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Roots of Strategy: Book 2 - 3 Military Classics
Ardant du Picq's Battle Studies, Clausewitz's Principles of War, and Jomini's Art of War.
560 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 1987
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October 27, 2022
So, I read this book (these books?) years ago, maybe decades, but I was reminded of them by the recent events in Russia's (so far) ill-starred invasion of Ukraine. Was there anything in the writings of these 19th century military theorists (all of whom had some real-world combat experience, but all of whom also were far more famous for their writings), that shed light on how things have gone in the first year of the Russo-Ukrainian war? Well, there was.
From du Picq, we have an emphasis on the "moral" factors. He rails against the "scientific" advice of the late 18th and early 19th century, more a mania for order and predictability than anything to do with empirical research, that resulted in the straight lines and fire-by-volley which we think of when we think of British redcoats. He advocates repeatedly for consideration of what the mortal man, with finite courage and willpower, can actually do. They cannot, he asserts, stand unflinching and calm in the face of modern (i.e. 19th century) firepower, and must be instructed in how to use "fire-at-will" and skirmishing tactics effectively, because there is little or no chance of getting him to fight in any other way once the firing actually begins and people begin dying. The primary determination of what tactics and maneuvers to use, he asserts, is not from peacetime measurements of firing rates on a target range.
Some of the issues discussed, are obsolete now. It is, however, undeniably the case that du Picq's central point (proper tactics rely more on an understanding of human psychology than on the physics of shrapnel and gunpowder), is still relevant. Even more so, is the recognizable pattern of a mid-ranking officer railing, in his private writings, at the unwillingness or inability of those in charge to admit that what happens on the ground does not match their theories.
Next, we have Clausewitz, undoubtedly the best known (now) of all 19th century writers on war. He introduced concepts such as "friction", the idea that the attackers will have more and more go wrong with their perfect plans and perfect formations, the longer the attack goes on. At some point, if the attacker does not recognize the need to pause and regroup, they may find themselves so disorganized as to be vulnerable to immediate counterattack. I am told that something of the sort happened to Ukraine in the 2014 war; they have been more careful about it this time.
Clausewitz is also known for this phrase:
"War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth."
This is the sentence that caused the phrase, "the fog of war", to become the primary metaphor for how the ones giving orders on the battlefield must deal with profound uncertainty as to what the true state of affairs at that moment actually is. It follows clearly from this, that military intelligence is of the highest importance, and that if your intelligence services are lacking in performance of their task, you will suffer greatly. Despite his background in the KGB, it appears that Putin's intelligence led him to expect a far different situation in Ukraine than what actually transpired in the first few months.
Moreover, the fundamental uncertainty is important to realize; when the war began, it was fundamentally uncertain how many Ukrainians would resist, and how many would attempt to make their peace with the presumed soon-to-be-rulers of their land. In the event, it turned out that nearly all resisted. Was Putin a fool to not know it would turn out thus? I think not; it easily could have turned out differently. Putin was, however, a fool to believe that he knew how it would turn out, and was not prepared for the possibility that Ukraine would resist with all their might, and that the West would be so inspired by their performance that they hastened to supply them the arms to continue doing it. To be unable to pierce the fog of war is not folly, but to be unaware that it exists, most definitely is.
Jomini's writings are, in a wide variety of ways, hammering home the basic point that winning strategy consists of applying most of your force against a point where your opponent has only a fraction of their own, while still having reserves at your disposal to react to how things develop. He discusses the various arrangements and formations that can allow this, and how the choice of which to use depends on terrain and other circumstances. There are more specific recommendations in his writings than in du Picq's or Clausewitz's, but then (unlike those two) Jomini lived long enough to see his writings published, and responded to. The Ukrainian tactic of sending (with great ostentation and many pronouncements) a smaller force to Kherson, barely as numerous as the Russian defenders they were supposed to attack, while sending (secretly) a far larger force to a thinly defended part of the Russian line near Kharkiv, was a brilliant use of this principle.
In the end, though, I was reminded of the following quote, from a much older military theorist, Sun Tzu:
“Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
1 He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
2 He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
3 He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
4 He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
5 He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.”
In all five points, Russia (Putin) has erred:
1 He fought when he had no need
2 Russia has repeatedly sent untrained, or inappropriately trained, troops to do the wrong task
3 Russia has, by this point, at least five separate armies (regular, Luhansk militia, Donetsk militia, Wagner group, and Chechen militia), and they each have different motivations
4 Russia was not, it is now eminently demonstrated, prepared, even though they began the war, whereas Ukraine had spent all the time since 2014 in preparing as best they could
5 Putin has, by all accounts, begun to replace his generals every few weeks, and even give orders as to what points must be fought for and not abandoned, even though he has no military experience
The war is not, of course, over until it is over, and I suppose it is not impossible that somehow things will shift in Russia's direction (although I doubt it). But what is certain is that, as these three 19th century writers used the battles of Napoleon, Caesar, and Hannibal to illustrate their points, the current Russo-Ukrainian war will be studies by students of military strategy for decades to come.
From du Picq, we have an emphasis on the "moral" factors. He rails against the "scientific" advice of the late 18th and early 19th century, more a mania for order and predictability than anything to do with empirical research, that resulted in the straight lines and fire-by-volley which we think of when we think of British redcoats. He advocates repeatedly for consideration of what the mortal man, with finite courage and willpower, can actually do. They cannot, he asserts, stand unflinching and calm in the face of modern (i.e. 19th century) firepower, and must be instructed in how to use "fire-at-will" and skirmishing tactics effectively, because there is little or no chance of getting him to fight in any other way once the firing actually begins and people begin dying. The primary determination of what tactics and maneuvers to use, he asserts, is not from peacetime measurements of firing rates on a target range.
Some of the issues discussed, are obsolete now. It is, however, undeniably the case that du Picq's central point (proper tactics rely more on an understanding of human psychology than on the physics of shrapnel and gunpowder), is still relevant. Even more so, is the recognizable pattern of a mid-ranking officer railing, in his private writings, at the unwillingness or inability of those in charge to admit that what happens on the ground does not match their theories.
Next, we have Clausewitz, undoubtedly the best known (now) of all 19th century writers on war. He introduced concepts such as "friction", the idea that the attackers will have more and more go wrong with their perfect plans and perfect formations, the longer the attack goes on. At some point, if the attacker does not recognize the need to pause and regroup, they may find themselves so disorganized as to be vulnerable to immediate counterattack. I am told that something of the sort happened to Ukraine in the 2014 war; they have been more careful about it this time.
Clausewitz is also known for this phrase:
"War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth."
This is the sentence that caused the phrase, "the fog of war", to become the primary metaphor for how the ones giving orders on the battlefield must deal with profound uncertainty as to what the true state of affairs at that moment actually is. It follows clearly from this, that military intelligence is of the highest importance, and that if your intelligence services are lacking in performance of their task, you will suffer greatly. Despite his background in the KGB, it appears that Putin's intelligence led him to expect a far different situation in Ukraine than what actually transpired in the first few months.
Moreover, the fundamental uncertainty is important to realize; when the war began, it was fundamentally uncertain how many Ukrainians would resist, and how many would attempt to make their peace with the presumed soon-to-be-rulers of their land. In the event, it turned out that nearly all resisted. Was Putin a fool to not know it would turn out thus? I think not; it easily could have turned out differently. Putin was, however, a fool to believe that he knew how it would turn out, and was not prepared for the possibility that Ukraine would resist with all their might, and that the West would be so inspired by their performance that they hastened to supply them the arms to continue doing it. To be unable to pierce the fog of war is not folly, but to be unaware that it exists, most definitely is.
Jomini's writings are, in a wide variety of ways, hammering home the basic point that winning strategy consists of applying most of your force against a point where your opponent has only a fraction of their own, while still having reserves at your disposal to react to how things develop. He discusses the various arrangements and formations that can allow this, and how the choice of which to use depends on terrain and other circumstances. There are more specific recommendations in his writings than in du Picq's or Clausewitz's, but then (unlike those two) Jomini lived long enough to see his writings published, and responded to. The Ukrainian tactic of sending (with great ostentation and many pronouncements) a smaller force to Kherson, barely as numerous as the Russian defenders they were supposed to attack, while sending (secretly) a far larger force to a thinly defended part of the Russian line near Kharkiv, was a brilliant use of this principle.
In the end, though, I was reminded of the following quote, from a much older military theorist, Sun Tzu:
“Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
1 He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
2 He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
3 He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
4 He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
5 He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.”
In all five points, Russia (Putin) has erred:
1 He fought when he had no need
2 Russia has repeatedly sent untrained, or inappropriately trained, troops to do the wrong task
3 Russia has, by this point, at least five separate armies (regular, Luhansk militia, Donetsk militia, Wagner group, and Chechen militia), and they each have different motivations
4 Russia was not, it is now eminently demonstrated, prepared, even though they began the war, whereas Ukraine had spent all the time since 2014 in preparing as best they could
5 Putin has, by all accounts, begun to replace his generals every few weeks, and even give orders as to what points must be fought for and not abandoned, even though he has no military experience
The war is not, of course, over until it is over, and I suppose it is not impossible that somehow things will shift in Russia's direction (although I doubt it). But what is certain is that, as these three 19th century writers used the battles of Napoleon, Caesar, and Hannibal to illustrate their points, the current Russo-Ukrainian war will be studies by students of military strategy for decades to come.
November 22, 2017
The books by duPicq and Jomini were very interesting. Both are somewhat dated by their references to napoleonic techniques, although Jomini makes some references to potential impacts of weaponry advances in his conclusions. The Clausewitz book included was not as general, and much of its topics were better discussed in Jomini’s work. I would have preferred Clausewitz’s “on War” instead.
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