In “Freedom National” James Oakes outlines the legal reasoning that evolved in the antebellum North to justify the end of human bondage and how adoption of that reasoning united and mobilized a fractious political constituency into forming the Republican Party under whose banner Abraham Lincoln became the 16th President of the United States. In so doing, Oakes puts to rest the notion that the American Civil War was fought for any reason other than ending slavery.
Due to the subtle suggestion that a desire to end slavery somehow necessarily implies some claim of moral superiority on the part of the liberator, the question of the Civil War’s purpose has always been controversial. On the surface it is difficult to reconcile the many Northern manifestations of hostility towards blacks with a presumption of moral superiority over the South. Oaks undertakes a survey of the complex set of motivations that inclined the North, sometimes in spite of itself, towards an anti-slavery ethos – an ethos that rejected human bondage while, at the same time, placing no obligation on it to embrace its African victims. While slavery, of course, was morally reprehensible, in the Northern mind it was seen by most as merely being distasteful. However, when to this distaste was also added the countless reasons why slavery was bad for the North from various economic, social and status perspectives, the case against slavery became compelling while a willingness to embrace slaves themselves became, at best, optional.
As slavery was tolerated by the Constitution, ending it by means that did not necessitate destruction of the union required activists and politicians (primarily in the North) to thread a fascinating legal needle with theories that evolved slowly in the decades preceding the Civil War. The lynchpin of this reasoning held that while the Constitution allowed slavery (specifically, a claim to service in persons) where it was sanctioned by local law, it did not hold slavery itself to be the law of the land so much as it held local governance to be supreme over the federal governance – as clearly articulated in the Declaration of Independence, the natural state of “persons” was freedom, and while some localities may choose to claim a constitutionally protected right to the lifetime service of certain of those “persons”, the Constitution itself defaulted to freedom wherever slavery was not affirmed by local statute. Under this theory, the right of a slaveholder to his “property” did not extend beyond the boundaries of the state where it was allowed by state law. As it was generally believed that slavery needed to expand into new territories in order to survive, one means of ending slavery in a manner consistent with the Constitution was to limit it to those states where it existed and to prohibit it in new states that should be formed as the nation expanded westward across North America.
A slave, this theory held, was not the same species of unambiguously protected property as was, say, a chair or a cow but rather, existed only in the right of a slaveholder to the slave’s labor in states where such arrangements were specifically sanctioned. Under the 1773 English common law principal of the Summerset doctrine, the natural condition of persons was freedom, and whenever a slave was moved to a jurisdiction where a right to a slave’s labor was not guaranteed by local law, the “person” automatically became free. Moreover, the Northwest Ordinances of 1787 (and ratified by congress in its first session in 1789) established congress’s right to limit slavery in new territories, thus ensuring that to the extent the Federal legislature chose to exercise its prerogative, slavery could never be established by the law of states created from Territories which should come into the union in the future.
The fundamental right claimed by the Federal government to proscribe a particular species of property in new states versus the claim of slaveholding states to own human beings became the animating tension American history in the first half of the 19th century. For reasons of economic survival, slaveholding states needed slavery to expand into new territories, whereas northerners, for reasons often having little or nothing to do with a moral aversion to human bondage, wished to see it limited. Every time that new territory was added to American holdings, this tension reemerged as bitter and divisive controversies. The Missouri Compromise, the status of territories annexed through the Mexican War and the related Wilmot Proviso, the Compromise of 1850 and the Kansas Nebraska Act worked as emotionally charged wounds inflicted by one section of the country on another in ways that served to undermine national cohesion and promote sectional contempt.
With this as background, Oakes makes the compelling case that the ascendancy of the Republican Party – a party formed from various coalitions intent on killing slavery by limiting its expansion – and the election of Abraham Lincoln provided the final stress event that plunged the nation into war.
So was slavery the cause of the Civil War? While indeed it was, the history of the Republican Party and the issues that inspired its formation make it clear that slavery was, for most Republicans, scarcely a moral crusade fought for strictly abolitionist reasons. To be sure, it is safe to say that the majority of the party elites (including Lincoln) found slavery distasteful, yet their willingness to engage nuanced legal arguments that appeared to radical slavery-hating abolitionists as little more than vile sophistry speaks to the tepid nature of their purely anti-slavery views. The goal of the Republicans was to end slavery for social, economic and, if at all, moral reasons while preserving the union – a goal that was only achievable by scrupulous adherence to the Constitution and, ultimately, nominal legal respect for the property rights of the slaveholding south.
It was this desire to preserve the constitutional basis for the Union that explains the evolution of war strategy as the conflict progressed. For all of their professed political aims, the prompt succession of the South following Lincoln’s election shocked Republicans. While the demise of slavery clearly represented a cornerstone of the Republican political creed, the containment strategy had always been designed to ensure that slavery’s death was gradual, compensated and, at the end, capped off with the voluntary migration of blacks anywhere in the world that wasn’t the United States….the last thing Republicans wanted or anticipated was the dissolution of the Union. However, the exigencies of war slowly inclined Lincoln and congress to embrace increasingly aggressive anti-slavery tactics that were, at least in the Republican view, afforded to them under war powers within – always within – the Constitution.
As Northern troops took territory in the South they were beset by slaves seeking their liberty. Recognizing that the slave labor was being used to fortify Southern military emplacements and, at least for many Northern officers and men, unwilling out of moral conviction or sectional spite to return the slaves to their rebellious masters, Congress passed the First Confiscation Act – a war powers measure that actuated the emancipation of slaves owned by rebel masters who managed to escape to Northern lines. When, however, John Fremont, the commander of the Western Military department authorized a general emancipation for all slaves within his authority, Lincoln made it clear that under the Constitution war powers were the exclusive prerogative of the chief executive and congress by overriding him. As the war progressed, the Second Confiscation Act expanded upon the First by liberating all slaves, regardless of their masters’ loyalty, who made it to Northern lines. Lincoln’s now famous Emancipation Proclamation, which freed all slaves within rebel held territories (but not in loyal slave states), was issued within the context of this series of constitutionally sanctioned war powers abridgements of otherwise inviolable property rights. The point is that at no time did anyone ever say (although, to be sure, many certainly believed) that the slaves should be freed because slavery was contrary to American values and morally wrong. Had Lincoln been inclined to try (which he certainly wasn’t), Northern support for the war would have evaporated overnight. However, when emancipation of millions of slaves was authorized as discrete war measures designed to weaken and humiliate the enemy, Northerners were inclined to grudgingly accept it as a necessary, if unsettling, exigency of war. The final step – the abolition of slavery through constitutional amendment – only won the necessary congressional support when framed as a means of permanently denying the South any constitutional argument for holding slaves, and thus, forever removing from their grasp the tool of bitter controversy that had led to the war.
In “Freedom National” Oakes reminds us that history should never be reduced to sound-bites. The moral, political and economic forces motivating both the North and the South were incredibly complex and moved in ways that utterly defy the contemporary inclination to reduce the Civil War to a simple-minded parable of good versus evil. “Freedom National” is a compelling read, and contributed significantly to my understanding of America’s complex political and racial history.