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Churchill's Bomb Lib/E: How the United States Overtook Britain in the First Nuclear Arms Race
Perhaps no scientific breakthrough has shaped the course of human history as much harnessing the atom. Yet the twentieth century might have turned out differently had this powerful technology stayed under the control of Great Britain. Author Graham Farmelo reveals Britain's supposedly visionary leader remained unconvinced of the potentially earth-shattering implications of his physicists' research. Churchill ultimately shared Britain's nuclear secrets withand ceded its initiative toAmerica, whose successful development and deployment of an atomic bomb placed the United States in a position of supreme power at the dawn of the nuclear age.
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First published September 1, 2012
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About the author
Graham Farmelo
9 books89 followersGraham Farmelo is a senior research fellow at the Science Museum, London and associate professor of physics at Northeastern University, US.
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Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews
February 26, 2023
A cool history on how the United States overcame the UK in terms of nuclear technology. A series of blunders, not understanding the technology, and the fear of the use of the Atom Bomb as a weapon of war gave way to the United States being the premier nuclear power. A fascinating story really was an easy page turner and full of interesting tidbits about the technology, from the early 20th century to about the midcentury when nuclear power was becoming the next big thing in science in the mid-20th century. Great history indeed.
December 13, 2017
A thorough biography of the British atomic bomb project and the not always wise decisions made by Churchill during it. Interestingly the author makes the most introspection about Professor Lindemann rather than Churchill, and how the scientific advisor influenced government policy about Britain's nuclear ambitions over the years
December 31, 2017
To anyone trying to get a full history of the development of the atomic bomb in the west, this book is a valuable addition. While the author is no Richard Rhodes, he does add historical context of why the British lost the lead in developing the first atomic bomb.
The background of Churchill's life long connection to H.G. Wells was fascinating. But even more surprising was Churchill's interest in, and understanding of nuclear research in the 1930's. However it raised the larger question of why, if Churchill truly understood the basics a decade before any other political leader, he was so slow on the uptake once the MAUD report laid out that building an atomic weapon was looking more like a massive industrial effort not a speculative research project. It was the dissemination of the MAUD report in the U.S. by a British scientist that convinced the country by the end of 1941 to fund serious nuclear research and pilot plant production.
My short take away from this book is that the British understood the theory, but didn't have the organizational skill, industrial capacity or leadership to make a big bet during wartime. (Ironically these same issues would see the British squander their lead in developing a commercial computer industry from their lead in Bletchley Park with the Colossus.) Lacking an understanding of what the ownership of a nuclear monopoly would mean, Churchill dealt away the early lead Britain had. By late 1942, when the British woke up to what was happening in the U.S. the Manhattan project had already become a U.S. Army military weapons system project and no British assistance or cooperative effort was wanted.
The book also helped me understand the role of Churchill's scientific advisor Frederick Lindemann. In most military histories Lindermann often appears as a footnote with a bit of disguised disdain, but with no real reasons given. While not quite a Lindermann biography the book helped me appreciate his outsized influence on Churchill's thinking about weapons systems.
(As an aside, somewhere, someone must have done a study comparing the weapon systems bets each side in WW II made; the Germans on V1, V2, battleships/cruisers versus aircraft carriers, U.S. bets on aircraft carriers, atomic bomb, long range bombers, Britain on fighters and medium range bombers, the Soviets betting on T-34 tanks Il-2 ground attack aircraft, multiple rocket launchers, and etc. It would be interesting to see which were the right/wrong bets.)
While I understand the authors intent of telling the arc of Churchill's life and the bomb, the post WW2 discussion seemed forced, thin and stretched the book out longer than necessary.
Finally, the book put in context the contributions and role of British scientists in the Manhattan project: William Penny, Otto Frisch,Rudolf Peierls, Geoffrey Taylor, Marcus Oliphant, Patrick Blackett, James Chadwick, Philip Moon and John Cockcroft. I had heard of these names in isolation but never quite understood their relationship to each other and their prewar research.
Just as a note, early on I almost put the book down a bit put off by the breezy writing and heavy use of English colloquial terms. (At times I had to refer to the web to translate them.) I'm glad I stuck to it. A worthwhile read for anyone interested in the British contribution to WWII nuclear weapons program.
The background of Churchill's life long connection to H.G. Wells was fascinating. But even more surprising was Churchill's interest in, and understanding of nuclear research in the 1930's. However it raised the larger question of why, if Churchill truly understood the basics a decade before any other political leader, he was so slow on the uptake once the MAUD report laid out that building an atomic weapon was looking more like a massive industrial effort not a speculative research project. It was the dissemination of the MAUD report in the U.S. by a British scientist that convinced the country by the end of 1941 to fund serious nuclear research and pilot plant production.
My short take away from this book is that the British understood the theory, but didn't have the organizational skill, industrial capacity or leadership to make a big bet during wartime. (Ironically these same issues would see the British squander their lead in developing a commercial computer industry from their lead in Bletchley Park with the Colossus.) Lacking an understanding of what the ownership of a nuclear monopoly would mean, Churchill dealt away the early lead Britain had. By late 1942, when the British woke up to what was happening in the U.S. the Manhattan project had already become a U.S. Army military weapons system project and no British assistance or cooperative effort was wanted.
The book also helped me understand the role of Churchill's scientific advisor Frederick Lindemann. In most military histories Lindermann often appears as a footnote with a bit of disguised disdain, but with no real reasons given. While not quite a Lindermann biography the book helped me appreciate his outsized influence on Churchill's thinking about weapons systems.
(As an aside, somewhere, someone must have done a study comparing the weapon systems bets each side in WW II made; the Germans on V1, V2, battleships/cruisers versus aircraft carriers, U.S. bets on aircraft carriers, atomic bomb, long range bombers, Britain on fighters and medium range bombers, the Soviets betting on T-34 tanks Il-2 ground attack aircraft, multiple rocket launchers, and etc. It would be interesting to see which were the right/wrong bets.)
While I understand the authors intent of telling the arc of Churchill's life and the bomb, the post WW2 discussion seemed forced, thin and stretched the book out longer than necessary.
Finally, the book put in context the contributions and role of British scientists in the Manhattan project: William Penny, Otto Frisch,Rudolf Peierls, Geoffrey Taylor, Marcus Oliphant, Patrick Blackett, James Chadwick, Philip Moon and John Cockcroft. I had heard of these names in isolation but never quite understood their relationship to each other and their prewar research.
Just as a note, early on I almost put the book down a bit put off by the breezy writing and heavy use of English colloquial terms. (At times I had to refer to the web to translate them.) I'm glad I stuck to it. A worthwhile read for anyone interested in the British contribution to WWII nuclear weapons program.
May 21, 2014
An in-depth tour of Britain's initial lead in nuclear science through the detonation of its own H bomb after that lead has been lost told from a perspective of the personalities involved. The most outsized, of course, were Churchill, Lindemann & Wells, but Farmelo has a knack for the character sketch in a page or two that gets at the essential humanity of all involved. As an American, I had to keep a web browser handy for whenever I encountered a Britishism I didn't know. Also, as an American, I appreciated this view of my country's politics & politicians. I long suspected, but never really knew, how lucky we were that Eisenhower's naive view of thermonuclear weapons as weapons of war merely different in size and not kind from existing explosives didn't hold sway. Well researched, well told & well worth reading.
July 27, 2020
An interesting in-depth look of Britain's initial lead in nuclear science capabilities and the personalities involved. Britain being fearful of the Nazi's already having the weapon, sourced a lot of the brain power of scientists that had escaped Nazi occupancy.
The author also explores the relationship between Churchill, Lindemann & Wells, and the influence they have over government policy before and after the second world war. In very typical British egocentric thought and unnecessary bureaucracy it is Eisenhower's naive view of thermonuclear weaponary and might of the American economy that supersedes Britain's lead and makes the bomb possible.
The author does an exquisite job of simplifying the complex science needed to understand the story, that even someone as science naive as me can understand. Very well researched, incredibly well told & well worth reading.
The author also explores the relationship between Churchill, Lindemann & Wells, and the influence they have over government policy before and after the second world war. In very typical British egocentric thought and unnecessary bureaucracy it is Eisenhower's naive view of thermonuclear weaponary and might of the American economy that supersedes Britain's lead and makes the bomb possible.
The author does an exquisite job of simplifying the complex science needed to understand the story, that even someone as science naive as me can understand. Very well researched, incredibly well told & well worth reading.
May 1, 2021
This was a painful book to read. I picked it up to learn more about Winston Churchill? What I discovered is that Farmelo is not a great scholar, does not write well, and cannot synthesize facts. There are no chapter numbers, each one has a poorly named subtitle (e.g. Chadwick believes Britain should build its own Bomb) and the only saving grace is each has a further timeline). IMO, Churchill clung to The Empire, did not delegate or collaborate well, had disdain for his critics,and was incapable of focussing on what became the Manhattan Project. I have no idea why Farmello was unable to synthesize these failings into a conclusion? In this book, Farmelo could not see the forest for the trees.
January 5, 2020
As a fan of Rhodes’ books on the subject I enjoyed Farmelo’s perspective on the British efforts. Farmelo paints a less than glamorous picture of Churchill; self absorbed, distracted, and ultimately out of touch, simultaneously covetous of the bomb as a prize to restore England’s place at the negotiating table, yet unable to focus on the challenges required to deliver a british bomb.
Farmelo’s takedown of Frederick Linderman, Britain’s expert beginner and professional scientific naysayer, underlined Churchill’s reluctance to seek advice, preferring to have his information filtered through trusted advisors rather than exposing himself to the challenge of contradictory points of view.
Farmelo’s takedown of Frederick Linderman, Britain’s expert beginner and professional scientific naysayer, underlined Churchill’s reluctance to seek advice, preferring to have his information filtered through trusted advisors rather than exposing himself to the challenge of contradictory points of view.
July 27, 2021
Very absorbing, if maybe just a little rambling at times - going into the minutiae of some aspects of the subject that, while interesting, didn't really add much to the overall thread. But that is a personal view, slightly churlish, and does not detract from a fascinating trip through British involvement in the development of nuclear weapons. The overriding sense that one gets is that so much of what happened during those decades was by accident and mis-management rather than intent.
July 19, 2025
This book was loaned to me by my 89 year old Uncle who was a heavily involved in CND and the Committee of 100 back in the 1960's - has always kept his 'anti-war' views and still gets very irate about government and various issues.
Interesting read - quite enlightening and a different view of the nations treasure 'Winston Churchill'
Interesting read - quite enlightening and a different view of the nations treasure 'Winston Churchill'
December 20, 2018
Excellent
November 9, 2020
Believe me it was a good book
October 22, 2021
An OK book, but not the easiest to read. It does provide a good recap of Churchill’s career during the development of the nuclear bomb.
August 11, 2022
Very little new information and too long for what it provides.
September 6, 2023
Short on detail
September 29, 2014
A worthwhile read.
Farmelo's book is strong in historical anecdote, and in providing enough of the physics to make sense. His knowledge of the scientific community involved in the eventual creation of nuclear weapons is prodigious. And he is a capable storyteller, who moves what could have been a dry story along with enough narrative impulse.
Where "Churchill's Bomb" stumbles is in his depiction of characters. Farmelo makes the mistake -- damaging for a storyteller and fatal for a historian -- of deciding who his subjects are, and then interpreting events in the contexts of these identities he has created. The reader gets no further than the Prologue before being introduced to a Churchill who was a poor judge of scientific talent, who was nearly terminally distractable, who was primarily reactive rather than proactive, who was amateur enough politically so as to be out-maneuvered by Roosevelt, and who is described as "myopic" and "quixotic". (You could read a good many Churchill biographies without coming across as damning a portrait of the man. One wonders, with a resume like that, how Churchill could have ever accomplished anything in public office.) Ultimately, Farmelo seems disappointed in Churchill's inability to foresee the future of something entirely unprecedented, or at least his inability to see it better than some others. And it is through the lens of this "lack of vision" that Farmelo interprets Churchill's story. (Near the end, he calls Churchill England's "ablest politician", but this seems an unconvincing compliment, so inconsistent is it with the preceding 400 pages.)
Others -- Lindemann, Tizard, Szilard, Bohr -- are left to the same sort of fate, to be marionettes on the ends of strings made of Farmelo's cursory a priori characterizations.
So I finished "Churchill's Bomb" feeling that I understood very little of the people involved, and hungry for deeper biographies of some of the players. But there's enough here in the way of detail and anecdote that I can't consider reading this book to have been time ill spent.
Farmelo's book is strong in historical anecdote, and in providing enough of the physics to make sense. His knowledge of the scientific community involved in the eventual creation of nuclear weapons is prodigious. And he is a capable storyteller, who moves what could have been a dry story along with enough narrative impulse.
Where "Churchill's Bomb" stumbles is in his depiction of characters. Farmelo makes the mistake -- damaging for a storyteller and fatal for a historian -- of deciding who his subjects are, and then interpreting events in the contexts of these identities he has created. The reader gets no further than the Prologue before being introduced to a Churchill who was a poor judge of scientific talent, who was nearly terminally distractable, who was primarily reactive rather than proactive, who was amateur enough politically so as to be out-maneuvered by Roosevelt, and who is described as "myopic" and "quixotic". (You could read a good many Churchill biographies without coming across as damning a portrait of the man. One wonders, with a resume like that, how Churchill could have ever accomplished anything in public office.) Ultimately, Farmelo seems disappointed in Churchill's inability to foresee the future of something entirely unprecedented, or at least his inability to see it better than some others. And it is through the lens of this "lack of vision" that Farmelo interprets Churchill's story. (Near the end, he calls Churchill England's "ablest politician", but this seems an unconvincing compliment, so inconsistent is it with the preceding 400 pages.)
Others -- Lindemann, Tizard, Szilard, Bohr -- are left to the same sort of fate, to be marionettes on the ends of strings made of Farmelo's cursory a priori characterizations.
So I finished "Churchill's Bomb" feeling that I understood very little of the people involved, and hungry for deeper biographies of some of the players. But there's enough here in the way of detail and anecdote that I can't consider reading this book to have been time ill spent.
July 21, 2014
I was expecting more than a graph traversal of the people involved with Churchill's and the MAUD.
I think The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation covers enough and better the political issues of the British bomb.
The decisions which lead to implosion and Fat Man (Mark III) were glossed over a bit (the code word "gadget" was used once and without mentioning Bob Christy and most of the other Americans involved and implosion wasn't used again until it was mentioned in the one line in a paragraph when it was decided to test off Western Australia (merely noting the island).
Maybe it was more how the US had the industrial capability over overshadowing the UK while the UK had to fight a war.
The bits about British spying for the Soviets also tended to leave out more of their complex social decisions why they thought the ideas had to be shared with the Soviets. The book did get into the drop decision and the expense of fissile material wasn't a good way to just demo a device (one plus about the book). The Americans played a little loose with the Ottawa Agreement.
I'm going to toss the book to a weaponeer friend retired from Livermore and see what he thinks. I thought this was a more detailed book that it turned out to be. The beginning starts slowly and detailed and ends fast without a lot of detail (Harwell another sites and the annoyance of the British against Groves might be covered in another book).
It does cite my old prof Badash, and Rhoades, but not other sources (which is OK). It's amazing what's been worked out since.
Oh, I also just happened to have the Los Alamos ski club history book which had photos of the British departure party. It was noted that Chadwick (neutron) was a decent skier.
I think The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation covers enough and better the political issues of the British bomb.
The decisions which lead to implosion and Fat Man (Mark III) were glossed over a bit (the code word "gadget" was used once and without mentioning Bob Christy and most of the other Americans involved and implosion wasn't used again until it was mentioned in the one line in a paragraph when it was decided to test off Western Australia (merely noting the island).
Maybe it was more how the US had the industrial capability over overshadowing the UK while the UK had to fight a war.
The bits about British spying for the Soviets also tended to leave out more of their complex social decisions why they thought the ideas had to be shared with the Soviets. The book did get into the drop decision and the expense of fissile material wasn't a good way to just demo a device (one plus about the book). The Americans played a little loose with the Ottawa Agreement.
I'm going to toss the book to a weaponeer friend retired from Livermore and see what he thinks. I thought this was a more detailed book that it turned out to be. The beginning starts slowly and detailed and ends fast without a lot of detail (Harwell another sites and the annoyance of the British against Groves might be covered in another book).
It does cite my old prof Badash, and Rhoades, but not other sources (which is OK). It's amazing what's been worked out since.
Oh, I also just happened to have the Los Alamos ski club history book which had photos of the British departure party. It was noted that Chadwick (neutron) was a decent skier.
November 6, 2021
This review is for the audio version of this book.
I spent almost 40 years supporting the US weapons development program at a federal R&D lab, and both my parents were heavily involved in the Manhattan Project. Hence, the topic of atomic energy runs deep.
Having read a few of Churchill's books & bios, this title caught my eye as being more specific to the topic of defense and also written by a Brit.
I enjoyed this book immensely. Maybe I have an advantage since I'm familiar with or have heard of many of the players, both here in the US and across the pond, but I had a ton of aha moments throughout the listen as UK-specific politics and policies unfolded and various intricacies were explained, weaving together nicely with what I already know and filling in some details of the UK's weapons program I wasn't aware of.
Many of the anecdotal stories and personalities made me laugh out loud or groan in frustration as I related to the humor and commiserated with the clash of ideas, funding woes, and governmental red tape I was all too familiar with in my career.
The narrator couldn't be better. Not at all droning or boring, and not overly animated. His character vocalizations were spot-on, making the subject matter interesting and entertaining, at least for this old nerd.
In all, highly recommended.
I spent almost 40 years supporting the US weapons development program at a federal R&D lab, and both my parents were heavily involved in the Manhattan Project. Hence, the topic of atomic energy runs deep.
Having read a few of Churchill's books & bios, this title caught my eye as being more specific to the topic of defense and also written by a Brit.
I enjoyed this book immensely. Maybe I have an advantage since I'm familiar with or have heard of many of the players, both here in the US and across the pond, but I had a ton of aha moments throughout the listen as UK-specific politics and policies unfolded and various intricacies were explained, weaving together nicely with what I already know and filling in some details of the UK's weapons program I wasn't aware of.
Many of the anecdotal stories and personalities made me laugh out loud or groan in frustration as I related to the humor and commiserated with the clash of ideas, funding woes, and governmental red tape I was all too familiar with in my career.
The narrator couldn't be better. Not at all droning or boring, and not overly animated. His character vocalizations were spot-on, making the subject matter interesting and entertaining, at least for this old nerd.
In all, highly recommended.
May 31, 2016
Compelling account of Churchill's involvement in the development of nuclear weapons.
Since childhood nuclear weapons, and the annihilation they promise, have held a morbid fascination for me, representing both the stuff of nightmares (literally) and an issue of great political, historical and intellectual interest. I am also a long-standing admirer of Winston Churchill, the greatest (albeit flawed) holder of the office of prime minister our country has known. This book engages with both irresistibly.
Since childhood nuclear weapons, and the annihilation they promise, have held a morbid fascination for me, representing both the stuff of nightmares (literally) and an issue of great political, historical and intellectual interest. I am also a long-standing admirer of Winston Churchill, the greatest (albeit flawed) holder of the office of prime minister our country has known. This book engages with both irresistibly.
April 5, 2015
This book highlights further flaws in Churchill's judgement. In particular he selected a sub standard scientific advisor and mistakenly stuck by him to the exclusion of others more able.
An interesting read but not a compelling one.
An interesting read but not a compelling one.
November 5, 2016
A good book on an interesting subject. Churchill's personal involvement in the early stages - getting before any substantive work was done - is contrasted with his lack of involvement in later stages. Well worth a read.
January 23, 2017
A fascinating and immensely readable dive into early nuclear research and arms development as told from the British perspective, effective in illuminating the roles of many oft-unsung heroes of modern science.
July 17, 2014
Good stuff, well done.
Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews