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July 22, 2020
I couldn't help finishing this book overnight. This book gives birth to the later popular Chinese term "潜规则" (English: Unspoken Rules). Note that a new concept is good when it immediately interprets a wide range of social phenomena, and bridges people's cognitive gap on a series topics they were originally not able to verbalize.
This book is like the Freakonomics to interpret why corruption *always* happens under Despotism.
0. Motivation: If you want to change the dark side of society, first understand what it is, how it works, and why it lasts long.
1. Top takeaway: If a system is designed wrongly, such as despotism instead of democracy, the same problem will occur again and again, on every generation. Even extreme events like rebellions to destroy a whole dynasty happens about every 300 years. The same pattern again and again: new dynasty with a strict leader at the beginning, then the bureaucracy system gets bulkier, more parasite officials, poorer lives of normal people, and, finally, when there is no chance to survive without revolution, the mass rebel. "No chance to survive" usually occurs when the tax amount is larger than their production ability.
When such bad system occurs, individual-level actions (e.g., not accepting brides yourself) cannot help the situation at all. Reasons include: by not behaving like your peer officials, you hurt their profits. By not accepting brides, you will not be able to send "gifts" to your peer or supervisor, so they will be against you. Even if you survived these hostilities and other officials' criticism against you in front of the emperor, the positive change that you promoted (e.g., ban of bribery in your administrative region), will disappear immediately after you die. The main reason is that the loopholes in the system, in this case despotism, is just like gravity, or a reward system that benefits corruption 100 times more than non-corruption. Or, even worse, people who do not follow these unspoken rules to bribe, will face unnatural death. You are the outlier.
2. (More notes to be migrated here.)
3. Look at the cause, but not the outcome
After reading this book, others such as
- the highly influential research on Chinese history 1587 (万历十五年),
- Pulitzer award winning Behind the Beautiful Forevers, which is about how poor people in Mumbai, no matter how hard they work, hardly struggled their life out of the poor undercity, and
- Nobel prize winner's book Poor Economics
becomes surface-scratching books. Efficient people solve the "cause" of the problem, and others solve the visible "outcomes" of the problem. Busily working to alleviate the outcomes can be compared to working at the foot of a torrential waterfall, without changing the water course to redirect the source of the water.
More dangerously, working to alleviate the visible outcomes can be turned into null efforts easily, if the nature of the problem is systematic. Remember, when gravity makes objects fall, it is void if you help some objects to get to a normal height, because they (or others) are destined to fall again if you don't impose system change.
4. Research methodology: the author spends solid efforts into literature mining, including books in classical Chinese, which differs from contemporary Chinese just as old English to modern English. He also looks into so many records of regional cases. When talking about prices at a certain historical time, he has to check other references to get baseline prices.
His reading list: 镜湖自传年谱 1837，狱中杂记（方苞, 1715），活地狱 李伯元，皇明经世文编，眉山县志，儒林外史，清代四川财政史料，容县制，高宗实录，清史稿，道咸宦海见闻录1839，大清会典，清代驿传述略，明清人物史事论析1996，谨革除钱粮积弊片，光绪财政通纂，镜湖自撰年谱，明史，明会典，典故纪闻，皇清经世文编，后汉书，晋百官表注，文化、权利与国家--1900-1942年的华北农村， 袁中郎随笔，金陵琐事，明史纪事本末，万历野获编·补遗，明通鉴，国初事迹，朱元璋传，醒予山房文存，官场现形记，江苏省明清以来碑刻资料选集，明清苏州农村经济资料，巴档抄件，封建衙门探秘，封建衙门探秘，皇明祖训，四友斋丛说，魏书，警世恒言，广志绎，三垣笔记，海瑞集，淳安县政事序，大诰，大诰续篇，明朝小史，晏子春秋，二十二史劄記，后鉴录，春明梦余录，豫变纪略，明季北略，烈皇小识，颂天胪笔，李自成纪年附考，朱元璋传，客滇述，明史管窥，天下郡国利病书，履园丛话，玉堂荟记，谢和耐1977中国社会史，守郧纪略，明季北略，明通鉴，明史纪事本末，温江县志，简阳县志，清代四川财政史料，历史的先声--半个世纪前的庄严承诺，论衡，阅微草堂笔记，世说新语，后汉书，新教伦理与资本主义精神，雷锋日记摘抄，六典通考，胡雪岩，七修类稿，继世纪闻，中国财政史，学制说赘，二刻拍案惊奇，十三峰书屋书札，大清律，中国法制史
------
Related Readings:
- 二十年目睹之怪现状
- 余华：兄弟，活着，许三观卖血记
- 秋菊打官司 can become a void effort only after 5 years
- Behind the Beautiful Forevers -> under extreme conditions (e.g., extreme poverty), you can only live by depriving others.
- Lecture given by the author
Solutions:
- Mechanism Design: textbook, overview, Coursera
This book is like the Freakonomics to interpret why corruption *always* happens under Despotism.
0. Motivation: If you want to change the dark side of society, first understand what it is, how it works, and why it lasts long.
1. Top takeaway: If a system is designed wrongly, such as despotism instead of democracy, the same problem will occur again and again, on every generation. Even extreme events like rebellions to destroy a whole dynasty happens about every 300 years. The same pattern again and again: new dynasty with a strict leader at the beginning, then the bureaucracy system gets bulkier, more parasite officials, poorer lives of normal people, and, finally, when there is no chance to survive without revolution, the mass rebel. "No chance to survive" usually occurs when the tax amount is larger than their production ability.
When such bad system occurs, individual-level actions (e.g., not accepting brides yourself) cannot help the situation at all. Reasons include: by not behaving like your peer officials, you hurt their profits. By not accepting brides, you will not be able to send "gifts" to your peer or supervisor, so they will be against you. Even if you survived these hostilities and other officials' criticism against you in front of the emperor, the positive change that you promoted (e.g., ban of bribery in your administrative region), will disappear immediately after you die. The main reason is that the loopholes in the system, in this case despotism, is just like gravity, or a reward system that benefits corruption 100 times more than non-corruption. Or, even worse, people who do not follow these unspoken rules to bribe, will face unnatural death. You are the outlier.
2. (More notes to be migrated here.)
3. Look at the cause, but not the outcome
After reading this book, others such as
- the highly influential research on Chinese history 1587 (万历十五年),
- Pulitzer award winning Behind the Beautiful Forevers, which is about how poor people in Mumbai, no matter how hard they work, hardly struggled their life out of the poor undercity, and
- Nobel prize winner's book Poor Economics
becomes surface-scratching books. Efficient people solve the "cause" of the problem, and others solve the visible "outcomes" of the problem. Busily working to alleviate the outcomes can be compared to working at the foot of a torrential waterfall, without changing the water course to redirect the source of the water.
More dangerously, working to alleviate the visible outcomes can be turned into null efforts easily, if the nature of the problem is systematic. Remember, when gravity makes objects fall, it is void if you help some objects to get to a normal height, because they (or others) are destined to fall again if you don't impose system change.
4. Research methodology: the author spends solid efforts into literature mining, including books in classical Chinese, which differs from contemporary Chinese just as old English to modern English. He also looks into so many records of regional cases. When talking about prices at a certain historical time, he has to check other references to get baseline prices.
His reading list: 镜湖自传年谱 1837，狱中杂记（方苞, 1715），活地狱 李伯元，皇明经世文编，眉山县志，儒林外史，清代四川财政史料，容县制，高宗实录，清史稿，道咸宦海见闻录1839，大清会典，清代驿传述略，明清人物史事论析1996，谨革除钱粮积弊片，光绪财政通纂，镜湖自撰年谱，明史，明会典，典故纪闻，皇清经世文编，后汉书，晋百官表注，文化、权利与国家--1900-1942年的华北农村， 袁中郎随笔，金陵琐事，明史纪事本末，万历野获编·补遗，明通鉴，国初事迹，朱元璋传，醒予山房文存，官场现形记，江苏省明清以来碑刻资料选集，明清苏州农村经济资料，巴档抄件，封建衙门探秘，封建衙门探秘，皇明祖训，四友斋丛说，魏书，警世恒言，广志绎，三垣笔记，海瑞集，淳安县政事序，大诰，大诰续篇，明朝小史，晏子春秋，二十二史劄記，后鉴录，春明梦余录，豫变纪略，明季北略，烈皇小识，颂天胪笔，李自成纪年附考，朱元璋传，客滇述，明史管窥，天下郡国利病书，履园丛话，玉堂荟记，谢和耐1977中国社会史，守郧纪略，明季北略，明通鉴，明史纪事本末，温江县志，简阳县志，清代四川财政史料，历史的先声--半个世纪前的庄严承诺，论衡，阅微草堂笔记，世说新语，后汉书，新教伦理与资本主义精神，雷锋日记摘抄，六典通考，胡雪岩，七修类稿，继世纪闻，中国财政史，学制说赘，二刻拍案惊奇，十三峰书屋书札，大清律，中国法制史
------
Related Readings:
- 二十年目睹之怪现状
- 余华：兄弟，活着，许三观卖血记
- 秋菊打官司 can become a void effort only after 5 years
- Behind the Beautiful Forevers -> under extreme conditions (e.g., extreme poverty), you can only live by depriving others.
- Lecture given by the author
Solutions:
- Mechanism Design: textbook, overview, Coursera
May 7, 2022
417-Unspoken Rules-Wu Si-Essay-2001
Barack
2022/05/07
Wu Si was born in Beijing in 1957. Studied at the Renmin University of China. Representative works: "Unspoken Rules", "The Law of Blood Reward", "Hidden Order", etc. In 1996, Wu Si served as executive editor and vice president of "Yanhuang Chunqiu" magazine. In 2009, he served as the legal representative of "Yanhuang Chunqiu" magazine. In 2015, he left "Yanhuang Chunqiu".
"Unspoken Rules", first published in 2001. It consists of several articles, which are divided into main editions and miscellaneous editions. In the main edition, Wu Si abstracts some historical conclusions that have not been seriously described by predecessors through the analysis of the history of the past dynasties and gives corresponding names. The focus of the article revolves around the "elimination of honest officials", describing some changes in Chinese history from a unique perspective. After the book was published, "unspoken rules" became a popular word and were widely used in all walks of life, especially in the entertainment industry.
Table of Contents
1. Have a sharp weapon
2. The common people are taking advantage of
3. Second-class fairness
4. Reasons for being a corrupt official
5. Bad governance is a sieve
6. The emperor is also taken advantage of
7. Settle the violators
8. It is also a good thing to talk about seniority
9. The Law of New Officials' Fall
10. The boundaries of justice always get old
The system is dead, but man is alive. The implementation of the system also needs to be done by people, so the people responsible for implementing these systems have considerable flexibility in many cases, and this flexibility actually makes power rent-seeking possible. On the surface, it is completely legal and compliant; in essence, it conforms to its own interests. The person in the upper position makes the rules, and the natural power is amazing. At the executive level, although they seem to have little power, if they really do something in operation, it is also daunting.
The officials cut ten roads. Because the state apparatus is powerful, the person who enforces the rules on behalf of the state apparatus is also powerful. This situation is somewhat similar to the feeling of fox fake tiger power. The state apparatus itself is also emotionless, but the executors have preferences. The rules stipulated in the text should be good from a literal point of view, but there must be some flexibility when interpreting them in actual situations. From ancient times to the present, our ancestors have taught us that "learning is the best way to become an official", that is, to educate us to find ways to become a member of the group of national robot executors.
The legal right to harm makes officials who have little power in name very powerful. Life and death, how could there be no profit? For victims, no matter how rich they are, if their personal freedom is not guaranteed, where can the money be used for other than to clear the joints?
Also because officials have greater actual power, traditional Chinese thought puts forward high moral requirements for officials. In fact, it is to fight against human nature through morality. In other countries, religion may be used against humanity. But no matter what the specific method is, it is essentially the hope that the entire state machine can operate as far as possible according to the original ideal state of design, rather than being distorted by human desires.
I myself have experienced dissatisfaction with certain unspoken rules before when I was probably around 14 years old. When encountering unspoken rules, generally speaking, there are three choices. The first is to accept the complex emotions in the heart, and the second is to make trouble. However, making trouble and pursuing justice may not necessarily achieve your wishes, but may involve your own life. After all, cutting off people's wealth, such as killing one's parents, will inevitably be counterattacked by those with vested interests. The third is to use this self-motivation to strengthen yourself. When you are strong enough, even if it is impossible to eliminate all the unspoken rules that you cannot see, at least you can do more things.
It has been said in China since ancient times that the people do not fight against the officials, and they die without complaining. In an official-based society, officials occupy an absolutely dominant position, which is probably why the highest ideal of scholars in China for thousands of years is to be an official. Why is it said that everything is inferior, only reading is high because our country is the first checkpoint for selecting talents through reading? What kind of environment you are in actually determines what path you should take. In the feudal society, ordinary people are just fat meat to be slaughtered. Even as a professional, it is difficult to really get ahead. Still going to work.
The so-called "herdsmen" are grazing people, and those who are grazing are naturally vegetarian animals such as cattle and sheep. Everything in the flock belongs to the shepherd. However, a shepherd can't manage such a large number of sheep, so naturally, he has to keep some shepherd dogs. Although a carnivorous shepherd cannot own a flock, it is naturally better for the shepherd to live a better life than the flock. There is only one shepherd, but there are many shepherds. Becoming a shepherd probably requires destiny, and becoming a shepherd can be achieved through acquired efforts.
Behind every regulation we see, there are real people who paid the price and learned the lesson. The price is so great that it can sometimes be paid for by the bloodshed of a single person, a group of people, or even millions of people. The rules on paper represent the interests of the supreme ruler, that is, the interests of the shepherds. For sheepdogs, their interests do not always align with those of the shepherd, and may even conflict with each other. Therefore, it is conceivable that the shepherd dog will obey the yang and yin. That's why rules are written on paper often don't work in practice.
Power is great, but nominal income is low, which will inevitably make those who hold power seek to realize the power. This is a problem that has never been solved by all dynasties. But even if welfare is improved, it may not guarantee absolute integrity. A relatively good method is probably only a combination of grace and power?
Most people seek profit and avoid harm. For a person like Hai Rui, what he did is difficult for most people to do. This is the difficulty against humanity. Ordinary people in later generations, seeing the difficulty of the life of such an honest official and the extravagance of the life of a corrupt official, how could they not be a great temptation to young people?
The few cases of honest officials in the history books are still remembered after thousands of years because of their rarity. It is precise because of its rarity that it shows its difficulty. Today we can see these records, not only because of the persistence of these individuals but also because of luck. The actual number of people like them maybe ten times as many as one hundred times, but most of them end up miserably, and they don't even have the chance to be recorded in the history books.
There must be a traitor next to the faint king. This is a fact. But we need to understand the cause and effect relationship. It is not that there are traitors first, and then there are foolish monarchs, but the foolish monarchs first make the traitors possible. Everyone is surrounded by good people and bad people. The key is how to choose and how to judge. The emperor is like this, and so are ordinary people. Without the ability to discriminate, even if you meet good people, you will not be able to identify and gather around you. If you have the ability to distinguish, even if you stray into a bad crowd, you will always find ways to avoid its influence and leave as soon as possible. In the end, it's your own reasons.
I have made the country by myself, and I have enough understanding of the whole system and have sufficient experience from the grassroots to the upper layer. At the same time, I also need to have enough prestige for the people below. Probably only in this way, it is possible to integrate the whole system. Manage as much as you want. But even so, the whole system may not be able to operate exactly as you want. Not to mention the successor? When the heir took over, there was already a huge country in front of him, and he didn't know the whole system. The people below were respectful on the surface, but in fact, they were disobedient. How could the heir's actual control power be imagined?
Guan takes care of the appearance with interpretation and influence, and the appearance sends money and things to the golden crown. No matter how good the rules are, if a machine wants a machine to run smoothly and run smoothly, even if it is well-conceived, it still needs lubricating oil. The king of lubrication is corruption. Even I think that as long as there are serious problems in human society, we can only reduce its ratio as much as possible and weaken its degree, but it is impossible to completely eliminate it. Many leaders in human history, some with tenderness and some in research and development, can't resist human nature after all.
August 29, 2023
摘錄：
长话短说。我跟踪此事达数年之久，明白了一个道理：这不是我最初想象的道德善恶问题，我面对的是大多数人处于一种利害格局中的寻常或者叫正常的行为，它基于大家都可以理解的趋利避害的现实计算。
“身怀利器，杀心自起”
张居正总结说：人们怕那些吏，一定要贿赂那些吏，并不是指望从他们手里捞点好处，而是怕他们祸害自己。
合法地祸害别人的能力，乃是官吏们的看家本领。这是一门真正的艺术，种种资源和财富正要据此分肥并重新调整。
冤大头是贪官污吏的温床。在冤大头们低眉顺眼的培育下，贪官污吏的风险很小，麻烦很少，收益却特别高，因此想挤进来的人也特别多，他们的队伍迅速壮大。
违背潜规则，意味着互动中的某一方要擅自涨价或者压价。这不是小事，简直就是抢劫钱财。除非双方的造福或加害能力发生显著变化，潜规则是不能随便修改违背的。
从平均的方面说，每个在官场上有影响的官员都有理由认为：我们都没有说你的坏话，我们有能力害你却没有害你，我们甚至还说了你的好话，让你得了这么一个美差肥缺，难道你就不能出点血，让大家也沾点光么？从不平均的方面说，京官、将军、上司之类的官员最有造福能力或者加害能力，自然应该多分。这种能力的强度像水波一样呈环状递减，分配的利益也如此递减。打秋风、请客吃饭、表礼水礼、程仪、炭敬冰敬别敬、三节两寿等等，都是在此规律下支配的官场利益分配机制。
新官堕落定律 所谓堕落，当然是从圣贤要求的标准看。如果换成新官适应社会和熟悉业务的角度，我们看到的则是一个重新学习和迅速进步的过程，一个接受再教育的过程。第一次是接受圣贤的教育，第二次则是接受胥吏衙役和人间大学的教育。第一次教育教了官员们满口仁义道德，第二次教育教了他们一肚子男娼女盗。
相形之下，现在的官员真是太俗太蠢太无知了。红包书记说现在的人送礼，经常在香烟、酒盒、果箱里藏钱，还送一些空调和微波炉之类的夯货。这再次表明了潜文化传统的断裂，似乎一切都要从头摸索。从好的方面说，技巧的笨拙表明行贿发生的次数不多或时间不长。从坏的方面说，又表明这种现象的生存环境更好，官员的脸皮更厚，无须精巧打扮。
持续数十年的决裂传统和培育新人的凶狠努力，居然只造就了一点行贿名称和技巧上的差距。
歌曰：“吃他娘，穿他娘，开了大门迎闯王，闯王来时不纳粮！”
1、潜规则是人们私下认可的行为约束；
2、这种行为约束，依据当事各方的造福或损害能力，在社会行为主体的互动中自发生成，可以使互动各方的冲突减少，交易成本降低；
3、所谓约束，就是行为越界必将招致报复，对这种利害后果的共识，强化了互动各方对彼此行为的预期的稳定性；
4、这种在实际上得到遵从的规矩，背离了正义观念或正式制度的规定，侵犯了主流意识形态或正式制度所维护的利益，因此不得不以隐蔽的形式存在，当事人对隐蔽形式本身也有明确的认可；
5、通过这种隐蔽，当事人将正式规则的代表屏蔽于局部互动之外，或者，将代表拉入私下交易之中，凭借这种私下的规则替换，获取正式规则所不能提供的利益。
长话短说。我跟踪此事达数年之久，明白了一个道理：这不是我最初想象的道德善恶问题，我面对的是大多数人处于一种利害格局中的寻常或者叫正常的行为，它基于大家都可以理解的趋利避害的现实计算。
“身怀利器，杀心自起”
张居正总结说：人们怕那些吏，一定要贿赂那些吏，并不是指望从他们手里捞点好处，而是怕他们祸害自己。
合法地祸害别人的能力，乃是官吏们的看家本领。这是一门真正的艺术，种种资源和财富正要据此分肥并重新调整。
冤大头是贪官污吏的温床。在冤大头们低眉顺眼的培育下，贪官污吏的风险很小，麻烦很少，收益却特别高，因此想挤进来的人也特别多，他们的队伍迅速壮大。
违背潜规则，意味着互动中的某一方要擅自涨价或者压价。这不是小事，简直就是抢劫钱财。除非双方的造福或加害能力发生显著变化，潜规则是不能随便修改违背的。
从平均的方面说，每个在官场上有影响的官员都有理由认为：我们都没有说你的坏话，我们有能力害你却没有害你，我们甚至还说了你的好话，让你得了这么一个美差肥缺，难道你就不能出点血，让大家也沾点光么？从不平均的方面说，京官、将军、上司之类的官员最有造福能力或者加害能力，自然应该多分。这种能力的强度像水波一样呈环状递减，分配的利益也如此递减。打秋风、请客吃饭、表礼水礼、程仪、炭敬冰敬别敬、三节两寿等等，都是在此规律下支配的官场利益分配机制。
新官堕落定律 所谓堕落，当然是从圣贤要求的标准看。如果换成新官适应社会和熟悉业务的角度，我们看到的则是一个重新学习和迅速进步的过程，一个接受再教育的过程。第一次是接受圣贤的教育，第二次则是接受胥吏衙役和人间大学的教育。第一次教育教了官员们满口仁义道德，第二次教育教了他们一肚子男娼女盗。
相形之下，现在的官员真是太俗太蠢太无知了。红包书记说现在的人送礼，经常在香烟、酒盒、果箱里藏钱，还送一些空调和微波炉之类的夯货。这再次表明了潜文化传统的断裂，似乎一切都要从头摸索。从好的方面说，技巧的笨拙表明行贿发生的次数不多或时间不长。从坏的方面说，又表明这种现象的生存环境更好，官员的脸皮更厚，无须精巧打扮。
持续数十年的决裂传统和培育新人的凶狠努力，居然只造就了一点行贿名称和技巧上的差距。
歌曰：“吃他娘，穿他娘，开了大门迎闯王，闯王来时不纳粮！”
1、潜规则是人们私下认可的行为约束；
2、这种行为约束，依据当事各方的造福或损害能力，在社会行为主体的互动中自发生成，可以使互动各方的冲突减少，交易成本降低；
3、所谓约束，就是行为越界必将招致报复，对这种利害后果的共识，强化了互动各方对彼此行为的预期的稳定性；
4、这种在实际上得到遵从的规矩，背离了正义观念或正式制度的规定，侵犯了主流意识形态或正式制度所维护的利益，因此不得不以隐蔽的形式存在，当事人对隐蔽形式本身也有明确的认可；
5、通过这种隐蔽，当事人将正式规则的代表屏蔽于局部互动之外，或者，将代表拉入私下交易之中，凭借这种私下的规则替换，获取正式规则所不能提供的利益。
March 9, 2025
潜规则“其实就是一种权力结构的方式。无非是有那么一拨人掌握了合法伤害权，欺负另外一边，而另外一边反抗成本太高，那我只有认账了—行，就按你说的来吧，多交点儿就多交点儿，多上点贡就上点贡。”而合法伤害权“来自暴力集团，暴力集团的成本和收益要用血酬定律来计算”。暴力最强者“可以立法定规”，“元规则就是决定规则的规则，暴力最强者说了算，就是中国历史上的元规则。”“从潜规则和元规则、血酬定律的角度看中国历史，可以看到一些新景象，官家主义就是我对这幅包含新景象的社会体系的称呼，我认为秦汉以来的中国社会就是官家主义社会。”
“与官营工业不同，民营工业在市场体系中的分工和发展，是一种利益主体不断生成的过程。”“只要分工带来的利益大于交易成本，分工和发展的进程就会无止境地持续下去。”“所谓资本主义制度，就是这样一个资本控制了暴力和劝说力的制度。”“清帝国的战败标志着一个历史性的转折：暴力赋敛集团直接控制下的暴力，敌不过福利生产集团控制下的暴力。”
“与官营工业不同，民营工业在市场体系中的分工和发展，是一种利益主体不断生成的过程。”“只要分工带来的利益大于交易成本，分工和发展的进程就会无止境地持续下去。”“所谓资本主义制度，就是这样一个资本控制了暴力和劝说力的制度。”“清帝国的战败标志着一个历史性的转折：暴力赋敛集团直接控制下的暴力，敌不过福利生产集团控制下的暴力。”
June 23, 2018
對於中國歷史背後運作規律的思考。
September 7, 2020
Read in 2015.
December 25, 2020
读的修订版 一本历史随笔，却并不轻松。看完《潜规则》已是深夜了，愤怒不甘难受那些激烈的情绪也跟着阅读的尾声趋于平淡了。太阳底下无新鲜事。看书的时候想到了太多的社会新闻，若不是压迫太甚哪有那些种种的官逼民反。可是，我们细想除了各种集体，人与人的相处如果伤害的能力不一样，不一样会产生这种明面下的某种形式的压制。
February 4, 2022
Great understanding of the truth in history. Tough reality.
June 27, 2024
History never changes.
November 13, 2024
通俗读物、杂文体质。止于现象描述和概念塑造。
December 15, 2025
老百姓受苦，不是因为他们愚昧
贪官横行，不是因为他们道德败坏
恶政频出，不是因为统治者蠢
而是在那样的结构里，这样做“最理性、最省成本、最安全”。
为什么潜规则能长期存在，因为它能让关键人物活下去、维持基本秩序，是“次优但可持续”的社会方案。
贪官横行，不是因为他们道德败坏
恶政频出，不是因为统治者蠢
而是在那样的结构里，这样做“最理性、最省成本、最安全”。
为什么潜规则能长期存在，因为它能让关键人物活下去、维持基本秩序，是“次优但可持续”的社会方案。
February 15, 2018
If you can find a well-translated version (and enough background explanation) then this is a must comprehension for anyone who wishes to do business in China, and a great read for anyone interested in the Chinese culture.
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