High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

by Max Frankel

One of the giants of American journalism now re-creates an unforgettable time–in which the whole world feared extinction. High Noon in the Cold War captures the Cuban Missile Crisis in a new light, from inside the hearts and minds of the famous men who provoked and, in the nick of time, resolved the confrontation.

Using his personal memories of covering the conflict, and gathering evidence from recent records and new scholarship and testimony, Max Frankel corrects widely held misconceptions about the game of “nuclear chicken” played by John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev in October 1962, when Soviet missiles were secretly planted in Cuba and aimed at the United States.

High Noon in the Cold War portrays an embattled young American presidentnot jaunty and callow as widely believed, but increasingly calm and statesmanlikeand a Russian ruler who was not only a “wily old peasant” but an insecure belligerent desperate to achieve credibility. Here, too, are forgotten heroes like John McCone, the conservative Republican CIA head whose intuition made him a crucial figure in White House debates.

In detailing the disastrous miscalculations of the two superpowers (the U.S. thought the Soviets would never deploy missiles to Cuba; the Soviets thought the U.S. would have to acquiesce) and how Kennedy and Khrushchev beat back hotheads in their own councils, this fascinating book re-creates the whole story of the scariest encounter of the Cold War, as told by a master reporter.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, Russia, Military Fiction

224 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2004

About the author

Max Frankel was an American journalist who was executive editor of The New York Times from 1986 to 1994.

Reviews

[Preetam Chatterjee · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read Max Frankel’s High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 2016, fresh off watching Thirteen Days—the Kevin Costner film that compresses those tense October weeks into a chamber drama of political brinkmanship.

The pairing was perfect: the movie gave me the adrenaline and tight focus of the Kennedy inner circle; Frankel’s book gave me the broader sweep, the geopolitical scaffolding holding up the drama.

Frankel writes with the confidence of someone who lived close to these events as a journalist. His account doesn’t just tick off the familiar beats—the discovery of the missiles, the blockade, the secret deal—but restores the sense of improvisation that defined those thirteen days.

Kennedy comes across as measured and shrewd, resisting both hawks and doves in his own administration. Khrushchev is revealed as equally calculating, trying to project strength abroad while juggling his own political risks at home.

What I appreciated most was Frankel’s ability to braid the personal and the structural—the whispered counsel in the Oval Office with the realities of nuclear doctrine, the superpower pride with the very human fear of miscalculation. Where Thirteen Days immerses you in the claustrophobia of decision-making, High Noon pans out to show the world stage, the choreography of moves and counter-moves that kept the crisis from tipping into catastrophe.

Reading it so soon after the film, I found they complemented each other like two halves of the same story: one dramatised in real time, the other reflected upon with historical clarity.

Both left me with the same shiver—the awareness that history’s most dangerous moment could have ended very differently, and that the line between disaster and survival was drawn by a handful of men making calls no one should ever have to make.

[Paul Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Much has been written about the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, from many perspectives by the people involved in the high-level decisions at the time. It is regarded as the most dangerous two weeks in the history of the world where two superpowers came face to face in a nuclear showdown. High noon, indeed. At the time, Max Frankel was a reporter for the New York Times. Through his own reporting at the time and subsequent research, Mr. Frankel's account is a fresh overview of the events with some interesting observations. He doesn't, in any way, diminish the significance of the events of October 1962. The nuclear standoff had many dimensions. "The Cuban Missile Crisis was also a Macho Crisis," writes Frankel. Mr. Frankel paints sympathetic, honest portraits of both men, with their strong and weak points. He points out how both men's leadership was contradicted by some of their own actions. It was two very decidedly different men that became connected by one burning question: How does one resolve the crisis peacefully? One thing I found rather telling, in comparison to our current politics, was that both men made the effort, during the crisis, to understand how the other was thinking. Both men tried to understand one another not to gain advantage over the other but to allow both sides to extricate from an enormously dangerous situation with dignity. Mr. Frankel's work is detailed, well-researched and smartly - written. Highly recommended. High Noon In the Cold War by Max Frankel is available in accessible formats for the blind and partially sighted at the Centre for Equitable Library Access (CELA) in Canada and Bookshare in the United States.

[Steve · Rating 4 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this perspective on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Most tellings of the story (at least American tellings) pose Khrushchev as a bellicose instigator, perfectly willing to take the world into a nuclear war to demonstrate his strength to the West. In these versions, Kennedy is the levelheaded sage, guiding the brilliant men of his executive committee through intricate diplomatic maneuvers to outfox the wily old Russian and defuse the crisis. The world came to the very brink of nuclear annihilation, and the Kennedy White House averted it. Frankel, a longtime reporter for the New York Times who covered the crisis, tells a different version, more subtle and more believable than the American myth. Khrushchev believes that he can secretly establish his missiles in Cuba and announce their presence after the U.S. presidential election. The missiles, he believes, are no different from the American Jupiter missiles aimed at the USSR from Turkey and Italy. Once the crisis erupts, Frankel describes a Khrushchev who will do almost anything to avoid a nuclear exchange, even on a tactical level. Kennedy is the dove of his group, taking the most conservative route through the crisis short of rolling over. Chance plays a larger part in Frankel’s telling of the story as well, working sometimes for and sometimes against the players in the game. Frankel’s brief analysis of the longer term effects of the crisis in the last chapter of this book connects Khrushchev’s ouster, the escalation of hostilities in Vietnam, and Lyndon Johnson’s rise to the presidency to the arms race that nearly bankrupted the U.S. and did lead to the collapse of the USSR.

[Jeremy · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was probably my favorite book of the several I used for a paper on the Cuban missile crisis. The author's take on the crisis is very interesting. Doesn't get bogged down in details.

[Bryan Whitehead · Rating 3 out of 5]

New York Times old-timer Max Frankel treats us to his perspective on the Cuban Missile Crisis. As a journalist he isn’t exactly offering us an insider’s perspective, and that has its plusses and its minuses. On the good side, he isn’t trying to grind an axe or exonerate himself for past wrong-doings. The reporter’s neutrality helps give this an aura of “just the facts” with only minimal gloss. But that’s a problem, too, because the work also comes across as somewhat superficial. It’s short, and it doesn’t really say much that hasn’t already been said elsewhere. Frankel makes a few good points about how close we really weren’t to nuclear war. But at the same time his focus almost exclusively on Kennedy and Khrushchev dangerously downplays what was happening elsewhere in their governments, tides that would prove to have much greater short- and long-term effects than the crisis itself (as Frankel briefly and only partially acknowledges in the final chapter). Overall this isn’t a bad intro to October 1962, but anyone who already knows the basics won’t find much enlightenment here.

[Alan Johnson · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read the hardcover edition of this book in 2004. I reread this book in the Kindle edition in 2025.

Max Frankel, a veteran journalist, wrote the book in a superb style, summarizing his understanding of numerous primary sources, including his own first-hand experiences as a New York Times reporter in 1962. Having read many of the same primary sources, I agree with about 90% of his analysis and interpretation. I disagree with or question some of his other conclusions. Although Frankel listed his primary sources in the bibliography, he did not include any footnotes or endnotes in the book. If he had done so, I might have been able to check the statements in the book that I questioned against the cited sources. But his book is nevertheless a remarkable account of the Cuban Missile Crisis, especially the thoughts and actions of President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev and those of their internal critics.

[Immigration Art · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent historical review, written with the perspective of hindsight and historical archives not immediately available during, or right after, the Crisis.

And, as it turns out, the popular perception that the entire world was on the "brink of nuclear destruction" was not true.

Why is everything I learned in high school wrong? Was the school system bad and I was blissfully unaware? Good God help me.

Read this book. It is excellent. It is concise. It is convincing. It is eye-opening.

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

High Noon in the Cold War captures the Cuban Missile Crisis in a new light, from inside the hearts and minds of the famous men who provoked and, in the nick of time, resolved the confrontation. Using his personal memories of covering the conflict, and gathering evidence from recent records and new scholarship and testimony, Max Frankel corrects widely held misconceptions about the game of “nuclear chicken” played by John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev in October 1962, when Soviet missiles were secretly planted in Cuba and aimed at the United States. High Noon in the Cold War portrays an embattled young American presidentnot jaunty and callow as widely believed, but increasingly calm and statesmanlikeand a Russian ruler who was not only a “wily old peasant” but an insecure belligerent desperate to achieve credibility. Here, too, are forgotten heroes like John McCone, the conservative Republican CIA head whose intuition made him a crucial figure in White House debates. In detailing the disastrous miscalculations of the two superpowers (the U.S. thought the Soviets would never deploy missiles to Cuba; the Soviets thought the U.S. would have to acquiesce) and how Kennedy and Khrushchev beat back hotheads in their own councils, this fascinating book re-creates the whole story of the scariest encounter of the Cold War, as told by a master reporter.

[David Rubenstein · Rating 4 out of 5]

This being my third Cuban-missile-crisis book in a row, few facts were surprising. Frankel offered little speculation about undocumented motives, which was both good and bad. He did not cover very much about what was happening on the ground in Cuba, territory covered well by "One Minute to Midnight." Engaging, but less "you were there" than "One Minute."

His picture of John Kennedy was the most compelling of the three books, even as it mostly stayed out of "he must have been thinking."

[Weston Hory · Rating 5 out of 5]

Short, but explains the Cuban Missile Crisis well, highlights only a couple weeks of the crisis which makes it even more interesting.

[Sooz · Rating 4 out of 5]

this is not an overly long or onerous read, and it does have information that has come to light in recent years. you'll learn interesting bits of information like how the Kennedy inner circle made a secret deal with Khrushchev and lied -straight faced, boldly lied- when asked pointblank about it. but what it all boils down to is one simple statement:

"For the roots of crises, look to powerful men feeling vulnerable and underestimated.'

that my friends, sums the whoooole thing up in a nutshell ... no. not quite. Kennedy and Khrushchev had a very unique situation in that their crisis occured in the nuclear age. the atom bomb forever changed the theatre of battle. now there was no winning, and years and years of military strategy was useless to them. they were on their own, each hoping to out bluff the other with swagger and threats and rumor. each feeling vulnerable and underestimated and very very trapped - afraid to back down and afraid to move forward.

[Bev · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great book about the Cuban Missile crisis, the Kennedys and Khrushchev. Having been very young during this time it was interesting to realize how much I remembered. How lucky we were that Kennedy and Khushchev knew what was at stake and were more interested in perserving the world then destroying it, even though they came close. What came to my mind while I was reading this book, and especially when I was done, good thing this didn't happen with our current President in office, where would we be?

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good read, very informative. Excellent detail on Kennedy's and Kruschev's perspectives and motivations, as well as political drivers throughout the timeframe. Frankel fails to include the perspective of the public, however. He also fails to communicate the feeling of intense drama that people - both politician and citizens - were feeling during these events.

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this book Mr. Frankel gives a great explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis, not only by explaining it in easy to understand terms but also by giving his readers an overview of the event as well as the causes and the effects. A really easy read and I rather enjoyed it. Highly recommended for anyone who is interested in the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Kennedy Presidency.

[Heather · Rating 3 out of 5]

I did a critical review of this book for my US History class. It can be dry at points, but overall it was interesting and detailed yet easy to follow. Come to think of it, maybe I'll post the review here when I get home.

[Caroline · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was never one for American history after, say, 1865. Lately I've read a lot of 20th century history, international relations, diplomacy, American intervention abroad . . . It's fascinating. Case in point: Cuban Missile Crisis. This book explains it all, in language anyone can understand.

[John Devlin · Rating 3 out of 5]

A tense read of the intentions and mis-intentions of both countries at the run-up to the first real serious threat of nuclear war

[George · Rating 4 out of 5]

A Must Read book about the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Portions of this book should be read in High School.

[Erich · Rating 3 out of 5]

The best part has to be when the Soviet Ambassador Gromyko is lying to Kennedy and Kennedy pretends to believe him.