The Objects of Thought

by Tim Crane

The Objects of Thought addresses the ancient question of how it is possible to think about what does not exist. Tim Crane argues that the representation of the non-existent is a pervasive feature of our thought about the world, and that we will not adequately understand thought's representational power ('intentionality') unless we have understood the representation of the non-existent. Intentionality is conceived by Crane in terms of the direction of the mind upon an object of thought, or an intentional object. Intentional objects are what we think about. Some intentional objects exist and some do not. Non-existence poses a problem because there seem to be truths about non-existent intentional objects, but truths are answerable to reality, and reality contains only what exists. The proposed solution is to accept that there are some genuine truths about non-existent intentional objects, but to hold that they must be reductively explained in terms of truths about what does exist.
The Objects of Thought offers both an original account of the nature of intentionality and a solution to the problem of thought about the non-existent.

Genres: Philosophy, Logic, Nonfiction

182 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2013

About the author

​Tim Crane is a professor of philosophy at the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest and Vienna.

He works in the philosophy of mind, and attempts to address questions about the most general nature, or essence, of the human mind, and about the place of the mind in the rest of nature.

Reviews

[Andrew Langridge · Rating 4 out of 5]

Although quite technical and probably directed primarily at an academic audience, this book rewards serious attention. Crane's version of representationalism is very appealing, and here he deals effectively with the seemingly timeless question dealt with by Aristotle and Russell concerning negative existential statements. In saying 'the planet Volcan does not exist' we appear to contradict ourselves. How is it possible to mention Volcan, let alone say anything truthful about it, if it doesn't exist?

Why is this important? If we can be mistaken about our perceptions and if we talk about non-existent things in the same way as we do about existent things, then how are we able to state anything truthful about the world?

Crane's solution is to deny any simple identification of the objects of our thoughts and the external world. What makes a claim true about a non-existent object is an explanation in terms of existent things.

[Tuomas · Rating 4 out of 5]

Crane's writing is excellent and very clear, so this book is a pleasure to read. It takes an interesting angle to many questions in philosophical logic and philosophy of mind which often suffer from needless technicalities. Not so in Crane's book, he manages to make some real progress regarding the non-existent. The first part of the book is better though -- and more interesting to me personally -- as I find the arguments more in-depth. Crane's discussion of Meinongianism and related issues is commendable. I would recommend it to anyone interested in these themes and have already used it extensively in my own work.

[Jonathan Griffiths · Rating 4 out of 5]

The subject of this book is the philosophical 'problem' of non-existence: how do we talk, and how do we think, about things, events, persons, who do not in reality exist?

The answer Crane gives to this problem is in the main straightforward: there *are* genuine truths we can say about things which don't exist, and the way we give these truths is to explain them in terms of truths about things which do exist.

The following statements are therefore true (not false, and not neither true nor false):
1 - Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any living detective.
2 - Pegasus is a mythological flying horse.
3 - Some characters in the Bible existed, and some characters did not.

Crane writes with a comfortable, calm and expert lucidity. He also speaks very well in public. A gripping and hugely instructive read.