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Wolverhampton Military Studies
Stemming the Tide: Officers and Leadership in the British Expeditionary Force 1914
Nominated for the NYMAS Arthur Goodzeit Book Award 2013
Runner-up for the SAHR Templer Medal 2013
Nominated for the ISG Special Award 2014. The ISG Special Award recognises the development of printed and electronic resources in a specific subject area.
The British Expeditionary Force of 1914 was described by the official historian as "incomparably the best trained, best organized, and best equipped British Army that ever went forth to war." The BEF proved its fighting qualities in the fierce battles of 1914 and its reputation has endured. However, the same cannot be said for many of its commanders, who have frequently been portrayed as old fashioned, incompetent, and out of touch with events on the battlefield.
Yet the officers who led the BEF to war were every bit as professional and hard-bitten as the soldiers they commanded. These officers had learned their craft in the unforgiving school of colonial warfare and honed their understanding of conflict in the period of reform that reshaped the army between 1902 and 1914. As this book reveals, when faced with the realities of modern combat, the officers of the BEF were prepared for the challenge.
This collection offers a broad picture of command at all levels of the BEF through a series of biographical essays on key officers. Drawing upon much original research, each chapter explores the pre-war background and experience of the officer and assesses his performance in combat in the opening months of the First World War. The book features insightful reappraisals of famous figures including John French and Douglas Haig, fresh studies of staff officers such as William Robertson and Henry Wilson, and a thorough discussion of officers at 'the sharp end', with chapters covering divisional, brigade, battalion and company commanders.
The essays reveal an officer class that, despite certain weaknesses, provided highly effective leadership during the chaotic fighting of August to November 1914. Without their influence it is unlikely that the BEF would have been able to survive the difficulties of the 'Great Retreat', much less halt the German invasions of France and Belgium.
This book will be of great interest to anyone who studies the First World War, and of particular value to those who seek a greater understanding of the British Army of the era.
Runner-up for the SAHR Templer Medal 2013
Nominated for the ISG Special Award 2014. The ISG Special Award recognises the development of printed and electronic resources in a specific subject area.
The British Expeditionary Force of 1914 was described by the official historian as "incomparably the best trained, best organized, and best equipped British Army that ever went forth to war." The BEF proved its fighting qualities in the fierce battles of 1914 and its reputation has endured. However, the same cannot be said for many of its commanders, who have frequently been portrayed as old fashioned, incompetent, and out of touch with events on the battlefield.
Yet the officers who led the BEF to war were every bit as professional and hard-bitten as the soldiers they commanded. These officers had learned their craft in the unforgiving school of colonial warfare and honed their understanding of conflict in the period of reform that reshaped the army between 1902 and 1914. As this book reveals, when faced with the realities of modern combat, the officers of the BEF were prepared for the challenge.
This collection offers a broad picture of command at all levels of the BEF through a series of biographical essays on key officers. Drawing upon much original research, each chapter explores the pre-war background and experience of the officer and assesses his performance in combat in the opening months of the First World War. The book features insightful reappraisals of famous figures including John French and Douglas Haig, fresh studies of staff officers such as William Robertson and Henry Wilson, and a thorough discussion of officers at 'the sharp end', with chapters covering divisional, brigade, battalion and company commanders.
The essays reveal an officer class that, despite certain weaknesses, provided highly effective leadership during the chaotic fighting of August to November 1914. Without their influence it is unlikely that the BEF would have been able to survive the difficulties of the 'Great Retreat', much less halt the German invasions of France and Belgium.
This book will be of great interest to anyone who studies the First World War, and of particular value to those who seek a greater understanding of the British Army of the era.
- GenresWorld War I
360 pages, Hardcover
First published November 19, 2013
36 people want to read
About the author
Spencer Jones
18 books16 followersSpencer Jones is Senior Lecturer in Armed Forces & War Studies at the University of Wolverhampton, UK.
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May 2, 2020
Another excellent series addition. This book focuses on all levels of command in the BEF in 1914, including specific chapters on the senior commanders, down to more general chapters on battalion and company command, as well as a chapter on the role of the dispatch riders.
It is hard to comprehend the leaders of 1914 with the the baggage of our knowledge of 1915-18, a discussion on Haig without mention of the Somme or Passchendaele is difficult and unusual. As a consequence there is often little focus on these early formative months of the war as an evolution of senior officers thinking. Stemming the Tide does this masterfully, breaking down the performance of commanders in 1914 as the context to lessons of the later war years, rather than the other way round. This allows for a more objective understanding of their role, and an assessment of their performance.
As well as the 'big' names like French and Haig, lesser known officers are covered, including those who died prematurely and whose impact on the war was therefore not felt - Grieson for example, leaving the reader with a sense of what could have been, as some of these men clearly performed well or had the capacity to do so before their careers were prematurely ended.
The chapters here go some way to challenging some of the conclusions of Gardner in Trial by Fire; and Zuber's Mons Myth also comes in for particular criticism for having gone beyond the his conclusions. Stemming the Tide concludes that rather than the tired 'lions led by donkeys' thesis the senior leadership, and junior officers of the BEF were well schooled in their disciplines, had more war experience than their German opponents, and broadly made effective decisions that ensured the survival of the army. Yes, there were mistakes, and ineffective operators, French's commanded of GHQ , ineffectiveness command structure in particular, as well as the cliques that existed in the pre-war army. The level of pre-war debate around training and the lessons of the Boer war are clear evidence that the commanders are not mindless buffoons, but serious professionals. Yes they didn't have the experience of commanding mass armies, but they took the lessons of 1914, and applied them to 1915-18, with greater or lesser success, and few, if any others, had real command experience on the scale the Great War required.
The dispatch rider chapter is almost a teaser for a future addition. A little focused on aspect of the war, where communications are often discussed in the context of positional warfare from 1915-18, this chapter alludes to the critical role played by this small body of men, but it is clearly worth of further more in depth study.
A highly recommended study of officers and leadership during the epoch of 1914, essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the legacy on the British army for the rest of the war, and to rebalance historical accusations of incompetence.
It is hard to comprehend the leaders of 1914 with the the baggage of our knowledge of 1915-18, a discussion on Haig without mention of the Somme or Passchendaele is difficult and unusual. As a consequence there is often little focus on these early formative months of the war as an evolution of senior officers thinking. Stemming the Tide does this masterfully, breaking down the performance of commanders in 1914 as the context to lessons of the later war years, rather than the other way round. This allows for a more objective understanding of their role, and an assessment of their performance.
As well as the 'big' names like French and Haig, lesser known officers are covered, including those who died prematurely and whose impact on the war was therefore not felt - Grieson for example, leaving the reader with a sense of what could have been, as some of these men clearly performed well or had the capacity to do so before their careers were prematurely ended.
The chapters here go some way to challenging some of the conclusions of Gardner in Trial by Fire; and Zuber's Mons Myth also comes in for particular criticism for having gone beyond the his conclusions. Stemming the Tide concludes that rather than the tired 'lions led by donkeys' thesis the senior leadership, and junior officers of the BEF were well schooled in their disciplines, had more war experience than their German opponents, and broadly made effective decisions that ensured the survival of the army. Yes, there were mistakes, and ineffective operators, French's commanded of GHQ , ineffectiveness command structure in particular, as well as the cliques that existed in the pre-war army. The level of pre-war debate around training and the lessons of the Boer war are clear evidence that the commanders are not mindless buffoons, but serious professionals. Yes they didn't have the experience of commanding mass armies, but they took the lessons of 1914, and applied them to 1915-18, with greater or lesser success, and few, if any others, had real command experience on the scale the Great War required.
The dispatch rider chapter is almost a teaser for a future addition. A little focused on aspect of the war, where communications are often discussed in the context of positional warfare from 1915-18, this chapter alludes to the critical role played by this small body of men, but it is clearly worth of further more in depth study.
A highly recommended study of officers and leadership during the epoch of 1914, essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the legacy on the British army for the rest of the war, and to rebalance historical accusations of incompetence.
Displaying 1 of 1 review