An interesting story of how Che Guevara, supposed guerrilla warfare genius, met his demise in Bolivia. The authors build their story around several interesting characters: Che himself (who was more runaway fugitive during this period than a revolutionary guerrilla leader), Major Ralph Shelton of the US Special Forces (whose ideas about counterinsurgency were ahead of their time) and Gary Prado Salmon, the noble commander of the otherwise incompetent Bolivian Rangers. Also included are two CIA officers involved in the operation: the former Cuban exile Gustavo Villoldo (who had hunted Che in the Congo prior to his Bolivian assignment) and the more well-known Félix Rodríguez, veteran of the Bay of Pigs, who would later become involved in the Iran-Contra fiasco.
With US troops fighting a war in Vietnam at the time, Shelton’s team was restricted largely to a training role, and could not actually accompany the Rangers into combat against Che’s forces. Contrary to the leftist mythology and the traditions of Che’s cult and myth, the CIA was not hellbent on assassinating Che; they actually wanted him alive for interrogation and knew that killing him would just transform him into a martyr. Nevertheless, they were overruled by the Bolivian government.
Afterwards, Che did, of course, become a martyr, an image to be plastered on T-shirts and coffee mugs worldwide: ironic since Che himself was hardly a proponent of this kind of free-market capitalism. “The great revolutionary,” the authors write, “has become a capitalist commodity.” In any case, Che was a thug who advocated slave labor and executed many innocents. “We have executed, we are executing, and we will continue to execute,” he told the UN. “To send men to the firing squad, “ he proclaimed, “judicial proof is unnecessary.These procedures are an archaic bourgeois detail.” In the early years of the Castro regime, Che continually advocated for eliminating rights of assembly, free speech, and free press. Notably, Che also failed at everything he tried to achieve on his own.
The book’s title is blatantly misleading, since the role of the American Special Forces team is only briefly discussed, but the story is still rather interesting. The authors give us good, human portraits of all the characters involved; even their treatment of Che is somewhat sympathetic, thankfully without buying into the romantic revisionism of the “T-shirt Che.” Che’s guerrilla leadership in Bolivia was rather incompetent: he was terrible at operational security and failed to win over the local peasants. They sloppily left hundreds of documents, containing Bolivian contacts and bank accounts, in a parked jeep where Bolivian forces easily found it. The campaign also demonstrated Che’s ineptitude as a tactician. Che was great as a propagandist, but an utter failure as a guerrilla leader.The authors are also good at describing the situation in Bolivia at the time and in Latin America in general.
The book reads like a novel, but not in a good way. The writing itself is rather disappointing to the point of mediocrity: the authors tell the story in a breathless, melodramatic style that reminds the reader of a docudrama or something. I also suspect that much of the dialogue was invented, but the book does stick to the facts despite the breezy writing. The book’s attempts at character development are awkward, and the authors feel the need to include internal monologues that are just as poorly written and most likely imagined. For example, they’ll have a Bolivian soldier undergoing rigorous Ranger training and at the same time have him contemplate the global designs of the world’s superpowers. The authors frequently use clichés that are way too Hollywood for them to have much positive effect. Amazingly, the authors write on page 268 that the Iran-Contra scandal involved hostages held at the US embassy in Tehran. Are you serious? Everyone knows that the hostages were in Lebanon.
Allow me to provide some fine examples of the authors’ writing style:
-They refer to “the 1929 bank collapse”--surely the authors mean the stock market crash.
-They refer to “military law”--surely they mean “martial law.”
-Che Guevara was apparently “hip.”
-Major Shelton’s Special Forces team was “barred by diplomacy from going near the red zone.”
- “He had seen war up close, and he wasn’t looking for more of that ugly shit.”
-building a firing range in Santa Cruz “took a lot of doing.”
-Shelton’s team carried “complicated rifles”(as the authors attempt to retell the arrival of Shelton’s team through the eyes of a villager)
- Félix Rodríguez had “the mind of a chess player.”
-”Like all good CIA operatives, Rodríguez had learned everything he could about the Bolivian government.”
-”After some coordination, Rodríguez was fully able to earn asylum from the Venezuelans.”
-Rodríguez was to parachute into Cuba with a radio beacon for “U.S. air-strike guidance.”
-Military officers “had an ego the size of Texas.”
-”Barrientos wasn’t an idiot. He understood the way the game was played.”
-”Ability to move in the night is a tactical advantage in battle; it enables a unit to stay a step ahead of the enemy.”
-”No, Prado had no intention of shooting prisoners. That’s not what a good soldier does. That would violate every military principle--everything Prado had been raised to believe about the rules of engagement.”
-”Out, here, oh God. This was a different story.”
-”It was obvious both men were fighting a proxy war in Bolivia, and neither one cared much for the fate of the South American country. Theirs was a bigger fight.
It was democracy versus communism.
It was good versus evil.
It was the United States versus the Soviet Union and China.
In the fall of 1967, it was a fight being waged all over the world.”
This sort of thing is endless, and it makes for painful reading at times. There is certainly quite a story to tell here, and the authors succeed for the most part, but this kind of writing is just far too strange and lacking in quality for the book to live up to its compelling subject matter.
In all, the book is quite good in some ways, and pretty bad in others. In all, it succeeds for the most part.