According to the series preface the book should be aimed at "Christian students and others associated with college and university campuses, including faculty, staff, trustees, and other various constituents" (11). However the book is too cursory for college use. It may be better for introducing high school students to ethics, but if it isn't supplemented students won't have a firm grasp (and may even have an inaccurate grasp) of the ethical systems that are touched on.
For instance, Mitchell states that "An 'ought' claim cannot be derived from an 'is' claim" (29). But no mention is made of how virtue theorists attempt to get around this problem, which seems relevant given that the book later makes positive reference to virtue theory generally (which requires some solution here) and MacIntyre specifically who specifically attempted to show how to avoid the problem.
More importantly, inaccuracy might be an independent problem for the book in one or two places. The first chapter discusses relativism and, in laying out the relativist position, Mitchell refers to Pojman's construction of the argument as resting upon the diversity thesis and the dependency thesis.
According to Mitchell, the dependency thesis "holds that morality depends on human nature, the human condition, or specific sociocultural circumstances, or a combination of all three" (25). However according to Pojman and Fieser, the dependency thesis is that “All moral principles derive their validity from cultural acceptance” (Ethics, 7th ed. p. 19). Notice that the dependency thesis is specifically about conventional ethical relativism or cultural relativism.
The reason the difference matters is that the way Mitchell defines it (as a premise belonging to the broader class of relativism) it allows him to move from ethical relativism to a discussion of “ethical hedonism” (25) and views that might "maintain that what’s right and wrong depends upon the human condition, such as that humans are mortal" (26). This misleadingly gives the impression that ethical hedonists or any view which closely binds ethics to "the human condition" (virtue theory, natural law) are relativists.
Unfortunately, Mitchell doesn't cite any specific source after referring to Pojman's two premise scheme on pages 24-26. Based on later references to the book, Mitchell is using the 5th edition of Pojman's Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong (E:DRW) and it's possible (though it seems unlikely to me) that this accounts for the issue above.
But Mitchell's later references to Pojman are also out of step with the 7th edition of E:DRW. On page 74 Mitchell refers to Pojman's critique in E:DRW of action-based ethics (ABEs), giving the impression that Pojman endorses the critiques. But in the 7th edition the critiques are presented from a neutral standpoint. And what Mitchell refers to as the "spiritual dimension" problem for ABE is presented as the "spontaneous dimension" in the 7th edition.
It's plausible that these discrepancies are due to different editions of the book, where Fieser attempted to move the book in a more secular and "neutral" direction after Pojman's death (and this would explain some of the confusing switches I mentioned in my review that book)... but I don't have access to the 5th edition and can't check. If this is the case, then I still think the responsibility falls on Mitchell's shoulders to check later editions that his readers will most likely have access to and make them aware that such changes were made to later editions of the book.