"A 'must read' by historian and layman alike." --Col. David M. Glantz, author of "Kursk""An important book that will surely become the definitive account." --John Prados, author of "Normandy Crucible"
Compelling study of how the Soviets inflicted a stunning defeat on the Germans during the early years of World War IIRelies on archival records from both sides to shatter old myths about this battle
This book recounts the battles to the Northwest of Moscow, southeast from Leningrad. These actions have been overlooked in favor of the main objectives of taking Moscow and Leningrad. The Germans thought they could bag another large chunk (7 armies) of the Soviet forces and leave the main targets of Moscow/Leningrad as easy picking:
The book has a striking “Glantzian” feel so I was not surprised to see Col Glantz as the main instigator of this book theme and a significant contributor when I got to the acknowledgements at the end. Thankfully the authors have a few personal accounts scattered within to make the reading easier. Also a positive is the many maps included. Definitely better than the Glantz-type unreadable maps. These maps showed German and Soviet moves with towns/villages/rivers/etc clearly marked. But much of the book deals with units and locations at various times--boring. A much more readable book than the typical Glantz.
Why read this book? I think it gives a very good picture of the reasons why the Eastern campaign was doomed to failure from the start:
(The German commander) made a gamble, staking his spearhead that speed and German tactical competence would triumph over distance, logistics, the bad roads and weather, and the Red Army.
This is fundamental to understanding the Battle of Kalinin. The Germans assessed the situation and concluded that they were involved in a pursuit against a beaten enemy. This sort of situation required audacity, risk taking, and speed. The enemy was believed to have no significant reserves, so the security of the forces conducting the pursuit was of less significance. Serious resistance was not expected, and even when it came, on October 15th and 17th, it was seen as a temporary phenomenon. The failure to discuss the potential enemy resistance is striking in Reinhardt’s operational orders. The only obstacles that were discussed were the shortage of fuel and the condition of the roads.
The Soviet assessment of the situation was very different from the German one. Despite the chaotic conditions, very weak communications, and limited ability to gather intelligence, the Stavka determined that the situation was essentially a meeting engagement, and acted accordingly. They threw everything they could spare in the direction of the key point: the city of Kalinin. Their intention was offensive from the very beginning. Their assessment was fundamentally correct, and even though they lacked the ability to coordinate their forces, or even to establish clear command relations, they succeeded in demolishing the ambitious German plan.
More good reasons to learn about the Kalinin battle:
A couple things I learned: 1) The Soviets intended to use a remotely piloted aircraft to take out a bridge. My uninformed assumption was this was a capability of the western Allies only towards the end of the war:
On the ‘other side of the hill,’ Stalin, livid at the German capture of both Kalinin bridges despite preparations to blow them up, ordered the Gorbatov and rail bridges across the Volga destroyed by bombing. A plan was developed to use a remotely piloted TB-3 four-engined bomber loaded with explosives, controlled from a DB-ZB bomber, to crash into the Gorbatov Bridge. However, the Soviets liberated Kalinin before this materialized.
I also never realized there were significant formations of motorcycle troops on the German side. I haven’t seen or read about these before.
Some stirring accounts of the Soviet defenders. Even if embellished, there had to be this kind of all-out effort to stop the German war machine:
A virtual suicide attack, nevertheless it caused all sorts of problems and let the Germans know the enemy wasn’t going to fold:
Overall a 3+ Star read and definitely worth it. P.S. I really hate it when Amazon adds it to my currently reading or closes it with "read" when I finish without my permission. Stop trying to do what you think I want!
An important contribution to the new level of WWII scholarship made possible by the opening of Soviet archives, the book is a detailed study of a well defined period of time and a narrow geographic area - the point in time when Barbarossa ground to a halt, and the Kalinin front North and West of Moscow.
The authors have achieved two things that are in my mind extraordinary. First they have achieved a balance in sources that lets the see what is happening from both German and Soviet points of view. This is a commonplace in histories of, say, Normandy; it is still a rarity among books on the East. Second, they have selected a critical action which illustrates general principals typical of the last stages of the German offensive but is small enough to be in an understandable level of detail.
This should not be your first book on the Great Patriotic War (my favorite for that purpose is Glantz's Before Stalingrad) but should be high on your list if you want to understand the campaign in real detail.
This is a ground-breaking piece of research and writing on the Battle of Kalinin in October 1941. Elements of XXXXI Motorized Corps made a hard left turn on the way to Moscow to take the city and then launched an ill-fated expedition along the Torzhok Road to the northWEST to link up with Army Group North and bag a couple Soviet armies. Of course, it didn't happen. The German XXXXI Motorized Corps got hammered, with 1st Panzer Division, 36 Motorized Division, and 900 Lehr Brigade getting mauled by forces of Ivan Konev's Kalinin Front. For English-speaking readers, this is a revelation since the available translated accounts do not talk about this. Radey and Sharp provide a lively and detailed narrative on why and how this happened. It will change your perspective on what really caused the failure of the German offensive against Moscow in the waning months of OPERATION BARBAROSSA.
It turns out that this book is rather narrower than the title suggests, as it concentrates on the battle at Kalinin between the German XXXXI Motorized Corps and its Soviet opposition. However, this monograph is very much part of the new operational military history that is unwilling to give the Wehrmacht a pass for its own blind spots of gross arrogance and incompetent logistics, while at the same time respecting the Soviets for their drive and doggedness; even when Soviet command and control arrangements left a lot to be desired.
A very good book that clearly exposes the German command hubris and the Soviet's dogged determination. Groundbreaking in the use of Soviet archival material, there still are vague areas and unresolved contradictions. The maps are rather poor makes following the action a bit difficult.
When the Germans swept east invading the Soviet Union, the world soon expected that Moscow would fall in weeks. Armored thrusts moved with lightning speed and large quantities of Red Army soldiers became POWs. Red Army units were encircled all around and the STAVKA had to make decisions based on fragmented intelligence. At the German HQs the commanders were convinced all would be over in no time.
But in places small Red Army units stood their ground and kept the Germans from breaking through to Moscow. In the area southeast of Leningrad and northwest of Moscow, Soviet resistance hardened and Wehrmacht units got stopped and in places was meeting tough counterattacks. Still convinced of their supremacy and skill, and seriously underestimating their opponent, the Germans soon got into trouble. Most of what we know right now, or is classified as a certainty, is that the winter weather hindered the German advance and was the main reason that they got stopped before the gates of Moscow.
This book howevers shows us differently. Yes, the weather did play a role, but was not completely on the hand of the Soviets. Far more was happening at that time and these were the main reasons why the German advance ran out of speed. Contradicting orders, and not only made by Hitler, axis of advance got changed irregularly, underestimating the ability of the foe and its equipment, neglecting clear signs from the frontline that resistance was far tougher and far more serious than expected, bad intel on the enemy.
This book adds a lot to the growing understanding of how and why the German campaign ran afoul. If you are interested in the Russian campaign, than I highly recommend to read this book.
One point that I do have to mention here is that I did not find it an easy read. Topic aside, the way the information is represented somehow makes the reading 'flow' less well than I had expected. Lots of Soviet names and notes in these pages. The movements are well explained but one has to keep the maps close by in order to follow along and make sense of the confusing situations represented here.
This book focuses on what the author refers to as a “piece of the Battle of Moscow mosaic” … the northwestern region of the battle centering on the city/town of Kalinin, which served as the last obstacle before a clear route to Moscow itself.
The book is authoritative/scholarly and is heavily sourced from both the German and Soviet sides. While I certainly appreciated the microscopic examination of on small, but critically important aspect of a larger campaign, I found the book to be a tedious read and could only consume it small doses.
The author certainly illustrates the slugfest nature of this front in the Battle of Moscow resulting in attrition ultimately playing a pivotal role in buying time for the Soviet Union. Depleted Soviet units wearing down the Germans, giving the Soviet high command time to amass fresh forces that would ultimately deliver the decisive blow to the German plan to take Moscow.
Very well written account of Operation Typhoon. I picked this because I had particular interest in the actions of the 129th Infantry Division, which only had a minor role in the operation.
I found this book disappointing on several fronts. It gets bogged down in details, often redundant details, as though it were trying to prove it substance while at the same time it failed to engage the reader with a cohesive narrative. It was quite redundant in its structure as well having whole sections that essentially repeated prior material. Finally it contained several faux pas such as inconsistency describing weapon bore diameters, using both centimeters and the more commonly accepted millimeters. It could have used more and graphically better maps as well.