want to let brutal kleptocrats take over around the world. The Army prefers to concentrate on large wars with near-peer competitors. Big wars promise a straightforward goal, a clear beginning, middle, and end, and total national commitment. There's also presumably more at stake in a big war. I can see the Army now moving to swear off the counterinsurgency wars like Iraq and Afghanistan. But counterinsurgencies have to be fought by different rules, and we shouldn't forget how it's done. We're at least as likely to fight a counterinsurgency as a regular war.
September 11, 2008
Max Boot wrote an intriguing book that should have been read by more powerful people than it was. I believe Savage Wars was released in about 2002, and since Boot is well known as a conservative commentator, I don’t understand why the book and its lessons were not better appreciated by like-minded folks in the White House prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Boot makes a compelling case that there are humongous difficulties in dealing with nation-building and counterinsurgency warfare, and Boot makes that case by looking back at the many small wars the American military has engaged in. Even when those engagements were handled well, they were extremely difficult affairs that involved hardships for the troops, time, and a savvy for far more than just military matters (bureaucracy, diplomacy, and all aspects of running governments). Lessons all unlearned for the first couple of years in Iraq and Afghanistan. Better days have come for the US’s efforts in Iraq, but Boot’s book should have made it far more obvious what the US was in for. His chapter on the Philippines is incredibly important.
Another overall theme of Boot’s book is that America’s supposed “way of war,” which involves involvement in huge wars, is not really the American way of war. Rather, the US has spent far more time engaged in small wars, which have also helped establish an American empire of sorts. An empire quite different than many that have existed before it and, according to Boot, better than its predecessors.
Well worth the read. Fine book with great snapshots of some hero worship worthy military folks from America’s past.
Another overall theme of Boot’s book is that America’s supposed “way of war,” which involves involvement in huge wars, is not really the American way of war. Rather, the US has spent far more time engaged in small wars, which have also helped establish an American empire of sorts. An empire quite different than many that have existed before it and, according to Boot, better than its predecessors.
Well worth the read. Fine book with great snapshots of some hero worship worthy military folks from America’s past.
March 9, 2022
America's history is littered with little conflicts that have shaped our interactions with the world. Even our definitions have demonstrated our growth as a world power, from America's "small wars," "imperial wars," or, as the Pentagon now terms them, "low-intensity conflicts." Boot details the expedition against the Barbary Pirates, bloody landings in Samoa, the Philippines, China, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Mexico, Russia, and elsewhere. From 1800 to the present day, such undeclared wars have made up the vast majority of our military engagements. Yet the military has often resisted preparing itself for small wars, preferring instead to train for big conflicts that seldom come. Boot re-examines the tragedy of Vietnam through a "small war" prism. He concludes with a devastating critique of the Powell Doctrine and a convincing argument that the armed forces must reorient themselves to better handle small-war missions, because such clashes are an inevitable result of America's far-flung imperial responsibilities.
Why I started this book: It's been on my Professional Reading list for years... but I finally picked it up from the library.
Why I finished it: With each chapter being a concise history of an individual small war this was an easy book to start and stop. Which slow me down, as I took multiple opportunities to stop. But it was also an enlightening book, especially towards the end. This book was written in 2002. And all the counterinsurgency lessons that the military had to relearn was still in the future... so it was with some small chagrin that I read Boot's recommendations and critics that felt like a prophet in the wilderness.
Why I started this book: It's been on my Professional Reading list for years... but I finally picked it up from the library.
Why I finished it: With each chapter being a concise history of an individual small war this was an easy book to start and stop. Which slow me down, as I took multiple opportunities to stop. But it was also an enlightening book, especially towards the end. This book was written in 2002. And all the counterinsurgency lessons that the military had to relearn was still in the future... so it was with some small chagrin that I read Boot's recommendations and critics that felt like a prophet in the wilderness.
April 9, 2021
This is an extremely interesting survey of America's "small wars" including:
1. Barbary Pirates in the early 1800s
2. Pacific Islands in mid 1800s
3. China and Korea in the late 1800s as well as the Boxer Rebellion
4. Occupation of the Philippines
5. Polar Expeditions in Russia 1918-1919
6. Banana Wars of the early 20th century
7. Revisiting the various strategies employed in Vietnam with those historical contexts in mind
I was particularly surprised to read about the U.S. military operations in China before and after the Boxer Rebellion. The coverage of the two Russia expeditions was also fascinating.
The funny thing about this book was that it was written in 2002, when the war in Afghanistan was already considered a success and the U.S. had yet to intervene in Iraq. Here's a quote:
"The Philippine War stands as a monument to the U.S. armed forces' ability to fight and win a major counterinsurgency campaign - one that was bigger and uglier than any America is likely to confront in the future."
I'm sure the author was eating his words a few years later. His main thesis is that, based on the Philippines and various missions in Vietnam in which U.S. forces successfully turned the hearts and minds of the population, the U.S. can win a counterinsurgency campaign. Unfortunately, it was this belief strongly held by the proponents of COIN during the Bush Administration that led to the disaster in Iraq.
1. Barbary Pirates in the early 1800s
2. Pacific Islands in mid 1800s
3. China and Korea in the late 1800s as well as the Boxer Rebellion
4. Occupation of the Philippines
5. Polar Expeditions in Russia 1918-1919
6. Banana Wars of the early 20th century
7. Revisiting the various strategies employed in Vietnam with those historical contexts in mind
I was particularly surprised to read about the U.S. military operations in China before and after the Boxer Rebellion. The coverage of the two Russia expeditions was also fascinating.
The funny thing about this book was that it was written in 2002, when the war in Afghanistan was already considered a success and the U.S. had yet to intervene in Iraq. Here's a quote:
"The Philippine War stands as a monument to the U.S. armed forces' ability to fight and win a major counterinsurgency campaign - one that was bigger and uglier than any America is likely to confront in the future."
I'm sure the author was eating his words a few years later. His main thesis is that, based on the Philippines and various missions in Vietnam in which U.S. forces successfully turned the hearts and minds of the population, the U.S. can win a counterinsurgency campaign. Unfortunately, it was this belief strongly held by the proponents of COIN during the Bush Administration that led to the disaster in Iraq.
July 9, 2018
Max Boot sometimes seems like the kind of guy who thinks that there isn't a human problem that can't be solved with a military intervention. That aside, this is a very interesting look at America's "small wars," going right back to the Barbary Pirates. Boot looks at what the US, especially the Marines, got right in fighting these limited little brush fire wars all through the 19th and 20th centuries. He also examines what was in his estimation the most unsuccessful small war of all -- Vietnam. The Americans knew once how to fight a small war properly, but saw Vietnam on the model of World War Two -- a conventional conflict to be fought with tanks, artillery and bombers. As Boot says, maybe a low-intensity approach -- real hearts and minds -- wouldn't have worked better, but it could scarcely have been worse -- particularly where civilian casualties are concerned. I have a feeling we're all going to see a lot of these small wars in the next few decades, so it's good to have Boot remind us that they can be fought successfully, and generally with light casualties.
May 6, 2018
We forgot many things that we learned overseas in the era around WWI and up to WWII. The "Small Wars Manual" morphed into the "Operations Other Than War Manual" in my day and was not to be revisted again until Petraeus' 2009 "Field Manual On Counterinsurgency" which was jointly written with the USMC, the one service which achieved success in the 1930's as well as attempted to operate correctly (Ink Blot Doctrine) for a portion of the Vietnam War. The USMC remains both the most flexible and the most intellectually involved of all our services. A good read on all of the above, but I would have liked to have seen the later sections on American Military interventions in the 1990's developedmore fully. Perhaps at it's writting in 2002, not enough time had passed to gain the same level of perspective. Consider this book to be required reading for any and all participants in both current and future versions of "The Great Game."
March 2, 2017
Boot is one of our top military historians, and he makes a compelling case that the U.S. has a deep history in small wars, and we can learn from our past and apply the lessons to the current and future conflicts.
Most of early small wars we did not try to stay in the area or conquer - we wanted to get in and out. Though in Philippines U.S. had success only when leaving garrisons in the countryside.
Boot makes an interesting claim that if the U.S. had been willing to send 2-3 divisions to Moscow in 1918 we could have defeated the Bolsheviks.
Counterinsurgencies worked best if soldiers did not rotate out, if we used violence only when needed, and if we were able to build an effective native constabulary force.
Most of early small wars we did not try to stay in the area or conquer - we wanted to get in and out. Though in Philippines U.S. had success only when leaving garrisons in the countryside.
Boot makes an interesting claim that if the U.S. had been willing to send 2-3 divisions to Moscow in 1918 we could have defeated the Bolsheviks.
Counterinsurgencies worked best if soldiers did not rotate out, if we used violence only when needed, and if we were able to build an effective native constabulary force.
August 26, 2017
This book is an outstanding chronicle of the US armed forces prosecution of small wars throughout our history. The author clearly demonstrates his thesis that the US has always been intervening in world affairs since its founding. I am sure that the author's conclusions will be disturbing to many from all sides of the political spectrum today, however his well sourced cogent arguments should inspire reflection about the role of our country in the world going forward. This is whether you agree with him or not. Along with Peter Hopkirk's "The Great Game" I would say this is essential reading to understand our ongoing conflict in Afghanistan today.
December 29, 2021
Another great read that came to my attention from the Civil Affairs Association recommended reading list. Learned a lot in this book about leaders, military engagements and American foreign policy I was previously unfamiliar with. Max Boot mostly presents facts and stories but also does a great job on the tail end of the book applying lessons learned and recommendations for policy makers in determining the just and proper use of America's unparalleled military force. Published in 2002 the book is still 95% relevant, but I would be interested in some updates since a lot has changed in the last 13 years.
December 17, 2015
This book is eminently readable. Not only does Boot use a wide-ranging vocabulary, but his narrative style is light and fresh. He turns descriptions of relatively obscure 19th-century imperial battles between usually poorly balanced adversaries into informative, compelling tales.
His personal politics are fairly obvious, thought not off-putting (at least to this reader). He is clearly an apologist for American imperial power, though certainly not blind to the risks and negative outcomes that application and extension of that power has produced in developing or non-developed societies.
His personal politics are fairly obvious, thought not off-putting (at least to this reader). He is clearly an apologist for American imperial power, though certainly not blind to the risks and negative outcomes that application and extension of that power has produced in developing or non-developed societies.
November 29, 2019
I've been wanting to read a book about the small and forgotten wars that the U.S. has fought over the years. This book educated me on a vast amount of conflicts that I had no idea even went down. From the wars in Tripoli to the current war in Afghanistan, Max Boot is able to explain what happened and why it's important for all the wars he covered (and there are a lot of wars covered). I would recommend this to anyone wanting to learn more about foreign policy, U.S. history, or military history.
May 20, 2008
A fantastic if a bit gory history of America's little known small wars - definitely refutes the notion that America has ever been an isolationist power and provides interesting insight on America's small wars in the WOT.
February 5, 2012
Read this book junior year of college for a book report. As the title indicates (taken from the White Man's Burden) it is a not so veiled defense of American imperialism.
December 27, 2022
Highly recommend this. It shows all the ways the U.S. has been an imperial power since the 1800s, especially in our own backyard.
December 3, 2024
Boot's book is a useful reference to those undeclared and minor wars and military engagements of Empire that the United States engaged in throughout it's history, such as the Boxer Rebellion, the "Banana Wars", the war with Tripoli, the Korean War, Vietnam and many others.
It lost some stars when Boot inserted his own political opinions towards the end of the book, which dealt with foreign policy issues in his lifetime. At that point he lost the dispassionate objectivity required of a historian, and let his own hawkish views seep in. He was prematurely writing an historical interpretation before the dust had settled.
The facts of history have not been kind to Boot's observation that Iraq was producing "weapons of mass destruction". He should have cut the work off at Vietnam, and made a conclusion free of the taint of what he wanted to believe was true about our flawed foreign policies.
But that said, I'll keep it on my shelf...for now.
An aside...
I read a used copy of this book, and I certainly don't mind highlighting or marginal notes made by previous owners. One of the owners of this book, however, cluttered up the margins with mindless jabs at the content, as well as careless and irrelevant observations and silly witticisms. The way they were written suggested he meant them for the next person down the line.
Thanks, but no thanks. While I occasionally find such notes interesting, I don't need any help getting through the book or a joke to brighten my day.
It lost some stars when Boot inserted his own political opinions towards the end of the book, which dealt with foreign policy issues in his lifetime. At that point he lost the dispassionate objectivity required of a historian, and let his own hawkish views seep in. He was prematurely writing an historical interpretation before the dust had settled.
The facts of history have not been kind to Boot's observation that Iraq was producing "weapons of mass destruction". He should have cut the work off at Vietnam, and made a conclusion free of the taint of what he wanted to believe was true about our flawed foreign policies.
But that said, I'll keep it on my shelf...for now.
An aside...
I read a used copy of this book, and I certainly don't mind highlighting or marginal notes made by previous owners. One of the owners of this book, however, cluttered up the margins with mindless jabs at the content, as well as careless and irrelevant observations and silly witticisms. The way they were written suggested he meant them for the next person down the line.
Thanks, but no thanks. While I occasionally find such notes interesting, I don't need any help getting through the book or a joke to brighten my day.
July 3, 2020
Max Boot has written an ambitious and in my mind highly successful book, chronicling all of America's small wars from its founding days through the 1990s, a work that is both authoritative and timely. Boot does not chronicle America's large wars - "conventional, set-piece engagements" generally against large standing armies - and writes that they are not the norm of American military history. Rather the small war, many rather small-scale engagements that often involved few or no casualties, has been far more common.
In reality there have been four types of small wars engaged in by American forces; punitive (to punish attacks made against American lives or property), protective (designed to safeguard these American lives and property), pacification (to occupy a foreign territory), and profiteering (to grab territory or trade concessions), with some operations serving more than one purpose. Boot chronicles these wars through three major periods of American history; from the late 1700s to the 1890s when the U.S. was a growing commercial though not a military power; from 1898 to 1941 when the U.S. was one of the great powers; and from 1941 when the U.S. was a superpower. Boot notes the changes in mission objectives, strategies, and results in these three eras of American military and foreign policy history.
The bulk of this work chronicles these small wars, from the Barbary Pirates war in the early 19th century through our actions in Samoa in 1899, the expedition to China during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the Philippine War (1899-1902), the U.S. intervention in the Russian Civil War in 1918-1920 (which made for harrowing reading), various deployments and occupations in Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in the first half of the 20th century (including the famous expedition against Pancho Villa), the actions of the Yangtze River Patrol in China, up to the Vietnam War. This history makes for gripping reading, providing me with a history I know little or nothing about, one filled with personal stories of men who should be famous but who instead are largely forgotten today. We are introduced to such individuals as William Eaton, an "early-day Lawrence of Arabia" who was a U.S. consul to Tunis who helped organized a native and foreign army to dispose the pasha of Tripoli during the Barbary Wars. Another interesting one was Captain David Porter of the U.S. Navy, captain of the _Essex_, who while fighting the British in the Pacific in 1813 crossed 2,500 miles of ocean, put into the Marquesas Islands for repairs, and ended up becoming involved in a native war, trying to annex the islands for the U.S. One of the major stars of this work was Smedly Butler, according to some possibly the greatest Marine who ever lived, who fought in the Spanish-American War, Philippine War, Boxer Uprising, Nicaragua, at Veracruz, Haiti, and again in China in 1927, winning several Medals of Honor, though after retiring becoming an avowed pacifist and opponent of such conflicts.
I found his section on the Vietnam War enlightening, analyzing it in the context of the small wars that had occurred before. He notes some of the reasons as to why that war did not end in success; among them the South Vietnamese were trained as a miniature version of the American army, rather than as a much more effective constabulary force - part army, part police - one focused on internal defense, a type that had been highly effective for the US in the Caribbean, the Philippines, and elsewhere; the U.S. was not in direct command of locally recruited soldiers, as South Vietnamese soldiers were often picked for political rather than competence reasons, again contrary to prior U.S. experience in small wars; and one successful program, the Combined Action Program or CAP, which relied on small groups of U.S. soldiers paired with native soldiers stationed to particular villages, concentrating on knowing local villagers and patrolling the region, rather than on ambitious and ultimately frustrating and wasteful "search and destroy" missions in the Highlands and elsewhere, was not adequately supported, despite evidence both in Vietnam and in previous small wars that such programs worked and were even popular with U.S. troops and local citizens.
Boot closes the book with a highly useful section on analyzing the future of small wars in American foreign and defense policy. He notes that despite claims that the first Gulf War eliminated the Vietnam Syndrome, American military planners and presidents have been too timid in their deployments overseas, too afraid of generating casualties (particularly for humanitarian missions), believing that the only wars that will achieve any degree of support with the American people are the "sanitized, high-tech warfare" such as was attempted in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Boot writes that not only will this very policy backfire (crippling mission goals and encouraging enemies to attack American forces even more in the belief that any American casualties will force the military to leave their country, among other reasons), but that it is erroneous at its very heart. He writes that in fact the American public is often more motivated in its support of military missions abroad by such factors as the "odds of success and the stakes involved" rather than purely by body count, even if the mission is not purely one dictated by obvious goals centering on national security. He even notes that sometimes casualties can actually increase support for a mission, either for reasons of wanting revenge or notions that those who died should not have died in vain. He cautions that the Powell Doctrine not withstanding (stating that the U.S. should only get involved in wars with a clear national interest, with overwhelming force, and with a clear exit strategy), we will always face wars in which these things will be lacking and that we should prepare for this, wars that while limited in objectives and methods can achieve notable successes.
In reality there have been four types of small wars engaged in by American forces; punitive (to punish attacks made against American lives or property), protective (designed to safeguard these American lives and property), pacification (to occupy a foreign territory), and profiteering (to grab territory or trade concessions), with some operations serving more than one purpose. Boot chronicles these wars through three major periods of American history; from the late 1700s to the 1890s when the U.S. was a growing commercial though not a military power; from 1898 to 1941 when the U.S. was one of the great powers; and from 1941 when the U.S. was a superpower. Boot notes the changes in mission objectives, strategies, and results in these three eras of American military and foreign policy history.
The bulk of this work chronicles these small wars, from the Barbary Pirates war in the early 19th century through our actions in Samoa in 1899, the expedition to China during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the Philippine War (1899-1902), the U.S. intervention in the Russian Civil War in 1918-1920 (which made for harrowing reading), various deployments and occupations in Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in the first half of the 20th century (including the famous expedition against Pancho Villa), the actions of the Yangtze River Patrol in China, up to the Vietnam War. This history makes for gripping reading, providing me with a history I know little or nothing about, one filled with personal stories of men who should be famous but who instead are largely forgotten today. We are introduced to such individuals as William Eaton, an "early-day Lawrence of Arabia" who was a U.S. consul to Tunis who helped organized a native and foreign army to dispose the pasha of Tripoli during the Barbary Wars. Another interesting one was Captain David Porter of the U.S. Navy, captain of the _Essex_, who while fighting the British in the Pacific in 1813 crossed 2,500 miles of ocean, put into the Marquesas Islands for repairs, and ended up becoming involved in a native war, trying to annex the islands for the U.S. One of the major stars of this work was Smedly Butler, according to some possibly the greatest Marine who ever lived, who fought in the Spanish-American War, Philippine War, Boxer Uprising, Nicaragua, at Veracruz, Haiti, and again in China in 1927, winning several Medals of Honor, though after retiring becoming an avowed pacifist and opponent of such conflicts.
I found his section on the Vietnam War enlightening, analyzing it in the context of the small wars that had occurred before. He notes some of the reasons as to why that war did not end in success; among them the South Vietnamese were trained as a miniature version of the American army, rather than as a much more effective constabulary force - part army, part police - one focused on internal defense, a type that had been highly effective for the US in the Caribbean, the Philippines, and elsewhere; the U.S. was not in direct command of locally recruited soldiers, as South Vietnamese soldiers were often picked for political rather than competence reasons, again contrary to prior U.S. experience in small wars; and one successful program, the Combined Action Program or CAP, which relied on small groups of U.S. soldiers paired with native soldiers stationed to particular villages, concentrating on knowing local villagers and patrolling the region, rather than on ambitious and ultimately frustrating and wasteful "search and destroy" missions in the Highlands and elsewhere, was not adequately supported, despite evidence both in Vietnam and in previous small wars that such programs worked and were even popular with U.S. troops and local citizens.
Boot closes the book with a highly useful section on analyzing the future of small wars in American foreign and defense policy. He notes that despite claims that the first Gulf War eliminated the Vietnam Syndrome, American military planners and presidents have been too timid in their deployments overseas, too afraid of generating casualties (particularly for humanitarian missions), believing that the only wars that will achieve any degree of support with the American people are the "sanitized, high-tech warfare" such as was attempted in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Boot writes that not only will this very policy backfire (crippling mission goals and encouraging enemies to attack American forces even more in the belief that any American casualties will force the military to leave their country, among other reasons), but that it is erroneous at its very heart. He writes that in fact the American public is often more motivated in its support of military missions abroad by such factors as the "odds of success and the stakes involved" rather than purely by body count, even if the mission is not purely one dictated by obvious goals centering on national security. He even notes that sometimes casualties can actually increase support for a mission, either for reasons of wanting revenge or notions that those who died should not have died in vain. He cautions that the Powell Doctrine not withstanding (stating that the U.S. should only get involved in wars with a clear national interest, with overwhelming force, and with a clear exit strategy), we will always face wars in which these things will be lacking and that we should prepare for this, wars that while limited in objectives and methods can achieve notable successes.
July 24, 2025
I wanted more out of this book. There is good and interesting information regarding many obscure topics in American history. However, the author’s analyses are outdated, even for a book published over 20 years ago. Additionally, to me, it is completely inexplicable for him to label the Indian wars as “outside the scope of this book,” and not actually write about them, but then spend 30 pages writing about the Vietnam War - which no reasonable person would consider to have been a “small” war.
I don’t regret reading this book, but wish I had gotten more out of it.
I don’t regret reading this book, but wish I had gotten more out of it.
Read
September 1, 2023Putting this one down for now, not sure if it is sweaty enough for me
Read
September 20, 2023Read for the bit on the boxer rebellion. Wanted more info on the Han Lin academy and library that burned in the siege.
February 6, 2025
Good book, good overall view of a long historical time
October 8, 2020
The Savage Wars Of Peace: Small Wars And The Rise Of American Power by Max Boot is the detailed history of the wars that are not common knowledge to most Americans. Boot holds a Bachelor’s degree in history, with high honors, from the University of California, Berkeley (1991), and a Master’s degree in history from Yale University (1992). He was born in Russia, grew up in Los Angeles. He was and editor and writer for both The Christian Science Monitor and the Wall Street Journal. He is also the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.
A colleague from work gave me this book to read. I looked at the title and saw "Small Wars" and immediately assumed it was about the Marines. I was, however, only partially right. Ask the average American what wars we fought and you'll get the Revolutionary War, Civil War, WWI, WWII, Vietnam, Gulf Wars, and Afghanistan. A few might add the War of 1812, Panama, and Korea. Not many realize how many (undeclared) wars America actually fought in its history. I was familiar with most covered in the book from boot camp on Parris Island. The Marines' history is full these small wars throughout Latin America and Asia.
Several aspects surprised me probably more than they should have in reading this book. Up until the beginning of the 20th century, American Naval commanders had quite a bit of leeway in making American foreign policy. In an era of very slow communications, quick actions by captains set policy. Secondly, the United States and Britain had a rather cozy, if unofficial, naval alliance.
The first part of the book stresses America's naval history and the navy as an arm of American policy and interests. Its rise from six ships commissioned in 1794, (a privileged officer corps, and dregs, foreigners and a high percentage of blacks making the the enlisted ranks) to a premiere navy with an elite amphibious infantry force. An interesting look at the army is also included. Throughout America's history, there seems to be a division of power. The army is successful in big wars and fighting outside of the urban environment. Boot states that even today Marines clear cities and the army prefers to go around them. There is good reason for that too. A very heavy mechanized army finds it hard to maneuver huge M1 tanks down third world streets.
Some of this history may be based on tradition. The Marines spent much of the pre-WWI years and the interwar years fighting insurgencies in Latin America. It entered Vietnam as the insurgency fighting force based on experience decades before. Even then, the only small wars manual was written by the Marines. It stated, "Small Wars represent the normal and frequent operations of the Marine Corps." It is the big wars that gain the attention and the prestige in the military...and the budget too.
In Vietnam, Khe Sanh is a battle the US wanted. A head to head fight and a way to confront the enemy. The US poured supplies and Marines into Khe Sahn to make a stand that lasted over five months. Once the siege was over, Khe Sanh was immediately dismantled. In the meantime, the Viet Cong built up strength. Forgetting everything the US learned about insurgencies, the US was happy to fight a battle on its terms instead of the enemy's. Sadly, the victory really did not accomplish anything.
There are plenty of events covered from the beginning of America's navy through the First Gulf War. The book was published in early 2002 and does not include Afghanistan or the Second War in Iraq although the tone of the US failure to successfully fight insurgencies is clearly set. It is almost as if this book was written in hindsight to the Afghan and Iraq war. I found this book to be very informative and well written. This is an important book as modern warfare is quickly turning into insurgency and counter-insurgency conflicts. The days of large naval battles and large scale tank warfare seem to be over. The new warfare needs to be quick, mobile, and have the ability to operate in urban environments. Boot gives us a history of our past battles and a commentary on the present.
A colleague from work gave me this book to read. I looked at the title and saw "Small Wars" and immediately assumed it was about the Marines. I was, however, only partially right. Ask the average American what wars we fought and you'll get the Revolutionary War, Civil War, WWI, WWII, Vietnam, Gulf Wars, and Afghanistan. A few might add the War of 1812, Panama, and Korea. Not many realize how many (undeclared) wars America actually fought in its history. I was familiar with most covered in the book from boot camp on Parris Island. The Marines' history is full these small wars throughout Latin America and Asia.
Several aspects surprised me probably more than they should have in reading this book. Up until the beginning of the 20th century, American Naval commanders had quite a bit of leeway in making American foreign policy. In an era of very slow communications, quick actions by captains set policy. Secondly, the United States and Britain had a rather cozy, if unofficial, naval alliance.
The first part of the book stresses America's naval history and the navy as an arm of American policy and interests. Its rise from six ships commissioned in 1794, (a privileged officer corps, and dregs, foreigners and a high percentage of blacks making the the enlisted ranks) to a premiere navy with an elite amphibious infantry force. An interesting look at the army is also included. Throughout America's history, there seems to be a division of power. The army is successful in big wars and fighting outside of the urban environment. Boot states that even today Marines clear cities and the army prefers to go around them. There is good reason for that too. A very heavy mechanized army finds it hard to maneuver huge M1 tanks down third world streets.
Some of this history may be based on tradition. The Marines spent much of the pre-WWI years and the interwar years fighting insurgencies in Latin America. It entered Vietnam as the insurgency fighting force based on experience decades before. Even then, the only small wars manual was written by the Marines. It stated, "Small Wars represent the normal and frequent operations of the Marine Corps." It is the big wars that gain the attention and the prestige in the military...and the budget too.
In Vietnam, Khe Sanh is a battle the US wanted. A head to head fight and a way to confront the enemy. The US poured supplies and Marines into Khe Sahn to make a stand that lasted over five months. Once the siege was over, Khe Sanh was immediately dismantled. In the meantime, the Viet Cong built up strength. Forgetting everything the US learned about insurgencies, the US was happy to fight a battle on its terms instead of the enemy's. Sadly, the victory really did not accomplish anything.
There are plenty of events covered from the beginning of America's navy through the First Gulf War. The book was published in early 2002 and does not include Afghanistan or the Second War in Iraq although the tone of the US failure to successfully fight insurgencies is clearly set. It is almost as if this book was written in hindsight to the Afghan and Iraq war. I found this book to be very informative and well written. This is an important book as modern warfare is quickly turning into insurgency and counter-insurgency conflicts. The days of large naval battles and large scale tank warfare seem to be over. The new warfare needs to be quick, mobile, and have the ability to operate in urban environments. Boot gives us a history of our past battles and a commentary on the present.
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