The Bombers and The Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe 1940-1945

by Richard Overy

Between 1939 and 1945, hundreds of European cities, towns and villages were devastated by aerial bombing; around 600,000 Europeans were killed and more than a million injured. In this first full narrative history of the air war, Overy deals with the whole of Europe, Scandinavia and the USSR; he considers bombing as part of broader strategies; and he looks at the campaigns from two what they were meant to achieve and the impact they had in reality on bombed populations.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War II, Military History, War, Military Fiction, Germany

592 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2013

About the author

Richard James Overy is a British historian who has published extensively on the history of World War II and the Third Reich.

Educated at Caius College, Cambridge and awarded a research fellowship at Churchill College, Professor Overy taught history at Cambridge from 1972 to 1979, as a fellow of Queens' College and from 1976 as a university assistant lecturer. In 1980 he moved to King's College London, where he became professor of modern history in 1994. He was appointed to a professorship at the University of Exeter in 2004.

His work on World War II has been praised as "highly effective in the ruthless dispelling of myths" (A. J. P. Taylor), "original and important" (New York Review of Books) and "at the cutting edge" (Times Literary Supplement.)[

Reviews

[Creighton · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was at my local library when I saw this book in the collection of World War Two books, and I knew I had to get it. At first, before I started reading this book, I expected a book talking about the entire Air-war in Europe, such as the battle of Britain, but this book talked more about the strategic bombing war, why it was done, how it was done, the effects of it, and I came back with knowledge about it that I didn't have before. I feel the air war can be neglected at times, and Richard Overy gave me some perspective on it that I didn't have before. This is actually the first book I have read by Overy, and I cannot wait to read his other works, as some of the titles pertain to some research I am conducting.

[D. · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a very detailed and well documented work yet was worded so as to be easy to read. It gave a real perspective of the gigantic scope of the bombing effort put forth by the Allies in WWII. The book asked the questions, "Was the bombing effective, and did it meet its objectives." Even though I would agree to some extent with the conclusions, I would say they are negated by the fact that approximately 291,000 Americans died in the conflict and we didn't start the war. The fact that only some 250,000 German civilians died as a result of bombings is hardly a drop compared to the 6 million Jews exterminated by the Germans or the 13 million Soviets who starved or were killed by Nazis. The Germans started this war and killed millions of innocent victims so it is immaterial how many of their civilians were killed in the "fog of war". The writer was correct is his belief that the bombing did not have the desired effect on stopping Germany, however, that is an indication of the lack of accurate bombing methods and equipment. Notice how soon Japan surrendered when only two bombs of deadly accuracy and a horrific method of destruction were used. If bombs dropped on Germany had been more accurate and deadly, it would certainly have made a huge change in the German war effort.

[Rob Kitchin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Prior to the Second World War there was a believe, especially amongst the air forces of the various belligerents, that bombing could determine the outcome of wars, curtailing land campaigns. The subtitle of this book is ‘Allied Air War Over Europe, 1940-1945’ and it focuses on the Western allies attempts to test this hypothesis, charting the bombing campaigns over Germany in particular, its Axis partners, and occupied countries such as France and the Netherlands from the perspective of the bombers and those who were bombed. To a large degree it is academic in its approach, setting out a rather dry and dispassionate account based on the historical archive of documentary evidence, presenting events at a distance and with memos and statistics rather than personalities and experiences. Overy argues that the bombing campaign not only did not achieve its aims, but cost more in lives and material than it gained in strategic and tactical advances. That is not to say that the bombing campaign had no effect – it certainly led to much destruction, lives lost, disruption, and some influence on the distribution of resources, but rather than collapsing morale it often reinforced resolve and it had little impact on industrial production until near the war’s end. While the book provides a broad overview of the politics and practice of bombing, from both Allied and Axis perspective, it gives little sense of the key people involved who are rather one-dimensional, or the experiences of those undertaking bombing raids or being bombed. Moreover, it provides very little coverage of the Eastern front and that of the third major allied party, Russia. I was expecting the book to circle round to a wider systemic analysis of the effects and ethics of bombing at the conclusion, but that didn’t materialise. Overall, an interesting read concerning the politics and effects of a bombing campaign.

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

**Won via Goodreads First Reads Giveaway **

Bombers and Bombed is a very interesting look at both ends of the Allied bombing campaign in Europe 1940-45. I am a fan of new or little told stories from WWII and this easy read is near the top. The book is very detailed, maybe a little too detailed for the beginner history buff. You will not be disappointed with B&B and I enjoyed this book greatly. On a side note, as I read this book a bulldozer driver in Germany was killed on a construction site by an unexploded allied bomb from WWII on 1-3-2014, apparently this is not uncommon.

[Marcus · Rating 3 out of 5]

Let me start by pointing out that this review is for the American edition from Viking Press, which apparently is “missing” several chapters, mainly those concerning German use of bombers against Great Britain in 1940-41.

On with the review then…

“The Bombers and the Bombed” is supposed to be, according to the author, the most detailed analysis of use of aerial bombing during World War 2. Its uniqueness is based on the fact that it covers in great detail both the Allied and German side of the bombing campaign against Germany itself, something the author claims hadn’t been done before. Furthermore, the author also covers the bombing campaign against Italian peninsula which, with the exception of the notorious decision to bomb monastery at Monte Cassino, is indeed barely ever discussed. Final section of the book is dedicated to bombing operations against countries occupied by Germany; here (in well-established Anglo-saxon historian’s tradition) the focus lies squarely on the Western Europe with France getting the lion’s share of allotted space.

While the author inserts throughout the book an occasional story or quote regarding the effects of the bombing operations on real people, this book is not about the personal experiences or ‘human story’ of neither the ‘bombers’ nor the ‘bombed’. The focus is set squarely on study of politics, decision processes, statistics and economics associated with Allied bombing operations between 1940 and 1945 and their impact on Germany’s ability to conduct military operations. As result, this book is filled with statistics of bomb tonnage dropped in individual raids, numbers of casualties, effects on industry output, transport capabilities, morale and work effectiveness of workers and so on. Remainder of the book is dedicated to an overview of political aspects of the campaign, military strategy, decisions and expectations and detailed, but rather broad discussion about the actual effects on population afflicted by the bombings. All this is, at least on the surface, discussed in cold, factual manner. The factual material provided by the author in this volume is of absolute top quality and detail. The perhaps less wished for side-effect of this meticulousness combined with the ‘academic’ writing style of the author is that this will be a very hard book to absorb for casual reader. Those expecting a narrative of the kind provided by for example Beevor or Atkinson will be sorely disappointed. On the other hand, for those who are ‘initiated’, the content of this book is a veritable treasure-trove of valuable information, presented in a format that is indeed quite unique and thought-provoking. Furthermore, the sections dedicated to the actions directed against Italy and countries occupied by Germany do indeed provide new and valuable information.

I must however remark that on couple of ocassions I've got the distinct impression that there are certain limits to the validity of author's analysis. As long as his narrative concerns itself with dissection of pure statistics and social/political/economical aspects of the bombing offensive, it is hard to find any flaws in his train of though, even though one may not necessarily agree with the conclusions he arrives to. But as soon as professor Overy moves over to a discussion about realities of combat over skies of Germany, then at least in my opinion he's outside his comfort zone and is no longer one hundred procent reliable. One small example of what I'm talking about is a statement he makes at one point about advantages of automatic cannons used by German fighters vs. defensive armament of American bombers. His claim is that cannons had longer range than heavy machine guns of the bombers, thus giving German fighters obvious advantages in combat. While I understand why he arrives to this conclusion, it is unfortunately without a shadow of a doubt absolutely wrong. Combination of three factors - different trajectory of heavy cannon shells, very low amount of ammunition that could be carried by German airplanes for their cannons and much lower rate of fire of the cannons - made it absolutely essential for German fighters to get very close to their targets if they were to have any chance to be effective. Also, nature of contemporary fighter airplane as a firing platform made it practically impossible to hit not only the barn's door, but the entire barn at ranges longer than 400 meters. The entire issue may be a small detail in broad content of this book (indeed, the remark I react against is a whole of two sentences long), but it is indicative to where author's true competence really lies.

Author's comparison of defensive tactics employed by RAF during 1940 and Luftwaffe against daytime operations of Allied bombers is another, maybe more serious, indication of author's limitations. In this, far more detailed, discussion the author makes the claim that Luftwaffe made grave mistake in employing large formations of fighter airplanes in attacks against American bombers. He points out to the effectivness of Dowding's tactics of using small 'packs' of airplanes in hit-and-run attacks and states that same approach would serve Luftwaffe much better. To be perfectly honest, on this occasion I fail to see how the author arrives to this conclusion and would go as far as saying that it's complete rubbish. First and foremost, the author fails to recognize the fact that Dowding's tactics weren't a choice of convenience, they were forced on him by single factor - available response time. Unlike commanders of Luftwaffe in later years of war, he had literally minutes to get his fighters into position where interception of bombers was possible before they arrived over their target. German controllers on the other hand had several hours at their disposal to recognize possible targets of American bombers, get individual tactical units in the air and group them according to the situation. Indeed, German fighters often had the luxury of gathering near American bomber formations, wait until the escort fighters had to leave, then get in front of bomber formations and attack them from optimal direction. Individual attacks on bombers were indeed done by smaller segments of fighters, often from different directions at the same time, but the concentration of 'big wings' against one or two American 'boxes' at a time made very much sense indeed and often caused dramatic loses, rendering entire formations unfit for further combat operations. Furthermore, as the war progressed, the tactical situation in the air also changed. American escort formations took full advantage of their superior numbers and covered tens of kilometers in all directions from bomber boxes. German fighters had to literally fight their way through that space before they even reached the bombers; flying in large formations under those circumstances made once again perfect sense and indeed was the only way to even get to the bombers. Author's failure to recognize changes in tactical realities of 1942-45 when compared with 1940 is, to me at least, somewhat perpelexing.

So is it those observations that cause me to give this book a rating of 'only' three stars then? No, even though I feel it is important to recognize the fact that when it comes to evaluation of actual combat operations, operational doctrines and tactics employed by both sides, there are much better books out there than this volume. At the same time it has to be recognized that these topics are only of secondary importance to professor Overy's analysis and therefore not the deciding factor in regard of its quality or veracity.

The real reason why my reception of this volume is lukewarm is that I regard ‘Bombers and the Bombed’ to be flying under false flag. Professor Overy claims for his volume to be an objective analysis of Allied bombing operations during World War II. But… the final and perhaps the most important component of this book, indeed the red thread that binds the ‘cold’ analysis into coherent whole consists of the discussion about actual effectiveness as well as the morality of Allied bombing operations. This discussion of whether the effects of Allied bombing campaign were worth the horrible price paid in form of civilian casualties and destruction in urban areas is spread throughout the book and is in my opinion the actual causus vivendi for this volume. In simple terms, the real question that the author is trying to answer with this book is simply 'Was it worth it?'. And it is in this discussion that the author delivers his absolute and unreserved condemnation of Allied bombing campaign.

As far as I understand it, the author bases his standpoint on following conclusions:
• Allied operations were conducted in haphazard manner and without any real coordination between British and American counterparts.
• Initial expectations on technical capabilities of bombers were vastly exaggerated and, when their ineffectiveness was slowly realized, the facts were simply ignored.
• Despite the fact that the buildup of both British and American bomber force required enormous material, production and manpower resources, the intent for their use was never very clear. Therefore, the objectives of their operations were based on incorrect assumptions and expectations and as a consequence vaguely defined, often contradictory and most of the time unrealistic.
• As a result of technical limitations and faulty strategy, the individual raids seldom had real impact on German capability to conduct the war and on few occasions when it did happen, the results were very limited. Impact om industrial output could most of the time be reconstituted or handled by alternative resources.
• Despite lack of any real impact, the Allied insisted on continuation of the bombing operations, causing unnecessarily up to half a million of civilian casualties, additional suffering on millions of innocent civilian population as well as massive and often wanton material destruction of significant portion of continental Europe’s urban areas.
• The barbarism of unrestricted Allied bombing practices caused the coalescence of German civilian population’s morale and will to resist as well as a lot of negative feelings toward Allied countries among populations of occupied countries. The bombing campaign was therefore having the exact opposite result to the one pursued by the Allies.
• Despite allied efforts, industrial output of Germany rose steadily throughout the period of the offensive, often by several hundreds percent.
• Based on all of the above, the bombing operations were a gigantic mistake, required enormous resources that would have much larger effect if used in other ways and cast very deep shadow on morality of Allied conduct of the war against Nazi Germany.

Here’s the thing – the debate regarding different aspects of Allied bombing offensive of 1940-45 (both in Europe and against Japan) and especially its effects and morality has been raging among historians, philosophers, military theorists and politicians pretty much since the day World War 2 ended. The topic is extremely complicated, multi-faceted, booby-trapped with emotions and infected with very real human suffering of enormous proportions. If a single book is to be regarded as the definitive study of these events, what caused them and what their effect really was, it should be written by a person who really is objective. This volume aspires to be exactly that book and indeed, in many respects the conclusions of the author need to be accepted as correct ones. But in the discussion about validity of Allied approach and perhaps even more importantly, when the morality of these operations is scrutinized, if the person conducting is to be perceived as credible, he or she must be impartial to begin with.

It is in this respect that Richard Overy fails to impress me. Admittedly, he never expresses clearly his standpoint, but the manner in which he presents and comments the factual data, the way he uses the vocabulary and indeed the occasional snide remarks that sneak through in his narrative are to me at least indications that he uses the facts to support a clearly preconceived condemnation instead of (possibly) arriving to it in an impartial process.

I have other problems with author’s reasoning, his dismissal of Germany’s conduct in the war as a contributing factor to the escalation of Allied bombing operations and his downplaying of the very real effects on Germany’s capability to conduct military operations being perhaps the two most persistent grievances of mine. But first and foremost, I cannot help but be discouraged with my impression that the author’s starting position in the vital ‘moral discussion’ is that the events he discusses were wrong on the most elementary level. The way I see it, he uses this book to argue this stand-point and at the same time claiming impartiality. This stand strikes me simply as dishonest. That’s why I’m choosing to regard this book as a very valuable collection of factual data, but refuse to accept its ‘philosophical’ input in the debate about this infected subject matter.

[victor harris · Rating 4 out of 5]

The quality of scholarship and analysis is excellent, but you should be advised you have to plow through mountains of statistics that belonged in an appendix. Also needed major editing, the paragraphs in many cases are intolerably lengthy, sometimes in excess of a page, and tend to lose the thread and force of the explanation.

[Lysergius · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hmm, looks like I have two copies. Oh well, it was worth reading again.

[Norman Metzger · Rating 5 out of 5]

I took a quite personal interest in this book since as a young child living in Frankfurt a/m I was one of the "bombed". I also was one of the children evacuated to a country town near the end of the war, a program that Overy touches on tangentially. Beyond the personal side, this is indeed a very good book, and makes clear in merciless detail how ineffective the bombing campaigns often were. Entire cities were missed and even if the cities were found the targets were either not found or subject to little damage. The resilience of the Nazi regime in rebuilding factories or moving them or cleverly disguising them from aerial views is impressive, even for an evil regime. The obtuseness, esp of the Briish managers of the bombing campaign, is truly impressive, as they continued to to view evidence that their efforts were highly flawed as facts to be ignored. Perhaps the saddest part for me was the terrible harm inflicted by our bombers on the Netherlands (think Nijmegen), Belgium, France, Denmark, in which many civilians were killed while targets were missed or marginally damaged -- and much of that happened toward the end of the war, Finally, I was startled when in the acknowledgments, normally an anodyne matter, the author calls the services of the National Archives as a "researcher's nightmare".

[David Bird · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is much more for the reader looking to understand the broad picture of the offensive and defensive sides of the bombing war, than one seeking dramatic narratives of individual survival and heroism.

The bomber forces were probably the greatest instance of technology driving policy. Bombers were built based on the presumption that they would deliver knockout blows; having been built, they were used, and continued to be used even after it was clear that they were not delivering on their original objectives. Rather the objectives were redifined to make bombing successful in a bureaucratic, if not a purely military sense.

Overy's analysis is generally dispassionate, and makes a real effort to see the evolving contemporary perspectives, rather than simply offering hindsight judgments.

[Sebastian Palmer · Rating 4 out of 5]

At one point in this book Overy describes strategic bombing as ‘the western front of the war’. By invoking the massive and largely wasteful carnage of the trench warfare of WWI this brief description from Overy delivers a judgement he elsewhere steps gingerly around. For us living on an island where for several hundred years the civilian population has been largely insulated from the vicissitudes of European war, bombing quite literally brought home what Overy aptly describes as an ‘unprecedented violation of British domestic life’, with 43,000 civilians killed. Overall though, for me, this book was more about exposition than judgement. Overy sets the facts before us. We have to decide what we make of them.

With a deft authorial touch Overy’s epic study of death from the air in the new era of ‘total war’ starts and ends in Bulgaria. I won’t spoil it by telling you how exactly. Confining himself to Europe, Overy shines a light on some areas less well examined, such as the bombing of Russia, Italy and occupied Europe (the latter in the well-titled ‘Bombing Friends Bombing Enemies’ chapter) and others much more widely debated, such as the Battle of Britain, the Blitz, and the Battle for Germany. The first thing to make clear is that, whilst numerous other aspects of aerial conflict are mentioned, this is about the ‘strategic’ heavy-bombing war, in which the home front became a new front line, and a major theme of the book has to do with ‘those [non-combatants] caught in the crossfire of war’.

Having begun WWII weaned on a diet of dystopian inter-war prophecy all nations and their air forces were slow, despite all the speculation, to adjust to the reality of this new modern form of conflict. Once combat is joined Overy notes a number of emerging paradoxes: the use of cutting edge science and technology to deliver what transpired to be a very blunt instrument; the rapid volte-face from the condemnation of any bombing where civilians might be killed (and attendant hollow promises not to resort to it) followed not only by the conscious embracing of killing an enemy’s civil population, but also by a seemingly inevitable escalation in doing so, as bombing changed from illegal barbarism to default weapon; and, perhaps especially, the mismatch between expectations and results.

In this last lie at least two further paradoxes: the first has to do with the ‘absolute nature’ of perceived threats leading to the necessary ‘moral relativism’ requisite to embracing strategic bombing; whilst the second concerns the ‘wide gap … between claims and results’. What emerged in this gap was not what the inter-war projections had suggested, i.e. the very quick and complete collapse of bombed societies, but a new aerial theatre of war, soaking up massive amounts of money, technology and blood, most often ending up in long, protracted campaigns. Whilst exact figures in such a history are hard to be certain of, for a host of reasons which Overy discusses, he tends to favour lesser but better substantiated (or estimated) figures, citing 600,000 civilian dead in Europe as a result of the bombing war.

Overy is very good on complexity and multiplicity: whilst acknowledging the enduring clichés and the propaganda of the time, he tries to sift the evidence (and the degree of research and detail is impressive bordering on mind-numbing) to provide more nuanced accounts. In places the statistics make for a dry account, but they are balanced with enough human interest to sustain the demanding level of detail. Whilst Overy more or less occludes his own views, a judgement seeps through from the bare facts: the so called strategic heavy bombing war was ‘inadequate in its own terms … [&] morally compromised’. And what have we learned? ‘The principal lesson learned from the bombing campaigns of the Second World War was the need for even greater and more indiscriminate destruction of the enemy if ever World War III materialised.’ Chilling stuff!

Perhaps a brutal editor could have helped trim this enormous tome a little, and I’d have almost certainly found it easier going if it had been broken up a bit more (sections and chapters err on the huge side). But the subject merits this in-depth treatment, and Overy delivers a compelling narrative with great aplomb. My proof copy lacked photos, map and index, all of which will doubtless enhance an already rich experience. Whilst I’d love to recommend this book to the widest possible readership, I think the scale and level of detail will mean it’s not read by as many as perhaps it ought to be. A model of scholarly research, lucid prose and balanced exposition, I just hope the books size doesn’t limit it’s readership. I suspect it will.

Nevertheless, very highly recommended.

[Tyler · Rating 4 out of 5]

The acclaimed scholar Richard Overy explains here the goals and consequences of the Allied bombing of Europe during World War II. Prior to the war, many theorists in the United States and Great Britain had speculated that the bomber aircraft would be the most spectacular tool in a warring nation's arsenal. The thinking went that it would be the best way to both destroy an enemy's military capability and compel a political uprising. Overy explains over more than 400 pages that World War II did not conform to what the most enthusiastic advocates believed. U.S. and British pilots unleashed an incredible barrage of bombs on Germany and other Axis nations from 1940 to 1945, but the bombs did not singlehandedly bring about regime changes or permanently cripple enemy capabilities. They also took an incredible amount of civilian lives, because aerial bombs were not a precise tool during those years. Overy does explain the accomplishments of bombing that did help to bring about an Allied victory, despite these drawbacks. He also makes a major contribution to the literature by explaining how the people bombed during the war draw upon state resources to cope with the damage that Allied bombs inflicted. I found the book in general to be a very dry and dense read, but unique in its broad coverage. It covers both the bombers and the bombed, across the vast expanse of Europe, and in so doing adds to our understanding of World War II.

[Ross Mckinney · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very solid history of the bombing efforts in WWII. It's not a gung ho book. There were lots of decisions made that reflected mis-use of heavy bombers and probably did little to accelerate the end of the war but did clearly lead to massive numbers of civilian casualties. Bombing reflects the completion of a shift for war as a battle between soldiers to war as a battle between peoples. The goal by the end of WWII for the bombing effort was to kill Germans, and it didn't matter if they were women, children, or elderly. Dresden was example. The war was basically over, and the Russians were nearing Dresden when the bombing occurred. Something on the order of 30,000-40,000 people were killed in the fire storm, most of whom were civilians fleeing the approaching battle fronts. And the people who did the bombing knew exactly what was happening. Their hope was that killing enough civilians would ruin morale and end the war sooner. It didn't happen during the London Blitz, and it didn't happen in Germany. A sad tale, told well. It goes on a bit, since Overy is also interested in why French, Dutch, Belgian, etc, civilians were also targeted and how they reacted. Not a shining moment for humanity.

[AJourneyWithoutMap · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War Over Europe 1940-1945 is a very fascinating account of the concerted Allied air attacks over Europe during the World War II. The author Richard Overy, who is the author of The Twilight Years, discusses in detail the massive air raids pointing out that it amounted to bombing friends and enemies alike, questioning if its objective was met.

The book contains six detailed chapters, including The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Bomber Command 1939 - 1942, The Casablanca Offensive: The Allies Over Germany 1943 - 1944, The "Battle of Germany" 1944 -1945, The Logic of Total War: German Society Under the Bombs, Italy: The War of Bombs and Words, Bombing Friends, Bombing Enemies: Germany's New Order.

While the book in itself is insightful, I am particularly fascinated by the epilogue Lessons Learned and Not Learned: Bombing into the Postwar World. Richard Overy's perceptive and shrewd understanding is a delightful lesson in history which must be read. The Preface, Notes, Maps, Prologue all make a fine addition to a better understanding of the contents of the book.

[Maxim Pyankov · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a well-researched and documented book. As a WWII enthusiast, it was great to dive into a specific sub-category of the conflict via this book. I now also want to further explore, on the similar scale, the maritime aspect of the conflict, especially the U-boat and related campaigns.
The text was easy to read and to follow, and chronologically made good sense.
I wish the book had covered or given me a glimpse into the Soviet-vs.-German mutual bombing campaigns. As is, there was absolutely no information on this front. The vast majority is focused on the Allied campaigns, with a very minor pivot, almost a footnote, to the Pacific bombing campaign (of course - the book title well describes the subject matter at hand). It also would have been great to have more witness accounts as well as to have the pictures of the destruction. Other than that - easy to read text, well researched material, and an interesting topic to explore for the WWII enthusiasts.

[Ang Jacobson · Rating 4 out of 5]

I actually liked the chapters about the German civil defense preparations leading up to the war...thought it was a little out of sequence, since this is discussed after the bombing chapters...and learned some new info about how the Italians didn't do the same and how quickly their war ended. And to repeat what others have already mentioned, the material is dry; well researched, but most certainly dry...

[SCOTT GOODISON · Rating 4 out of 5]

I enjoyed this book. Never realized the bombing was done more for political reasons than for strategic reasons. It was helpful to explain the different reasons the British were bombing as opposed to the Americans. I like the stories of the men who did the bombing and the few on the people who were bombed. It really was startling how Germany industry was prodicing more material near in the last 18 months of the war than at the start.

[Greg · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent very detailed analysis of just about every bombing campaign in Europe I WW2. Not just the allied bombing of Germany and the blitz. This book includes the Italian bombing offensive and the allied bombing of Italy and the Russian front. Even includes the allied bombing of Bulgaria. Lots of discussion too about the effectiveness of each campaign.

[Brian Asalone · Rating 4 out of 5]

comprehensive and goes into great detail about the areas hit and the questionable effects. The British version of this book (which I actually read) is longer and includes discussion of the German bombing of England. Why the american publishers decided to shorten the book by eliminating this, I have no idea.

[Larry · Rating 5 out of 5]

Overy's book is the best study of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany in World War II. It is well researched and well written, and doesn't underestimate the suffering involved. It is an indispensable book.

[Captain Cocanutty · Rating 4 out of 5]

Reads a bit like a textbook when talking about the bombing side of the war, but when it got into the bombed side of the war there was a lot more analysis that made the book more interesting. Overall it was a bit dry but the end made up for it when it all came together.

[Norman Smith · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very thorough review of the bombing offensives in Europe in the Second World War. It is densely packed with information; it is not an easy book to read but if you are interested in that subject, it is very good.

[Jordan Galloway · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book provided interesting and thorough insights into the technical, tactical, and dramatic insights of the bombing and allied war.

[Gerry McCaffrey · Rating 3 out of 5]

An overwhelming account, so much detail that it times it was a challenge but in the end I got there.

[Jonas Short]

*dnf

Fascinating but I need to get a hard copy so I can actually go through it slowly and appreciate the research and analysis without a library loan period

[Ashley Roeder · Rating 4 out of 5]

Richard Overy is one of my favorite historians to read. He’s meticulous in his research, but what truly sets him apart is how tightly his arguments are constructed, each point layered with such depth and documentation that it’s difficult to counterargue. The Bombers and the Bombed is one of those rare works that manages to be both exhaustive and unsettling; it’s not simply a history of air power, but an examination of what happens when technology, ideology, and morality collide.

Overy covers the entire European theater of bombing, from the Luftwaffe’s early assaults on Warsaw and London to the RAF and USAAF’s relentless campaigns over Germany, France, and the Low Countries. But what makes this book remarkable is its scope: it isn’t limited to the usual narrative of “Britain endured, Germany burned.” Overy gives equal weight to the occupied nations caught between liberation and annihilation: France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Romania, and beyond. By the end, you realize that every corner of Europe lived under the shadow of the bomber.

This is not a triumphant book. It’s a study in moral erosion. The farther Overy takes you into the bombing war, the clearer it becomes that the original goal, to destroy an enemy’s capacity to fight, gave way to something darker and more indiscriminate. The rhetoric of precision collapsed under the realities of weather, inaccuracy, and political justification. Cities were flattened not because they mattered militarily, but because they were there. As Overy writes in his conclusion, "victory came not through precision, but through the destruction of everything that made civilization worth defending."

His real purpose, though, is philosophical. He asks what happens when modern societies, armed with technology and ideology, lose the ability to distinguish between military necessity and moral restraint. That question echoes through every chapter, from the refusal to bomb Auschwitz, to the Allied raids that killed thousands in “friendly” occupied cities like Rotterdam and Caen. By the time the reader reaches the epilogue, it’s clear that the bombing war was less about winning than about learning to live with moral contradiction.

Overy ends on a somber note: the air power that once promised liberation left behind a moral paradox. The more precise our weapons became, the more total their destructive potential. The “lessons learned” of the Second World War were, in truth, lessons not learned at all. What was supposed to be the great innovation of modern warfare instead revealed the limits of humanity’s moral imagination.

The Bombers and the Bombed is not an easy read, nor should it be. It’s a work of staggering scholarship and uncomfortable truths, forcing the reader to confront the moral cost of progress. Few historians could have written it with such balance: detached yet deeply human. For anyone trying to understand not just what happened in the skies over Europe, but what it meant, this is essential reading.

[Peter Goodman · Rating 3 out of 5]

“The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War over Europe, 1940-1945,” by Richard Overy (Viking, 2013). Overy wrote “Why the Allies Won,” a far better---or at least, more interesting---book. Here he examines in great detail the origins of British and American thinking about how to conduct a war in the air, how it evolved, and whether it worked at all. After WWI, most strategic thinkers felt that future wars would be decided by devastating bombing, which would destroy cities, kill civilians, and terrorize the populations into surrender. That’s what they thought, but they did not really prepare. The British bombers were pathetic: slow, poorly armed, with tiny bomb loads of small bombs and wholly inadequate bombsights. The Americans were somewhat better prepared: because of the country’s size, and its distance from potential enemies, it concentrated on big planes with long range, and heavy defensive armament. But the leaders thought blows from the air would be devastating. Overy begins with some bombing raids in Bulgaria, which accomplished little but embittered the population against the Allies. It was a Bulgarian officer who invented the contact-fuse bomb, with its oval shape and guiding fins. The first British raids were disasters; planes got lost, completely missed their targets, couldn’t hit anything close to where they aimed. When the Germans finally responded, they shot down so many planes the British were forced to fly only at night. But almost from the beginning strategists intended to hit and kill civilians—but they hid that fact, claiming civilian casualties were mistakes. Finally the British developed the Lancaster bomber, big, long-ranged, well-armed, and with an immense carrying capacity. Still the bombing did not have much of an effect in Germany. Losses were heavy, damage was light and quickly repaired. The Americans promised a lot but were a very long time getting going. They had difficulty bringing over enough aircraft and crews, logistics were a mess, the forces grew very slowly. At first the Yanks thought they could send B-17s through without fighter escort. That did not work. But they didn’t have planes with the range to accompany the bombers. Slowly the escorts appeared. The P-47, moderate range; the P-38, much longer; and finally the P-51, able to fly all the way to Vienna. It also took a long time to develop the technology and techniques: how to develop formations; how to fly in formation; how to keep control over such large forces; how to get them to the targets and back; how to utilize the fighters; how to keep the planes flying; how to train and support the crews The war in the air was ferocious. Although at first damage was not great and the Germans were very well organized, to shelter civilians, fight fires and repair damage, slowly Americans and Brits learned to use their power. The British from the beginning---not just from “Bomber Harris”---meant to devastate cities, not just military targets. For one thing, their bombing was so inaccurate at first they barely got within five miles of the target. Even by the end there was very little precision. The Americans, flying by day, intended to hit specific targets, and their aiming was better, but nevertheless they mostly missed. The British experimented with incendiaries—what chemicals to use, how many bombs, what the best combination would be, and what weather situations were best for spreading fire. Dresden was not the first firestorm, and it wasn’t the worst. Hamburg was earlier and more devastating. The Germans eventually were forced to put more and more of their resources into air defense, which meant that the Eastern and Italian fronts were starved of artillery and fighters to help the ground troops. Eventually the Allies had complete control of the air, even though German fighter production grew and grew despite all the bombing. It was the attacks on fuel and transportation, not the bombing of the cities, that had the most effect on German war-fighting capabilities. Overy provides much detail about the infighting among the British and American commands, over the proper direction to take, the tactics and strategy, etc. He talks about how awful the experiences were for the crews: again and again, in noisy, freezing, thin-skinned planes, in the air for hours, under constant attack with very little chance of making through the required 25 missions. The men went crazy. Ultimately, however, for me as a reader, the book became mostly dry reporting of internal debates and bureaucratic organization. He does write about what it was like in the planes and on the ground, but in snippets. That is not his primary concern. The most important thing I learned is that killing civilians was not a mistake, from the beginning.

http://ww2history.com/experts/Richard...

[Annette · Rating 5 out of 5]

Source: Free copy from Viking in exchange for a review.

Summary:
During World War II (1939-1945) "600,000 European civilians were killed by bomb attack and well over a million more were seriously injured, in some cases physically or mentally disabled for life." Page xi
It is with these sobering statistics, Richard Overy, begins a detailed overview of the bombers who bombed in order to destroy the Axis powers of World War II.
The main thrust of the book is on the bombers of the Allied forces: the Bomber Command of Great Britain and the American forces (principally the 8th Air Force).
There is limited information in the book on Germany's Blitz of England.
Germany's bomber force is also written in brief.
The civilian work on the ground in Germany is explored: volunteer firemen who put out the fires, preparing civilians for escape and shelter, destruction statistics, and rebuilding.
There is a chapter on the bombings by the Allied forces on the countries who were either the enemy or were occupied by the enemy. These countries were Bulgaria, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
An in-depth study of bombs and incendiary bombs make up more than one chapter. This includes statistics on how many were dropped, where they were dropped, destruction which occurred, and a surreal survey of the destroyed cities after the war.
An ending chapter is on reflection, questioning choices which were made.

My Thoughts:
The book is lengthy, detailed, organized well. It is a text book treatise on the Allied bombers of World War II over Europe.
While reading the book I wondered why there was not information on Germany's bombings in England, only a reference is given. After reading a few comments at Amazon, I was surprised to learn the original edition of the book has a chapter on the history of the London Blitz, but this edition left out the chapter. I will not speculate on an answer.
This book is not a human interest story, there are few personal stories of those who were the bombers or the bombed. But, this was not the intention from the beginning. The author is straight forward in the preface on what his aims are.
The preface is excellent. I love the authors organization and serious nature of writing the book. One of his aims was to look at "archive sources in both countries", and not just "narratives". A point which I had not known about the cities which were bombed, "For most European societies there is no official history."

If you are looking for a human interest story, this is not a book you would want to read.
If you love to read World War II history and want a heavy study on the bombers and the bombed, then this is the book for you.

Final remarks:
In my opinion, after World War II ended, this book would not have been published. The Allied forces were glad the war was over, and they could go on with their lives. For Europe, especially for Germany, they were the defeated enemy, rebuilding the nation is what they poured their strength into. For both sides, revisiting what happened, which included mistakes made, was not an option. It's been almost 69 years since the war ended. It is with a strong conviction that I state Germany had to be defeated, as well as Italy, and Japan.
There was no plan B.

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

Richard Overy, THE BOMBERS AND THE BOMBED, Allied Air War over Europe, 1940-1945. Viking, 2013. Xxviii, 562.

The author begins with a chapter on “Bombing Bulgaria” as a summary of his major theses.

13. The political element of the bombing war was partly dictated by the direct involvement of politicians in decision making about bombing. The bombing of Bulgaria was Churchill’s idea, and he remained the driving force behind the argument that air raids would provide a quick and relatively cheap way of forcing the country to change sides. … The campaign in the Balkans also showed how casually politicians could decide on operations whose effectiveness they were scarcely in a position to judge from a strategic or operational point of view. The temptation to reach for airpower when other means of exerting direct violent pressure were absent proved hard to resist. Bombing had the virtues of being flexible, costing less than other military options, and enjoying a high public visibility, rather like the gunboat in nineteenth-century diplomacy. … Political intervention in bombing campaigns was a common feature during the war, culminating in the decision eventually taken to drop atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. This (almost) final act in the bombing war has generated a continuing debate about the balance between political and military considerations, but it could equally be applied to other wartime contexts.

24. Air force commanders had an urgent need to demonstrate that their operations were militarily useful in the face of hostile criticism from the other services or the impatience of their political masters. Perhaps the best example is the shift in British planning from the 1939 Western Air Plans for limited attacks on Ruhr industrial installations to the decision taken in 1941 to attack the central areas of German industrial cities with large quantities of incendiaries to destroy working-class housing and to kill workers. The reasons for escalation differ in histori-/cal detail from case to case. Nevertheless, they suggest a common process dictated partly by technical frustration at poor accuracy and navigation or high losses; partly by political frustration at the absence of unambiguous results; partly by air force anxiety that failure might reflect badly on its claim on resources; and finally, and significantly, by the slow erosion of any relative more constraints that might have acted to limit the damage of the campaigns

There are quite a few quotes which tie together the ownership of technology, technology not sufficiently developed. political pressure on the generals, the demands of the British people to strike back, the incapacity to do anything else than attack population centers, etc., etc., which drove the British to make morale the central focus of the british strategic bombing campaign. see pp. 42-43, 229-30.366-67

p. 198 The British were ready to use gas, as were we, even towards the end of the war when Churchill favored gas attacks not only on enemy troops but on the cities of Germany. Indeed there were some plans for biological warfare as well.

A TERRIFYING BOOK. FACILE DESCENSUS AVERNI. WE FIGHT THE LAST WARS. A FUTURE ONE WOULD ESCALATE FROM THE BEGINNING.

[Matthew Barlow · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a long read, but very well written. Overy's assessment of the bombing of Europe by the allies is dead on in its analysis and scope. He skillfully shows that many of the European targets were legitimate military targets, and that civilian casualties were often the result of poor conditions, inaccurate intelligence, or the ineffectiveness of high altitude bombing. However, this is not to say that the the Allies never intentionally target civilians. When bombing enemy cities, particularly German cities, civilian workers were seen as legitimate targets and Allied forces intentionally dropped incendiary devices into heavily populated housing areas in order to magnify the effect of the fires and maximize the effect on the population. As Overy shows a policy of terror bombing was also practiced, although on a smaller scale, in Italy, where the populations was seen to not believe in Mussolini or his cause, meaning that the threat of bombing could help generate revolution.

In addition to the discussion of military targets, Overy addresses the issue of political bombing. This is seen as being done in two ways. First through the use of propaganda drops, and second through the selection of targets for political regions. Overy shows that propaganda drops, the practice of dropping leaflets from bombers, was a clear policy for allied bombers and specially tailored for the target populations.In some instances these drops were meant to incite rebellion, where in others they acted as a warning that working for Germans classified the population as targets that were subject to bombing. The complex relationship that existed between allied nations and their leaders meant that politics was a major factor in bombing decisions, especially in the early war when British Bomber Command was still in its infancy. Here Churchill routinely advised on targets, accepting or denying them based on his own assessment of the situation. The same was true in later campaigns in occupied France, Holland, Belgium, and Norway, where the political demands of exiled governments had to be considered to avoid alienating civilian populations.

Finally Overy does briefly touch upon the issue of bombing Auschwitz, but shows that the best opportunity was early in the war before the camp had fully developed. Plans were scrapped due to limited intelligence regarding facility location, and the difficulty of attacking one specific rail line in a remote area. Later war opportunities were indeed passed up because commanders did not consider it to be a primary target and given the record of inaccuracy of Allied bombers, would likely have killed many of the prisoners that they were trying to help.

All in all this was an excellent book that promises to serve me in my own future research.

[patrick Lorelli · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this book there are parts of it that are very interesting and there are other parts for me that were difficult to get through. There is so much information that at times you feel like there is too much. Most of the information is about the towns or cities that were bombed in Europe during WWII. There is also information about the blitz on Britain by Germany. Britain then set out and bomb Bulgaria multiple times for their alliance with Germany like they had in WWI. Thinking that bombing towns and then the capitol would win over the people it did not. It made them think that Britain were evil. By the time the U.S. came into the war the English were still in charge of the missions even though we had the most planes and pilots. Instead of attacking factories they continued to bomb towns. Killing and displacing thousands of people. There were times in the end of 45 and in 44 that they started bombing factories and train yards so they could not deliver goods. There was a consent bickering between Harris of England and Doolittle of the U.S. Doolittle thought it was wrong targeting civilian populations. This came to a head in February of 45 when a town (Pfozhiem), was bomb and 83% of the town was destroyed and 17,600 were killed. The third highest in European bombing. After this the press in England and the U.S. were after the leaders. Churchill and Roosevelt, here in the states they were able to contain the story. In England they had a harder time and eventually Churchill had Portal, notify all chief of staffs to stop with the bombing. On April 14 & 15 Potsdam was bomb. This was a Harris thing he just like the power to bomb. There is also a chapter of Italy being bomb for only a month less than Germany was bomb. As many Italians were killed from bombing as did the Britain’s during the blitz. The damage to Italy’s ancient heritage filled two volumes when investigated after the war. There is a chapter at the end of the book that talks about the effectiveness of the bombing. One of the Germans Generals Goring, “said that when the factories were destroyed it had more of an effect on us in the field”. The author shows documents that prove that point. Like I said at the beginning parts of this book was good and other parts were long. The author did spend a long time researching the information and he backs up his points with charts from the Second World War. If you like history your kind of book. I got this book from net galley.