Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking.
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John Broome s a British philosopher and economist. He was the White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.
For those with a distaste for analytical philosophy this book is the stuff of nightmares. For people on the analytical philosophy train, however, it is an impeccable and convincing overview of the philosophical concept of rationality. Although sometimes a bit too analytically overbearing and drenched in logic, especially for people like me with only a superficial understanding of logic, Broome, in my opinion, succeeds in his attempt to give his own account of the nature of rationality.
Most importantly, he attacks the view that it is somehow entirely or even largely about responding correctly to reasons. Broome argues that reasons in fact only play a role of minor importance and that the real stuff of rationality is in reasoning (hence the title) and in responding to rational requirements. At this point I should interject one weakness of the argument, being his peculiar reluctance of saying that rationality is normative. I simply do not understand how one could imagine rationality not being a source of normativity. Another thing worth mentioning is his, as far as I know, entirely novel introduction of a principle of practical reason he calls Enkrasia, simply the idea that if you believe you ought to do something you intend to do it. His thesis that rationality plays an important role in going from beliefs to intentions and that active Enkratic reasoning can even reinforce these intentions in case they falter or shudder so that they lead to actual actions strikes me as accurate and very insightful.
In short, the way he steers the argument from the very beginning, where he defines what we mean by using the word "ought", to the dismissal of reasons, to the affirmation of the importance of rational requirements, to an account of the nature of reasoning is, if sometimes extremely complicated, a remarkable feat.